MdeModulePkg/Universal/SecurityStubDxe/SecurityStub.c

   1 /** @file
   2   This driver produces Security2 and Security architectural protocol based on SecurityManagementLib.
   3
   4   Copyright (c) 2006 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
   5   SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
   6
   7 **/
   8
   9
  10 #include <Uefi.h>
  11 #include <Protocol/Security.h>
  12 #include <Protocol/Security2.h>
  13 #include <Library/DebugLib.h>
  14 #include <Library/UefiBootServicesTableLib.h>
  15 #include <Library/UefiDriverEntryPoint.h>
  16 #include <Library/SecurityManagementLib.h>
  17 #include "Defer3rdPartyImageLoad.h"
  18
  19 //
  20 // Handle for the Security Architectural Protocol instance produced by this driver
  21 //
  22 EFI_HANDLE                  mSecurityArchProtocolHandle = NULL;
  23
  24 /**
  25   The EFI_SECURITY_ARCH_PROTOCOL (SAP) is used to abstract platform-specific
  26   policy from the DXE core response to an attempt to use a file that returns a
  27   given status for the authentication check from the section extraction protocol.
  28
  29   The possible responses in a given SAP implementation may include locking
  30   flash upon failure to authenticate, attestation logging for all signed drivers,
  31   and other exception operations.  The File parameter allows for possible logging
  32   within the SAP of the driver.
  33
  34   If File is NULL, then EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER is returned.
  35
  36   If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by
  37   AuthenticationStatus is safe for the DXE Core to use, then EFI_SUCCESS is returned.
  38
  39   If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by
  40   AuthenticationStatus is not safe for the DXE Core to use under any circumstances,
  41   then EFI_ACCESS_DENIED is returned.
  42
  43   If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by
  44   AuthenticationStatus is not safe for the DXE Core to use right now, but it
  45   might be possible to use it at a future time, then EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION is
  46   returned.
  47
  48   @param  This             The EFI_SECURITY_ARCH_PROTOCOL instance.
  49   @param  AuthenticationStatus
  50                            This is the authentication type returned from the Section
  51                            Extraction protocol. See the Section Extraction Protocol
  52                            Specification for details on this type.
  53   @param  File             This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is
  54                            being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.
  55
  56   @retval EFI_SUCCESS            Do nothing and return success.
  57   @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER  File is NULL.
  58 **/
  59 EFI_STATUS
  60 EFIAPI
  61 SecurityStubAuthenticateState (
  62   IN CONST EFI_SECURITY_ARCH_PROTOCOL  *This,
  63   IN UINT32                            AuthenticationStatus,
  64   IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL    *File
  65   )
  66 {
  67   EFI_STATUS Status;
  68
  69   Status = ExecuteSecurity2Handlers (EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_AUTHENTICATION_STATE,
  70                                    AuthenticationStatus,
  71                                    File,
  72                                    NULL,
  73                                    0,
  74                                    FALSE
  75                                    );
  76   if (Status == EFI_SUCCESS) {
  77     Status = ExecuteSecurityHandlers (AuthenticationStatus, File);
  78   }
  79
  80   return Status;
  81 }
  82
  83 /**
  84   The DXE Foundation uses this service to measure and/or verify a UEFI image.
  85
  86   This service abstracts the invocation of Trusted Computing Group (TCG) measured boot, UEFI
  87   Secure boot, and UEFI User Identity infrastructure. For the former two, the DXE Foundation
  88   invokes the FileAuthentication() with a DevicePath and corresponding image in
  89   FileBuffer memory. The TCG measurement code will record the FileBuffer contents into the
  90   appropriate PCR. The image verification logic will confirm the integrity and provenance of the
  91   image in FileBuffer of length FileSize . The origin of the image will be DevicePath in
  92   these cases.
  93   If the FileBuffer is NULL, the interface will determine if the DevicePath can be connected
  94   in order to support the User Identification policy.
  95
  96   @param  This             The EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL instance.
  97   @param  File             A pointer to the device path of the file that is
  98                            being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.
  99   @param  FileBuffer       A pointer to the buffer with the UEFI file image.
 100   @param  FileSize         The size of the file.
