2 Implement image verification services for secure boot service
4 Caution: This file requires additional review when modified.
5 This library will have external input - PE/COFF image.
6 This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like
7 buffer overflow, integer overflow.
9 DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead() function will make sure the PE/COFF image content
10 read is within the image buffer.
12 DxeImageVerificationHandler(), HashPeImageByType(), HashPeImage() function will accept
13 untrusted PE/COFF image and validate its data structure within this image buffer before use.
15 Copyright (c) 2009 - 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
16 This program and the accompanying materials
17 are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
18 which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
19 http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
21 THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
22 WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
26 #include "DxeImageVerificationLib.h"
29 // Caution: This is used by a function which may receive untrusted input.
30 // These global variables hold PE/COFF image data, and they should be validated before use.
32 EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION mNtHeader
;
33 UINT32 mPeCoffHeaderOffset
;
37 // Information on current PE/COFF image
40 UINT8
*mImageBase
= NULL
;
41 UINT8 mImageDigest
[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
];
42 UINTN mImageDigestSize
;
45 // Notify string for authorization UI.
47 CHAR16 mNotifyString1
[MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN
] = L
"Image verification pass but not found in authorized database!";
48 CHAR16 mNotifyString2
[MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN
] = L
"Launch this image anyway? (Yes/Defer/No)";
50 // Public Exponent of RSA Key.
52 CONST UINT8 mRsaE
[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };
56 // OID ASN.1 Value for Hash Algorithms
58 UINT8 mHashOidValue
[] = {
59 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A, // OBJ_sha1
60 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, // OBJ_sha224
61 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, // OBJ_sha256
62 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, // OBJ_sha384
63 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, // OBJ_sha512
66 HASH_TABLE mHash
[] = {
67 { L
"SHA1", 20, &mHashOidValue
[0], 5, Sha1GetContextSize
, Sha1Init
, Sha1Update
, Sha1Final
},
68 { L
"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue
[5], 9, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
},
69 { L
"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue
[14], 9, Sha256GetContextSize
, Sha256Init
, Sha256Update
, Sha256Final
},
70 { L
"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue
[23], 9, Sha384GetContextSize
, Sha384Init
, Sha384Update
, Sha384Final
},
71 { L
"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue
[32], 9, Sha512GetContextSize
, Sha512Init
, Sha512Update
, Sha512Final
}
75 SecureBoot Hook for processing image verification.
77 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.
78 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
79 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the
80 data, this value contains the required size.
81 @param[in] Data Data pointer.
87 IN CHAR16
*VariableName
,
88 IN EFI_GUID
*VendorGuid
,
94 Reads contents of a PE/COFF image in memory buffer.
96 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
97 PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will make sure the PE/COFF image content
98 read is within the image buffer.
100 @param FileHandle Pointer to the file handle to read the PE/COFF image.
101 @param FileOffset Offset into the PE/COFF image to begin the read operation.
102 @param ReadSize On input, the size in bytes of the requested read operation.
103 On output, the number of bytes actually read.
104 @param Buffer Output buffer that contains the data read from the PE/COFF image.
106 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The specified portion of the PE/COFF image was read and the size
110 DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead (
113 IN OUT UINTN
*ReadSize
,
119 if (FileHandle
== NULL
|| ReadSize
== NULL
|| Buffer
== NULL
) {
120 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
123 if (MAX_ADDRESS
- FileOffset
< *ReadSize
) {
124 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
127 EndPosition
= FileOffset
+ *ReadSize
;
128 if (EndPosition
> mImageSize
) {
129 *ReadSize
= (UINT32
)(mImageSize
- FileOffset
);
132 if (FileOffset
>= mImageSize
) {
136 CopyMem (Buffer
, (UINT8
*)((UINTN
) FileHandle
+ FileOffset
), *ReadSize
);
145 @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is
148 @return UINT32 Image Type
153 IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL
*File
157 EFI_HANDLE DeviceHandle
;
158 EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL
*TempDevicePath
;
159 EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL
*BlockIo
;
162 return IMAGE_UNKNOWN
;
166 // First check to see if File is from a Firmware Volume
169 TempDevicePath
= (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL
*) File
;
170 Status
= gBS
->LocateDevicePath (
171 &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid
,
175 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
176 Status
= gBS
->OpenProtocol (
178 &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid
,
182 EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_TEST_PROTOCOL
184 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
185 return IMAGE_FROM_FV
;
190 // Next check to see if File is from a Block I/O device
193 TempDevicePath
= (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL
*) File
;
194 Status
= gBS
->LocateDevicePath (
195 &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid
,
199 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
201 Status
= gBS
->OpenProtocol (
203 &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid
,
207 EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_GET_PROTOCOL
209 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status
) && BlockIo
!= NULL
) {
210 if (BlockIo
->Media
!= NULL
) {
211 if (BlockIo
->Media
->RemovableMedia
) {
213 // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is removable
215 return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA
;
218 // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is not removable
220 return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA
;
227 // File is not in a Firmware Volume or on a Block I/O device, so check to see if
228 // the device path supports the Simple File System Protocol.
231 TempDevicePath
= (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL
*) File
;
232 Status
= gBS
->LocateDevicePath (
233 &gEfiSimpleFileSystemProtocolGuid
,
237 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
239 // Simple File System is present without Block I/O, so assume media is fixed.
241 return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA
;
245 // File is not from an FV, Block I/O or Simple File System, so the only options
246 // left are a PCI Option ROM and a Load File Protocol such as a PXE Boot from a NIC.
248 TempDevicePath
= (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL
*) File
;
249 while (!IsDevicePathEndType (TempDevicePath
)) {
250 switch (DevicePathType (TempDevicePath
)) {
252 case MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH
:
253 if (DevicePathSubType (TempDevicePath
) == MEDIA_RELATIVE_OFFSET_RANGE_DP
) {
254 return IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM
;
258 case MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH
:
259 if (DevicePathSubType(TempDevicePath
) == MSG_MAC_ADDR_DP
) {
260 return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA
;
267 TempDevicePath
= NextDevicePathNode (TempDevicePath
);
269 return IMAGE_UNKNOWN
;
273 Calculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in
274 PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A
276 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
277 PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure
278 within this image buffer before use.
280 @param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type.
282 @retval TRUE Successfully hash image.
283 @retval FALSE Fail in hash image.
293 EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
*Section
;
298 UINTN SumOfBytesHashed
;
299 EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
*SectionHeader
;
303 UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes
;
306 SectionHeader
= NULL
;
309 if ((HashAlg
>= HASHALG_MAX
)) {
314 // Initialize context of hash.
316 ZeroMem (mImageDigest
, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
);
320 mImageDigestSize
= SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
;
321 mCertType
= gEfiCertSha1Guid
;
325 mImageDigestSize
= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
;
326 mCertType
= gEfiCertSha256Guid
;
330 mImageDigestSize
= SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE
;
331 mCertType
= gEfiCertSha384Guid
;
335 mImageDigestSize
= SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
;
336 mCertType
= gEfiCertSha512Guid
;
343 CtxSize
= mHash
[HashAlg
].GetContextSize();
345 HashCtx
= AllocatePool (CtxSize
);
346 if (HashCtx
== NULL
) {
350 // 1. Load the image header into memory.
352 // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context.
353 Status
= mHash
[HashAlg
].HashInit(HashCtx
);
360 // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;
361 // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded
363 if (mNtHeader
.Pe32
->FileHeader
.Machine
== IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64
&& mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.Magic
== EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
) {
365 // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value
366 // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the
367 // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
368 // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
370 Magic
= EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
;
373 // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header
375 Magic
= mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.Magic
;
379 // 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.
380 // 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.
382 HashBase
= mImageBase
;
383 if (Magic
== EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
) {
387 HashSize
= (UINTN
) ((UINT8
*) (&mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.CheckSum
) - HashBase
);
388 NumberOfRvaAndSizes
= mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.NumberOfRvaAndSizes
;
389 } else if (Magic
== EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
) {
393 HashSize
= (UINTN
) ((UINT8
*) (&mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.CheckSum
) - HashBase
);
394 NumberOfRvaAndSizes
= mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.NumberOfRvaAndSizes
;
397 // Invalid header magic number.
