2 Implement authentication services for the authenticated variable
5 Caution: This module requires additional review when modified.
6 This driver will have external input - variable data. It may be input in SMM mode.
7 This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like
8 buffer overflow, integer overflow.
9 Variable attribute should also be checked to avoid authentication bypass.
11 ProcessVarWithPk(), ProcessVarWithKek() and ProcessVariable() are the function to do
12 variable authentication.
14 VerifyTimeBasedPayload() and VerifyCounterBasedPayload() are sub function to do verification.
15 They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library
16 to verify the signature.
18 Copyright (c) 2009 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
19 This program and the accompanying materials
20 are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
21 which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
22 http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
24 THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
25 WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
30 #include "AuthService.h"
33 /// Global database array for scratch
35 UINT8 mPubKeyStore
[MAX_KEYDB_SIZE
];
37 UINT8 mCertDbStore
[MAX_CERTDB_SIZE
];
39 EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport
[] = {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID
, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID
, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID
, EFI_CERT_X509_GUID
};
41 // Public Exponent of RSA Key.
43 CONST UINT8 mRsaE
[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };
45 // Hash context pointer
47 VOID
*mHashCtx
= NULL
;
50 // Pointer to runtime buffer.
51 // For "Append" operation to an existing variable, a read/modify/write operation
52 // is supported by firmware internally. Reserve runtime buffer to cache previous
53 // variable data in runtime phase because memory allocation is forbidden in virtual mode.
55 VOID
*mStorageArea
= NULL
;
58 // The serialization of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes
59 // parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the
60 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value
61 // i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)
63 UINT8
*mSerializationRuntimeBuffer
= NULL
;
66 // Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.
67 // These data are used to peform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.
69 EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem
[] = {
70 //{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }
71 {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID
, 0, 32 },
72 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID
, 0, 256 },
73 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID
, 0, 256 },
74 {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID
, 0, 20 },
75 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID
, 0, 256 },
76 {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID
, 0, ((UINT32
) ~0)},
77 {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID
, 0, 28 },
78 {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID
, 0, 48 },
79 {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID
, 0, 64 }
83 Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.
85 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.
86 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.
88 @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.
89 @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.
93 NeedPhysicallyPresent(
94 IN CHAR16
*VariableName
,
95 IN EFI_GUID
*VendorGuid
98 if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid
, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid
) && (StrCmp (VariableName
, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME
) == 0))
99 || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid
, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid
) && (StrCmp (VariableName
, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME
) == 0))) {
107 Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.
109 @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.
110 @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.
118 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable
;
120 FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME
, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid
, &Variable
, &mVariableModuleGlobal
->VariableGlobal
, FALSE
);
121 if (Variable
.CurrPtr
!= NULL
&& *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable
.CurrPtr
)) == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE
) {
130 Internal function to delete a Variable given its name and GUID, no authentication
133 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.
134 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.
136 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable deleted successfully.
137 @retval Others The driver failded to start the device.
142 IN CHAR16
*VariableName
,
143 IN EFI_GUID
*VendorGuid
147 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable
;
149 Status
= FindVariable (VariableName
, VendorGuid
, &Variable
, &mVariableModuleGlobal
->VariableGlobal
, FALSE
);
150 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
154 ASSERT (Variable
.CurrPtr
!= NULL
);
155 return UpdateVariable (VariableName
, VendorGuid
, NULL
, 0, 0, 0, 0, &Variable
, NULL
);
159 Initializes for authenticated varibale service.
161 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Function successfully executed.
162 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Fail to allocate enough memory resources.
166 AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (
171 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable
;
172 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable
;
178 UINT8 SecureBootMode
;
179 UINT8 SecureBootEnable
;
184 // Initialize hash context.
186 CtxSize
= Sha256GetContextSize ();
187 mHashCtx
= AllocateRuntimePool (CtxSize
);
188 if (mHashCtx
== NULL
) {
189 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
;
193 // Reserved runtime buffer for "Append" operation in virtual mode.
195 mStorageArea
= AllocateRuntimePool (MAX (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize
), PcdGet32 (PcdMaxHardwareErrorVariableSize
)));
196 if (mStorageArea
== NULL
) {
197 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
;
201 // Prepare runtime buffer for serialized data of time-based authenticated
202 // Variable, i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).
204 mSerializationRuntimeBuffer
= AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize
) + sizeof (EFI_GUID
) + sizeof (UINT32
) + sizeof (EFI_TIME
));
205 if (mSerializationRuntimeBuffer
== NULL
) {
206 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
;
210 // Check "AuthVarKeyDatabase" variable's existence.
211 // If it doesn't exist, create a new one with initial value of 0 and EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
213 Status
= FindVariable (
215 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid
,
217 &mVariableModuleGlobal
->VariableGlobal
,
221 if (Variable
.CurrPtr
== NULL
) {
222 VarAttr
= EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE
| EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
| EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
| EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
;
225 Status
= UpdateVariable (
227 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid
,
236 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
241 // Load database in global variable for cache.
243 DataSize
= DataSizeOfVariable (Variable
.CurrPtr
);
244 Data
= GetVariableDataPtr (Variable
.CurrPtr
);
245 ASSERT ((DataSize
!= 0) && (Data
!= NULL
));
246 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore
, (UINT8
*) Data
, DataSize
);
247 mPubKeyNumber
= (UINT32
) (DataSize
/ EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE
);
250 FindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME
, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid
, &PkVariable
, &mVariableModuleGlobal
->VariableGlobal
, FALSE
);
251 if (PkVariable
.CurrPtr
== NULL
) {
252 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO
, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME
));
254 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO
, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME
));
258 // Create "SetupMode" varable with BS+RT attribute set.
