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0c18794e 1## @file SecurityPkg.dec\r
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2# Provides security features that conform to TCG/UEFI industry standards\r
3#\r
4# The security features include secure boot, measured boot and user identification.\r
5# It also provides the definitions(including PPIs/PROTOCOLs/GUIDs and library classes)\r
6# and libraries instances, which are used for those features.\r
0c18794e 7#\r
1a2ad3ba 8# Copyright (c) 2009 - 2020, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
f88e9c5b 9# (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP <BR>\r
cda6f945 10# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>\r
289b714b 11# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent\r
0c18794e 12#\r
13##\r
14\r
15[Defines]\r
16 DEC_SPECIFICATION = 0x00010005\r
17 PACKAGE_NAME = SecurityPkg\r
606d38a5 18 PACKAGE_UNI_FILE = SecurityPkg.uni\r
7ae77cee 19 PACKAGE_GUID = 4EFC4F66-6219-4427-B780-FB99F470767F\r
b921c629 20 PACKAGE_VERSION = 0.98\r
0c18794e 21\r
22[Includes]\r
23 Include\r
24\r
25[LibraryClasses]\r
c2fcbc85 26 ## @libraryclass Provides hash interfaces from different implementations.\r
b3548d32 27 #\r
22f89647 28 HashLib|Include/Library/HashLib.h\r
b3548d32 29\r
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30 ## @libraryclass Provides a platform specific interface to detect physically present user.\r
31 #\r
22f89647 32 PlatformSecureLib|Include/Library/PlatformSecureLib.h\r
b3548d32 33\r
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34 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces to handle TPM 1.2 request.\r
35 #\r
22f89647 36 TcgPhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/TcgPhysicalPresenceLib.h\r
b3548d32 37\r
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38 ## @libraryclass Provides support for TCG PP >= 128 Vendor Specific PPI Operation.\r
39 #\r
40 TcgPpVendorLib|Include/Library/TcgPpVendorLib.h\r
b3548d32 41\r
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42 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces for other modules to send TPM 2.0 command.\r
43 #\r
c1d93242 44 Tpm2CommandLib|Include/Library/Tpm2CommandLib.h\r
b3548d32 45\r
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46 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces on how to access TPM 2.0 hardware device.\r
47 #\r
c1d93242 48 Tpm2DeviceLib|Include/Library/Tpm2DeviceLib.h\r
b3548d32 49\r
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50 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces for other modules to send TPM 1.2 command.\r
51 #\r
22f89647 52 Tpm12CommandLib|Include/Library/Tpm12CommandLib.h\r
b3548d32 53\r
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54 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces on how to access TPM 1.2 hardware device.\r
55 #\r
22f89647 56 Tpm12DeviceLib|Include/Library/Tpm12DeviceLib.h\r
b3548d32 57\r
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58 ## @libraryclass Provides TPM Interface Specification (TIS) interfaces for TPM command.\r
59 #\r
22f89647 60 TpmCommLib|Include/Library/TpmCommLib.h\r
89b1612f 61\r
b3548d32 62 ## @libraryclass Provides support for TCG Physical Presence Interface (PPI) specification\r
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63 # >= 128 Vendor Specific PPI Operation.\r
64 #\r
49a2f8ce 65 Tcg2PpVendorLib|Include/Library/Tcg2PpVendorLib.h\r
b3548d32 66\r
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67 ## @libraryclass Handle TPM 2.0 physical presence request from OS.\r
68 #\r
69 Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.h\r
0c18794e 70\r
d6b926e7 71 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces about TCG storage generic command.\r
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72 #\r
73 TcgStorageCoreLib|Include/Library/TcgStorageCoreLib.h\r
74\r
d6b926e7 75 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces about TCG storage Opal generic command.\r
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76 #\r
77 TcgStorageOpalLib|Include/Library/TcgStorageOpalLib.h\r
78\r
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79 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces to access RPMC device.\r
80 #\r
81 RpmcLib|Include/Library/RpmcLib.h\r
82\r
83 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces to access variable root key.\r
84 #\r
85 VariableKeyLib|Include/Library/VariableKeyLib.h\r
86\r
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87 ## @libraryclass Provides interfaces about firmware TPM measurement.\r
88 #\r
89 TcgEventLogRecordLib|Include/Library/TcgEventLogRecordLib.h\r
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90\r
91 ## @libraryclass Provides helper functions related to creation/removal Secure Boot variables.\r
92 #\r
93 SecureBootVariableLib|Include/Library/SecureBootVariableLib.h\r
0c18794e 94[Guids]\r
606d38a5 95 ## Security package token space guid.\r
0c18794e 96 # Include/Guid/SecurityPkgTokenSpace.h\r
ed47ae02 97 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid = { 0xd3fb176, 0x9569, 0x4d51, { 0xa3, 0xef, 0x7d, 0x61, 0xc6, 0x4f, 0xea, 0xba }}\r
606d38a5 98\r
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99 ## GUID used to "SecureBootEnable" variable for the Secure Boot feature enable/disable.\r
100 # This variable is used for allowing a physically present user to disable Secure Boot via firmware setup without the possession of PKpriv.\r
beda2356 101 # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
ed47ae02 102 gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid = { 0xf0a30bc7, 0xaf08, 0x4556, { 0x99, 0xc4, 0x0, 0x10, 0x9, 0xc9, 0x3a, 0x44 } }\r