403 Status
= mHash
[HashAlg
].HashUpdate(HashCtx
, HashBase
, HashSize
);
409 // 5. Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).
411 if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes
<= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
) {
413 // 6. Since there is no Cert Directory in optional header, hash everything
414 // from the end of the checksum to the end of image header.
416 if (Magic
== EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
) {
420 HashBase
= (UINT8
*) &mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.CheckSum
+ sizeof (UINT32
);
421 HashSize
= mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.SizeOfHeaders
- (UINTN
) (HashBase
- mImageBase
);
426 HashBase
= (UINT8
*) &mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.CheckSum
+ sizeof (UINT32
);
427 HashSize
= mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.SizeOfHeaders
- (UINTN
) (HashBase
- mImageBase
);
431 Status
= mHash
[HashAlg
].HashUpdate(HashCtx
, HashBase
, HashSize
);
438 // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.
440 if (Magic
== EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
) {
444 HashBase
= (UINT8
*) &mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.CheckSum
+ sizeof (UINT32
);
445 HashSize
= (UINTN
) ((UINT8
*) (&mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.DataDirectory
[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
]) - HashBase
);
450 HashBase
= (UINT8
*) &mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.CheckSum
+ sizeof (UINT32
);
451 HashSize
= (UINTN
) ((UINT8
*) (&mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.DataDirectory
[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
]) - HashBase
);
455 Status
= mHash
[HashAlg
].HashUpdate(HashCtx
, HashBase
, HashSize
);
462 // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)
463 // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.
465 if (Magic
== EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
) {
469 HashBase
= (UINT8
*) &mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.DataDirectory
[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
+ 1];
470 HashSize
= mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.SizeOfHeaders
- (UINTN
) (HashBase
- mImageBase
);
475 HashBase
= (UINT8
*) &mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.DataDirectory
[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
+ 1];
476 HashSize
= mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.SizeOfHeaders
- (UINTN
) (HashBase
- mImageBase
);
480 Status
= mHash
[HashAlg
].HashUpdate(HashCtx
, HashBase
, HashSize
);
488 // 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header.
490 if (Magic
== EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
) {
494 SumOfBytesHashed
= mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.SizeOfHeaders
;
499 SumOfBytesHashed
= mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.SizeOfHeaders
;
503 Section
= (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
*) (
505 mPeCoffHeaderOffset
+
507 sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER
) +
508 mNtHeader
.Pe32
->FileHeader
.SizeOfOptionalHeader
512 // 11. Build a temporary table of pointers to all the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
513 // structures in the image. The 'NumberOfSections' field of the image
514 // header indicates how big the table should be. Do not include any
515 // IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.
517 SectionHeader
= (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
*) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
) * mNtHeader
.Pe32
->FileHeader
.NumberOfSections
);
518 if (SectionHeader
== NULL
) {
523 // 12. Using the 'PointerToRawData' in the referenced section headers as
524 // a key, arrange the elements in the table in ascending order. In other
525 // words, sort the section headers according to the disk-file offset of
528 for (Index
= 0; Index
< mNtHeader
.Pe32
->FileHeader
.NumberOfSections
; Index
++) {
530 while ((Pos
> 0) && (Section
->PointerToRawData
< SectionHeader
[Pos
- 1].PointerToRawData
)) {
531 CopyMem (&SectionHeader
[Pos
], &SectionHeader
[Pos
- 1], sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
));
534 CopyMem (&SectionHeader
[Pos
], Section
, sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
));
539 // 13. Walk through the sorted table, bring the corresponding section
540 // into memory, and hash the entire section (using the 'SizeOfRawData'
541 // field in the section header to determine the amount of data to hash).
542 // 14. Add the section's 'SizeOfRawData' to SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED .
543 // 15. Repeat steps 13 and 14 for all the sections in the sorted table.
545 for (Index
= 0; Index
< mNtHeader
.Pe32
->FileHeader
.NumberOfSections
; Index
++) {
546 Section
= &SectionHeader
[Index
];
547 if (Section
->SizeOfRawData
== 0) {
550 HashBase
= mImageBase
+ Section
->PointerToRawData
;
551 HashSize
= (UINTN
) Section
->SizeOfRawData
;
553 Status
= mHash
[HashAlg
].HashUpdate(HashCtx
, HashBase
, HashSize
);
558 SumOfBytesHashed
+= HashSize
;
562 // 16. If the file size is greater than SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED, there is extra
563 // data in the file that needs to be added to the hash. This data begins
564 // at file offset SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED and its length is:
565 // FileSize - (CertDirectory->Size)
567 if (mImageSize
> SumOfBytesHashed
) {
568 HashBase
= mImageBase
+ SumOfBytesHashed
;
570 if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes
<= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
) {
573 if (Magic
== EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
) {
577 CertSize
= mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.DataDirectory
[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
].Size
;
582 CertSize
= mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.DataDirectory
[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
].Size
;
586 if (mImageSize
> CertSize
+ SumOfBytesHashed
) {
587 HashSize
= (UINTN
) (mImageSize
- CertSize
- SumOfBytesHashed
);
589 Status
= mHash
[HashAlg
].HashUpdate(HashCtx
, HashBase
, HashSize
);
593 } else if (mImageSize
< CertSize
+ SumOfBytesHashed
) {
599 Status
= mHash
[HashAlg
].HashFinal(HashCtx
, mImageDigest
);
602 if (HashCtx
!= NULL
) {
605 if (SectionHeader
!= NULL
) {
606 FreePool (SectionHeader
);
612 Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and calculate hash of
613 Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in PE/COFF Specification
616 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
617 PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure
618 within this image buffer before use.
620 @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode Signature retrieved from signed image.
621 @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode Signature in bytes.
623 @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported.
624 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully.
630 IN UINTN AuthDataSize
635 for (Index
= 0; Index
< HASHALG_MAX
; Index
++) {
637 // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.
638 // According to PKCS#7 Definition:
639 // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
641 // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
642 // contentInfo ContentInfo,
644 // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing
645 // This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.
646 // Fixed offset (+32) is calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.
648 if ((*(AuthData
+ 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE
) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE
) {
650 // Only support two bytes of Long Form of Length Encoding.
655 if (AuthDataSize
< 32 + mHash
[Index
].OidLength
) {
656 return EFI_UNSUPPORTED
;
659 if (CompareMem (AuthData
+ 32, mHash
[Index
].OidValue
, mHash
[Index
].OidLength
) == 0) {
664 if (Index
== HASHALG_MAX
) {
665 return EFI_UNSUPPORTED
;
669 // HASH PE Image based on Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.
671 if (!HashPeImage(Index
)) {
672 return EFI_UNSUPPORTED
;
680 Returns the size of a given image execution info table in bytes.
682 This function returns the size, in bytes, of the image execution info table specified by
683 ImageExeInfoTable. If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL, then 0 is returned.
685 @param ImageExeInfoTable A pointer to a image execution info table structure.
687 @retval 0 If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL.
688 @retval Others The size of a image execution info table in bytes.
692 GetImageExeInfoTableSize (
693 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
*ImageExeInfoTable
697 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO
*ImageExeInfoItem
;
700 if (ImageExeInfoTable
== NULL
) {
704 ImageExeInfoItem
= (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO
*) ((UINT8
*) ImageExeInfoTable
+ sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
));
705 TotalSize
= sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
);
706 for (Index
= 0; Index
< ImageExeInfoTable
->NumberOfImages
; Index
++) {
707 TotalSize
+= ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32
*) &ImageExeInfoItem
->InfoSize
);
708 ImageExeInfoItem
= (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO
*) ((UINT8
*) ImageExeInfoItem
+ ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32
*) &ImageExeInfoItem
->InfoSize
));
715 Create signature list based on input signature data and certificate type GUID. Caller is reposible
716 to free new created SignatureList.
718 @param[in] SignatureData Signature data in SignatureList.
719 @param[in] SignatureDataSize Signature data size.
720 @param[in] CertType Certificate Type.
721 @param[out] SignatureList Created SignatureList.
722 @param[out] SignatureListSize Created SignatureListSize.
724 @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.