260 FindVariable (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME
, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid
, &Variable
, &mVariableModuleGlobal
->VariableGlobal
, FALSE
);
261 if (PkVariable
.CurrPtr
== NULL
) {
262 mPlatformMode
= SETUP_MODE
;
264 mPlatformMode
= USER_MODE
;
266 Status
= UpdateVariable (
268 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid
,
271 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
| EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
,
277 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
282 // Create "SignatureSupport" varable with BS+RT attribute set.
284 FindVariable (EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME
, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid
, &Variable
, &mVariableModuleGlobal
->VariableGlobal
, FALSE
);
285 Status
= UpdateVariable (
286 EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME
,
287 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid
,
289 sizeof(mSignatureSupport
),
290 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
| EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
,
296 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
301 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.
302 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in USER_MODE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.
303 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.
305 SecureBootEnable
= SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE
;
306 FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME
, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid
, &Variable
, &mVariableModuleGlobal
->VariableGlobal
, FALSE
);
307 if (Variable
.CurrPtr
!= NULL
) {
308 SecureBootEnable
= *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable
.CurrPtr
));
309 } else if (mPlatformMode
== USER_MODE
) {
311 // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in USER_MODE.
313 SecureBootEnable
= SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE
;
314 Status
= UpdateVariable (
315 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME
,
316 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid
,
319 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE
| EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
,
325 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
331 // Create "SecureBoot" varable with BS+RT attribute set.
333 if (SecureBootEnable
== SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE
&& mPlatformMode
== USER_MODE
) {
334 SecureBootMode
= SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE
;
336 SecureBootMode
= SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE
;
338 FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME
, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid
, &Variable
, &mVariableModuleGlobal
->VariableGlobal
, FALSE
);
339 Status
= UpdateVariable (
340 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME
,
341 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid
,
344 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
| EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
,
350 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
354 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO
, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME
, mPlatformMode
));
355 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO
, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME
, SecureBootMode
));
356 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO
, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME
, SecureBootEnable
));
359 // Initialize "CustomMode" in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE state.
361 FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME
, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid
, &Variable
, &mVariableModuleGlobal
->VariableGlobal
, FALSE
);
362 CustomMode
= STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE
;
363 Status
= UpdateVariable (
364 EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME
,
365 &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid
,
368 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE
| EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
,
374 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
378 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO
, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME
, CustomMode
));
381 // Check "certdb" variable's existence.
382 // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with
383 // EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
385 Status
= FindVariable (
389 &mVariableModuleGlobal
->VariableGlobal
,
393 if (Variable
.CurrPtr
== NULL
) {
394 VarAttr
= EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE
| EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
| EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
| EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
;
395 ListSize
= sizeof (UINT32
);
396 Status
= UpdateVariable (
407 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
416 Add public key in store and return its index.
418 @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data
420 @return Index of new added item
431 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable
;
436 if (PubKey
== NULL
) {
440 Status
= FindVariable (
442 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid
,
444 &mVariableModuleGlobal
->VariableGlobal
,
447 ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status
);
448 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
453 // Check whether the public key entry does exist.
456 for (Ptr
= mPubKeyStore
, Index
= 1; Index
<= mPubKeyNumber
; Index
++) {
457 if (CompareMem (Ptr
, PubKey
, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE
) == 0) {
461 Ptr
+= EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE
;
466 // Add public key in database.
468 if (mPubKeyNumber
== MAX_KEY_NUM
) {
470 // Public key dadatase is full, try to reclaim invalid key.
474 // NV storage can't reclaim at runtime.
480 mVariableModuleGlobal
->VariableGlobal
.NonVolatileVariableBase
,
481 &mVariableModuleGlobal
->NonVolatileLastVariableOffset
,
487 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
491 Status
= FindVariable (
493 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid
,
495 &mVariableModuleGlobal
->VariableGlobal
,
498 ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status
);
499 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
503 DataSize
= DataSizeOfVariable (Variable
.CurrPtr
);
504 Data
= GetVariableDataPtr (Variable
.CurrPtr
);
505 ASSERT ((DataSize
!= 0) && (Data
!= NULL
));
506 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore
, (UINT8
*) Data
, DataSize
);
507 mPubKeyNumber
= (UINT32
) (DataSize
/ EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE
);
509 if (mPubKeyNumber
== MAX_KEY_NUM
) {
514 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore
+ mPubKeyNumber
* EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE
, PubKey
, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE
);
515 Index
= ++mPubKeyNumber
;
517 // Update public key database variable.
519 Status
= UpdateVariable (
521 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid
,
523 mPubKeyNumber
* EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE
,
524 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE
| EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
| EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
| EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
,
530 ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status
);
537 Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID type.
538 Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.
540 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
541 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.
542 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.
543 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like
544 buffer overflow, integer overflow.
546 @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.
547 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.
548 @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.
550 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
551 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.
552 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.
556 VerifyCounterBasedPayload (
563 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION
*CertData
;
564 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256
*CertBlock
;
565 UINT8 Digest
[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
];
569 PayloadSize
= DataSize
- AUTHINFO_SIZE
;
574 if (Data
== NULL
|| PubKey
== NULL
) {
575 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
578 CertData
= (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION
*) Data
;
579 CertBlock
= (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256
*) (CertData
->AuthInfo
.CertData
);
582 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.
583 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID.
585 if ((CertData
->AuthInfo
.Hdr
.wCertificateType
!= WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID
) ||
586 !CompareGuid (&CertData
->AuthInfo
.CertType
, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid
)
589 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.
591 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
;
594 // Hash data payload with SHA256.