ecc722ad 103\r
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104 ## GUID used to "CustomMode" variable for two Secure Boot modes feature: "Custom" and "Standard".\r
105 # Standard Secure Boot mode is the default mode as UEFI Spec's description.\r
106 # Custom Secure Boot mode allows for more flexibility as specified in the following:\r
107 # Can enroll or delete PK without existing PK's private key.\r
108 # Can enroll or delete KEK without existing PK's private key.\r
109 # Can enroll or delete signature from DB/DBX without KEK's private key.\r
ecc722ad 110 # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
111 gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid = { 0xc076ec0c, 0x7028, 0x4399, { 0xa0, 0x72, 0x71, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x9f } }\r
ed47ae02 112\r
c2fcbc85 113 ## GUID used to "VendorKeysNv" variable to record the out of band secure boot keys modification.\r
b3548d32 114 # This variable is a read-only NV variable that indicates whether someone other than the platform vendor has used a\r
c2fcbc85 115 # mechanism not defined by the UEFI Specification to transition the system to setup mode or to update secure boot keys.\r
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116 # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
117 gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid = { 0x9073e4e0, 0x60ec, 0x4b6e, { 0x99, 0x3, 0x4c, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x26, 0xf, 0x3c } }\r
118\r
98c2d961 119 ## GUID used to "certdb"/"certdbv" variable to store the signer's certificates for common variables with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute.\r
ed47ae02 120 # Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
121 gEfiCertDbGuid = { 0xd9bee56e, 0x75dc, 0x49d9, { 0xb4, 0xd7, 0xb5, 0x34, 0x21, 0xf, 0x63, 0x7a } }\r
af9af05b 122\r
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123 ## Hob GUID used to pass a TCG_PCR_EVENT from a TPM PEIM to a TPM DXE Driver.\r
124 # Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h\r
301c867b 125 gTcgEventEntryHobGuid = { 0x2b9ffb52, 0x1b13, 0x416f, { 0xa8, 0x7b, 0xbc, 0x93, 0xd, 0xef, 0x92, 0xa8 }}\r
0c18794e 126\r
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127 ## Hob GUID used to pass a TCG_PCR_EVENT_2 from a TPM2 PEIM to a TPM2 DXE Driver.\r
128 ## Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h\r
129 gTcgEvent2EntryHobGuid = { 0xd26c221e, 0x2430, 0x4c8a, { 0x91, 0x70, 0x3f, 0xcb, 0x45, 0x0, 0x41, 0x3f }}\r
130\r
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131 ## HOB GUID used to record TPM device error.\r
132 # Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h\r
133 gTpmErrorHobGuid = { 0xef598499, 0xb25e, 0x473a, { 0xbf, 0xaf, 0xe7, 0xe5, 0x7d, 0xce, 0x82, 0xc4 }}\r
134\r
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135 ## HOB GUID used to record TPM2 startup locality\r
136 ## Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h\r
137 gTpm2StartupLocalityHobGuid = { 0x397b0c9, 0x22e8, 0x459e, { 0xa4, 0xff, 0x99, 0xbc, 0x65, 0x27, 0x9, 0x29 }}\r
138\r
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139 ## HOB GUID used to record TCG 800-155 PlatformId Event\r
140 ## Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h\r
141 gTcg800155PlatformIdEventHobGuid = { 0xe2c3bc69, 0x615c, 0x4b5b, { 0x8e, 0x5c, 0xa0, 0x33, 0xa9, 0xc2, 0x5e, 0xd6 }}\r
142\r
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143 ## HOB GUID used to pass all PEI measured FV info to DXE Driver.\r
144 # Include/Guid/MeasuredFvHob.h\r
0758c830 145 gMeasuredFvHobGuid = { 0xb2360b42, 0x7173, 0x420a, { 0x86, 0x96, 0x46, 0xca, 0x6b, 0xab, 0x10, 0x60 }}\r
2aadc920 146\r
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147 ## GUID used to "PhysicalPresence" variable and "PhysicalPresenceFlags" variable for TPM request and response.\r
148 # Include/Guid/PhysicalPresenceData.h\r
0c18794e 149 gEfiPhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xf6499b1, 0xe9ad, 0x493d, { 0xb9, 0xc2, 0x2f, 0x90, 0x81, 0x5c, 0x6c, 0xbc }}\r
b3548d32 150\r
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151 ## GUID used to "Tcg2PhysicalPresence" variable and "Tcg2PhysicalPresenceFlags" variable for TPM2 request and response.\r
152 # Include/Guid/Tcg2PhysicalPresenceData.h\r
153 gEfiTcg2PhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xaeb9c5c1, 0x94f1, 0x4d02, { 0xbf, 0xd9, 0x46, 0x2, 0xdb, 0x2d, 0x3c, 0x54 }}\r
154\r
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155 ## GUID used for FormSet guid and user profile variable.\r
156 # Include/Guid/UserIdentifyManagerHii.h\r
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157 gUserIdentifyManagerGuid = { 0x3ccd3dd8, 0x8d45, 0x4fed, { 0x96, 0x2d, 0x2b, 0x38, 0xcd, 0x82, 0xb3, 0xc4 }}\r
158\r
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159 ## GUID used for FormSet.\r
160 # Include/Guid/TcgConfigHii.h\r
a0c56a82 161 gTcgConfigFormSetGuid = { 0xb0f901e4, 0xc424, 0x45de, { 0x90, 0x81, 0x95, 0xe2, 0xb, 0xde, 0x6f, 0xb5 }}\r
b3548d32 162\r
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163 ## GUID used for FormSet and config variable.\r
164 # Include/Guid/Tcg2ConfigHii.h\r
165 gTcg2ConfigFormSetGuid = {0x6339d487, 0x26ba, 0x424b, { 0x9a, 0x5d, 0x68, 0x7e, 0x25, 0xd7, 0x40, 0xbc }}\r
b3548d32 166\r
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167 ## GUID used for FormSet.\r
168 # Include/Guid/SecureBootConfigHii.h\r
beda2356 169 gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid = { 0x5daf50a5, 0xea81, 0x4de2, {0x8f, 0x9b, 0xca, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0xcf, 0x5c, 0x14}}\r
c2fcbc85 170\r
