[mirror_edk2.git] / SecurityPkg / SecurityPkg.dec

## @file  SecurityPkg.dec\r
#  Provides security features that conform to TCG/UEFI industry standards\r
#\r
#  The security features include secure boot, measured boot and user identification.\r
#  It also provides the definitions(including PPIs/PROTOCOLs/GUIDs and library classes)\r
#  and libraries instances, which are used for those features.\r
#\r
# Copyright (c) 2009 - 2020, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
# (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP <BR>\r
# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR>\r
# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent\r
#\r
##\r
\r
[Defines]\r
  DEC_SPECIFICATION              = 0x00010005\r
  PACKAGE_NAME                   = SecurityPkg\r
  PACKAGE_UNI_FILE               = SecurityPkg.uni\r
  PACKAGE_GUID                   = 4EFC4F66-6219-4427-B780-FB99F470767F\r
  PACKAGE_VERSION                = 0.98\r
\r
[Includes]\r
  Include\r
\r
[LibraryClasses]\r
  ##  @libraryclass  Provides hash interfaces from different implementations.\r
  #\r
  HashLib|Include/Library/HashLib.h\r
\r
  ##  @libraryclass  Provides a platform specific interface to detect physically present user.\r
  #\r
  PlatformSecureLib|Include/Library/PlatformSecureLib.h\r
\r
  ##  @libraryclass  Provides interfaces to handle TPM 1.2 request.\r
  #\r
  TcgPhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/TcgPhysicalPresenceLib.h\r
\r
  ##  @libraryclass  Provides support for TCG PP >= 128 Vendor Specific PPI Operation.\r
  #\r
  TcgPpVendorLib|Include/Library/TcgPpVendorLib.h\r
\r
  ##  @libraryclass  Provides interfaces for other modules to send TPM 2.0 command.\r
  #\r
  Tpm2CommandLib|Include/Library/Tpm2CommandLib.h\r
\r
  ##  @libraryclass  Provides interfaces on how to access TPM 2.0 hardware device.\r
  #\r
  Tpm2DeviceLib|Include/Library/Tpm2DeviceLib.h\r
\r
  ##  @libraryclass  Provides interfaces for other modules to send TPM 1.2 command.\r
  #\r
  Tpm12CommandLib|Include/Library/Tpm12CommandLib.h\r
\r
  ##  @libraryclass  Provides interfaces on how to access TPM 1.2 hardware device.\r
  #\r
  Tpm12DeviceLib|Include/Library/Tpm12DeviceLib.h\r
\r
  ##  @libraryclass  Provides TPM Interface Specification (TIS) interfaces for TPM command.\r
  #\r
  TpmCommLib|Include/Library/TpmCommLib.h\r
\r
  ##  @libraryclass  Provides support for TCG Physical Presence Interface (PPI) specification\r
  #   >= 128 Vendor Specific PPI Operation.\r
  #\r
  Tcg2PpVendorLib|Include/Library/Tcg2PpVendorLib.h\r
\r
  ##  @libraryclass  Handle TPM 2.0 physical presence request from OS.\r
  #\r
  Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLib|Include/Library/Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.h\r
\r
  ##  @libraryclass  Handle TPM 2.0 platform hierarchy configuration\r
  #\r
  TpmPlatformHierarchyLib|Include/Library/TpmPlatformHierarchyLib.h\r
\r
  ## @libraryclass  Provides interfaces about TCG storage generic command.\r
  #\r
  TcgStorageCoreLib|Include/Library/TcgStorageCoreLib.h\r
\r
  ## @libraryclass  Provides interfaces about TCG storage Opal generic command.\r
  #\r
  TcgStorageOpalLib|Include/Library/TcgStorageOpalLib.h\r
\r
  ## @libraryclass  Provides interfaces about firmware TPM measurement.\r
  #\r
  TcgEventLogRecordLib|Include/Library/TcgEventLogRecordLib.h\r
\r
  ## @libraryclass  Provides helper functions related to creation/removal Secure Boot variables.\r
  #\r
  SecureBootVariableLib|Include/Library/SecureBootVariableLib.h\r
\r
  ## @libraryclass  Provides support to enroll Secure Boot keys.\r
  #\r
  SecureBootVariableProvisionLib|Include/Library/SecureBootVariableProvisionLib.h\r
\r
  ## @libraryclass  Provides support to manage variable 'PK' related protections.\r
  #\r
  PlatformPKProtectionLib|Include/Library/PlatformPKProtectionLib.h\r
\r
[Guids]\r
  ## Security package token space guid.\r
  # Include/Guid/SecurityPkgTokenSpace.h\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid      = { 0xd3fb176, 0x9569, 0x4d51, { 0xa3, 0xef, 0x7d, 0x61, 0xc6, 0x4f, 0xea, 0xba }}\r
\r
  ## GUID used to "SecureBootEnable" variable for the Secure Boot feature enable/disable.\r
  #  This variable is used for allowing a physically present user to disable Secure Boot via firmware setup without the possession of PKpriv.\r
  #  Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
  gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid    = { 0xf0a30bc7, 0xaf08, 0x4556, { 0x99, 0xc4, 0x0, 0x10, 0x9, 0xc9, 0x3a, 0x44 } }\r
\r
