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1 /** @file
2 Implement authentication services for the authenticated variable
3 service in UEFI2.2.
4
5 Caution: This module requires additional review when modified.
6 This driver will have external input - variable data. It may be input in SMM mode.
7 This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like
8 buffer overflow, integer overflow.
9 Variable attribute should also be checked to avoid authentication bypass.
10 The whole SMM authentication variable design relies on the integrity of flash part and SMM.
11 which is assumed to be protected by platform. All variable code and metadata in flash/SMM Memory
12 may not be modified without authorization. If platform fails to protect these resources,
13 the authentication service provided in this driver will be broken, and the behavior is undefined.
14
15 ProcessVarWithPk(), ProcessVarWithKek() and ProcessVariable() are the function to do
16 variable authentication.
17
18 VerifyTimeBasedPayload() and VerifyCounterBasedPayload() are sub function to do verification.
19 They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library
20 to verify the signature.
21
22 Copyright (c) 2009 - 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
23 This program and the accompanying materials
24 are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
25 which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
26 http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
27
28 THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
29 WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
30
31 **/
32
33 #include "Variable.h"
34 #include "AuthService.h"
35
36 ///
37 /// Global database array for scratch
38 ///
39 UINT8 *mPubKeyStore;
40 UINT32 mPubKeyNumber;
41 UINT32 mMaxKeyNumber;
42 UINT32 mMaxKeyDbSize;
43 UINT8 *mCertDbStore;
44 UINT32 mMaxCertDbSize;
45 UINT32 mPlatformMode;
46 UINT8 mVendorKeyState;
47
48 EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[] = {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, EFI_CERT_X509_GUID};
49 //
50 // Public Exponent of RSA Key.
51 //
52 CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };
53 //
54 // Hash context pointer
55 //
56 VOID *mHashCtx = NULL;
57
58 //
59 // The serialization of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes
60 // parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the
61 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value
62 // i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)
63 //
64 UINT8 *mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = NULL;
65
66 //
67 // Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.
68 // These data are used to peform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.
69 //
70 EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {
71 //{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }
72 {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },
73 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },
74 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },
75 {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },
76 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },
77 {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},
78 {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },
79 {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },
80 {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 },
81 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, 0, 48 },
82 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, 0, 64 },
83 {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, 0, 80 }
84 };
85
86 /**
87 Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.
88
89 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.
90 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.
91
92 @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.
93 @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.
94
95 **/
96 BOOLEAN
97 NeedPhysicallyPresent(
98 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
99 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid
100 )
101 {
102 if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))
103 || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {
104 return TRUE;
105 }
106
107 return FALSE;
108 }
109
110 /**
111 Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.
112
113 @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.
114 @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.
115
116 **/
117 BOOLEAN
118 InCustomMode (
119 VOID
120 )
121 {
122 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;
123
124 FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);
125 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL && *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr)) == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {
126 return TRUE;
127 }
128
129 return FALSE;
130 }
131
132 /**
133 Initializes for authenticated varibale service.
134
135 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Function successfully executed.
136 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Fail to allocate enough memory resources.
137
138 **/
139 EFI_STATUS
140 AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (
141 VOID
142 )
143 {
144 EFI_STATUS Status;
145 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;
146 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;
147 UINT8 VarValue;
148 UINT32 VarAttr;
149 UINT8 *Data;
150 UINTN DataSize;
151 UINTN CtxSize;
152 UINT8 SecureBootMode;
153 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;
154 UINT8 CustomMode;
155 UINT32 ListSize;
156
157 //
158 // Initialize hash context.
159 //
160 CtxSize = Sha256GetContextSize ();
161 mHashCtx = AllocateRuntimePool (CtxSize);
162 if (mHashCtx == NULL) {
163 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
164 }
165
166 //
167 // Reserve runtime buffer for public key database. The size excludes variable header and name size.
168 //
169 mMaxKeyDbSize = PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) - sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER) - sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME);
170 mMaxKeyNumber = mMaxKeyDbSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;
171 mPubKeyStore = AllocateRuntimePool (mMaxKeyDbSize);
172 if (mPubKeyStore == NULL) {
173 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
174 }
175
176 //
177 // Reserve runtime buffer for certificate database. The size excludes variable header and name size.