725 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successfully create signature list.
730 IN UINT8
*SignatureData
,
731 IN UINTN SignatureDataSize
,
732 IN EFI_GUID
*CertType
,
733 OUT EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
**SignatureList
,
734 OUT UINTN
*SignatureListSize
737 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*SignList
;
739 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*Signature
;
742 *SignatureList
= NULL
;
744 SignListSize
= sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
) - 1 + SignatureDataSize
;
745 SignList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) AllocateZeroPool (SignListSize
);
746 if (SignList
== NULL
) {
747 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
;
750 SignList
->SignatureHeaderSize
= 0;
751 SignList
->SignatureListSize
= (UINT32
) SignListSize
;
752 SignList
->SignatureSize
= (UINT32
) SignatureDataSize
+ sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
) - 1;
753 CopyMem (&SignList
->SignatureType
, CertType
, sizeof (EFI_GUID
));
755 DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO
, "SignatureDataSize %x\n", SignatureDataSize
));
756 Signature
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) SignList
+ sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
));
757 CopyMem (Signature
->SignatureData
, SignatureData
, SignatureDataSize
);
759 *SignatureList
= SignList
;
760 *SignatureListSize
= SignListSize
;
767 Create an Image Execution Information Table entry and add it to system configuration table.
769 @param[in] Action Describes the action taken by the firmware regarding this image.
770 @param[in] Name Input a null-terminated, user-friendly name.
771 @param[in] DevicePath Input device path pointer.
772 @param[in] Signature Input signature info in EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST data structure.
773 @param[in] SignatureSize Size of signature.
778 IN EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action
,
779 IN CHAR16
*Name OPTIONAL
,
780 IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL
*DevicePath
,
781 IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*Signature OPTIONAL
,
782 IN UINTN SignatureSize
785 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
*ImageExeInfoTable
;
786 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
*NewImageExeInfoTable
;
787 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO
*ImageExeInfoEntry
;
788 UINTN ImageExeInfoTableSize
;
789 UINTN NewImageExeInfoEntrySize
;
791 UINTN DevicePathSize
;
794 ImageExeInfoTable
= NULL
;
795 NewImageExeInfoTable
= NULL
;
796 ImageExeInfoEntry
= NULL
;
800 if (DevicePath
== NULL
) {
805 NameStringLen
= StrSize (Name
);
807 NameStringLen
= sizeof (CHAR16
);
810 EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, (VOID
**) &ImageExeInfoTable
);
811 if (ImageExeInfoTable
!= NULL
) {
813 // The table has been found!
814 // We must enlarge the table to accomodate the new exe info entry.
816 ImageExeInfoTableSize
= GetImageExeInfoTableSize (ImageExeInfoTable
);
820 // We should create a new table to append to the configuration table.
822 ImageExeInfoTableSize
= sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
);
825 DevicePathSize
= GetDevicePathSize (DevicePath
);
828 // Signature size can be odd. Pad after signature to ensure next EXECUTION_INFO entry align
830 NewImageExeInfoEntrySize
= sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO
) + NameStringLen
+ DevicePathSize
+ SignatureSize
;
832 NewImageExeInfoTable
= (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
*) AllocateRuntimePool (ImageExeInfoTableSize
+ NewImageExeInfoEntrySize
);
833 if (NewImageExeInfoTable
== NULL
) {
837 if (ImageExeInfoTable
!= NULL
) {
838 CopyMem (NewImageExeInfoTable
, ImageExeInfoTable
, ImageExeInfoTableSize
);
840 NewImageExeInfoTable
->NumberOfImages
= 0;
842 NewImageExeInfoTable
->NumberOfImages
++;
843 ImageExeInfoEntry
= (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO
*) ((UINT8
*) NewImageExeInfoTable
+ ImageExeInfoTableSize
);
845 // Update new item's information.
847 WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32
*) ImageExeInfoEntry
, Action
);
848 WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32
*) ((UINT8
*) ImageExeInfoEntry
+ sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION
)), (UINT32
) NewImageExeInfoEntrySize
);
850 NameStr
= (CHAR16
*)(ImageExeInfoEntry
+ 1);
852 CopyMem ((UINT8
*) NameStr
, Name
, NameStringLen
);
854 ZeroMem ((UINT8
*) NameStr
, sizeof (CHAR16
));
858 (UINT8
*) NameStr
+ NameStringLen
,
862 if (Signature
!= NULL
) {
864 (UINT8
*) NameStr
+ NameStringLen
+ DevicePathSize
,
870 // Update/replace the image execution table.
872 gBS
->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, (VOID
*) NewImageExeInfoTable
);
875 // Free Old table data!
877 if (ImageExeInfoTable
!= NULL
) {
878 FreePool (ImageExeInfoTable
);
883 Check whether the hash of an given X.509 certificate is in forbidden database (DBX).
885 @param[in] Certificate Pointer to X.509 Certificate that is searched for.
886 @param[in] CertSize Size of X.509 Certificate.
887 @param[in] SignatureList Pointer to the Signature List in forbidden database.
888 @param[in] SignatureListSize Size of Signature List.
889 @param[out] RevocationTime Return the time that the certificate was revoked.
891 @return TRUE The certificate hash is found in the forbidden database.
892 @return FALSE The certificate hash is not found in the forbidden database.
896 IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (
897 IN UINT8
*Certificate
,
899 IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*SignatureList
,
900 IN UINTN SignatureListSize
,
901 OUT EFI_TIME
*RevocationTime
906 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*DbxList
;
908 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*CertHash
;
913 UINT8 CertDigest
[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
];
915 UINTN SiglistHeaderSize
;
920 DbxList
= SignatureList
;
921 DbxSize
= SignatureListSize
;
923 HashAlg
= HASHALG_MAX
;
925 if ((RevocationTime
== NULL
) || (DbxList
== NULL
)) {
930 // Retrieve the TBSCertificate from the X.509 Certificate.
932 if (!X509GetTBSCert (Certificate
, CertSize
, &TBSCert
, &TBSCertSize
)) {
936 while ((DbxSize
> 0) && (SignatureListSize
>= DbxList
->SignatureListSize
)) {
938 // Determine Hash Algorithm of Certificate in the forbidden database.
940 if (CompareGuid (&DbxList
->SignatureType
, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid
)) {
941 HashAlg
= HASHALG_SHA256
;
942 } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList
->SignatureType
, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid
)) {
943 HashAlg
= HASHALG_SHA384
;
944 } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList
->SignatureType
, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid
)) {
945 HashAlg
= HASHALG_SHA512
;
947 DbxSize
-= DbxList
->SignatureListSize
;
948 DbxList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) ((UINT8
*) DbxList
+ DbxList
->SignatureListSize
);
953 // Calculate the hash value of current TBSCertificate for comparision.
955 if (mHash
[HashAlg
].GetContextSize
== NULL
) {
958 ZeroMem (CertDigest
, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
);
959 HashCtx
= AllocatePool (mHash
[HashAlg
].GetContextSize ());
960 if (HashCtx
== NULL
) {
963 Status
= mHash
[HashAlg
].HashInit (HashCtx
);
967 Status
= mHash
[HashAlg
].HashUpdate (HashCtx
, TBSCert
, TBSCertSize
);
971 Status
= mHash
[HashAlg
].HashFinal (HashCtx
, CertDigest
);
976 SiglistHeaderSize
= sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + DbxList
->SignatureHeaderSize
;
977 CertHash
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) DbxList
+ SiglistHeaderSize
);
978 CertHashCount
= (DbxList
->SignatureListSize
- SiglistHeaderSize
) / DbxList
->SignatureSize
;
979 for (Index
= 0; Index
< CertHashCount
; Index
++) {
981 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.
983 DbxCertHash
= CertHash
->SignatureData
;
984 if (CompareMem (DbxCertHash
, CertDigest
, mHash
[HashAlg
].DigestLength
) == 0) {
986 // Hash of Certificate is found in forbidden database.
991 // Return the revocation time.