  ## GUID used to "CustomMode" variable for two Secure Boot modes feature: "Custom" and "Standard".\r
  #  Standard Secure Boot mode is the default mode as UEFI Spec's description.\r
  #  Custom Secure Boot mode allows for more flexibility as specified in the following:\r
  #  Can enroll or delete PK without existing PK's private key.\r
  #  Can enroll or delete KEK without existing PK's private key.\r
  #  Can enroll or delete signature from DB/DBX without KEK's private key.\r
  #  Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
  gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid           = { 0xc076ec0c, 0x7028, 0x4399, { 0xa0, 0x72, 0x71, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x9f } }\r
\r
  ## GUID used to "VendorKeysNv" variable to record the out of band secure boot keys modification.\r
  #  This variable is a read-only NV variable that indicates whether someone other than the platform vendor has used a\r
  #  mechanism not defined by the UEFI Specification to transition the system to setup mode or to update secure boot keys.\r
  #  Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
  gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid               = { 0x9073e4e0, 0x60ec, 0x4b6e, { 0x99, 0x3, 0x4c, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x26, 0xf, 0x3c } }\r
\r
  ## GUID used to "certdb"/"certdbv" variable to store the signer's certificates for common variables with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute.\r
  #  Include/Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h\r
  gEfiCertDbGuid                     = { 0xd9bee56e, 0x75dc, 0x49d9, { 0xb4, 0xd7, 0xb5, 0x34, 0x21, 0xf, 0x63, 0x7a } }\r
\r
  ## Hob GUID used to pass a TCG_PCR_EVENT from a TPM PEIM to a TPM DXE Driver.\r
  #  Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h\r
  gTcgEventEntryHobGuid              = { 0x2b9ffb52, 0x1b13, 0x416f, { 0xa8, 0x7b, 0xbc, 0x93, 0xd, 0xef, 0x92, 0xa8 }}\r
\r
  ## Hob GUID used to pass a TCG_PCR_EVENT_2 from a TPM2 PEIM to a TPM2 DXE Driver.\r
  ## Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h\r
  gTcgEvent2EntryHobGuid             = { 0xd26c221e, 0x2430, 0x4c8a, { 0x91, 0x70, 0x3f, 0xcb, 0x45, 0x0, 0x41, 0x3f }}\r
\r
  ## Hob GUID used to pass a CC_EVENT from SEC to a CC DXE Driver.\r
  ## Include/Guid/CcEventHob.h\r
  gCcEventEntryHobGuid               = { 0x20f8fd36, 0x6d00, 0x40fb, { 0xb7, 0x04, 0xd1, 0x2c, 0x15, 0x3c, 0x62, 0xeb }}\r
\r
  ## HOB GUID used to record TPM device error.\r
  #  Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h\r
  gTpmErrorHobGuid                   = { 0xef598499, 0xb25e, 0x473a, { 0xbf, 0xaf, 0xe7, 0xe5, 0x7d, 0xce, 0x82, 0xc4 }}\r
\r
  ## HOB GUID used to record TPM2 startup locality\r
  ## Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h\r
  gTpm2StartupLocalityHobGuid        = { 0x397b0c9, 0x22e8, 0x459e, { 0xa4, 0xff, 0x99, 0xbc, 0x65, 0x27, 0x9, 0x29 }}\r
\r
  ## HOB GUID used to record TCG 800-155 PlatformId Event\r
  ## Include/Guid/TcgEventHob.h\r
  gTcg800155PlatformIdEventHobGuid   = { 0xe2c3bc69, 0x615c, 0x4b5b, { 0x8e, 0x5c, 0xa0, 0x33, 0xa9, 0xc2, 0x5e, 0xd6 }}\r
\r
  ## HOB GUID used to pass all PEI measured FV info to DXE Driver.\r
  #  Include/Guid/MeasuredFvHob.h\r
  gMeasuredFvHobGuid                 = { 0xb2360b42, 0x7173, 0x420a, { 0x86, 0x96, 0x46, 0xca, 0x6b, 0xab, 0x10, 0x60 }}\r
\r
  ## GUID used to "PhysicalPresence" variable and "PhysicalPresenceFlags" variable for TPM request and response.\r
  #  Include/Guid/PhysicalPresenceData.h\r
  gEfiPhysicalPresenceGuid           = { 0xf6499b1, 0xe9ad, 0x493d, { 0xb9, 0xc2, 0x2f, 0x90, 0x81, 0x5c, 0x6c, 0xbc }}\r
\r
  ## GUID used to "Tcg2PhysicalPresence" variable and "Tcg2PhysicalPresenceFlags" variable for TPM2 request and response.\r
  #  Include/Guid/Tcg2PhysicalPresenceData.h\r
  gEfiTcg2PhysicalPresenceGuid = { 0xaeb9c5c1, 0x94f1, 0x4d02, { 0xbf, 0xd9, 0x46, 0x2, 0xdb, 0x2d, 0x3c, 0x54 }}\r
\r
  ## GUID used for FormSet guid and user profile variable.\r
  # Include/Guid/UserIdentifyManagerHii.h\r
  gUserIdentifyManagerGuid           = { 0x3ccd3dd8, 0x8d45, 0x4fed, { 0x96, 0x2d, 0x2b, 0x38, 0xcd, 0x82, 0xb3, 0xc4 }}\r
\r
  ## GUID used for FormSet.\r
  #  Include/Guid/TcgConfigHii.h\r
  gTcgConfigFormSetGuid              = { 0xb0f901e4, 0xc424, 0x45de, { 0x90, 0x81, 0x95, 0xe2, 0xb, 0xde, 0x6f, 0xb5 }}\r
\r
  ## GUID used for FormSet and config variable.\r
  #  Include/Guid/Tcg2ConfigHii.h\r
  gTcg2ConfigFormSetGuid    = {0x6339d487, 0x26ba, 0x424b, { 0x9a, 0x5d, 0x68, 0x7e, 0x25, 0xd7, 0x40, 0xbc }}\r
\r