596 ZeroMem (Digest
, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
);
597 Status
= Sha256Init (mHashCtx
);
601 Status
= Sha256Update (mHashCtx
, Data
+ AUTHINFO_SIZE
, PayloadSize
);
608 Status
= Sha256Update (mHashCtx
, &PayloadSize
, sizeof (UINTN
));
613 // Hash Monotonic Count.
615 Status
= Sha256Update (mHashCtx
, &CertData
->MonotonicCount
, sizeof (UINT64
));
619 Status
= Sha256Final (mHashCtx
, Digest
);
624 // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.
627 ASSERT (Rsa
!= NULL
);
629 // Set RSA Key Components.
630 // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.
632 Status
= RsaSetKey (Rsa
, RsaKeyN
, PubKey
, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE
);
636 Status
= RsaSetKey (Rsa
, RsaKeyE
, mRsaE
, sizeof (mRsaE
));
641 // Verify the signature.
643 Status
= RsaPkcs1Verify (
647 CertBlock
->Signature
,
648 EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE
658 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
;
663 Update platform mode.
665 @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.
667 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
668 @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.
677 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable
;
678 UINT8 SecureBootMode
;
679 UINT8 SecureBootEnable
;
680 UINTN VariableDataSize
;
682 Status
= FindVariable (
684 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid
,
686 &mVariableModuleGlobal
->VariableGlobal
,
689 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
694 // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible
695 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
697 mPlatformMode
= (UINT8
) Mode
;
698 CopyMem (GetVariableDataPtr (Variable
.CurrPtr
), &mPlatformMode
, sizeof(UINT8
));
702 // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating
703 // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot
704 // Variable in runtime.
710 // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.
711 // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,
712 // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.
714 Status
= FindVariable (
715 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME
,
716 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid
,
718 &mVariableModuleGlobal
->VariableGlobal
,
722 // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.
723 // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.
724 // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.
726 if (Variable
.CurrPtr
== NULL
) {
727 SecureBootMode
= SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE
;
729 if (mPlatformMode
== USER_MODE
) {
730 SecureBootMode
= SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE
;
731 } else if (mPlatformMode
== SETUP_MODE
) {
732 SecureBootMode
= SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE
;
734 return EFI_NOT_FOUND
;
738 Status
= UpdateVariable (
739 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME
,
740 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid
,
743 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
| EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
,
749 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
754 // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.
756 Status
= FindVariable (
757 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME
,
758 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid
,
760 &mVariableModuleGlobal
->VariableGlobal
,
764 if (SecureBootMode
== SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE
) {
766 // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.
768 SecureBootEnable
= SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE
;
769 VariableDataSize
= sizeof (SecureBootEnable
);
772 // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"
773 // variable is not in secure boot state.
775 if (Variable
.CurrPtr
== NULL
|| EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
778 SecureBootEnable
= SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE
;
779 VariableDataSize
= 0;
782 Status
= UpdateVariable (
783 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME
,
784 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid
,
787 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE
| EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
,
797 Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx variable.
799 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.
800 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
801 @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.
802 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.
804 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.
805 @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.
809 CheckSignatureListFormat(
810 IN CHAR16
*VariableName
,
811 IN EFI_GUID
*VendorGuid
,
816 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*SigList
;
822 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*CertData
;
829 ASSERT (VariableName
!= NULL
&& VendorGuid
!= NULL
&& Data
!= NULL
);
831 if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid
, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid
) && (StrCmp (VariableName
, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME
) == 0)){
833 } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid
, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid
) && StrCmp (VariableName
, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME
) == 0) ||
834 (CompareGuid (VendorGuid
, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
) &&
835 (StrCmp (VariableName
, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE
) == 0 || StrCmp (VariableName
, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1
) == 0))){
842 SigList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) Data
;
843 SigDataSize
= DataSize
;
847 // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.
848 // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.
850 while ((SigDataSize
> 0) && (SigDataSize
>= SigList
->SignatureListSize
)) {
851 for (Index
= 0; Index
< (sizeof (mSupportSigItem
) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM
)); Index
++ ) {
852 if (CompareGuid (&SigList
->SignatureType
, &mSupportSigItem
[Index
].SigType
)) {
854 // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner
855 // component) add the data length according to signature type.
857 if (mSupportSigItem
[Index
].SigDataSize
!= ((UINT32
) ~0) &&
858 (SigList
->SignatureSize
- sizeof (EFI_GUID
)) != mSupportSigItem
[Index
].SigDataSize
) {
859 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
861 if (mSupportSigItem
[Index
].SigHeaderSize
!= ((UINTN
) ~0) &&
862 SigList
->SignatureHeaderSize
!= mSupportSigItem
[Index
].SigHeaderSize
) {
863 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
869 if (Index
== (sizeof (mSupportSigItem
) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM
))) {
871 // Undefined signature type.
873 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
876 if (CompareGuid (&SigList
->SignatureType
, &gEfiCertX509Guid
)) {
878 // Try to retrieve the RSA public key from the X.509 certificate.
879 // If this operation fails, it's not a valid certificate.
881 RsaContext
= RsaNew ();
882 if (RsaContext
== NULL
) {
883 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
885 CertData
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) SigList
+ sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + SigList
->SignatureHeaderSize
);
886 CertLen
= SigList
->SignatureSize
- sizeof (EFI_GUID
);
887 if (!RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (CertData
->SignatureData
, CertLen
, &RsaContext
)) {
888 RsaFree (RsaContext
);
889 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
891 RsaFree (RsaContext
);
894 if ((SigList
->SignatureListSize
- sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) - SigList
->SignatureHeaderSize
) % SigList
->SignatureSize
!= 0) {
895 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
897 SigCount
+= (SigList
->SignatureListSize
- sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) - SigList
->SignatureHeaderSize
) / SigList
->SignatureSize
;
899 SigDataSize
-= SigList
->SignatureListSize
;
900 SigList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) ((UINT8
*) SigList
+ SigList
->SignatureListSize
);
903 if (((UINTN
) SigList
- (UINTN
) Data
) != DataSize
) {
904 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
907 if (IsPk
&& SigCount
> 1) {
908 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
915 Process variable with platform key for verification.
917 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
918 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.