993 CopyMem (RevocationTime
, (EFI_TIME
*)(DbxCertHash
+ mHash
[HashAlg
].DigestLength
), sizeof (EFI_TIME
));
996 CertHash
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) CertHash
+ DbxList
->SignatureSize
);
999 DbxSize
-= DbxList
->SignatureListSize
;
1000 DbxList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) ((UINT8
*) DbxList
+ DbxList
->SignatureListSize
);
1004 if (HashCtx
!= NULL
) {
1012 Check whether signature is in specified database.
1014 @param[in] VariableName Name of database variable that is searched in.
1015 @param[in] Signature Pointer to signature that is searched for.
1016 @param[in] CertType Pointer to hash algrithom.
1017 @param[in] SignatureSize Size of Signature.
1019 @return TRUE Found the signature in the variable database.
1020 @return FALSE Not found the signature in the variable database.
1024 IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (
1025 IN CHAR16
*VariableName
,
1026 IN UINT8
*Signature
,
1027 IN EFI_GUID
*CertType
,
1028 IN UINTN SignatureSize
1032 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*CertList
;
1033 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*Cert
;
1041 // Read signature database variable.
1046 Status
= gRT
->GetVariable (VariableName
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, NULL
, &DataSize
, NULL
);
1047 if (Status
!= EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
) {
1051 Data
= (UINT8
*) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize
);
1056 Status
= gRT
->GetVariable (VariableName
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, NULL
, &DataSize
, Data
);
1057 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
1061 // Enumerate all signature data in SigDB to check if executable's signature exists.
1063 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) Data
;
1064 while ((DataSize
> 0) && (DataSize
>= CertList
->SignatureListSize
)) {
1065 CertCount
= (CertList
->SignatureListSize
- sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) - CertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
) / CertList
->SignatureSize
;
1066 Cert
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) CertList
+ sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + CertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
);
1067 if ((CertList
->SignatureSize
== sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
) - 1 + SignatureSize
) && (CompareGuid(&CertList
->SignatureType
, CertType
))) {
1068 for (Index
= 0; Index
< CertCount
; Index
++) {
1069 if (CompareMem (Cert
->SignatureData
, Signature
, SignatureSize
) == 0) {
1071 // Find the signature in database.
1074 SecureBootHook (VariableName
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, CertList
->SignatureSize
, Cert
);
1078 Cert
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) Cert
+ CertList
->SignatureSize
);
1086 DataSize
-= CertList
->SignatureListSize
;
1087 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) ((UINT8
*) CertList
+ CertList
->SignatureListSize
);
1099 Check whether the timestamp is valid by comparing the signing time and the revocation time.
1101 @param SigningTime A pointer to the signing time.
1102 @param RevocationTime A pointer to the revocation time.
1104 @retval TRUE The SigningTime is not later than the RevocationTime.
1105 @retval FALSE The SigningTime is later than the RevocationTime.
1109 IsValidSignatureByTimestamp (
1110 IN EFI_TIME
*SigningTime
,
1111 IN EFI_TIME
*RevocationTime
1114 if (SigningTime
->Year
!= RevocationTime
->Year
) {
1115 return (BOOLEAN
) (SigningTime
->Year
< RevocationTime
->Year
);
1116 } else if (SigningTime
->Month
!= RevocationTime
->Month
) {
1117 return (BOOLEAN
) (SigningTime
->Month
< RevocationTime
->Month
);
1118 } else if (SigningTime
->Day
!= RevocationTime
->Day
) {
1119 return (BOOLEAN
) (SigningTime
->Day
< RevocationTime
->Day
);
1120 } else if (SigningTime
->Hour
!= RevocationTime
->Hour
) {
1121 return (BOOLEAN
) (SigningTime
->Hour
< RevocationTime
->Hour
);
1122 } else if (SigningTime
->Minute
!= RevocationTime
->Minute
) {
1123 return (BOOLEAN
) (SigningTime
->Minute
< RevocationTime
->Minute
);
1126 return (BOOLEAN
) (SigningTime
->Second
<= RevocationTime
->Second
);
1130 Check if the given time value is zero.
1132 @param[in] Time Pointer of a time value.
1134 @retval TRUE The Time is Zero.
1135 @retval FALSE The Time is not Zero.
1143 if ((Time
->Year
== 0) && (Time
->Month
== 0) && (Time
->Day
== 0) &&
1144 (Time
->Hour
== 0) && (Time
->Minute
== 0) && (Time
->Second
== 0)) {
1152 Record multiple certificate list & verification state of a verified image to
1153 IMAGE_EXECUTION_TABLE.
1155 @param[in] CertBuf Certificate list buffer.
1156 @param[in] CertBufLength Certificate list buffer.
1157 @param[in] Action Certificate list action to be record.
1158 @param[in] ImageName Image name.
1159 @param[in] ImageDevicePath Image device path.
1163 RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(
1165 IN UINTN CertBufLength
,
1166 IN EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action
,
1167 IN CHAR16
*ImageName OPTIONAL
,
1168 IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL
*ImageDevicePath OPTIONAL
1177 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*SignatureList
;
1178 UINTN SignatureListSize
;
1180 CertNumber
= (UINT8
) (*CertBuf
);
1181 CertPtr
= CertBuf
+ 1;
1182 for (Index
= 0; Index
< CertNumber
; Index
++) {
1183 CertSize
= (UINTN
) ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32
*)CertPtr
);
1184 Cert
= (UINT8
*)CertPtr
+ sizeof (UINT32
);
1187 // Record all cert in cert chain to be passed
1189 Status
= CreateSignatureList(Cert
, CertSize
, &gEfiCertX509Guid
, &SignatureList
, &SignatureListSize
);
1190 if (!EFI_ERROR(Status
)) {
1191 AddImageExeInfo (Action
, ImageName
, ImageDevicePath
, SignatureList
, SignatureListSize
);
1192 FreePool (SignatureList
);
1199 Check whether the timestamp signature is valid and the signing time is also earlier than
1200 the revocation time.
1202 @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from signed image.
1203 @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.
1204 @param[in] RevocationTime The time that the certificate was revoked.
1206 @retval TRUE Timestamp signature is valid and signing time is no later than the
1208 @retval FALSE Timestamp signature is not valid or the signing time is later than the
1213 PassTimestampCheck (
1215 IN UINTN AuthDataSize
,
1216 IN EFI_TIME
*RevocationTime
1220 BOOLEAN VerifyStatus
;
1221 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*CertList
;
1222 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*Cert
;
1229 EFI_TIME SigningTime
;
1232 // Variable Initialization
1234 VerifyStatus
= FALSE
;
1242 // If RevocationTime is zero, the certificate shall be considered to always be revoked.
1244 if (IsTimeZero (RevocationTime
)) {
1249 // RevocationTime is non-zero, the certificate should be considered to be revoked from that time and onwards.
1250 // Using the dbt to get the trusted TSA certificates.
1253 Status
= gRT
->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, NULL
, &DbtDataSize
, NULL
);
1254 if (Status
!= EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
) {
1257 DbtData
= (UINT8
*) AllocateZeroPool (DbtDataSize
);
1258 if (DbtData
== NULL
) {
1261 Status
= gRT
->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, NULL
, &DbtDataSize
, (VOID
*) DbtData
);
1262 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
1266 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) DbtData
;
1267 while ((DbtDataSize
> 0) && (DbtDataSize
>= CertList
->SignatureListSize
)) {
1268 if (CompareGuid (&CertList
->SignatureType
, &gEfiCertX509Guid
)) {
1269 Cert
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) CertList
+ sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + CertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
);
1270 CertCount
= (CertList
->SignatureListSize
- sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) - CertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
) / CertList
->SignatureSize
;
1271 for (Index
= 0; Index
< CertCount
; Index
++) {
1273 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.
1275 RootCert
= Cert
->SignatureData
;
1276 RootCertSize
= CertList
->SignatureSize
- sizeof (EFI_GUID
);
1278 // Get the signing time if the timestamp signature is valid.
1280 if (ImageTimestampVerify (AuthData
, AuthDataSize
, RootCert
, RootCertSize
, &SigningTime
)) {
1282 // The signer signature is valid only when the signing time is earlier than revocation time.