178 //
179 mMaxCertDbSize = PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) - sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER) - sizeof (EFI_CERT_DB_NAME);
180 mCertDbStore = AllocateRuntimePool (mMaxCertDbSize);
181 if (mCertDbStore == NULL) {
182 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
183 }
184
185 //
186 // Prepare runtime buffer for serialized data of time-based authenticated
187 // Variable, i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).
188 //
189 mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) + sizeof (EFI_TIME));
190 if (mSerializationRuntimeBuffer == NULL) {
191 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
192 }
193
194 //
195 // Check "AuthVarKeyDatabase" variable's existence.
196 // If it doesn't exist, create a new one with initial value of 0 and EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
197 //
198 Status = FindVariable (
199 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,
200 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,
201 &Variable,
202 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,
203 FALSE
204 );
205
206 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {
207 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
208 VarValue = 0;
209 mPubKeyNumber = 0;
210 Status = UpdateVariable (
211 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,
212 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,
213 &VarValue,
214 sizeof(UINT8),
215 VarAttr,
216 0,
217 0,
218 &Variable,
219 NULL
220 );
221 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
222 return Status;
223 }
224 } else {
225 //
226 // Load database in global variable for cache.
227 //
228 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);
229 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);
230 ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));
231 //
232 // "AuthVarKeyDatabase" is an internal variable. Its DataSize is always ensured not to exceed mPubKeyStore buffer size(See definition before)
233 // Therefore, there is no memory overflow in underlying CopyMem.
234 //
235 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);
236 mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);
237 }
238
239 FindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &PkVariable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);
240 if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {
241 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));
242 } else {
243 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));
244 }
245
246 //
247 // Create "SetupMode" variable with BS+RT attribute set.
248 //
249 FindVariable (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);
250 if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {
251 mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;
252 } else {
253 mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;
254 }
255 Status = UpdateVariable (
256 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
257 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
258 &mPlatformMode,
259 sizeof(UINT8),
260 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
261 0,
262 0,
263 &Variable,
264 NULL
265 );
266 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
267 return Status;
268 }
269
270 //
271 // Create "SignatureSupport" variable with BS+RT attribute set.
272 //
273 FindVariable (EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);
274 Status = UpdateVariable (
275 EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,
276 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
277 mSignatureSupport,
278 sizeof(mSignatureSupport),
279 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
280 0,
281 0,
282 &Variable,
283 NULL
284 );
285 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
286 return Status;
287 }
288
289 //
290 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.
291 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in USER_MODE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.
292 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.
293 //
294 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;
295 FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);
296 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {
297 SecureBootEnable = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));
298 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {
299 //
300 // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in USER_MODE.
301 //
302 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;
303 Status = UpdateVariable (
304 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
305 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
306 &SecureBootEnable,
307 sizeof (UINT8),
308 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,
309 0,
310 0,
311 &Variable,
312 NULL
313 );
314 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
315 return Status;
316 }
317 }
318
319 //
320 // Create "SecureBoot" variable with BS+RT attribute set.
321 //
322 if (SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE && mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {
323 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;
324 } else {
325 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;
326 }
327 FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);
328 Status = UpdateVariable (
329 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
330 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
331 &SecureBootMode,
332 sizeof (UINT8),
333 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,
334 0,
335 0,
336 &Variable,
337 NULL
338 );
339 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
340 return Status;
341 }
342
343 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, mPlatformMode));
344 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBootMode));
345 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));
346
347 //
348 // Initialize "CustomMode" in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE state.
349 //
350 FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);
351 CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;
352 Status = UpdateVariable (
353 EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,
354 &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,
355 &CustomMode,
356 sizeof (UINT8),
357 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,
358 0,
359 0,
360 &Variable,
361 NULL
362 );
363 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
364 return Status;
365 }
366
367 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, CustomMode));
368
369 //
370 // Check "certdb" variable's existence.
371 // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with
372 // EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
373 //
374 Status = FindVariable (
375 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,
376 &gEfiCertDbGuid,
377 &Variable,
378 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,
379 FALSE
380 );
381
382 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {
383 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
384 ListSize = sizeof (UINT32);
385 Status = UpdateVariable (
386 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,
387 &gEfiCertDbGuid,
388 &ListSize,
389 sizeof (UINT32),
390 VarAttr,
391 0,
392 0,
393 &Variable,
394 NULL
395 );
396 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
397 return Status;
398 }
399 }
400
401 //
402 // Check "VendorKeysNv" variable's existence and create "VendorKeys" variable accordingly.