  ## GUID used for FormSet.\r
  #  Include/Guid/SecureBootConfigHii.h\r
  gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid       = { 0x5daf50a5, 0xea81, 0x4de2, {0x8f, 0x9b, 0xca, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0xcf, 0x5c, 0x14}}\r
\r
  ## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate TPM is disabled.\r
  #  Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r
  gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceNoneGuid      = { 0x00000000, 0x0000, 0x0000, { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } }\r
\r
  ## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate TPM 1.2 device is selected to support.\r
  #  Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r
  gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm12Guid     = { 0x8b01e5b6, 0x4f19, 0x46e8, { 0xab, 0x93, 0x1c, 0x53, 0x67, 0x1b, 0x90, 0xcc } }\r
\r
  ## GUID value used for PcdTpmInstanceGuid to indicate discrete TPM 2.0 device is selected to support.\r
  #  Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r
  gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm20DtpmGuid = { 0x286bf25a, 0xc2c3, 0x408c, { 0xb3, 0xb4, 0x25, 0xe6, 0x75, 0x8b, 0x73, 0x17 } }\r
\r
  ## GUID used to select supported TPM instance from UI.\r
  #  Include/Guid/TpmInstance.h\r
  gEfiTpmDeviceSelectedGuid          = { 0x7f4158d3, 0x74d, 0x456d, { 0x8c, 0xb2, 0x1, 0xf9, 0xc8, 0xf7, 0x9d, 0xaa } }\r
\r
  ## Include/OpalPasswordExtraInfoVariable.h\r
  gOpalExtraInfoVariableGuid =  {0x44a2ad5d, 0x612c, 0x47b3, {0xb0, 0x6e, 0xc8, 0xf5, 0x0b, 0xfb, 0xf0, 0x7d}}\r
\r
  ## GUID used to exchange registered SWI value and NVS region between Tcg2Acpi and Tcg2Smm.\r
  ## Include/Guid/TpmNvsMm.h\r
  gTpmNvsMmGuid                      = { 0xc96c76eb, 0xbc78, 0x429c, { 0x9f, 0x4b, 0xda, 0x51, 0x78, 0xc2, 0x84, 0x57 }}\r
\r
  ## GUID used to enforce loading order between Tcg2Acpi and Tcg2Smm\r
  gTcg2MmSwSmiRegisteredGuid         = { 0x9d4548b9, 0xa48d, 0x4db4, { 0x9a, 0x68, 0x32, 0xc5, 0x13, 0x9e, 0x20, 0x18 } }\r
\r
  ## GUID used to specify section with default PK content\r
  gDefaultPKFileGuid                 = { 0x85254ea7, 0x4759, 0x4fc4, { 0x82, 0xd4, 0x5e, 0xed, 0x5f, 0xb0, 0xa4, 0xa0 } }\r
\r
  ## GUID used to specify section with default KEK content\r
  gDefaultKEKFileGuid                = { 0x6f64916e, 0x9f7a, 0x4c35, { 0xb9, 0x52, 0xcd, 0x04, 0x1e, 0xfb, 0x05, 0xa3 } }\r
\r
  ## GUID used to specify section with default db content\r
  gDefaultdbFileGuid                 = { 0xc491d352, 0x7623, 0x4843, { 0xac, 0xcc, 0x27, 0x91, 0xa7, 0x57, 0x44, 0x21 } }\r
\r
  ## GUID used to specify section with default dbx content\r
  gDefaultdbxFileGuid                = { 0x5740766a, 0x718e, 0x4dc0, { 0x99, 0x35, 0xc3, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0x3f, 0x88, 0x4f } }\r
\r
  ## GUID used to specify section with default dbt content\r
  gDefaultdbtFileGuid                = { 0x36c513ee, 0xa338, 0x4976, { 0xa0, 0xfb, 0x6d, 0xdb, 0xa3, 0xda, 0xfe, 0x87 } }\r
\r
[Ppis]\r
  ## The PPI GUID for that TPM physical presence should be locked.\r
  # Include/Ppi/LockPhysicalPresence.h\r
  gPeiLockPhysicalPresencePpiGuid    = { 0xef9aefe5, 0x2bd3, 0x4031, { 0xaf, 0x7d, 0x5e, 0xfe, 0x5a, 0xbb, 0x9a, 0xd } }\r
\r
  ## The PPI GUID for that TPM is initialized.\r
  # Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h\r
  gPeiTpmInitializedPpiGuid      = { 0xe9db0d58, 0xd48d, 0x47f6, { 0x9c, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x40, 0xe8, 0x6c, 0x7b, 0x41 }}\r
\r
  ## The PPI GUID for that TPM initialization is done. TPM initialization may be success or fail.\r
  # Include/Ppi/TpmInitialized.h\r
  gPeiTpmInitializationDonePpiGuid = { 0xa030d115, 0x54dd, 0x447b, { 0x90, 0x64, 0xf2, 0x6, 0x88, 0x3d, 0x7c, 0xcc }}\r
\r
  ## Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcluded.h\r
  gEfiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoMeasurementExcludedPpiGuid = { 0x6e056ff9, 0xc695, 0x4364, { 0x9e, 0x2c, 0x61, 0x26, 0xf5, 0xce, 0xea, 0xae } }\r
\r
  ## Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoPrehashedFV.h\r
  gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPrehashedFvPpiGuid = { 0x3ce1e631, 0x7008, 0x477c, { 0xad, 0xa7, 0x5d, 0xcf, 0xc7, 0xc1, 0x49, 0x4b } }\r
\r
  ## Include/Ppi/FirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFv.h\r
  gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid = {0x7f5e4e31, 0x81b1, 0x47e5, { 0x9e, 0x21, 0x1e, 0x4b, 0x5b, 0xc2, 0xf6, 0x1d } }\r
\r
  ## Include/Ppi/Tcg.h\r
  gEdkiiTcgPpiGuid = {0x57a13b87, 0x133d, 0x4bf3, { 0xbf, 0xf1, 0x1b, 0xca, 0xc7, 0x17, 0x6c, 0xf1 } }\r
\r
#\r