1284 if (IsValidSignatureByTimestamp (&SigningTime
, RevocationTime
)) {
1285 VerifyStatus
= TRUE
;
1289 Cert
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) Cert
+ CertList
->SignatureSize
);
1292 DbtDataSize
-= CertList
->SignatureListSize
;
1293 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) ((UINT8
*) CertList
+ CertList
->SignatureListSize
);
1297 if (DbtData
!= NULL
) {
1301 return VerifyStatus
;
1305 Check whether the image signature is forbidden by the forbidden database (dbx).
1306 The image is forbidden to load if any certificates for signing are revoked before signing time.
1308 @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from the signed image.
1309 @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.
1310 @param[in] IsAuditMode Whether system Secure Boot Mode is in AuditMode.
1311 @param[in] ImageName Name of the image to verify.
1312 @param[in] ImageDevicePath DevicePath of the image to verify.
1314 @retval TRUE Image is forbidden by dbx.
1315 @retval FALSE Image is not forbidden by dbx.
1321 IN UINTN AuthDataSize
,
1322 IN BOOLEAN IsAuditMode
,
1323 IN CHAR16
*ImageName OPTIONAL
,
1324 IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL
*ImageDevicePath OPTIONAL
1328 BOOLEAN IsForbidden
;
1331 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*CertList
;
1333 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*CertData
;
1341 UINTN TrustedCertLength
;
1346 EFI_TIME RevocationTime
;
1348 UINTN SignerCertLength
;
1350 UINTN UnchainCertLength
;
1352 // Variable Initialization
1354 IsForbidden
= FALSE
;
1364 TrustedCertLength
= 0;
1366 SignerCertLength
= 0;
1368 UnchainCertLength
= 0;
1371 // The image will not be forbidden if dbx can't be got.
1374 Status
= gRT
->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, NULL
, &DataSize
, NULL
);
1375 if (Status
!= EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
) {
1378 Data
= (UINT8
*) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize
);
1383 Status
= gRT
->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, NULL
, &DataSize
, (VOID
*) Data
);
1384 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
1389 // Verify image signature with RAW X509 certificates in DBX database.
1390 // If passed, the image will be forbidden.
1392 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) Data
;
1393 CertListSize
= DataSize
;
1394 while ((CertListSize
> 0) && (CertListSize
>= CertList
->SignatureListSize
)) {
1395 if (CompareGuid (&CertList
->SignatureType
, &gEfiCertX509Guid
)) {
1396 CertData
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) CertList
+ sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + CertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
);
1397 CertCount
= (CertList
->SignatureListSize
- sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) - CertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
) / CertList
->SignatureSize
;
1399 for (Index
= 0; Index
< CertCount
; Index
++) {
1401 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.
1403 RootCert
= CertData
->SignatureData
;
1404 RootCertSize
= CertList
->SignatureSize
- sizeof (EFI_GUID
);
1407 // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.
1409 IsForbidden
= AuthenticodeVerify (
1418 SecureBootHook (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, CertList
->SignatureSize
, CertData
);
1422 CertData
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) CertData
+ CertList
->SignatureSize
);
1426 CertListSize
-= CertList
->SignatureListSize
;
1427 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) ((UINT8
*) CertList
+ CertList
->SignatureListSize
);
1431 // Check X.509 Certificate Hash & Possible Timestamp.
1435 // Retrieve the certificate stack from AuthData
1436 // The output CertStack format will be:
1437 // UINT8 CertNumber;
1438 // UINT32 Cert1Length;
1440 // UINT32 Cert2Length;
1443 // UINT32 CertnLength;
1446 Pkcs7GetSigners (AuthData
, AuthDataSize
, &CertBuffer
, &BufferLength
, &TrustedCert
, &TrustedCertLength
);
1447 if ((BufferLength
== 0) || (CertBuffer
== NULL
)) {
1453 // Check if any hash of certificates embedded in AuthData is in the forbidden database.
1455 CertNumber
= (UINT8
) (*CertBuffer
);
1456 CertPtr
= CertBuffer
+ 1;
1457 for (Index
= 0; Index
< CertNumber
; Index
++) {
1458 CertSize
= (UINTN
) ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32
*)CertPtr
);
1459 Cert
= (UINT8
*)CertPtr
+ sizeof (UINT32
);
1461 if (IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (Cert
, CertSize
, (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*)Data
, DataSize
, &RevocationTime
)) {
1463 // Check the timestamp signature and signing time to determine if the image can be trusted.
1466 if (PassTimestampCheck (AuthData
, AuthDataSize
, &RevocationTime
)) {
1467 IsForbidden
= FALSE
;
1472 CertPtr
= CertPtr
+ sizeof (UINT32
) + CertSize
;
1476 if (IsForbidden
&& IsAuditMode
) {
1477 Pkcs7GetCertificatesList(AuthData
, AuthDataSize
, &SignerCert
, &SignerCertLength
, &UnchainCert
, &UnchainCertLength
);
1480 // Record all certs in image to be failed
1482 if ((SignerCertLength
!= 0) && (SignerCert
!= NULL
)) {
1483 RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(
1486 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED
| EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED
,
1492 if ((UnchainCertLength
!= 0) && (UnchainCert
!= NULL
)) {
1493 RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(
1496 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED
| EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED
,
1507 Pkcs7FreeSigners (CertBuffer
);
1508 Pkcs7FreeSigners (TrustedCert
);
1509 Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCert
);
1510 Pkcs7FreeSigners (UnchainCert
);
1517 Check whether the image signature can be verified by the trusted certificates in DB database.
1519 @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from signed image.
1520 @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.
1521 @param[in] IsAuditMode Whether system Secure Boot Mode is in AuditMode.
1522 @param[in] ImageName Name of the image to verify.
1523 @param[in] ImageDevicePath DevicePath of the image to verify.
1525 @retval TRUE Image passed verification using certificate in db.
1526 @retval FALSE Image didn't pass verification using certificate in db.
1532 IN UINTN AuthDataSize
,
1533 IN BOOLEAN IsAuditMode
,
1534 IN CHAR16
*ImageName OPTIONAL
,
1535 IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL
*ImageDevicePath OPTIONAL
1539 BOOLEAN VerifyStatus
;
1540 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*CertList
;
1541 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*CertData
;
1550 EFI_TIME RevocationTime
;
1552 UINTN SignerCertLength
;
1554 UINTN UnchainCertLength
;
1562 VerifyStatus
= FALSE
;
1564 SignerCertLength
= 0;
1566 UnchainCertLength
= 0;
1569 Status
= gRT
->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, NULL
, &DataSize
, NULL
);
1570 if (Status
== EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
) {
1571 Data
= (UINT8
*) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize
);
1573 return VerifyStatus
;
1576 Status
= gRT
->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, NULL
, &DataSize
, (VOID
*) Data
);
1577 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
1582 // Find X509 certificate in Signature List to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.
1584 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) Data
;
1585 while ((DataSize
> 0) && (DataSize
>= CertList
->SignatureListSize
)) {
1586 if (CompareGuid (&CertList
->SignatureType
, &gEfiCertX509Guid
)) {
1587 CertData
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) CertList
+ sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + CertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
);
1588 CertCount
= (CertList
->SignatureListSize
- sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) - CertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
) / CertList
->SignatureSize
;
1590 for (Index
= 0; Index
< CertCount
; Index
++) {
1592 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.
1594 RootCert
= CertData
->SignatureData
;
1595 RootCertSize
= CertList
->SignatureSize
- sizeof (EFI_GUID
);
1598 // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.
1600 VerifyStatus
= AuthenticodeVerify (
1610 // Here We still need to check if this RootCert's Hash is revoked
1612 Status
= gRT
->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, NULL
, &DbxDataSize
, NULL
);
1613 if (Status
== EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
) {
1616 DbxData
= (UINT8
*) AllocateZeroPool (DbxDataSize
);
1617 if (DbxData
== NULL
) {
1621 Status
= gRT
->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, NULL
, &DbxDataSize
, (VOID
*) DbxData
);
1622 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
1626 if (IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (RootCert
, RootCertSize
, (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*)DbxData
, DbxDataSize
, &RevocationTime
)) {
1628 // Check the timestamp signature and signing time to determine if the image can be trusted.