403 //
404 FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);
405 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {
406 mVendorKeyState = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));
407 } else {
408 //
409 // "VendorKeysNv" not exist, initialize it in VENDOR_KEYS_VALID state.
410 //
411 mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_VALID;
412 Status = UpdateVariable (
413 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,
414 &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,
415 &mVendorKeyState,
416 sizeof (UINT8),
417 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,
418 0,
419 0,
420 &Variable,
421 NULL
422 );
423 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
424 return Status;
425 }
426 }
427
428 //
429 // Create "VendorKeys" variable with BS+RT attribute set.
430 //
431 FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);
432 Status = UpdateVariable (
433 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,
434 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
435 &mVendorKeyState,
436 sizeof (UINT8),
437 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,
438 0,
439 0,
440 &Variable,
441 NULL
442 );
443 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
444 return Status;
445 }
446
447 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, mVendorKeyState));
448
449 return Status;
450 }
451
452 /**
453 Add public key in store and return its index.
454
455 @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data
456 @param[in] VariableDataEntry The variable data entry
457
458 @return Index of new added item
459
460 **/
461 UINT32
462 AddPubKeyInStore (
463 IN UINT8 *PubKey,
464 IN VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY *VariableDataEntry
465 )
466 {
467 EFI_STATUS Status;
468 BOOLEAN IsFound;
469 UINT32 Index;
470 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;
471 UINT8 *Ptr;
472 UINT8 *Data;
473 UINTN DataSize;
474 VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY PublicKeyEntry;
475 UINT32 Attributes;
476
477 if (PubKey == NULL) {
478 return 0;
479 }
480
481 Status = FindVariable (
482 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,
483 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,
484 &Variable,
485 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,
486 FALSE
487 );
488 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
489 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Get public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));
490 return 0;
491 }
492
493 //
494 // Check whether the public key entry does exist.
495 //
496 IsFound = FALSE;
497 for (Ptr = mPubKeyStore, Index = 1; Index <= mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {
498 if (CompareMem (Ptr, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {
499 IsFound = TRUE;
500 break;
501 }
502 Ptr += EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;
503 }
504
505 if (!IsFound) {
506 //
507 // Add public key in database.
508 //
509 if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {
510 //
511 // Public key dadatase is full, try to reclaim invalid key.
512 //
513 if (AtRuntime ()) {
514 //
515 // NV storage can't reclaim at runtime.
516 //
517 return 0;
518 }
519
520 Status = Reclaim (
521 mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal.NonVolatileVariableBase,
522 &mVariableModuleGlobal->NonVolatileLastVariableOffset,
523 FALSE,
524 NULL,
525 NULL,
526 0,
527 TRUE
528 );
529 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
530 return 0;
531 }
532
533 Status = FindVariable (
534 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,
535 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,
536 &Variable,
537 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,
538 FALSE
539 );
540 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
541 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Get public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));
542 return 0;
543 }
544
545 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);
546 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);
547 ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));
548 //
549 // "AuthVarKeyDatabase" is an internal used variable. Its DataSize is always ensured not to exceed mPubKeyStore buffer size(See definition before)
550 // Therefore, there is no memory overflow in underlying CopyMem.
551 //
552 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);
553 mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);
554
555 if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {
556 return 0;
557 }
558 }
559
560 //
561 // Check the variable space for both public key and variable data.
562 //
563 PublicKeyEntry.VariableSize = (mPubKeyNumber + 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;
564 PublicKeyEntry.Guid = &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid;
565 PublicKeyEntry.Name = AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME;
566 Attributes = VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
567
568 if (!CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (Attributes, &PublicKeyEntry, VariableDataEntry, NULL)) {
569 //
570 // No enough variable space.
571 //
572 return 0;
573 }
574
575 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);
576 Index = ++mPubKeyNumber;
577 //
578 // Update public key database variable.
579 //
580 Status = UpdateVariable (
581 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,
582 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,
583 mPubKeyStore,
584 mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE,
585 Attributes,
586 0,
587 0,
588 &Variable,
589 NULL
590 );
591 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
592 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));
593 return 0;
594 }
595 }
596
597 return Index;
598 }
599
600 /**
601 Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID type.
602 Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.
603
604 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
605 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.
606 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.
607 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like
608 buffer overflow, integer overflow.