# [Error.gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid]\r
#   0x80000001 | Invalid value provided.\r
#   0x80000002 | Reserved bits must be set to zero.\r
#   0x80000003 | Incorrect progress or error code provided.\r
#\r
\r
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule]\r
  ## Image verification policy for removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.\r
  #  Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>\r
  #  NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>\r
  #  0x00000000      Always trust the image.<BR>\r
  #  0x00000001      Never trust the image.<BR>\r
  #  0x00000002      Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
  #  0x00000003      Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
  #  0x00000004      Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
  #  0x00000005      Query user when there is security violation.<BR>\r
  # @Prompt Set policy for the image from removable media.\r
  # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000002\r
\r
  ## Image verification policy for fixed media which includes hard disk.\r
  #  Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>\r
  #  NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>\r
  #  0x00000000      Always trust the image.<BR>\r
  #  0x00000001      Never trust the image.<BR>\r
  #  0x00000002      Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
  #  0x00000003      Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
  #  0x00000004      Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
  #  0x00000005      Query user when there is security violation.<BR>\r
  # @Prompt Set policy for the image from fixed media.\r
  # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000003\r
\r
  ## Defer Image Load policy settings. The policy is bitwise.\r
  #  If a bit is set, the image from corresponding device will be trusted when loading. Or\r
  #  the image will be deferred. The deferred image will be checked after user is identified.<BR><BR>\r
  #    BIT0       - Image from unknown device. <BR>\r
  #    BIT1       - Image from firmware volume.<BR>\r
  #    BIT2       - Image from OptionRom.<BR>\r
  #    BIT3       - Image from removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.<BR>\r
  #    BIT4       - Image from fixed media device which includes hard disk.<BR>\r
  # @Prompt Set policy whether trust image before user identification.\r
  # @ValidRange 0x80000002 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000001F\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDeferImageLoadPolicy|0x0000001F|UINT32|0x0000004\r
\r
  ## Null-terminated Unicode string of the file name that is the default name to save USB credential.\r
  #  The specified file should be saved at the root directory of USB storage disk.\r
  # @Prompt File name to save credential.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedUsbCredentialProviderTokenFileName|L"Token.bin"|VOID*|0x00000005\r
\r
  ## The size of Append variable buffer. This buffer is reserved for runtime use, OS can append data into one existing variable.\r
  #  Note: This PCD is not been used.\r
  # @Prompt Max variable size for append operation.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMaxAppendVariableSize|0x2000|UINT32|0x30000005\r
\r
  ## Specifies the type of TCG platform that contains TPM chip.<BR><BR>\r
  #  If 0, TCG platform type is PC client.<BR>\r
  #  If 1, TCG platform type is PC server.<BR>\r
  # @Prompt Select platform type.\r
  # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPlatformClass|0|UINT8|0x00000006\r
\r
  ## Progress Code for TPM device subclass definitions.<BR><BR>\r
  #  EFI_PERIPHERAL_TPM  = (EFI_PERIPHERAL | 0x000D0000) = 0x010D0000<BR>\r
  # @Prompt Status Code for TPM device definitions\r
  # @ValidList  0x80000003 | 0x010D0000\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeSubClassTpmDevice|0x010D0000|UINT32|0x00000007\r
\r
  ## Defines the IO port used to trigger a software System Management Interrupt (SMI).<BR><BR>\r
  #  Used as the SMI Command IO port by security functionality that triggers a software SMI such\r
  #  as Physical Presence Interface (PPI).<BR>\r
  # @Prompt SMI Command IO port.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSmiCommandIoPort|0xB2|UINT16|0x00000009\r
\r
  ## Progress Code for FV verification result.<BR><BR>\r
  #  (EFI_SOFTWARE_PEI_MODULE | EFI_SUBCLASS_SPECIFIC | XXX)\r
  # @Prompt Status Code for FV verification result\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationPass|0x0303100A|UINT32|0x00010030\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationFail|0x0303100B|UINT32|0x00010031\r
\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuRngSupportedAlgorithm|{0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}|VOID*|0x00010032\r