919 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.
920 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like
921 buffer overflow, integer overflow.
922 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.
924 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.
925 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
926 @param[in] Data Data pointer.
927 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the
928 data, this value contains the required size.
929 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.
930 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable
931 @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.
933 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
934 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.
935 check carried out by the firmware.
936 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.
941 IN CHAR16
*VariableName
,
942 IN EFI_GUID
*VendorGuid
,
945 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK
*Variable
,
946 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL
,
955 if ((Attributes
& EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE
) == 0 ||
956 (Attributes
& EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
) == 0) {
958 // PK, KEK and db/dbx should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based
959 // authenticated variable.
961 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
965 if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode
== SETUP_MODE
&& !IsPk
)) {
966 Payload
= (UINT8
*) Data
+ AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data
);
967 PayloadSize
= DataSize
- AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data
);
968 if (PayloadSize
== 0) {
972 Status
= CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName
, VendorGuid
, Payload
, PayloadSize
);
973 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
977 Status
= UpdateVariable (
986 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2
*) Data
)->TimeStamp
988 } else if (mPlatformMode
== USER_MODE
) {
990 // Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.
992 Status
= VerifyTimeBasedPayload (
1004 // Verify against the certificate in data payload.
1006 Status
= VerifyTimeBasedPayload (
1018 if (!EFI_ERROR(Status
) && IsPk
) {
1019 if (mPlatformMode
== SETUP_MODE
&& !Del
) {
1021 // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.
1023 Status
= UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE
);
1024 } else if (mPlatformMode
== USER_MODE
&& Del
){
1026 // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.
1028 Status
= UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE
);
1036 Process variable with key exchange key for verification.
1038 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
1039 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.
1040 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.
1041 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like
1042 buffer overflow, integer overflow.
1043 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.
1045 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.
1046 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
1047 @param[in] Data Data pointer.
1048 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the
1049 data, this value contains the required size.
1050 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.
1051 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.
1053 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
1054 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation
1055 check carried out by the firmware.
1056 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.
1061 IN CHAR16
*VariableName
,
1062 IN EFI_GUID
*VendorGuid
,
1065 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK
*Variable
,
1066 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL
1073 if ((Attributes
& EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE
) == 0 ||
1074 (Attributes
& EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
) == 0) {
1076 // DB and DBX should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based
1077 // authenticated variable.
1079 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
1082 Status
= EFI_SUCCESS
;
1083 if (mPlatformMode
== USER_MODE
&& !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {
1085 // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.
1087 return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (
1099 // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.
1101 Payload
= (UINT8
*) Data
+ AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data
);
1102 PayloadSize
= DataSize
- AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data
);
1104 Status
= CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName
, VendorGuid
, Payload
, PayloadSize
);
1105 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
1109 Status
= UpdateVariable (
1118 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2
*) Data
)->TimeStamp
1126 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set
1128 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
1129 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.
1130 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.
1131 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like
1132 buffer overflow, integer overflow.
1133 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.
1135 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.
1136 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
1138 @param[in] Data Data pointer.
1139 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the
1140 data, this value contains the required size.
1141 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.
1142 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.
1144 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
1145 @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with
1146 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
1147 @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The Database to save the public key is full.
1148 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
1149 set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation
1150 check carried out by the firmware.
1151 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.
1156 IN CHAR16
*VariableName
,
1157 IN EFI_GUID
*VendorGuid
,
1160 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK
*Variable
,
1161 IN UINT32 Attributes
1166 BOOLEAN IsFirstTime
;
1168 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION
*CertData
;
1169 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256
*CertBlock
;
1171 UINT64 MonotonicCount
;
1179 if (NeedPhysicallyPresent(VariableName
, VendorGuid
) && !UserPhysicalPresent()) {
1181 // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.
1183 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
;
1187 // A time-based authenticated variable and a count-based authenticated variable
1188 // can't be updated by each other.
1190 if (Variable
->CurrPtr
!= NULL
) {
1191 if (((Attributes
& EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
) != 0) &&
1192 ((Variable
->CurrPtr
->Attributes
& EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
) != 0)) {
1193 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
;
1196 if (((Attributes
& EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
) != 0) &&
1197 ((Variable
->CurrPtr
->Attributes
& EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
) != 0)) {
1198 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
;
1203 // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.
1205 if ((Attributes
& EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
) != 0) {
1206 return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (
1219 // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.
1221 if ((Attributes
& EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
) != 0) {
1223 // Determine current operation type.
1225 if (DataSize
== AUTHINFO_SIZE
) {
1229 // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
1231 if (Variable
->CurrPtr
== NULL
) {
1233 } else if ((Variable
->CurrPtr
->Attributes
& EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
) == 0) {
1236 KeyIndex
= Variable
->CurrPtr
->PubKeyIndex
;
1237 IsFirstTime
= FALSE
;
1239 } else if ((Variable
->CurrPtr
!= NULL
) &&
1240 ((Variable
->CurrPtr
->Attributes
& (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
| EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
)) != 0)
1243 // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.
1245 return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED
;
1248 // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.
1249 // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.
1251 Status
= UpdateVariable (VariableName
, VendorGuid
, Data
, DataSize
, Attributes
, 0, 0, Variable
, NULL
);
1256 // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.