1630 VerifyStatus
= PassTimestampCheck (AuthData
, AuthDataSize
, &RevocationTime
);
1636 CertData
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) CertData
+ CertList
->SignatureSize
);
1640 DataSize
-= CertList
->SignatureListSize
;
1641 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) ((UINT8
*) CertList
+ CertList
->SignatureListSize
);
1648 SecureBootHook (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, CertList
->SignatureSize
, CertData
);
1653 Pkcs7GetCertificatesList(AuthData
, AuthDataSize
, &SignerCert
, &SignerCertLength
, &UnchainCert
, &UnchainCertLength
);
1655 if ((SignerCertLength
!= 0) && (SignerCert
!= NULL
)) {
1657 // Record all cert in signer's cert chain to be passed
1659 RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(
1662 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED
| EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED
,
1668 if ((UnchainCertLength
!= 0) && (UnchainCert
!= NULL
)) {
1670 // Record all certs in unchained certificates lists to be failed
1672 RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(
1675 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED
| EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED
,
1682 // Record all certs in image to be failed
1684 if ((SignerCertLength
!= 0) && (SignerCert
!= NULL
)) {
1685 RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(
1688 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED
| EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED
,
1694 if ((UnchainCertLength
!= 0) && (UnchainCert
!= NULL
)) {
1695 RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(
1698 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED
| EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED
,
1710 if (DbxData
!= NULL
) {
1714 Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCert
);
1715 Pkcs7FreeSigners (UnchainCert
);
1717 return VerifyStatus
;
1721 Provide verification service for signed images in AuditMode, which include both signature validation
1722 and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and
1723 MSFT Authenticode type signatures are supported.
1725 In this implementation, only verify external executables when in AuditMode.
1726 Executables from FV is bypass, so pass in AuthenticationStatus is ignored. Other authentication status
1727 are record into IMAGE_EXECUTION_TABLE.
1729 The image verification policy is:
1730 If the image is signed,
1731 At least one valid signature or at least one hash value of the image must match a record
1732 in the security database "db", and no valid signature nor any hash value of the image may
1733 be reflected in the security database "dbx".
1734 Otherwise, the image is not signed,
1735 The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database "db", and
1736 not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".
1738 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
1739 PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure
1740 within this image buffer before use.
1742 @param[in] AuthenticationStatus
1743 This is the authentication status returned from the security
1744 measurement services for the input file.
1745 @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is
1746 being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.
1747 @param[in] FileBuffer File buffer matches the input file device path.
1748 @param[in] FileSize Size of File buffer matches the input file device path.
1749 @param[in] BootPolicy A boot policy that was used to call LoadImage() UEFI service.
1751 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The authenticate info is sucessfully stored for the file
1752 specified by DevicePath and non-NULL FileBuffer
1753 @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File and FileBuffer did not
1754 authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE
1755 Foundation many not use File.
1760 ImageVerificationInAuditMode (
1761 IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus
,
1762 IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL
*File
,
1763 IN VOID
*FileBuffer
,
1765 IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy
1770 EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER
*DosHdr
;
1771 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*SignatureList
;
1772 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action
;
1773 WIN_CERTIFICATE
*WinCertificate
;
1775 PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext
;
1776 UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes
;
1777 WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS
*PkcsCertData
;
1778 WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID
*WinCertUefiGuid
;
1781 EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY
*SecDataDir
;
1783 CHAR16
*FilePathStr
;
1784 UINTN SignatureListSize
;
1786 SignatureList
= NULL
;
1787 WinCertificate
= NULL
;
1789 PkcsCertData
= NULL
;
1791 Action
= EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED
| EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED
;
1792 Status
= EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
;
1796 // Check the image type and get policy setting.
1798 switch (GetImageType (File
)) {
1801 Policy
= ALWAYS_EXECUTE
;
1804 case IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM
:
1805 Policy
= PcdGet32 (PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy
);
1808 case IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA
:
1809 Policy
= PcdGet32 (PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy
);
1812 case IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA
:
1813 Policy
= PcdGet32 (PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy
);
1817 Policy
= DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
;
1822 // If policy is always/never execute, return directly.
1824 if (Policy
== ALWAYS_EXECUTE
) {
1829 // Get Image Device Path Str
1831 FilePathStr
= ConvertDevicePathToText (File
, FALSE
, TRUE
);
1834 // Authentication failed because of (unspecified) firmware security policy
1836 if (Policy
== NEVER_EXECUTE
) {
1838 // No signature, record FilePath/FilePathStr only
1840 AddImageExeInfo (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_POLICY_FAILED
| EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED
, FilePathStr
, File
, NULL
, 0);
1845 // The policy QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
1846 // violates the UEFI spec and has been removed.
1848 ASSERT (Policy
!= QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
&& Policy
!= ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
);
1849 if (Policy
== QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
|| Policy
== ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
) {
1854 // Read the Dos header.
1856 if (FileBuffer
== NULL
) {
1857 Status
= EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
1861 mImageBase
= (UINT8
*) FileBuffer
;
1862 mImageSize
= FileSize
;
1864 ZeroMem (&ImageContext
, sizeof (ImageContext
));
1865 ImageContext
.Handle
= (VOID
*) FileBuffer
;
1866 ImageContext
.ImageRead
= (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE
) DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead
;
1869 // Get information about the image being loaded
1871 Status
= PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo (&ImageContext
);
1872 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
1874 // The information can't be got from the invalid PeImage
1880 DosHdr
= (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER
*) mImageBase
;
1881 if (DosHdr
->e_magic
== EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE
) {
1883 // DOS image header is present,
1884 // so read the PE header after the DOS image header.
1886 mPeCoffHeaderOffset
= DosHdr
->e_lfanew
;
1888 mPeCoffHeaderOffset
= 0;
1892 // Check PE/COFF image.
1894 mNtHeader
.Pe32
= (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32
*) (mImageBase
+ mPeCoffHeaderOffset
);
1895 if (mNtHeader
.Pe32
->Signature
!= EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE
) {
1897 // It is not a valid Pe/Coff file.
1899 Status
= EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
;
1903 if (mNtHeader
.Pe32
->FileHeader
.Machine
== IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64
&& mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.Magic
== EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
) {
1905 // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value
1906 // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the
1907 // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
1908 // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
1910 Magic
= EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
;
1913 // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header
1915 Magic
= mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.Magic
;
1918 if (Magic
== EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
) {
1922 NumberOfRvaAndSizes
= mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.NumberOfRvaAndSizes
;
1923 if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes
> EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
) {
1924 SecDataDir
= (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY
*) &mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.DataDirectory
[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
];
1928 // Use PE32+ offset.
1930 NumberOfRvaAndSizes
= mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.NumberOfRvaAndSizes
;
1931 if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes
> EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
) {
1932 SecDataDir
= (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY
*) &mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.DataDirectory
[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
];
1937 // Start Image Validation.
1939 if (SecDataDir
== NULL
|| SecDataDir
->Size
== 0) {
1941 // This image is not signed. The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database "db",
1942 // and not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".
1944 if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256
)) {
1945 Status
= EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
;
1950 // Image Hash is in forbidden database (DBX).
1952 if (!IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1
, mImageDigest
, &mCertType
, mImageDigestSize
)) {
1954 // Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).
1956 if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE
, mImageDigest
, &mCertType
, mImageDigestSize
)) {
1957 Action
= EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED
| EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED
;
1962 // Add HASH digest for image without signature
1964 Status
= CreateSignatureList(mImageDigest
, mImageDigestSize
, &mCertType
, &SignatureList
, &SignatureListSize
);
1965 if (!EFI_ERROR(Status
)) {
1966 AddImageExeInfo (Action
, FilePathStr
, File
, SignatureList
, SignatureListSize
);
1967 FreePool (SignatureList
);
1973 // Verify the signature of the image, multiple signatures are allowed as per PE/COFF Section 4.7
1974 // "Attribute Certificate Table".
1975 // The first certificate starts at offset (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress) from the start of the file.