\r
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
  ## Image verification policy for OptionRom. Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>\r
  #  NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>\r
  #  0x00000000      Always trust the image.<BR>\r
  #  0x00000001      Never trust the image.<BR>\r
  #  0x00000002      Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
  #  0x00000003      Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
  #  0x00000004      Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>\r
  #  0x00000005      Query user when there is security violation.<BR>\r
  # @Prompt Set policy for the image from OptionRom.\r
  # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000001\r
\r
  ## Indicates the presence or absence of the platform operator during firmware booting.\r
  #  If platform operator is not physical presence during boot. TPM will be locked and the TPM commands\r
  #  that required operator physical presence can not run.<BR><BR>\r
  #   TRUE  - The platform operator is physically present.<BR>\r
  #   FALSE - The platform operator is not physically present.<BR>\r
  # @Prompt Physical presence of the platform operator.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmPhysicalPresence|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010001\r
\r
  ## Indicates whether the TPM2 platform hierarchy will be disabled by using\r
  #  a random password or by disabling the hierarchy\r
  #   TRUE  - A random password will be used\r
  #   FALSE - The hierarchy will be disabled\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRandomizePlatformHierarchy|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010024\r
\r
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
  ## Indicates whether TPM physical presence is locked during platform initialization.\r
  #  Once it is locked, it can not be unlocked for TPM life time.<BR><BR>\r
  #   TRUE  - Lock TPM physical presence asserting method.<BR>\r
  #   FALSE - Not lock TPM physical presence asserting method.<BR>\r
  # @Prompt Lock TPM physical presence asserting method.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceLifetimeLock|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010003\r
\r
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
  ## Indicates whether the platform supports the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR><BR>\r
  #   TRUE  - Supports the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR>\r
  #   FALSE - Does not support the software method of asserting physical presence.<BR>\r
  # @Prompt Enable software method of asserting physical presence.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceCmdEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010004\r
\r
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
  ## Indicates whether the platform supports the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR><BR>\r
  #   TRUE  - Supports the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR>\r
  #   FALSE - Does not support the hardware method of asserting physical presence.<BR>\r
  # @Prompt Enable hardware method of asserting physical presence.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPhysicalPresenceHwEnable|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010005\r
\r
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
  ## This PCD indicates if debugger exists. <BR><BR>\r
  #   TRUE  - Firmware debugger exists.<BR>\r
  #   FALSE - Firmware debugger doesn't exist.<BR>\r
  # @Prompt Firmware debugger status.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFirmwareDebuggerInitialized|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010009\r
\r
  ## This PCD indicates the initialization policy for TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>\r
  #  If 0, no initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.<BR>\r
  #  If 1, initialization needed.<BR>\r
  # @Prompt TPM 2.0 device initialization policy.<BR>\r
  # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2InitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000A\r
\r
  ## This PCD indicates the initialization policy for TPM 1.2.<BR><BR>\r
  #  If 0, no initialization needed - most likely used for chipset SRTM solution, in which TPM is already initialized.<BR>\r
  #  If 1, initialization needed.<BR>\r
  # @Prompt TPM 1.2 device initialization policy.\r
  # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInitializationPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000B\r