1258 CertData
= (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION
*) Data
;
1259 CertBlock
= (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256
*) (CertData
->AuthInfo
.CertData
);
1260 PubKey
= CertBlock
->PublicKey
;
1263 // Update Monotonic Count value.
1265 MonotonicCount
= CertData
->MonotonicCount
;
1269 // Check input PubKey.
1271 if (CompareMem (PubKey
, mPubKeyStore
+ (KeyIndex
- 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE
, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE
) != 0) {
1272 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
;
1275 // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable
1276 // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.
1278 if (CertData
->MonotonicCount
<= Variable
->CurrPtr
->MonotonicCount
) {
1280 // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.
1282 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
;
1286 // Verify the certificate in Data payload.
1288 Status
= VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data
, DataSize
, PubKey
);
1289 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
1294 // Now, the signature has been verified!
1296 if (IsFirstTime
&& !IsDeletion
) {
1298 // Update public key database variable if need.
1300 KeyIndex
= AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey
);
1301 if (KeyIndex
== 0) {
1302 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
;
1307 // Verification pass.
1309 return UpdateVariable (VariableName
, VendorGuid
, (UINT8
*)Data
+ AUTHINFO_SIZE
, DataSize
- AUTHINFO_SIZE
, Attributes
, KeyIndex
, MonotonicCount
, Variable
, NULL
);
1313 Merge two buffers which formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. Only the new EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
1314 will be appended to the original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, duplicate EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
1317 @param[in, out] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.
1318 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.
1319 @param[in] FreeBufSize Size of free data buffer
1320 @param[in] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST to be appended.
1321 @param[in] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.
1322 @param[out] MergedBufSize Size of the merged buffer
1324 @return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if input Data buffer overflowed
1328 AppendSignatureList (
1331 IN UINTN FreeBufSize
,
1333 IN UINTN NewDataSize
,
1334 OUT UINTN
*MergedBufSize
1337 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*CertList
;
1338 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*Cert
;
1340 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*NewCertList
;
1341 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*NewCert
;
1348 UINTN SignatureListSize
;
1351 Tail
= (UINT8
*) Data
+ DataSize
;
1353 NewCertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) NewData
;
1354 while ((NewDataSize
> 0) && (NewDataSize
>= NewCertList
->SignatureListSize
)) {
1355 NewCert
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) NewCertList
+ sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + NewCertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
);
1356 NewCertCount
= (NewCertList
->SignatureListSize
- sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) - NewCertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
) / NewCertList
->SignatureSize
;
1359 for (Index
= 0; Index
< NewCertCount
; Index
++) {
1363 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) Data
;
1364 while ((Size
> 0) && (Size
>= CertList
->SignatureListSize
)) {
1365 if (CompareGuid (&CertList
->SignatureType
, &NewCertList
->SignatureType
) &&
1366 (CertList
->SignatureSize
== NewCertList
->SignatureSize
)) {
1367 Cert
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) CertList
+ sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + CertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
);
1368 CertCount
= (CertList
->SignatureListSize
- sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) - CertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
) / CertList
->SignatureSize
;
1369 for (Index2
= 0; Index2
< CertCount
; Index2
++) {
1371 // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.
1373 if (CompareMem (NewCert
, Cert
, CertList
->SignatureSize
) == 0) {
1377 Cert
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) Cert
+ CertList
->SignatureSize
);
1384 Size
-= CertList
->SignatureListSize
;
1385 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) ((UINT8
*) CertList
+ CertList
->SignatureListSize
);
1390 // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, append it.
1392 if (CopiedCount
== 0) {
1393 if (FreeBufSize
< sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + NewCertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
) {
1394 return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
;
1398 // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.
1401 CopyMem (Tail
, NewCertList
, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + NewCertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
);
1402 Tail
= Tail
+ sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + NewCertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
;
1403 FreeBufSize
-= sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + NewCertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
;
1406 if (FreeBufSize
< NewCertList
->SignatureSize
) {
1407 return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
;
1409 CopyMem (Tail
, NewCert
, NewCertList
->SignatureSize
);
1410 Tail
+= NewCertList
->SignatureSize
;
1411 FreeBufSize
-= NewCertList
->SignatureSize
;
1415 NewCert
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) NewCert
+ NewCertList
->SignatureSize
);
1419 // Update SignatureListSize in newly appended EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.
1421 if (CopiedCount
!= 0) {
1422 SignatureListSize
= sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + NewCertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
+ (CopiedCount
* NewCertList
->SignatureSize
);
1423 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) (Tail
- SignatureListSize
);
1424 CertList
->SignatureListSize
= (UINT32
) SignatureListSize
;
1427 NewDataSize
-= NewCertList
->SignatureListSize
;
1428 NewCertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) ((UINT8
*) NewCertList
+ NewCertList
->SignatureListSize
);
1431 *MergedBufSize
= (Tail
- (UINT8
*) Data
);
1436 Compare two EFI_TIME data.
1439 @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.
1440 @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.
1442 @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.
1443 @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.
1448 IN EFI_TIME
*FirstTime
,
1449 IN EFI_TIME
*SecondTime
1452 if (FirstTime
->Year
!= SecondTime
->Year
) {
1453 return (BOOLEAN
) (FirstTime
->Year
< SecondTime
->Year
);
1454 } else if (FirstTime
->Month
!= SecondTime
->Month
) {
1455 return (BOOLEAN
) (FirstTime
->Month
< SecondTime
->Month
);
1456 } else if (FirstTime
->Day
!= SecondTime
->Day
) {
1457 return (BOOLEAN
) (FirstTime
->Day
< SecondTime
->Day
);
1458 } else if (FirstTime
->Hour
!= SecondTime
->Hour
) {
1459 return (BOOLEAN
) (FirstTime
->Hour
< SecondTime
->Hour
);
1460 } else if (FirstTime
->Minute
!= SecondTime
->Minute
) {
1461 return (BOOLEAN
) (FirstTime
->Minute
< SecondTime
->Minute
);
1464 return (BOOLEAN
) (FirstTime
->Second
<= SecondTime
->Second
);
1468 Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable
1469 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".