609
610 @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.
611 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.
612 @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.
613
614 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
615 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.
616 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.
617
618 **/
619 EFI_STATUS
620 VerifyCounterBasedPayload (
621 IN UINT8 *Data,
622 IN UINTN DataSize,
623 IN UINT8 *PubKey
624 )
625 {
626 BOOLEAN Status;
627 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;
628 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;
629 UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
630 VOID *Rsa;
631 UINTN PayloadSize;
632
633 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;
634 Rsa = NULL;
635 CertData = NULL;
636 CertBlock = NULL;
637
638 if (Data == NULL || PubKey == NULL) {
639 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
640 }
641
642 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;
643 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);
644
645 //
646 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.
647 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID.
648 //
649 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||
650 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)
651 ) {
652 //
653 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.
654 //
655 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
656 }
657 //
658 // Hash data payload with SHA256.
659 //
660 ZeroMem (Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
661 Status = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);
662 if (!Status) {
663 goto Done;
664 }
665 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, PayloadSize);
666 if (!Status) {
667 goto Done;
668 }
669 //
670 // Hash Size.
671 //
672 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &PayloadSize, sizeof (UINTN));
673 if (!Status) {
674 goto Done;
675 }
676 //
677 // Hash Monotonic Count.
678 //
679 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &CertData->MonotonicCount, sizeof (UINT64));
680 if (!Status) {
681 goto Done;
682 }
683 Status = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Digest);
684 if (!Status) {
685 goto Done;
686 }
687 //
688 // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.
689 //
690 Rsa = RsaNew ();
691 ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);
692 //
693 // Set RSA Key Components.
694 // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.
695 //
696 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);
697 if (!Status) {
698 goto Done;
699 }
700 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));
701 if (!Status) {
702 goto Done;
703 }
704 //
705 // Verify the signature.
706 //
707 Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (
708 Rsa,
709 Digest,
710 SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
711 CertBlock->Signature,
712 EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE
713 );
714
715 Done:
716 if (Rsa != NULL) {
717 RsaFree (Rsa);
718 }
719 if (Status) {
720 return EFI_SUCCESS;
721 } else {
722 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
723 }
724 }
725
726 /**
727 Update platform mode.
728
729 @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.
730
731 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
732 @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.
733
734 **/
735 EFI_STATUS
736 UpdatePlatformMode (
737 IN UINT32 Mode
738 )
739 {
740 EFI_STATUS Status;
741 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;
742 UINT8 SecureBootMode;
743 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;
744 UINTN VariableDataSize;
745
746 Status = FindVariable (
747 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
748 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
749 &Variable,
750 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,
751 FALSE
752 );
753 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
754 return Status;
755 }
756
757 //
758 // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible
759 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
760 //
761 mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;
762 CopyMem (GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr), &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));
763
764 if (AtRuntime ()) {
765 //
766 // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating
767 // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot
768 // Variable in runtime.
769 //
770 return Status;
771 }
772
773 //
774 // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.
775 // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,
776 // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.
777 //
778 Status = FindVariable (
779 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
780 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
781 &Variable,
782 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,
783 FALSE
784 );
785 //
786 // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.
787 // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.
788 // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.
789 //
790 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {
791 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;
792 } else {
793 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {
794 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;
795 } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {
796 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;
797 } else {
798 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
799 }
800 }
801
802 Status = UpdateVariable (
803 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
804 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
805 &SecureBootMode,
806 sizeof(UINT8),
807 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,
808 0,
809 0,
810 &Variable,
811 NULL
812 );
813 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
814 return Status;
815 }
816
817 //
818 // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.
819 //
820 Status = FindVariable (
821 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
822 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
823 &Variable,
824 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,
825 FALSE
826 );
827
828 if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {
829 //
830 // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.
831 //
832 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;
833 VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);
834 } else {
835 //
836 // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"
837 // variable is not in secure boot state.
838 //
839 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL || EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
840 return EFI_SUCCESS;
841 }
842 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;
843 VariableDataSize = 0;
844 }
845
846 Status = UpdateVariable (
847 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
848 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
849 &SecureBootEnable,
850 VariableDataSize,
851 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,
852 0,
853 0,
854 &Variable,
855 NULL
856 );
857 return Status;
858 }
859
860 /**
861 Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx/dbt variable.
862
863 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.
864 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
865 @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.
866 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.