\r
  ## This PCD indicates the TPM 2.0 SelfTest policy.<BR><BR>\r
  #  if 0, no SelfTest needed - most likely used for fTPM, because it might already be tested.<BR>\r
  #  if 1, SelfTest needed.<BR>\r
  # @Prompt TPM 2.0 device selftest.\r
  # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2SelfTestPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000C\r
\r
  ## This PCD indicates Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) policy using TPM 2.0.<BR><BR>\r
  #  if 0, no SCRTM measurement needed - In this case, it is already done.<BR>\r
  #  if 1, SCRTM measurement done by BIOS.<BR>\r
  # @Prompt SCRTM policy setting for TPM 2.0 device.\r
  # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2ScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000D\r
\r
  ## This PCD indicates Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) policy using TPM 1.2.<BR><BR>\r
  #  if 0, no SCRTM measurement needed - In this case, it is already done.<BR>\r
  #  if 1, SCRTM measurement done by BIOS.<BR>\r
  # @Prompt SCRTM policy setting for TPM 1.2 device\r
  # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00 - 0x1\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmScrtmPolicy|1|UINT8|0x0001000E\r
\r
  ## Guid name to identify TPM instance.<BR><BR>\r
  #  NOTE: This Pcd must be FixedAtBuild if Standalone MM is used\r
  #  TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NONE means disable.<BR>\r
  #  TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_TPM12 means TPM 1.2 DTPM.<BR>\r
  #  TPM_DEVICE_INTERFACE_DTPM2 means TPM 2.0 DTPM.<BR>\r
  #  Other GUID value means other TPM 2.0 device.<BR>\r
  # @Prompt TPM device type identifier\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInstanceGuid |{ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }|VOID*|0x0001000F\r
\r
  ## This PCD indicates if BIOS auto detect TPM1.2 or dTPM2.0.<BR><BR>\r
  #  FALSE - No auto detection.<BR>\r
  #  TRUE  - Auto detection.<BR>\r
  # @Prompt TPM type detection.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmAutoDetection|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x00010011\r
\r
  ## This PCD indicates TPM base address.<BR><BR>\r
  # @Prompt TPM device address.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmBaseAddress|0xFED40000|UINT64|0x00010012\r
\r
  ## This PCR means the OEM configured number of PCR banks.\r
  #  0 means dynamic get from supported HASH algorithm\r
  # @Prompt OEM configured number of PCR banks.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcg2NumberOfPCRBanks|0x0|UINT32|0x00010015\r
\r
  ## Provides one or more SHA 256 Hashes of the RSA 2048 public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images\r
  #  WARNING: The default value is treated as test key. Please do not use default value in the production.\r
  # @Prompt One or more SHA 256 Hashes of RSA 2048 bit public keys used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images\r
  #\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRsa2048Sha256PublicKeyBuffer|{0x91, 0x29, 0xc4, 0xbd, 0xea, 0x6d, 0xda, 0xb3, 0xaa, 0x6f, 0x50, 0x16, 0xfc, 0xdb, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x3c, 0xd6, 0xdc, 0xa4, 0x7a, 0x0e, 0xdd, 0xe6, 0x15, 0x8c, 0x73, 0x96, 0xa2, 0xd4, 0xa6, 0x4d}|VOID*|0x00010013\r
\r
  ## Provides one PKCS7 cert used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images\r
  #  WARNING: The default value is treated as test key. Please do not use default value in the production.\r
  # @Prompt One PKCS7 cert used to verify Recovery and Capsule Update images\r
  #\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPkcs7CertBuffer|{0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xec, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0xd4, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x00, 0xc0, 0x91, 0xc5, 0xe2, 0xb7, 0x66, 0xc0, 0xf8, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x81, 0x82, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x43, 0x4e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x08, 0x0c, 0x02, 0x53, 0x48, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x07, 0x0c, 0x02, 0x53, 0x48, 0x31, 0x12, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x09, 0x54, 0x69, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x65, 0x31, 0x0e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x05, 0x45, 0x44, 0x4b, 0x49, 0x49, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x52, 0x6f, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x31, 0x22, 0x30, 0x20, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x01, 0x16, 0x13, 0x65, 0x64, 0x6b, 0x69, 0x69, 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0x62, 0x68, 0xdd, 0x53, 0xc6, 0xdc, 0xa5, 0xdd, 0x9a, 0x2d, 0x8e, 0x79, 0x7c, 0x2e, 0x9c, 0xe4, 0x66, 0x80, 0x8c, 0x1d}|VOID*|0x00010014\r