1471 The data format of "certdb":
1473 // UINT32 CertDbListSize;
1474 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];
1475 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs2[];
1477 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certsn[];
1480 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.
1481 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.
1482 @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb".
1483 @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb".
1484 @param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.
1485 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.
1486 @param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from
1488 @param[out] CertNodeSize Length of AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA in bytes.
1490 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.
1491 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.
1492 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.
1497 IN CHAR16
*VariableName
,
1498 IN EFI_GUID
*VendorGuid
,
1501 OUT UINT32
*CertOffset
, OPTIONAL
1502 OUT UINT32
*CertDataSize
, OPTIONAL
1503 OUT UINT32
*CertNodeOffset
,OPTIONAL
1504 OUT UINT32
*CertNodeSize OPTIONAL
1508 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA
*Ptr
;
1512 UINT32 CertDbListSize
;
1514 if ((VariableName
== NULL
) || (VendorGuid
== NULL
) || (Data
== NULL
)) {
1515 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
1519 // Check whether DataSize matches recorded CertDbListSize.
1521 if (DataSize
< sizeof (UINT32
)) {
1522 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
1525 CertDbListSize
= ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32
*) Data
);
1527 if (CertDbListSize
!= (UINT32
) DataSize
) {
1528 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
1531 Offset
= sizeof (UINT32
);
1534 // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.
1536 while (Offset
< (UINT32
) DataSize
) {
1537 Ptr
= (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA
*) (Data
+ Offset
);
1539 // Check whether VendorGuid matches.
1541 if (CompareGuid (&Ptr
->VendorGuid
, VendorGuid
)) {
1542 NodeSize
= ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr
->CertNodeSize
);
1543 NameSize
= ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr
->NameSize
);
1544 CertSize
= ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr
->CertDataSize
);
1546 if (NodeSize
!= sizeof (EFI_GUID
) + sizeof (UINT32
) * 3 + CertSize
+
1547 sizeof (CHAR16
) * NameSize
) {
1548 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
1551 Offset
= Offset
+ sizeof (EFI_GUID
) + sizeof (UINT32
) * 3;
1553 // Check whether VariableName matches.
1555 if ((NameSize
== StrLen (VariableName
)) &&
1556 (CompareMem (Data
+ Offset
, VariableName
, NameSize
* sizeof (CHAR16
)) == 0)) {
1557 Offset
= Offset
+ NameSize
* sizeof (CHAR16
);
1559 if (CertOffset
!= NULL
) {
1560 *CertOffset
= Offset
;
1563 if (CertDataSize
!= NULL
) {
1564 *CertDataSize
= CertSize
;
1567 if (CertNodeOffset
!= NULL
) {
1568 *CertNodeOffset
= (UINT32
) ((UINT8
*) Ptr
- Data
);
1571 if (CertNodeSize
!= NULL
) {
1572 *CertNodeSize
= NodeSize
;
1577 Offset
= Offset
+ NameSize
* sizeof (CHAR16
) + CertSize
;
1580 NodeSize
= ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr
->CertNodeSize
);
1581 Offset
= Offset
+ NodeSize
;
1585 return EFI_NOT_FOUND
;
1589 Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable
1590 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".
1592 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.
1593 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.
1594 @param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.
1595 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.
1597 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.
1598 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.
1599 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.
1604 IN CHAR16
*VariableName
,
1605 IN EFI_GUID
*VendorGuid
,
1606 OUT UINT8
**CertData
,
1607 OUT UINT32
*CertDataSize
1610 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable
;
1616 if ((VariableName
== NULL
) || (VendorGuid
== NULL
) || (CertData
== NULL
) || (CertDataSize
== NULL
)) {
1617 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
1621 // Get variable "certdb".
1623 Status
= FindVariable (
1627 &mVariableModuleGlobal
->VariableGlobal
,
1630 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
1634 DataSize
= DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable
.CurrPtr
);
1635 Data
= GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable
.CurrPtr
);
1636 if ((DataSize
== 0) || (Data
== NULL
)) {
1638 return EFI_NOT_FOUND
;
1641 Status
= FindCertsFromDb (
1652 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
1656 *CertData
= Data
+ CertOffset
;
1661 Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated
1662 variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".
1664 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.
1665 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.
1667 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.
1668 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.
1669 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.
1670 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.
1675 IN CHAR16
*VariableName
,
1676 IN EFI_GUID
*VendorGuid
1679 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable
;
1684 UINT32 CertNodeOffset
;
1685 UINT32 CertNodeSize
;
1687 UINT32 NewCertDbSize
;
1689 if ((VariableName
== NULL
) || (VendorGuid
== NULL
)) {
1690 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
1694 // Get variable "certdb".
1696 Status
= FindVariable (
1700 &mVariableModuleGlobal
->VariableGlobal
,
1703 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
1707 DataSize
= DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable
.CurrPtr
);
1708 Data
= GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable
.CurrPtr
);
1709 if ((DataSize
== 0) || (Data
== NULL
)) {
1711 return EFI_NOT_FOUND
;
1714 if (DataSize
== sizeof (UINT32
)) {
1716 // There is no certs in certdb.
1722 // Get corresponding cert node from certdb.
1724 Status
= FindCertsFromDb (
1735 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
1739 if (DataSize
< (CertNodeOffset
+ CertNodeSize
)) {
1740 return EFI_NOT_FOUND
;
1744 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".