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171 ## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate TPM is disabled.\r
172 # Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r
c1d93242 173 gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceNoneGuid = { 0x00000000, 0x0000, 0x0000, { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } }\r
b3548d32 174\r
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175 ## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate TPM 1.2 device is selected to support.\r
176 # Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r
c1d93242 177 gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm12Guid = { 0x8b01e5b6, 0x4f19, 0x46e8, { 0xab, 0x93, 0x1c, 0x53, 0x67, 0x1b, 0x90, 0xcc } }\r
b3548d32 178\r
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179 ## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate discrete TPM 2.0 device is selected to support.\r
180 # Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r
c1d93242 181 gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm20DtpmGuid = { 0x286bf25a, 0xc2c3, 0x408c, { 0xb3, 0xb4, 0x25, 0xe6, 0x75, 0x8b, 0x73, 0x17 } }\r
b3548d32 182\r
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183 ## GUID used to select supported TPM instance from UI.\r
184 # Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r
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185 gEfiTpmDeviceSelectedGuid = { 0x7f4158d3, 0x74d, 0x456d, { 0x8c, 0xb2, 0x1, 0xf9, 0xc8, 0xf7, 0x9d, 0xaa } }\r
186\r
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187 ## Include/OpalPasswordExtraInfoVariable.h\r
188 gOpalExtraInfoVariableGuid = {0x44a2ad5d, 0x612c, 0x47b3, {0xb0, 0x6e, 0xc8, 0xf5, 0x0b, 0xfb, 0xf0, 0x7d}}\r
189\r
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190 ## GUID used to exchange registered SWI value and NVS region between Tcg2Acpi and Tcg2Smm.\r
191 ## Include/Guid/TpmNvsMm.h\r
192 gTpmNvsMmGuid = { 0xc96c76eb, 0xbc78, 0x429c, { 0x9f, 0x4b, 0xda, 0x51, 0x78, 0xc2, 0x84, 0x57 }}\r
193\r
194 ## GUID used to enforce loading order between Tcg2Acpi and Tcg2Smm\r
195 gTcg2MmSwSmiRegisteredGuid = { 0x9d4548b9, 0xa48d, 0x4db4, { 0x9a, 0x68, 0x32, 0xc5, 0x13, 0x9e, 0x20, 0x18 } }\r
196\r
1cf00fbd 197\r
0c18794e 198[Ppis]\r
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199 ## The PPI GUID for that TPM physical presence should be locked.\r
200 # Include/Ppi/LockPhysicalPresence.h\r
0c18794e 201 gPeiLockPhysicalPresencePpiGuid = { 0xef9aefe5, 0x2bd3, 0x4031, { 0xaf, 0x7d, 0x5e, 0xfe, 0x5a, 0xbb, 0x9a, 0xd } }\r
202\r
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203 ## The PPI GUID for that TPM is initialized.\r
204 # Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h\r
0c18794e 205 gPeiTpmInitializedPpiGuid = { 0xe9db0d58, 0xd48d, 0x47f6, { 0x9c, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x40, 0xe8, 0x6c, 0x7b, 0x41 }}\r
206\r
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207 ## The PPI GUID for that TPM initialization is done. TPM initialization may be success or fail.\r
208 # Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h\r
209 gPeiTpmInitializationDonePpiGuid = { 0xa030d115, 0x54dd, 0x447b, { 0x90, 0x64, 0xf2, 0x6, 0x88, 0x3d, 0x7c, 0xcc }}\r
210\r
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211 ## Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcluded.h\r
212 gEfiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcludedPpiGuid = { 0x6e056ff9, 0xc695, 0x4364, { 0x9e, 0x2c, 0x61, 0x26, 0xf5, 0xce, 0xea, 0xae } }\r
213\r
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214 ## Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoPrehashedFV.h\r
215 gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPrehashedFvPpiGuid = { 0x3ce1e631, 0x7008, 0x477c, { 0xad, 0xa7, 0x5d, 0xcf, 0xc7, 0xc1, 0x49, 0x4b } }\r
e18d1c37 216\r
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217 ## Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFv.h\r
218 gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid = {0x7f5e4e31, 0x81b1, 0x47e5, { 0x9e, 0x21, 0x1e, 0x4b, 0x5b, 0xc2, 0xf6, 0x1d } }\r
d7c054f9 219\r
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220 ## Include/Ppi/Tcg.h\r
221 gEdkiiTcgPpiGuid = {0x57a13b87, 0x133d, 0x4bf3, { 0xbf, 0xf1, 0x1b, 0xca, 0xc7, 0x17, 0x6c, 0xf1 } }\r
222\r
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223#\r
224# [Error.gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid]\r
225# 0x80000001 | Invalid value provided.\r
226# 0x80000002 | Reserved bits must be set to zero.\r
3dd05ac3 227# 0x80000003 | Incorrect progress or error code provided.\r
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228#\r
229\r
230[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule]\r
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231 ## Image verification policy for removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.\r
232 # Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>\r
233 # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>\r
234 # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.<BR>\r
235 # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.<BR>\r
236 # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
237 # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
238 # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
239 # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>\r
240 # @Prompt Set policy for the image from removable media.\r
241 # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005\r
db44ea6c 242 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000002\r
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243\r
244 ## Image verification policy for fixed media which includes hard disk.\r