1977 for (OffSet
= SecDataDir
->VirtualAddress
;
1978 OffSet
< (SecDataDir
->VirtualAddress
+ SecDataDir
->Size
);
1979 OffSet
+= (WinCertificate
->dwLength
+ ALIGN_SIZE (WinCertificate
->dwLength
))) {
1980 WinCertificate
= (WIN_CERTIFICATE
*) (mImageBase
+ OffSet
);
1981 if ((SecDataDir
->VirtualAddress
+ SecDataDir
->Size
- OffSet
) <= sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE
) ||
1982 (SecDataDir
->VirtualAddress
+ SecDataDir
->Size
- OffSet
) < WinCertificate
->dwLength
) {
1987 // Verify the image's Authenticode signature, only DER-encoded PKCS#7 signed data is supported.
1989 if (WinCertificate
->wCertificateType
== WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA
) {
1991 // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS which is described in the
1992 // Authenticode specification.
1994 PkcsCertData
= (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS
*) WinCertificate
;
1995 if (PkcsCertData
->Hdr
.dwLength
<= sizeof (PkcsCertData
->Hdr
)) {
1998 AuthData
= PkcsCertData
->CertData
;
1999 AuthDataSize
= PkcsCertData
->Hdr
.dwLength
- sizeof(PkcsCertData
->Hdr
);
2000 } else if (WinCertificate
->wCertificateType
== WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID
) {
2002 // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID which is described in UEFI Spec.
2004 WinCertUefiGuid
= (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID
*) WinCertificate
;
2005 if (WinCertUefiGuid
->Hdr
.dwLength
<= OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID
, CertData
)) {
2008 if (!CompareGuid (&WinCertUefiGuid
->CertType
, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid
)) {
2011 AuthData
= WinCertUefiGuid
->CertData
;
2012 AuthDataSize
= WinCertUefiGuid
->Hdr
.dwLength
- OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID
, CertData
);
2014 if (WinCertificate
->dwLength
< sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE
)) {
2020 Status
= HashPeImageByType (AuthData
, AuthDataSize
);
2021 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
2025 Action
= EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED
| EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED
;
2028 // Check the digital signature against the revoked certificate in forbidden database (dbx).
2029 // Check the digital signature against the valid certificate in allowed database (db).
2031 if (!IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData
, AuthDataSize
, TRUE
, FilePathStr
, File
)) {
2032 IsAllowedByDb (AuthData
, AuthDataSize
, TRUE
, FilePathStr
, File
);
2036 // Check the image's hash value.
2038 if (!IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1
, mImageDigest
, &mCertType
, mImageDigestSize
)) {
2039 if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE
, mImageDigest
, &mCertType
, mImageDigestSize
)) {
2040 Action
= EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED
| EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED
;
2045 // Add HASH digest for image with signature
2047 Status
= CreateSignatureList(mImageDigest
, mImageDigestSize
, &mCertType
, &SignatureList
, &SignatureListSize
);
2049 if (!EFI_ERROR(Status
)) {
2050 AddImageExeInfo (Action
, FilePathStr
, File
, SignatureList
, SignatureListSize
);
2051 FreePool (SignatureList
);
2058 if (OffSet
!= (SecDataDir
->VirtualAddress
+ SecDataDir
->Size
)) {
2060 // The Size in Certificate Table or the attribute certicate table is corrupted.
2062 Status
= EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
;
2064 Status
= EFI_SUCCESS
;
2069 if (FilePathStr
!= NULL
) {
2070 FreePool(FilePathStr
);
2078 Provide verification service for signed images, which include both signature validation
2079 and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and
2080 MSFT Authenticode type signatures are supported.
2082 In this implementation, only verify external executables when in USER MODE.
2083 Executables from FV is bypass, so pass in AuthenticationStatus is ignored.
2085 The image verification policy is:
2086 If the image is signed,
2087 At least one valid signature or at least one hash value of the image must match a record
2088 in the security database "db", and no valid signature nor any hash value of the image may
2089 be reflected in the security database "dbx".
2090 Otherwise, the image is not signed,
2091 The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database "db", and
2092 not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".
2094 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
2095 PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure
2096 within this image buffer before use.
2098 @param[in] AuthenticationStatus
2099 This is the authentication status returned from the security
2100 measurement services for the input file.
2101 @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is
2102 being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.
2103 @param[in] FileBuffer File buffer matches the input file device path.
2104 @param[in] FileSize Size of File buffer matches the input file device path.
2105 @param[in] BootPolicy A boot policy that was used to call LoadImage() UEFI service.
2107 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by DevicePath and non-NULL
2108 FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform policy dictates
2109 that the DXE Foundation may use the file.
2110 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The device path specified by NULL device path DevicePath
2111 and non-NULL FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform
2112 policy dictates that the DXE Foundation may execute the image in
2114 @retval EFI_OUT_RESOURCE Fail to allocate memory.
2115 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by File did not authenticate, and
2116 the platform policy dictates that File should be placed
2117 in the untrusted state. The image has been added to the file
2119 @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File and FileBuffer did not
2120 authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE
2121 Foundation many not use File.
2126 DxeImageVerificationHandler (
2127 IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus
,
2128 IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL
*File
,
2129 IN VOID
*FileBuffer
,
2131 IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy
2136 EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER
*DosHdr
;
2137 EFI_STATUS VerifyStatus
;
2138 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*SignatureList
;
2139 UINTN SignatureListSize
;
2140 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*Signature
;
2141 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action
;
2142 WIN_CERTIFICATE
*WinCertificate
;
2147 PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext
;
2148 UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes
;
2149 WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS
*PkcsCertData
;
2150 WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID
*WinCertUefiGuid
;
2153 EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY
*SecDataDir
;
2157 SignatureList
= NULL
;
2158 SignatureListSize
= 0;
2159 WinCertificate
= NULL
;
2161 PkcsCertData
= NULL
;
2162 Action
= EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED
;
2163 Status
= EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
;
2164 VerifyStatus
= EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
;
2166 GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME
, (VOID
**)&VarData
, NULL
);
2168 // Skip verification if AuditMode variable doesn't exist. AuditMode should always exist
2170 if (VarData
== NULL
) {
2173 AuditMode
= *VarData
;
2176 if (AuditMode
== AUDIT_MODE_ENABLE
) {
2177 return ImageVerificationInAuditMode(AuthenticationStatus
, File
, FileBuffer
, FileSize
, BootPolicy
);
2181 // Check the image type and get policy setting.
2183 switch (GetImageType (File
)) {
2186 Policy
= ALWAYS_EXECUTE
;
2189 case IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM
:
2190 Policy
= PcdGet32 (PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy
);
2193 case IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA
:
2194 Policy
= PcdGet32 (PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy
);
2197 case IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA
:
2198 Policy
= PcdGet32 (PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy
);
2202 Policy
= DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
;
2206 // If policy is always/never execute, return directly.
2208 if (Policy
== ALWAYS_EXECUTE
) {
2210 } else if (Policy
== NEVER_EXECUTE
) {
2211 return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
;
2215 // The policy QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
2216 // violates the UEFI spec and has been removed.
2218 ASSERT (Policy
!= QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
&& Policy
!= ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
);
2219 if (Policy
== QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
|| Policy
== ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
) {
2223 GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME
, (VOID
**)&VarData
, NULL
);
2225 // Skip verification if SecureBoot variable doesn't exist.
2227 if (VarData
== NULL
) {
2230 SecureBoot
= *VarData
;
2234 // Skip verification if SecureBoot is disabled but not AuditMode
2236 if (SecureBoot
== SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE
) {
2241 // Read the Dos header.
2243 if (FileBuffer
== NULL
) {
2244 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
2247 mImageBase
= (UINT8
*) FileBuffer
;
2248 mImageSize
= FileSize
;
2250 ZeroMem (&ImageContext
, sizeof (ImageContext
));
2251 ImageContext
.Handle
= (VOID
*) FileBuffer
;
2252 ImageContext
.ImageRead
= (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE
) DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead
;
2255 // Get information about the image being loaded
2257 Status
= PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo (&ImageContext
);
2258 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
2260 // The information can't be got from the invalid PeImage
2265 Status
= EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
;
2267 DosHdr
= (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER
*) mImageBase
;
2268 if (DosHdr
->e_magic
== EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE
) {
2270 // DOS image header is present,
2271 // so read the PE header after the DOS image header.