1746 NewCertDbSize
= (UINT32
) DataSize
- CertNodeSize
;
1747 NewCertDb
= (UINT8
*) mCertDbStore
;
1750 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.
1752 CopyMem (NewCertDb
, Data
, CertNodeOffset
);
1754 // Update CertDbListSize.
1756 CopyMem (NewCertDb
, &NewCertDbSize
, sizeof (UINT32
));
1758 // Copy the DB entries after deleting node.
1760 if (DataSize
> (CertNodeOffset
+ CertNodeSize
)) {
1762 NewCertDb
+ CertNodeOffset
,
1763 Data
+ CertNodeOffset
+ CertNodeSize
,
1764 DataSize
- CertNodeOffset
- CertNodeSize
1771 VarAttr
= EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE
| EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
| EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
| EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
;
1772 Status
= UpdateVariable (
1788 Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName
1789 and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb".
1791 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.
1792 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.
1793 @param[in] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.
1794 @param[in] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.
1796 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.
1797 @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName
1798 and VendorGuid already exists.
1799 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.
1800 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb"
1805 IN CHAR16
*VariableName
,
1806 IN EFI_GUID
*VendorGuid
,
1808 IN UINTN CertDataSize
1811 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable
;
1817 UINT32 NewCertDbSize
;
1818 UINT32 CertNodeSize
;
1820 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA
*Ptr
;
1822 if ((VariableName
== NULL
) || (VendorGuid
== NULL
) || (CertData
== NULL
)) {
1823 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
;
1827 // Get variable "certdb".
1829 Status
= FindVariable (
1833 &mVariableModuleGlobal
->VariableGlobal
,
1836 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
1840 DataSize
= DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable
.CurrPtr
);
1841 Data
= GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable
.CurrPtr
);
1842 if ((DataSize
== 0) || (Data
== NULL
)) {
1844 return EFI_NOT_FOUND
;
1848 // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb".
1849 // If yes return error.
1851 Status
= FindCertsFromDb (
1862 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
1864 return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
;
1868 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".
1870 NameSize
= (UINT32
) StrLen (VariableName
);
1871 CertNodeSize
= sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA
) + (UINT32
) CertDataSize
+ NameSize
* sizeof (CHAR16
);
1872 NewCertDbSize
= (UINT32
) DataSize
+ CertNodeSize
;
1873 if (NewCertDbSize
> MAX_CERTDB_SIZE
) {
1874 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
;
1876 NewCertDb
= (UINT8
*) mCertDbStore
;
1879 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.
1881 CopyMem (NewCertDb
, Data
, DataSize
);
1883 // Update CertDbListSize.
1885 CopyMem (NewCertDb
, &NewCertDbSize
, sizeof (UINT32
));
1887 // Construct new cert node.
1889 Ptr
= (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA
*) (NewCertDb
+ DataSize
);
1890 CopyGuid (&Ptr
->VendorGuid
, VendorGuid
);
1891 CopyMem (&Ptr
->CertNodeSize
, &CertNodeSize
, sizeof (UINT32
));
1892 CopyMem (&Ptr
->NameSize
, &NameSize
, sizeof (UINT32
));
1893 CopyMem (&Ptr
->CertDataSize
, &CertDataSize
, sizeof (UINT32
));
1896 (UINT8
*) Ptr
+ sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA
),
1898 NameSize
* sizeof (CHAR16
)
1902 (UINT8
*) Ptr
+ sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA
) + NameSize
* sizeof (CHAR16
),
1910 VarAttr
= EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE
| EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
| EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
| EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
;
1911 Status
= UpdateVariable (
1927 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set
1929 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
1930 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.
1931 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.
1932 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like
1933 buffer overflow, integer overflow.
1935 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.
1936 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
1937 @param[in] Data Data pointer.
1938 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the
1939 data, this value contains the required size.
1940 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.
1941 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.
1942 @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.
1943 @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.
1945 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
1946 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation
1947 check carried out by the firmware.
1948 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack
1950 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.
1954 VerifyTimeBasedPayload (
1955 IN CHAR16
*VariableName
,
1956 IN EFI_GUID
*VendorGuid
,
1959 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK
*Variable
,
1960 IN UINT32 Attributes
,
1961 IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType
,
1975 BOOLEAN VerifyStatus
;
1977 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*CertList
;
1978 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*Cert
;
1979 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable
;
1980 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2
*CertData
;
1983 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable
;
1988 UINTN CertStackSize
;
1989 UINT8
*CertsInCertDb
;
1990 UINT32 CertsSizeinDb
;
1992 VerifyStatus
= FALSE
;
2001 // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is
2002 // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)
2003 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new
2004 // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new
2005 // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not
2006 // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().
2008 CertData
= (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2
*) Data
;
2011 // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the
2012 // TimeStamp value are set to zero.
2014 if ((CertData
->TimeStamp
.Pad1
!= 0) ||
2015 (CertData
->TimeStamp
.Nanosecond
!= 0) ||
2016 (CertData
->TimeStamp
.TimeZone
!= 0) ||
2017 (CertData
->TimeStamp
.Daylight
!= 0) ||
2018 (CertData
->TimeStamp
.Pad2
!= 0)) {
2019 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
;
2022 if ((Variable
->CurrPtr
!= NULL
) && ((Attributes
& EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE
) == 0)) {
2023 if (CompareTimeStamp (&CertData
->TimeStamp
, &Variable
->CurrPtr
->TimeStamp
)) {
2025 // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.
2027 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
;
2032 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.
2033 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.
2035 if ((CertData
->AuthInfo
.Hdr
.wCertificateType
!= WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID
) ||
2036 !CompareGuid (&CertData
->AuthInfo
.CertType
, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid
)) {
2038 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.
2040 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
;
2044 // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.
2045 // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.