245 # Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>\r
246 # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>\r
247 # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.<BR>\r
248 # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.<BR>\r
249 # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
250 # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
251 # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
252 # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>\r
253 # @Prompt Set policy for the image from fixed media.\r
b3548d32 254 # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005\r
db44ea6c 255 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000003\r
0c18794e 256\r
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257 ## Defer Image Load policy settings. The policy is bitwise.\r
258 # If a bit is set, the image from corresponding device will be trusted when loading. Or\r
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259 # the image will be deferred. The deferred image will be checked after user is identified.<BR><BR>\r
260 # BIT0 - Image from unknown device. <BR>\r
261 # BIT1 - Image from firmware volume.<BR>\r
262 # BIT2 - Image from OptionRom.<BR>\r
263 # BIT3 - Image from removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.<BR>\r
264 # BIT4 - Image from fixed media device which includes hard disk.<BR>\r
265 # @Prompt Set policy whether trust image before user identification.\r
b3548d32 266 # @ValidRange 0x80000002 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000001F\r
606d38a5 267 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDeferImageLoadPolicy|0x0000001F|UINT32|0x0000004\r
0c18794e 268\r
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269 ## Null-terminated Unicode string of the file name that is the default name to save USB credential.\r
270 # The specified file should be saved at the root directory of USB storage disk.\r
271 # @Prompt File name to save credential.\r
272 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedUsbCredentialProviderTokenFileName|L"Token.bin"|VOID*|0x00000005\r
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273\r
274 ## The size of Append variable buffer. This buffer is reserved for runtime use, OS can append data into one existing variable.\r
275 # Note: This PCD is not been used.\r
276 # @Prompt Max variable size for append operation.\r
b3548d32 277 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMaxAppendVariableSize|0x2000|UINT32|0x30000005\r
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278\r
279 ## Specifies the type of TCG platform that contains TPM chip.<BR><BR>\r
280 # If 0, TCG platform type is PC client.<BR>\r
281 # If 1, TCG platform type is PC server.<BR>\r
282 # @Prompt Select platform type.\r
b3548d32 283 # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
606d38a5 284 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPlatformClass|0|UINT8|0x00000006\r
b3548d32 285\r
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286 ## Progress Code for TPM device subclass definitions.<BR><BR>\r
287 # EFI_PERIPHERAL_TPM = (EFI_PERIPHERAL | 0x000D0000) = 0x010D0000<BR>\r
288 # @Prompt Status Code for TPM device definitions\r
289 # @ValidList 0x80000003 | 0x010D0000\r
290 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeSubClassTpmDevice|0x010D0000|UINT32|0x00000007\r
606d38a5 291\r
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292 ## Defines the IO port used to trigger a software System Management Interrupt (SMI).<BR><BR>\r
293 # Used as the SMI Command IO port by security functionality that triggers a software SMI such\r
294 # as Physical Presence Interface (PPI).<BR>\r
295 # @Prompt SMI Command IO port.\r
296 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSmiCommandIoPort|0xB2|UINT16|0x00000009\r
297\r
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298 ## Progress Code for FV verification result.<BR><BR>\r
299 # (EFI_SOFTWARE_PEI_MODULE | EFI_SUBCLASS_SPECIFIC | XXX)\r
300 # @Prompt Status Code for FV verification result\r
301 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationPass|0x0303100A|UINT32|0x00010030\r
302 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationFail|0x0303100B|UINT32|0x00010031\r
303\r
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304 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuRngSupportedAlgorithm|{0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}|VOID*|0x00010032\r
305\r
0c18794e 306[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
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307 ## Image verification policy for OptionRom. Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>\r
308 # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>\r
309 # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.<BR>\r
310 # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.<BR>\r
311 # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
312 # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
313 # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
314 # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>\r
315 # @Prompt Set policy for the image from OptionRom.\r
316 # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005\r
317 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000001\r
318\r
606d38a5 319 ## Indicates the presence or absence of the platform operator during firmware booting.\r
b3548d32 320 # If platform operator is not physical presence during boot. TPM will be locked and the TPM commands\r
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321 # that required operator physical presence can not run.<BR><BR>\r
322 # TRUE - The platform operator is physically present.<BR>\r