2273 mPeCoffHeaderOffset
= DosHdr
->e_lfanew
;
2275 mPeCoffHeaderOffset
= 0;
2278 // Check PE/COFF image.
2280 mNtHeader
.Pe32
= (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32
*) (mImageBase
+ mPeCoffHeaderOffset
);
2281 if (mNtHeader
.Pe32
->Signature
!= EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE
) {
2283 // It is not a valid Pe/Coff file.
2288 if (mNtHeader
.Pe32
->FileHeader
.Machine
== IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64
&& mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.Magic
== EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
) {
2290 // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value
2291 // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the
2292 // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
2293 // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
2295 Magic
= EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
;
2298 // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header
2300 Magic
= mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.Magic
;
2303 if (Magic
== EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
) {
2307 NumberOfRvaAndSizes
= mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.NumberOfRvaAndSizes
;
2308 if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes
> EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
) {
2309 SecDataDir
= (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY
*) &mNtHeader
.Pe32
->OptionalHeader
.DataDirectory
[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
];
2313 // Use PE32+ offset.
2315 NumberOfRvaAndSizes
= mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.NumberOfRvaAndSizes
;
2316 if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes
> EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
) {
2317 SecDataDir
= (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY
*) &mNtHeader
.Pe32Plus
->OptionalHeader
.DataDirectory
[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
];
2322 // Start Image Validation.
2324 if (SecDataDir
== NULL
|| SecDataDir
->Size
== 0) {
2326 // This image is not signed. The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database "db",
2327 // and not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".
2329 if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256
)) {
2333 if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1
, mImageDigest
, &mCertType
, mImageDigestSize
)) {
2335 // Image Hash is in forbidden database (DBX).
2340 if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE
, mImageDigest
, &mCertType
, mImageDigestSize
)) {
2342 // Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).
2348 // Image Hash is not found in both forbidden and allowed database.
2354 // Verify the signature of the image, multiple signatures are allowed as per PE/COFF Section 4.7
2355 // "Attribute Certificate Table".
2356 // The first certificate starts at offset (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress) from the start of the file.
2358 for (OffSet
= SecDataDir
->VirtualAddress
;
2359 OffSet
< (SecDataDir
->VirtualAddress
+ SecDataDir
->Size
);
2360 OffSet
+= (WinCertificate
->dwLength
+ ALIGN_SIZE (WinCertificate
->dwLength
))) {
2361 WinCertificate
= (WIN_CERTIFICATE
*) (mImageBase
+ OffSet
);
2362 if ((SecDataDir
->VirtualAddress
+ SecDataDir
->Size
- OffSet
) <= sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE
) ||
2363 (SecDataDir
->VirtualAddress
+ SecDataDir
->Size
- OffSet
) < WinCertificate
->dwLength
) {
2368 // Verify the image's Authenticode signature, only DER-encoded PKCS#7 signed data is supported.
2370 if (WinCertificate
->wCertificateType
== WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA
) {
2372 // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS which is described in the
2373 // Authenticode specification.
2375 PkcsCertData
= (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS
*) WinCertificate
;
2376 if (PkcsCertData
->Hdr
.dwLength
<= sizeof (PkcsCertData
->Hdr
)) {
2379 AuthData
= PkcsCertData
->CertData
;
2380 AuthDataSize
= PkcsCertData
->Hdr
.dwLength
- sizeof(PkcsCertData
->Hdr
);
2381 } else if (WinCertificate
->wCertificateType
== WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID
) {
2383 // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID which is described in UEFI Spec.
2385 WinCertUefiGuid
= (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID
*) WinCertificate
;
2386 if (WinCertUefiGuid
->Hdr
.dwLength
<= OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID
, CertData
)) {
2389 if (!CompareGuid (&WinCertUefiGuid
->CertType
, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid
)) {
2392 AuthData
= WinCertUefiGuid
->CertData
;
2393 AuthDataSize
= WinCertUefiGuid
->Hdr
.dwLength
- OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID
, CertData
);
2395 if (WinCertificate
->dwLength
< sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE
)) {
2401 Status
= HashPeImageByType (AuthData
, AuthDataSize
);
2402 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
2407 // Check the digital signature against the revoked certificate in forbidden database (dbx).
2409 if (IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData
, AuthDataSize
, FALSE
, NULL
, NULL
)) {
2410 Action
= EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED
;
2411 VerifyStatus
= EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
;
2416 // Check the digital signature against the valid certificate in allowed database (db).
2418 if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus
)) {
2419 if (IsAllowedByDb (AuthData
, AuthDataSize
, FALSE
, NULL
, NULL
)) {
2420 VerifyStatus
= EFI_SUCCESS
;
2425 // Check the image's hash value.
2427 if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1
, mImageDigest
, &mCertType
, mImageDigestSize
)) {
2428 Action
= EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND
;
2429 VerifyStatus
= EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
;
2431 } else if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus
)) {
2432 if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE
, mImageDigest
, &mCertType
, mImageDigestSize
)) {
2433 VerifyStatus
= EFI_SUCCESS
;
2438 if (OffSet
!= (SecDataDir
->VirtualAddress
+ SecDataDir
->Size
)) {
2440 // The Size in Certificate Table or the attribute certicate table is corrupted.
2442 VerifyStatus
= EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
;
2445 if (!EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus
)) {
2448 Status
= EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
;
2449 if (Action
== EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED
|| Action
== EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND
) {
2451 // Get image hash value as executable's signature.
2453 SignatureListSize
= sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
) - 1 + mImageDigestSize
;
2454 SignatureList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureListSize
);
2455 if (SignatureList
== NULL
) {
2456 Status
= EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
;
2459 SignatureList
->SignatureHeaderSize
= 0;
2460 SignatureList
->SignatureListSize
= (UINT32
) SignatureListSize
;
2461 SignatureList
->SignatureSize
= (UINT32
) (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
) - 1 + mImageDigestSize
);
2462 CopyMem (&SignatureList
->SignatureType
, &mCertType
, sizeof (EFI_GUID
));
2463 Signature
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) SignatureList
+ sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
));
2464 CopyMem (Signature
->SignatureData
, mImageDigest
, mImageDigestSize
);
2469 if (Status
!= EFI_SUCCESS
) {
2471 // Policy decides to defer or reject the image; add its information in image executable information table.
2473 NameStr
= ConvertDevicePathToText (File
, FALSE
, TRUE
);
2474 AddImageExeInfo (Action
, NameStr
, File
, SignatureList
, SignatureListSize
);
2475 if (NameStr
!= NULL
) {
2476 DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO
, "The image doesn't pass verification: %s\n", NameStr
));
2479 Status
= EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
;
2482 if (SignatureList
!= NULL
) {
2483 FreePool (SignatureList
);
2490 On Ready To Boot Services Event notification handler.
2492 Add the image execution information table if it is not in system configuration table.
2494 @param[in] Event Event whose notification function is being invoked
2495 @param[in] Context Pointer to the notification function's context
2505 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
*ImageExeInfoTable
;
2506 UINTN ImageExeInfoTableSize
;
2508 EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, (VOID
**) &ImageExeInfoTable
);
2509 if (ImageExeInfoTable
!= NULL
) {
2513 ImageExeInfoTableSize
= sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
);
2514 ImageExeInfoTable
= (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE
*) AllocateRuntimePool (ImageExeInfoTableSize
);
2515 if (ImageExeInfoTable
== NULL
) {
2519 ImageExeInfoTable
->NumberOfImages
= 0;
2520 gBS
->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
, (VOID
*) ImageExeInfoTable
);
2525 Register security measurement handler.
2527 @param ImageHandle ImageHandle of the loaded driver.
2528 @param SystemTable Pointer to the EFI System Table.
2530 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The handlers were registered successfully.
2534 DxeImageVerificationLibConstructor (
2535 IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle
,
2536 IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE
*SystemTable
2542 // Register the event to publish the image execution table.
2544 EfiCreateEventReadyToBootEx (
2551 return RegisterSecurity2Handler (
2552 DxeImageVerificationHandler
,
2553 EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_VERIFY_IMAGE
| EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_IMAGE_REQUIRED