2047 SigData
= CertData
->AuthInfo
.CertData
;
2048 SigDataSize
= CertData
->AuthInfo
.Hdr
.dwLength
- (UINT32
) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID
, CertData
));
2051 // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.
2053 PayloadPtr
= SigData
+ SigDataSize
;
2054 PayloadSize
= DataSize
- OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA
- (UINTN
) SigDataSize
;
2057 // Construct a buffer to fill with (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).
2059 NewDataSize
= PayloadSize
+ sizeof (EFI_TIME
) + sizeof (UINT32
) +
2060 sizeof (EFI_GUID
) + StrSize (VariableName
) - sizeof (CHAR16
);
2061 NewData
= mSerializationRuntimeBuffer
;
2064 Length
= StrLen (VariableName
) * sizeof (CHAR16
);
2065 CopyMem (Buffer
, VariableName
, Length
);
2068 Length
= sizeof (EFI_GUID
);
2069 CopyMem (Buffer
, VendorGuid
, Length
);
2072 Length
= sizeof (UINT32
);
2073 CopyMem (Buffer
, &Attr
, Length
);
2076 Length
= sizeof (EFI_TIME
);
2077 CopyMem (Buffer
, &CertData
->TimeStamp
, Length
);
2080 CopyMem (Buffer
, PayloadPtr
, PayloadSize
);
2082 if (AuthVarType
== AuthVarTypePk
) {
2084 // Get platform key from variable.
2086 Status
= FindVariable (
2087 EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME
,
2088 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid
,
2090 &mVariableModuleGlobal
->VariableGlobal
,
2093 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
2097 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable
.CurrPtr
);
2098 Cert
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) CertList
+ sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + CertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
);
2099 RootCert
= Cert
->SignatureData
;
2100 RootCertSize
= CertList
->SignatureSize
- (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
) - 1);
2104 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.
2106 VerifyStatus
= Pkcs7Verify (
2115 } else if (AuthVarType
== AuthVarTypeKek
) {
2118 // Get KEK database from variable.
2120 Status
= FindVariable (
2121 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME
,
2122 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid
,
2124 &mVariableModuleGlobal
->VariableGlobal
,
2127 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
2132 // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.
2134 KekDataSize
= KekVariable
.CurrPtr
->DataSize
;
2135 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable
.CurrPtr
);
2136 while ((KekDataSize
> 0) && (KekDataSize
>= CertList
->SignatureListSize
)) {
2137 if (CompareGuid (&CertList
->SignatureType
, &gEfiCertX509Guid
)) {
2138 Cert
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) CertList
+ sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + CertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
);
2139 CertCount
= (CertList
->SignatureListSize
- sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) - CertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
) / CertList
->SignatureSize
;
2140 for (Index
= 0; Index
< CertCount
; Index
++) {
2142 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify
2144 RootCert
= Cert
->SignatureData
;
2145 RootCertSize
= CertList
->SignatureSize
- (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
) - 1);
2148 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.
2150 VerifyStatus
= Pkcs7Verify (
2161 Cert
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) Cert
+ CertList
->SignatureSize
);
2164 KekDataSize
-= CertList
->SignatureListSize
;
2165 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) ((UINT8
*) CertList
+ CertList
->SignatureListSize
);
2167 } else if (AuthVarType
== AuthVarTypePriv
) {
2170 // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX.
2171 // Get signer's certificates from SignedData.
2173 VerifyStatus
= Pkcs7GetSigners (
2181 if (!VerifyStatus
) {
2186 // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb for existing
2187 // variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates
2188 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.
2190 if ((Variable
->CurrPtr
!= NULL
)) {
2191 VerifyStatus
= FALSE
;
2193 Status
= GetCertsFromDb (VariableName
, VendorGuid
, &CertsInCertDb
, &CertsSizeinDb
);
2194 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
2198 if ((CertStackSize
!= CertsSizeinDb
) ||
2199 (CompareMem (SignerCerts
, CertsInCertDb
, CertsSizeinDb
) != 0)) {
2204 VerifyStatus
= Pkcs7Verify (
2212 if (!VerifyStatus
) {
2217 // Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.
2219 if ((PayloadSize
== 0) && (Variable
->CurrPtr
!= NULL
) && ((Attributes
& EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE
) == 0)) {
2220 Status
= DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName
, VendorGuid
);
2221 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
2222 VerifyStatus
= FALSE
;
2225 } else if (Variable
->CurrPtr
== NULL
&& PayloadSize
!= 0) {
2227 // Insert signer's certificates when adding a new common authenticated variable.
2229 Status
= InsertCertsToDb (VariableName
, VendorGuid
, SignerCerts
, CertStackSize
);
2230 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
2231 VerifyStatus
= FALSE
;
2235 } else if (AuthVarType
== AuthVarTypePayload
) {
2236 CertList
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
*) PayloadPtr
;
2237 Cert
= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
*) ((UINT8
*) CertList
+ sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
) + CertList
->SignatureHeaderSize
);
2238 RootCert
= Cert
->SignatureData
;
2239 RootCertSize
= CertList
->SignatureSize
- (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
) - 1);
2241 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.
2243 VerifyStatus
= Pkcs7Verify (
2252 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
;
2257 if (AuthVarType
== AuthVarTypePriv
) {
2258 Pkcs7FreeSigners (RootCert
);
2259 Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts
);
2262 if (!VerifyStatus
) {
2263 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
;
2266 Status
= CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName
, VendorGuid
, PayloadPtr
, PayloadSize
);
2267 if (EFI_ERROR (Status
)) {
2271 if ((PayloadSize
== 0) && (VarDel
!= NULL
)) {
2276 // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify
2278 return UpdateVariable (
2287 &CertData
->TimeStamp