\r
  ## This PCD defines minimum length(in bytes) of the system preboot TCG event log area(LAML).\r
  #  For PC Client Implementation spec up to and including 1.2 the minimum log size is 64KB.\r
  # @Prompt Minimum length(in bytes) of the system preboot TCG event log area(LAML).\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcgLogAreaMinLen|0x10000|UINT32|0x00010017\r
\r
  ## This PCD defines length(in bytes) of the TCG2 Final event log area.\r
  # @Prompt Length(in bytes) of the TCG2 Final event log area.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcg2FinalLogAreaLen|0x8000|UINT32|0x00010018\r
\r
  ## Null-terminated string of the Version of Physical Presence interface supported by platform.<BR><BR>\r
  # To support configuring from setup page, this PCD can be DynamicHii type and map to a setup option.<BR>\r
  # For example, map to TCG2_VERSION.PpiVersion to be configured by Tcg2ConfigDxe driver.<BR>\r
  # gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcgPhysicalPresenceInterfaceVer|L"TCG2_VERSION"|gTcg2ConfigFormSetGuid|0x0|"1.3"|NV,BS<BR>\r
  # @Prompt Version of Physical Presence interface supported by platform.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcgPhysicalPresenceInterfaceVer|"1.3"|VOID*|0x00000008\r
\r
  ## Indicate whether a physical presence user exist.\r
  # When it is configured to Dynamic or DynamicEx, it can be set through detection using\r
  # a platform-specific method (e.g. Button pressed) in a actual platform in early boot phase.<BR><BR>\r
  # @Prompt A physical presence user status\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUserPhysicalPresence|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010019\r
\r
  ## Indicate the TPM2 ACPI table revision. Rev 4 has been defined since TCG ACPI Specification Rev 00.37.<BR><BR>\r
  # To support configuring from setup page, this PCD can be DynamicHii type and map to a setup option.<BR>\r
  # For example, map to TCG2_VERSION.Tpm2AcpiTableRev to be configured by Tcg2ConfigDxe driver.<BR>\r
  # gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2AcpiTableRev|L"TCG2_VERSION"|gTcg2ConfigFormSetGuid|0x8|3|NV,BS<BR>\r
  # @Prompt Revision of TPM2 ACPI table.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2AcpiTableRev|3|UINT8|0x0001001A\r
\r
  ## This PCD defines initial setting of TCG2 Persistent Firmware Management Flags\r
  # PCD can be configured for different settings in different scenarios\r
  # This PCD follows UEFI TCG2 library definition bit of the BIOS TPM/Storage Management Flags<BR>\r
  #    BIT0  -  Reserved <BR>\r
  #    BIT1  -  TCG2_BIOS_TPM_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_PP_REQUIRED_FOR_CLEAR <BR>\r
  #    BIT2  -  Reserved <BR>\r
  #    BIT3  -  TCG2_LIB_PP_FLAG_RESET_TRACK <BR>\r
  #    BIT4  -  TCG2_BIOS_TPM_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_PP_REQUIRED_FOR_TURN_ON <BR>\r
  #    BIT5  -  TCG2_BIOS_TPM_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_PP_REQUIRED_FOR_TURN_OFF <BR>\r
  #    BIT6  -  TCG2_BIOS_TPM_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_PP_REQUIRED_FOR_CHANGE_EPS <BR>\r
  #    BIT7  -  TCG2_BIOS_TPM_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_PP_REQUIRED_FOR_CHANGE_PCRS <BR>\r
  #    BIT16 -  TCG2_BIOS_STORAGE_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_PP_REQUIRED_FOR_ENABLE_BLOCK_SID <BR>\r
  #    BIT17 -  TCG2_BIOS_STORAGE_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_PP_REQUIRED_FOR_DISABLE_BLOCK_SID <BR>\r
  #    BIT18 -  TCG2_BIOS_STORAGE_MANAGEMENT_FLAG_ENABLE_BLOCK_SID <BR>\r
  # @Prompt Initial setting of TCG2 Persistent Firmware Management Flags\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcg2PhysicalPresenceFlags|0x700E2|UINT32|0x0001001B\r
\r
  ## Indicate current TPM2 Interrupt Number reported by _CRS control method.<BR><BR>\r
  # TPM2 Interrupt feature is disabled If the pcd is set to 0.<BR>\r
  # @Prompt Current TPM2 Interrupt Number\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2CurrentIrqNum|0x00|UINT32|0x0001001C\r
\r
  ## Indicate platform possible TPM2 Interrupt Number reported by _PRS control method.<BR><BR>\r
  # Possible TPM2 Interrupt Number Buffer will not be reported if TPM2 Interrupt feature is disabled.<BR>\r
  # @Prompt Possible TPM2 Interrupt Number buffer\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2PossibleIrqNumBuf|{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}|VOID*|0x0001001D\r
\r