 101   @param  BootPolicy       A boot policy that was used to call LoadImage() UEFI service. If
 102                            FileAuthentication() is invoked not from the LoadImage(),
 103                            BootPolicy must be set to FALSE.
 104
 105   @retval EFI_SUCCESS             The file specified by DevicePath and non-NULL
 106                                   FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform policy dictates
 107                                   that the DXE Foundation may use the file.
 108   @retval EFI_SUCCESS             The device path specified by NULL device path DevicePath
 109                                   and non-NULL FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform
 110                                   policy dictates that the DXE Foundation may execute the image in
 111                                   FileBuffer.
 112   @retval EFI_SUCCESS             FileBuffer is NULL and current user has permission to start
 113                                   UEFI device drivers on the device path specified by DevicePath.
 114   @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION  The file specified by DevicePath and FileBuffer did not
 115                                   authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the file should be
 116                                   placed in the untrusted state. The image has been added to the file
 117                                   execution table.
 118   @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED       The file specified by File and FileBuffer did not
 119                                   authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE
 120                                   Foundation many not use File.
 121   @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION  FileBuffer is NULL and the user has no
 122                                   permission to start UEFI device drivers on the device path specified
 123                                   by DevicePath.
 124   @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION  FileBuffer is not NULL and the user has no permission to load
 125                                   drivers from the device path specified by DevicePath. The
 126                                   image has been added into the list of the deferred images.
 127 **/
 128 EFI_STATUS
 129 EFIAPI
 130 Security2StubAuthenticate (
 131   IN CONST EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL *This,
 132   IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL    *File,
 133   IN VOID                              *FileBuffer,
 134   IN UINTN                             FileSize,
 135   IN BOOLEAN                           BootPolicy
 136   )
 137 {
 138   EFI_STATUS                           Status;
 139
 140   if (FileBuffer != NULL) {
 141     Status = Defer3rdPartyImageLoad (File, BootPolicy);
 142     if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
 143       return Status;
 144     }
 145   }
 146
 147   return ExecuteSecurity2Handlers (EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_VERIFY_IMAGE |
 148                                    EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_DEFER_IMAGE_LOAD |
 149                                    EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_MEASURE_IMAGE |
 150                                    EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_CONNECT_POLICY,
 151                                    0,
 152                                    File,
 153                                    FileBuffer,
 154                                    FileSize,
 155                                    BootPolicy
 156                                    );
 157 }
 158
 159 //
 160 // Security2 and Security Architectural Protocol instance produced by this driver
 161 //
 162 EFI_SECURITY_ARCH_PROTOCOL  mSecurityStub = {
 163   SecurityStubAuthenticateState
 164 };
 165
 166 EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL mSecurity2Stub = {
 167   Security2StubAuthenticate
 168 };
 169
 170 /**
 171   Installs Security2 and Security Architectural Protocol.
 172
 173   @param  ImageHandle  The image handle of this driver.
 174   @param  SystemTable  A pointer to the EFI System Table.
 175
 176   @retval EFI_SUCCESS   Install the sample Security Architectural Protocol successfully.
 177
 178 **/
 179 EFI_STATUS
 180 EFIAPI
 181 SecurityStubInitialize (
 182   IN EFI_HANDLE        ImageHandle,
 183   IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE  *SystemTable
 184   )
 185 {
 186   EFI_STATUS  Status;
 187
 188   //
 189   // Make sure the Security Architectural Protocol is not already installed in the system
 190   //
 191   ASSERT_PROTOCOL_ALREADY_INSTALLED (NULL, &gEfiSecurity2ArchProtocolGuid);
 192   ASSERT_PROTOCOL_ALREADY_INSTALLED (NULL, &gEfiSecurityArchProtocolGuid);
 193
 194   //
 195   // Install the Security Architectural Protocol onto a new handle
 196   //
 197   Status = gBS->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (
 198                   &mSecurityArchProtocolHandle,
 199                   &gEfiSecurity2ArchProtocolGuid,
 200                   &mSecurity2Stub,
 201                   &gEfiSecurityArchProtocolGuid,
 202                   &mSecurityStub,
 203                   NULL
 204                   );
 205   ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
 206
 207   Defer3rdPartyImageLoadInitialize ();
 208
 209   return EFI_SUCCESS;
 210 }