867
868 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.
869 @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.
870
871 **/
872 EFI_STATUS
873 CheckSignatureListFormat(
874 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
875 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
876 IN VOID *Data,
877 IN UINTN DataSize
878 )
879 {
880 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;
881 UINTN SigDataSize;
882 UINT32 Index;
883 UINT32 SigCount;
884 BOOLEAN IsPk;
885 VOID *RsaContext;
886 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;
887 UINTN CertLen;
888
889 if (DataSize == 0) {
890 return EFI_SUCCESS;
891 }
892
893 ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);
894
895 if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){
896 IsPk = TRUE;
897 } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)) ||
898 (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&
899 ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||
900 (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0)))) {
901 IsPk = FALSE;
902 } else {
903 return EFI_SUCCESS;
904 }
905
906 SigCount = 0;
907 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
908 SigDataSize = DataSize;
909 RsaContext = NULL;
910
911 //
912 // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.
913 // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.
914 //
915 while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {
916 for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {
917 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {
918 //
919 // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner
920 // component) add the data length according to signature type.
921 //
922 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) &&
923 (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {
924 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
925 }
926 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINTN) ~0) &&
927 SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {
928 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
929 }
930 break;
931 }
932 }
933
934 if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {
935 //
936 // Undefined signature type.
937 //
938 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
939 }
940
941 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
942 //
943 // Try to retrieve the RSA public key from the X.509 certificate.
944 // If this operation fails, it's not a valid certificate.
945 //
946 RsaContext = RsaNew ();
947 if (RsaContext == NULL) {
948 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
949 }
950 CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);
951 CertLen = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);
952 if (!RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (CertData->SignatureData, CertLen, &RsaContext)) {
953 RsaFree (RsaContext);
954 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
955 }
956 RsaFree (RsaContext);
957 }
958
959 if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {
960 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
961 }
962 SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;
963
964 SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;
965 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);
966 }
967
968 if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {
969 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
970 }
971
972 if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {
973 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
974 }
975
976 return EFI_SUCCESS;
977 }
978
979 /**
980 Update "VendorKeys" variable to record the out of band secure boot key modification.
981
982 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is updated successfully.
983 @return Others Failed to update variable.
984
985 **/
986 EFI_STATUS
987 VendorKeyIsModified (
988 VOID
989 )
990 {
991 EFI_STATUS Status;
992 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;
993
994 if (mVendorKeyState == VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED) {
995 return EFI_SUCCESS;
996 }
997 mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED;
998
999 FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);
1000 Status = UpdateVariable (
1001 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,
1002 &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,
1003 &mVendorKeyState,
1004 sizeof (UINT8),
1005 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,
1006 0,
1007 0,
1008 &Variable,
1009 NULL
1010 );
1011 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1012 return Status;
1013 }
1014
1015 FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);
1016 return UpdateVariable (
1017 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,
1018 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
1019 &mVendorKeyState,
1020 sizeof (UINT8),
1021 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,
1022 0,
1023 0,
1024 &Variable,
1025 NULL
1026 );
1027 }
1028
1029 /**
1030 Process variable with platform key for verification.
1031
1032 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
1033 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.
1034 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.
1035 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like
1036 buffer overflow, integer overflow.
1037 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.
1038
1039 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.
1040 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
1041 @param[in] Data Data pointer.
1042 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the
1043 data, this value contains the required size.
1044 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.
1045 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable
1046 @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.
1047
1048 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
1049 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.
1050 check carried out by the firmware.
1051 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.
1052
1053 **/
1054 EFI_STATUS
1055 ProcessVarWithPk (
1056 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
1057 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
1058 IN VOID *Data,
1059 IN UINTN DataSize,
1060 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,
1061 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,
1062 IN BOOLEAN IsPk
1063 )
1064 {
1065 EFI_STATUS Status;
1066 BOOLEAN Del;
1067 UINT8 *Payload;
1068 UINTN PayloadSize;
1069
1070 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||
1071 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {
1072 //
1073 // PK, KEK and db/dbx/dbt should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based
1074 // authenticated variable.