323 # FALSE - The platform operator is not physically present.<BR>\r
324 # @Prompt Physical presence of the platform operator.\r
0c18794e 325 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPhysicalPresence|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010001\r
326\r
5a500332 327[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
b3548d32 328 ## Indicates whether TPM physical presence is locked during platform initialization.\r
606d38a5
DG
329 # Once it is locked, it can not be unlocked for TPM life time.<BR><BR>\r
330 # TRUE - Lock TPM physical presence asserting method.<BR>\r
331 # FALSE - Not lock TPM physical presence asserting method.<BR>\r
332 # @Prompt Lock TPM physical presence asserting method.\r
5a500332 333 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceLifetimeLock|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010003\r
606d38a5 334\r
5a500332 335[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
606d38a5
DG
336 ## Indicates whether the platform supports the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR><BR>\r
337 # TRUE - Supports the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR>\r
338 # FALSE - Does not support the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR>\r
339 # @Prompt Enable software method of asserting physical presence.\r
5a500332 340 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceCmdEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010004\r
606d38a5 341\r
5a500332 342[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
606d38a5
DG
343 ## Indicates whether the platform supports the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR><BR>\r
344 # TRUE - Supports the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR>\r
345 # FALSE - Does not support the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR>\r
346 # @Prompt Enable hardware method of asserting physical presence.\r
5a500332 347 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceHwEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010005\r
c1d93242
JY
348\r
349[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
606d38a5
DG
350 ## This PCD indicates if debugger exists. <BR><BR>\r
351 # TRUE - Firmware debugger exists.<BR>\r
352 # FALSE - Firmware debugger doesn't exist.<BR>\r
353 # @Prompt Firmware debugger status.\r
c1d93242
JY
354 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFirmwareDebuggerInitialized|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010009\r
355\r
606d38a5
DG
356 ## This PCD indicates the initialization policy for TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>\r
357 # If 0, no initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.<BR>\r
358 # If 1, initialization needed.<BR>\r
359 # @Prompt TPM 2.0 device initialization policy.<BR>\r
b3548d32 360 # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
c1d93242
JY
361 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2InitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000A\r
362\r
606d38a5
DG
363 ## This PCD indicates the initialization policy for TPM 1.2.<BR><BR>\r
364 # If 0, no initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.<BR>\r
365 # If 1, initialization needed.<BR>\r
366 # @Prompt TPM 1.2 device initialization policy.\r
b3548d32 367 # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
c1d93242
JY
368 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000B\r
369\r
606d38a5
DG
370 ## This PCD indicates the TPM 2.0 SelfTest policy.<BR><BR>\r
371 # if 0, no SelfTest needed - most likely used for fTPM, because it might already be tested.<BR>\r
372 # if 1, SelfTest needed.<BR>\r
373 # @Prompt TPM 2.0 device selftest.\r
b3548d32 374 # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
c1d93242
JY
375 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2SelfTestPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000C\r
376\r
606d38a5
DG
377 ## This PCD indicates Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) policy using TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>\r
378 # if 0, no SCRTM measurement needed - In this case, it is already done.<BR>\r
379 # if 1, SCRTM measurement done by BIOS.<BR>\r
380 # @Prompt SCRTM policy setting for TPM 2.0 device.\r
b3548d32 381 # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
c1d93242
JY
382 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2ScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000D\r
383\r
606d38a5
DG
384 ## This PCD indicates Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) policy using TPM 1.2.<BR><BR>\r
385 # if 0, no SCRTM measurement needed - In this case, it is already done.<BR>\r
386 # if 1, SCRTM measurement done by BIOS.<BR>\r
387 # @Prompt SCRTM policy setting for TPM 1.2 device\r
b3548d32 388 # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
c1d93242
JY
389 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000E\r
390\r
606d38a5 391 ## Guid name to identify TPM instance.<BR><BR>\r
8802583c 392 # NOTE: This Pcd must be FixedAtBuild if Standalone MM is used\r
606d38a5
DG
393 # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NONE means disable.<BR>\r
394 # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_TPM12 means TPM 1.2 DTPM.<BR>\r
395 # TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_DTPM2 means TPM 2.0 DTPM.<BR>\r
99d9ade8 396 # Other GUID value means other TPM 2.0 device.<BR>\r
606d38a5 397 # @Prompt TPM device type identifier\r
c1d93242
JY
398 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInstanceGuid |{ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }|VOID*|0x0001000F\r
399\r
606d38a5
DG
400 ## This PCD indicates if BIOS auto detect TPM1.2 or dTPM2.0.<BR><BR>\r