  ## Indicates if Opal DXE driver skip password prompt.<BR><BR>\r
  #   TRUE  - Skip password prompt.<BR>\r
  #   FALSE - Does not skip password prompt.<BR>\r
  # @Prompt Skip Opal DXE driver password prompt.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSkipOpalPasswordPrompt|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010020\r
\r
  ## Indicates if Hdd Password driver skip password prompt.<BR><BR>\r
  #   TRUE  - Skip password prompt.<BR>\r
  #   FALSE - Does not skip password prompt.<BR>\r
  # @Prompt Skip Hdd Password prompt.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSkipHddPasswordPrompt|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010021\r
\r
[PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]\r
\r
  ## This PCD indicates Hash mask for TPM 2.0. Bit definition strictly follows TCG Algorithm Registry.<BR><BR>\r
  #  If this bit is set, that means this algorithm is needed to extend to PCR.<BR>\r
  #  If this bit is clear, that means this algorithm is NOT needed to extend to PCR.<BR>\r
  #  If all the bits are clear, that means hash algorithm is determined by current Active PCR Banks.<BR>\r
  #    BIT0  -  SHA1.<BR>\r
  #    BIT1  -  SHA256.<BR>\r
  #    BIT2  -  SHA384.<BR>\r
  #    BIT3  -  SHA512.<BR>\r
  #    BIT4  -  SM3_256.<BR>\r
  # @Prompt Hash mask for TPM 2.0\r
  # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x0000001F\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2HashMask|0x0000001F|UINT32|0x00010010\r
\r
  ## This PCD indicated final BIOS supported Hash mask.\r
  #    Bios may choose to register a subset of PcdTpm2HashMask.\r
  #    So this PCD is final value of how many hash algo is extended to PCR.\r
  # If software HashLib(HashLibBaseCryptoRouter) solution is chosen, this PCD\r
  # has no need to be configured in platform dsc and will be set to correct\r
  # value by the HashLib instance according to the HashInstanceLib instances\r
  # linked, and the value of this PCD should be got in module entrypoint.\r
  # @Prompt Hash Algorithm bitmap.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcg2HashAlgorithmBitmap|0xFFFFFFFF|UINT32|0x00010016\r
\r
  ## This PCD indicates current active TPM interface type.\r
  #  According to TCG PTP spec 1.3, there are 3 types defined in TPM2_PTP_INTERFACE_TYPE.<BR>\r
  #  0x00 - FIFO interface as defined in TIS 1.3 is active.<BR>\r
  #  0x01 - FIFO interface as defined in PTP for TPM 2.0 is active.<BR>\r
  #  0x02 - CRB interface is active.<BR>\r
  #  0xFF - Contains no current active TPM interface type.<BR>\r
  #\r
  # @Prompt current active TPM interface type.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdActiveTpmInterfaceType|0xFF|UINT8|0x0001001E\r
\r
  ## This PCD records IdleBypass status supported by current active TPM interface.\r
  #  According to TCG PTP spec 1.3, TPM with CRB interface can skip idle state and\r
  #  directly move to CmdReady state. <BR>\r
  #  0x00 - Do not support IdleByPass.<BR>\r
  #  0x01 - Support IdleByPass.<BR>\r
  #  0xFF - IdleByPass State is not synced with TPM hardware.<BR>\r
  #\r
  # @Prompt IdleBypass status supported by current active TPM interface.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCRBIdleByPass|0xFF|UINT8|0x0001001F\r
\r
  ## This PCD records LAML field in TPM2 ACPI table.\r
  # @Prompt Tpm2AcpiTableLaml LAML field in TPM2 ACPI table.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2AcpiTableLaml|0|UINT32|0x00010022\r
\r
  ## This PCD records LASA field in TPM2 ACPI table.\r
  # @Prompt Tpm2AcpiTableLasa LASA field in TPM2 ACPI table.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpm2AcpiTableLasa|0|UINT64|0x00010023\r
\r
  ## This PCD records LAML field in CC EVENTLOG ACPI table.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCcEventlogAcpiTableLaml|0|UINT32|0x00010025\r
\r
  ## This PCD records LASA field in CC EVENTLOG ACPI table.\r
  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCcEventlogAcpiTableLasa|0|UINT64|0x00010026\r
\r
[PcdsFeatureFlag]\r
  ## Indicates if the platform requires PK to be self-signed when setting the PK in setup mode.\r
  #   TRUE  - Require PK to be self-signed.\r
  #   FALSE - Do not require PK to be self-signed.\r
  # @Prompt Require PK to be self-signed\r
  gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRequireSelfSignedPk|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x00010027\r
\r
[UserExtensions.TianoCore."ExtraFiles"]\r
  SecurityPkgExtra.uni\r