401 # FALSE - No auto detection.<BR>\r
402 # TRUE - Auto detection.<BR>\r
403 # @Prompt TPM type detection.\r
c1d93242
JY
404 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmAutoDetection|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010011\r
405\r
606d38a5
DG
406 ## This PCD indicates TPM base address.<BR><BR>\r
407 # @Prompt TPM device address.\r
c1d93242 408 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmBaseAddress|0xFED40000|UINT64|0x00010012\r
1a53a034 409\r
d6b926e7 410 ## This PCR means the OEM configured number of PCR banks.\r
1abfa4ce 411 # 0 means dynamic get from supported HASH algorithm\r
d6b926e7 412 # @Prompt OEM configured number of PCR banks.\r
1abfa4ce 413 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcg2NumberOfPCRBanks|0x0|UINT32|0x00010015\r
b3548d32 414\r
1a53a034 415 ## Provides one or more SHA 256 Hashes of the RSA 2048 public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images\r
d8d09b83 416 # WARNING: The default value is treated as test key. Please do not use default value in the production.\r
1a53a034
MK
417 # @Prompt One or more SHA 256 Hashes of RSA 2048 bit public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images\r
418 #\r
419 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRsa2048Sha256PublicKeyBuffer|{0x91, 0x29, 0xc4, 0xbd, 0xea, 0x6d, 0xda, 0xb3, 0xaa, 0x6f, 0x50, 0x16, 0xfc, 0xdb, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x3c, 0xd6, 0xdc, 0xa4, 0x7a, 0x0e, 0xdd, 0xe6, 0x15, 0x8c, 0x73, 0x96, 0xa2, 0xd4, 0xa6, 0x4d}|VOID*|0x00010013\r
f88e9c5b 420\r
d8d09b83
JY
421 ## Provides one PKCS7 cert used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images\r
422 # WARNING: The default value is treated as test key. Please do not use default value in the production.\r
423 # @Prompt One PKCS7 cert used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images\r
424 #\r
d3e0c996 425 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPkcs7CertBuffer|{0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xec, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0xd4, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x00, 0xc0, 0x91, 0xc5, 0xe2, 0xb7, 0x66, 0xc0, 0xf8, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x81, 0x82, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x43, 0x4e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x08, 0x0c, 0x02, 0x53, 0x48, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x07, 0x0c, 0x02, 0x53, 0x48, 0x31, 0x12, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x09, 0x54, 0x69, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x65, 0x31, 0x0e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x05, 0x45, 0x44, 0x4b, 0x49, 0x49, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x52, 0x6f, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x31, 0x22, 0x30, 0x20, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x01, 0x16, 0x13, 0x65, 0x64, 0x6b, 0x69, 0x69, 0x40, 0x74, 0x69, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x65, 0x2e, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x67, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x31, 0x37, 0x30, 0x34, 0x31, 0x30, 0x30, 0x38, 0x32, 0x37, 0x34, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x31, 0x37, 0x30, 0x35, 0x31, 0x30, 0x30, 0x38, 0x32, 0x37, 0x34, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x81, 0x82, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x43, 0x4e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x08, 0x0c, 0x02, 0x53, 0x48, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x07, 0x0c, 0x02, 0x53, 0x48, 0x31, 0x12, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x09, 0x54, 0x69, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x65, 0x31, 0x0e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x05, 0x45, 0x44, 0x4b, 0x49, 0x49, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x52, 0x6f, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x31, 0x22, 0x30, 0x20, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x01, 0x16, 0x13, 0x65, 0x64, 0x6b, 0x69, 0x69, 0x40, 0x74, 0x69, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x65, 0x2e, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x67, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xb9, 0x29, 0x29, 0x6c, 0x60, 0x0c, 0xd7, 0x23, 0xf6, 0x7d, 0xee, 0xf0, 0x62, 0xff, 0xd9, 0xc9, 0xaa, 0x55, 0x8c, 0x81, 0x95, 0x56, 0x3f, 0xb7, 0x56, 0x53, 0xb0, 0xc2, 0x82, 0x12, 0xc5, 0x3b, 0x75, 0x23, 0xb9, 0x4d, 0xd6, 0xc4, 0x55, 0x73, 0xf3, 0xaa, 0x95, 0xa8, 0x1b, 0xf3, 0x93, 0x7e, 0x9e, 0x40, 0xe4, 0x1d, 0x22, 0x9c, 0x93, 0x07, 0x0b, 0xd7, 0xaa, 0x5b, 0xd7, 0xe4, 0x1a, 0x21, 0x84, 0xd7, 0x63, 0x59, 0x03, 0x50, 0x1f, 0xf5, 0x14, 0x55, 0x93, 0x91, 0x9b, 0xf5, 0x52, 0xb0, 0xbf, 0x0e, 0x5c, 0x68, 0x3b, 0x59, 0x52, 0x98, 0x96, 0x56, 0xe1, 0xab, 0xc4, 0x43, 0xbb, 0x05, 0x57, 0x78, 0x45, 0x01, 0x9f, 0x58, 0x15, 0x53, 0x0e, 0x11, 0x94, 0x2f, 0x0e, 0xf1, 0xa6, 0x19, 0xa2, 0x6e, 0x86, 0x39, 0x2b, 0x33, 0x8d, 0xc7, 0xc5, 0xeb, 0xee, 0x1e, 0x33, 0xd3, 0x32, 0x94, 0xc1, 0x59, 0xc4, 0x0c, 0x97, 0x0b, 0x12, 0x48, 0x5f, 0x33, 0xf6, 0x60, 0x74, 0x7d, 0x57, 0xc2, 0x13, 0x2d, 0x7d, 0xa9, 0x87, 0xa3, 0x35, 0xea, 0x91, 0x83, 0x3f, 0x67, 0x7a, 0x92, 0x1f, 0x01, 0x53, 0x9f, 0x62, 0x5f, 0x99, 0x12, 0xfd, 0x73, 0x1b, 0x2d, 0x9e, 0x2b, 0x6c, 0x34, 0x49, 0xaf, 0x4f, 0x07, 0x8f, 0xc0, 0xe9, 0x6b, 0x9e, 0x5f, 0x79, 0x35, 0xda, 0x2a, 0x5c, 0x88, 0xee, 0xf6, 0x48, 0x61, 0xda, 0x96, 0xe3, 0x48, 0x46, 0xa0, 0x94, 0x1c, 0x9d, 0xf6, 0x5c, 0x87, 0x0e, 0xef, 0x74, 0x09, 0x91, 0x0d, 0x3d, 0x5a, 0xe7, 0xc5, 0x4c, 0x8a, 0x7a, 0xac, 0xa1, 0x85, 0xb6, 0x67, 0x44, 0x17, 0x55, 0x52, 0x3a, 0xe8, 0x11, 0x4d, 0x58, 0xa2, 0x93, 0x00, 0x62, 0xea, 0x7b, 0x80, 0xed, 0xcf, 0xbd, 0xdf, 0x75, 0x80, 0x4b, 0xb9, 0x65, 0x63, 0xad, 0x0b, 0x4d, 0x74, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, 0x63, 0x30, 0x61, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0x16, 0xaa, 0xd6, 0x8e, 0x1b, 0x2d, 0x43, 0xf3, 0x2d, 0xb0, 0x24, 0xad, 0x36, 0x65, 0x3f, 0xb2, 0xfa, 0xb1, 0x2c, 0xed, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0x16, 0xaa, 0xd6, 0x8e, 0x1b, 0x2d, 0x43, 0xf3, 0x2d, 0xb0, 0x24, 0xad, 0x36, 0x65, 0x3f, 0xb2, 0xfa, 0xb1, 0x2c, 0xed, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x04, 0x05, 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x30, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0f, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x04, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x86, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x95, 0xde, 0xdf, 0xa4, 0x14, 0xdb, 0x92, 0x22, 0x78, 0x1a, 0xbd, 0x31, 0x9d, 0x1e, 0xd7, 0x2f, 0x0a, 0x10, 0x11, 0x5d, 0x74, 0x61, 0xe8, 0x30, 0xc4, 0xf3, 0x15, 0xe9, 0x30, 0x54, 0xf4, 0xbb, 0x0c, 0x04, 0x78, 0x13, 0x5d, 0x2c, 0xdd, 0x8c, 0x92, 0x90, 0xd1, 0x9c, 0xd0, 0xd0, 0x18, 0xa3, 0xa3, 0xfc, 0x8c, 0x28, 0x5a, 0xd4, 0x91, 0x4d, 0x08, 0xc3, 0xf6, 0x1a, 0xc8, 0xdd, 0xa6, 0x08, 0x58, 0xe2, 0x15, 0x95, 0xfb, 0x2d, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0xb1, 0x30, 0x80, 0xbd, 0x9a, 0xb6, 0xe1, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x3e, 0xdd, 0xc4, 0xc7, 0x55, 0x65, 0xcf, 0x28, 0x17, 0xf4, 0xee, 0xda, 0xbe, 0x77, 0x70, 0xd5, 0x52, 0xd6, 0x15, 0x7a, 0xfb, 0xad, 0xaf, 0xfd, 0xd5, 0x45, 0x90, 0x5a, 0xe6, 0x31, 0x42, 0xd7, 0x84, 0xb3, 0x49, 0x56, 0x6a, 0xd3, 0x47, 0xf3, 0xbf, 0x68, 0x60, 0x8b, 0x0f, 0xe2, 0xaf, 0xf4, 0xe3, 0xec, 0x12, 0xb9, 0xe2, 0x3a, 0x16, 0x11, 0x4e, 0x4d, 0x73, 0x79, 0xaf, 0x47, 0x85, 0x4c, 0x76, 0x26, 0x9e, 0x8b, 0x32, 0xc0, 0x8e, 0xc2, 0xdc, 0x27, 0xa6, 0xef, 0xac, 0x93, 0x9e, 0xa1, 0x5e, 0xcf, 0x34, 0x45, 0xe0, 0x2a, 0xc7, 0x9d, 0x4d, 0xd7, 0xd7, 0x37, 0x72, 0x97, 0xf8, 0x58, 0xf9, 0xb6, 0x35, 0x48, 0xf1, 0xd1, 0x0a, 0x72, 0x7f, 0xfd, 0x4d, 0x7c, 0xe9, 0xcc, 0xd8, 0x48, 0x1b, 0x49, 0x52, 0x53, 0xde, 0x51, 0x01, 0x53, 0x35, 0xbc, 0x90, 0xcd, 0x8c, 0x8a, 0xcc, 0x43, 0x20, 0xa7, 0x45, 0xff, 0x2b, 0x55, 0xb0, 0x8b, 0x2d, 0xff, 0x55, 0x15, 0x4b, 0x84, 0xd0, 0xc3, 0xd3, 0x90, 0x9c, 0x94, 0x4b, 0x55, 0xd5, 0x62, 0xea, 0x22, 0xab, 0x62, 0x68, 0xdd, 0x53, 0xc6, 0xdc, 0xa5, 0xdd, 0x9a, 0x2d, 0x8e, 0x79, 0x7c, 0x2e, 0x9c, 0xe4, 0x66, 0x80, 0x8c, 0x1d}|VOID*|0x00010014\r
d8d09b83 426\r
91e914f5
CZ
427 ## This PCD defines minimum length(in bytes) of the system preboot TCG event log area(LAML).\r
428 # For PC Client Implementation spec up to and including 1.2 the minimum log size is 64KB.\r
429 # @Prompt Minimum length(in bytes) of the system preboot TCG event log area(LAML).\r
430 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcgLogAreaMinLen|0x10000|UINT32|0x00010017\r
431\r
432 ## This PCD defines length(in bytes) of the TCG2 Final event log area.\r
433 # @Prompt Length(in bytes) of the TCG2 Final event log area.\r
434 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcg2FinalLogAreaLen|0x8000|UINT32|0x00010018\r
435\r
dd6d0a52
SZ
436 ## Null-terminated string of the Version of Physical Presence interface supported by platform.<BR><BR>\r
437 # To support configuring from setup page, this PCD can be DynamicHii type and map to a setup option.<BR>\r
438 # For example, map to TCG2_VERSION.PpiVersion to be configured by Tcg2ConfigDxe driver.<BR>\r
439 # gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcgPhysicalPresenceInterfaceVer|L"TCG2_VERSION"|gTcg2ConfigFormSetGuid|0x0|"1.3"|NV,BS<BR>\r
440 # @Prompt Version of Physical Presence interface supported by platform.\r
441 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcgPhysicalPresenceInterfaceVer|"1.3"|VOID*|0x00000008\r
442\r
e2b083de 443 ## Indicate whether a physical presence user exist.\r
b3548d32 444 # When it is configured to Dynamic or DynamicEx, it can be set through detection using\r
e2b083de
LG
445 # a platform-specific method (e.g. Button pressed) in a actual platform in early boot phase.<BR><BR>\r
446 # @Prompt A physical presence user status\r
447 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUserPhysicalPresence|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010019\r
448\r
b909b8b9 449 ## Indicate the TPM2 ACPI table revision. Rev 4 has been defined since TCG ACPI Specification Rev 00.37.<BR><BR>\r
fca42289
ZC
450 # To support configuring from setup page, this PCD can be DynamicHii type and map to a setup option.<BR>\r
451 # For example, map to TCG2_VERSION.Tpm2AcpiTableRev to be configured by Tcg2ConfigDxe driver.<BR>\r
452 # gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2AcpiTableRev|L"TCG2_VERSION"|gTcg2ConfigFormSetGuid|0x8|3|NV,BS<BR>\r
453 # @Prompt Revision of TPM2 ACPI table.\r
454 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2AcpiTableRev|3|UINT8|0x0001001A\r
455\r
710174e0
ZC
456 ## This PCD defines initial setting of TCG2 Persistent Firmware Management Flags\r
457 # PCD can be configured for different settings in different scenarios\r
1a2ad3ba
MC
458 # This PCD follows UEFI TCG2 library definition bit of the BIOS TPM/Storage Management Flags<BR>\r
459 # BIT0 - Reserved <BR>\r
460 # BIT1 - TCG2_BIOS_TPM_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_PP_REQUIRED_FOR_CLEAR <BR>\r
461 # BIT2 - Reserved <BR>\r
462 # BIT3 - TCG2_LIB_PP_FLAG_RESET_TRACK <BR>\r
463 # BIT4 - TCG2_BIOS_TPM_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_PP_REQUIRED_FOR_TURN_ON <BR>\r
464 # BIT5 - TCG2_BIOS_TPM_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_PP_REQUIRED_FOR_TURN_OFF <BR>\r
465 # BIT6 - TCG2_BIOS_TPM_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_PP_REQUIRED_FOR_CHANGE_EPS <BR>\r
466 # BIT7 - TCG2_BIOS_TPM_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_PP_REQUIRED_FOR_CHANGE_PCRS <BR>\r
467 # BIT16 - TCG2_BIOS_STORAGE_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_PP_REQUIRED_FOR_ENABLE_BLOCK_SID <BR>\r
468 # BIT17 - TCG2_BIOS_STORAGE_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_PP_REQUIRED_FOR_DISABLE_BLOCK_SID <BR>\r
469 # BIT18 - TCG2_BIOS_STORAGE_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_ENABLE_BLOCK_SID <BR>\r
b3724a03 470 # @Prompt Initial setting of TCG2 Persistent Firmware Management Flags\r
e0972cfc 471 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcg2PhysicalPresenceFlags|0x700E2|UINT32|0x0001001B\r
710174e0 472\r
c4122dca
ZC
473 ## Indicate current TPM2 Interrupt Number reported by _CRS control method.<BR><BR>\r
474 # TPM2 Interrupt feature is disabled If the pcd is set to 0.<BR>\r
475 # @Prompt Current TPM2 Interrupt Number\r
5552ac42 476 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2CurrentIrqNum|0x00|UINT32|0x0001001C\r
c4122dca
ZC
477\r
478 ## Indicate platform possible TPM2 Interrupt Number reported by _PRS control method.<BR><BR>\r
479 # Possible TPM2 Interrupt Number Buffer will not be reported if TPM2 Interrupt feature is disabled.<BR>\r
480 # @Prompt Possible TPM2 Interrupt Number buffer\r
5552ac42 481 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2PossibleIrqNumBuf|{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}|VOID*|0x0001001D\r
c4122dca 482\r
6cbed0e3
CM
483 ## Indicates if Opal DXE driver skip password prompt.<BR><BR>\r
484 # TRUE - Skip password prompt.<BR>\r
485 # FALSE - Does not skip password prompt.<BR>\r
486 # @Prompt Skip Opal DXE driver password prompt.\r
487 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSkipOpalPasswordPrompt|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010020\r
8a9301cd 488\r
9e2416ae
CM
489 ## Indicates if Hdd Password driver skip password prompt.<BR><BR>\r
490 # TRUE - Skip password prompt.<BR>\r
491 # FALSE - Does not skip password prompt.<BR>\r
492 # @Prompt Skip Hdd Password prompt.\r
493 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSkipHddPasswordPrompt|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010021\r
494\r
f88e9c5b
SEHM
495[PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
496\r
d7c054f9 497 ## This PCD indicates Hash mask for TPM 2.0. Bit definition strictly follows TCG Algorithm Registry.<BR><BR>\r
f88e9c5b
SEHM
498 # If this bit is set, that means this algorithm is needed to extend to PCR.<BR>\r
499 # If this bit is clear, that means this algorithm is NOT needed to extend to PCR.<BR>\r
d7c054f9 500 # If all the bits are clear, that means hash algorithm is determined by current Active PCR Banks.<BR>\r
f88e9c5b
SEHM
501 # BIT0 - SHA1.<BR>\r
502 # BIT1 - SHA256.<BR>\r
503 # BIT2 - SHA384.<BR>\r
504 # BIT3 - SHA512.<BR>\r
c027f680 505 # BIT4 - SM3_256.<BR>\r
f88e9c5b 506 # @Prompt Hash mask for TPM 2.0\r
c027f680
ID
507 # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000001F\r
508 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2HashMask|0x0000001F|UINT32|0x00010010\r
f88e9c5b
SEHM
509\r
510 ## This PCD indicated final BIOS supported Hash mask.\r
511 # Bios may choose to register a subset of PcdTpm2HashMask.\r
512 # So this PCD is final value of how many hash algo is extended to PCR.\r
9fe9cf9a
SZ
513 # If software HashLib(HashLibBaseCryptoRouter) solution is chosen, this PCD\r
514 # has no need to be configured in platform dsc and will be set to correct\r
515 # value by the HashLib instance according to the HashInstanceLib instances\r
516 # linked, and the value of this PCD should be got in module entrypoint.\r
f194d873 517 # @Prompt Hash Algorithm bitmap.\r
f88e9c5b 518 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcg2HashAlgorithmBitmap|0xFFFFFFFF|UINT32|0x00010016\r
f15cb995
ZC
519\r
520 ## This PCD indicates current active TPM interface type.\r
d6b926e7 521 # According to TCG PTP spec 1.3, there are 3 types defined in TPM2_PTP_INTERFACE_TYPE.<BR>\r
f15cb995
ZC
522 # 0x00 - FIFO interface as defined in TIS 1.3 is active.<BR>\r
523 # 0x01 - FIFO interface as defined in PTP for TPM 2.0 is active.<BR>\r
524 # 0x02 - CRB interface is active.<BR>\r
525 # 0xFF - Contains no current active TPM interface type.<BR>\r
526 #\r
527 # @Prompt current active TPM interface type.\r
528 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdActiveTpmInterfaceType|0xFF|UINT8|0x0001001E\r
529\r
d6b926e7
SB
530 ## This PCD records IdleBypass status supported by current active TPM interface.\r
531 # According to TCG PTP spec 1.3, TPM with CRB interface can skip idle state and\r
532 # directly move to CmdReady state. <BR>\r
63197670
ZC
533 # 0x00 - Do not support IdleByPass.<BR>\r
534 # 0x01 - Support IdleByPass.<BR>\r
535 # 0xFF - IdleByPass State is not synced with TPM hardware.<BR>\r
536 #\r
d6b926e7 537 # @Prompt IdleBypass status supported by current active TPM interface.\r
63197670
ZC
538 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCRBIdleByPass|0xFF|UINT8|0x0001001F\r
539\r
1fca5528
JY
540 ## This PCD records LAML field in TPM2 ACPI table.\r
541 # @Prompt Tpm2AcpiTableLaml LAML field in TPM2 ACPI table.\r
542 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2AcpiTableLaml|0|UINT32|0x00010022\r
543\r
544 ## This PCD records LASA field in TPM2 ACPI table.\r
545 # @Prompt Tpm2AcpiTableLasa LASA field in TPM2 ACPI table.\r
546 gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2AcpiTableLasa|0|UINT64|0x00010023\r
547\r
606d38a5
DG
548[UserExtensions.TianoCore."ExtraFiles"]\r
549 SecurityPkgExtra.uni\r