1075 //
1076 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1077 }
1078
1079 Del = FALSE;
1080 if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !IsPk)) {
1081 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);
1082 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);
1083 if (PayloadSize == 0) {
1084 Del = TRUE;
1085 }
1086
1087 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);
1088 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1089 return Status;
1090 }
1091
1092 Status = UpdateVariable (
1093 VariableName,
1094 VendorGuid,
1095 Payload,
1096 PayloadSize,
1097 Attributes,
1098 0,
1099 0,
1100 Variable,
1101 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp
1102 );
1103 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
1104 return Status;
1105 }
1106
1107 if ((mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) || IsPk) {
1108 Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();
1109 }
1110 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {
1111 //
1112 // Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.
1113 //
1114 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (
1115 VariableName,
1116 VendorGuid,
1117 Data,
1118 DataSize,
1119 Variable,
1120 Attributes,
1121 AuthVarTypePk,
1122 &Del
1123 );
1124 } else {
1125 //
1126 // Verify against the certificate in data payload.
1127 //
1128 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (
1129 VariableName,
1130 VendorGuid,
1131 Data,
1132 DataSize,
1133 Variable,
1134 Attributes,
1135 AuthVarTypePayload,
1136 &Del
1137 );
1138 }
1139
1140 if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {
1141 if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !Del) {
1142 //
1143 // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.
1144 //
1145 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);
1146 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && Del){
1147 //
1148 // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.
1149 //
1150 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);
1151 }
1152 }
1153
1154 return Status;
1155 }
1156
1157 /**
1158 Process variable with key exchange key for verification.
1159
1160 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
1161 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.
1162 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.
1163 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like
1164 buffer overflow, integer overflow.
1165 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.
1166
1167 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.
1168 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
1169 @param[in] Data Data pointer.
1170 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the
1171 data, this value contains the required size.
1172 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.
1173 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.
1174
1175 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
1176 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation
1177 check carried out by the firmware.
1178 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.
1179
1180 **/
1181 EFI_STATUS
1182 ProcessVarWithKek (
1183 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
1184 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
1185 IN VOID *Data,
1186 IN UINTN DataSize,
1187 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,
1188 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL
1189 )
1190 {
1191 EFI_STATUS Status;
1192 UINT8 *Payload;
1193 UINTN PayloadSize;
1194
1195 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||
1196 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {
1197 //
1198 // DB, DBX and DBT should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based
1199 // authenticated variable.
1200 //
1201 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1202 }
1203
1204 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
1205 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {
1206 //
1207 // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.
1208 //
1209 return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (
1210 VariableName,
1211 VendorGuid,
1212 Data,
1213 DataSize,
1214 Variable,
1215 Attributes,
1216 AuthVarTypeKek,
1217 NULL
1218 );
1219 } else {
1220 //
1221 // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.
1222 //
1223 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);
1224 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);
1225
1226 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);
1227 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1228 return Status;
1229 }
1230
1231 Status = UpdateVariable (
1232 VariableName,
1233 VendorGuid,
1234 Payload,
1235 PayloadSize,
1236 Attributes,
1237 0,
1238 0,
1239 Variable,
1240 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp
1241 );
1242 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1243 return Status;
1244 }
1245
1246 if (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) {
1247 Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();
1248 }
1249 }
1250
1251 return Status;
1252 }
1253
1254 /**
1255 Check if it is to delete auth variable.
1256
1257 @param[in] Data Data pointer.
1258 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.
1259 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.
1260 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.
1261
1262 @retval TRUE It is to delete auth variable.
1263 @retval FALSE It is not to delete auth variable.
1264
1265 **/
1266 BOOLEAN
1267 IsDeleteAuthVariable (
1268 IN VOID *Data,
1269 IN UINTN DataSize,
1270 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,
1271 IN UINT32 Attributes
1272 )
1273 {
1274 BOOLEAN Del;
1275 UINT8 *Payload;
1276 UINTN PayloadSize;
1277
1278 Del = FALSE;
1279
1280 //
1281 // To delete a variable created with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
1282 // or the EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute,
1283 // SetVariable must be used with attributes matching the existing variable
1284 // and the DataSize set to the size of the AuthInfo descriptor.
1285 //
1286 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) &&
1287 (Attributes == Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes) &&
1288 ((Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)) {
1289 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {
1290 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);
1291 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);
1292 if (PayloadSize == 0) {
1293 Del = TRUE;
1294 }
1295 } else {
1296 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE;
1297 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;
1298 if (PayloadSize == 0) {
1299 Del = TRUE;
1300 }
1301 }
1302 }
1303
1304 return Del;
1305 }
1306
1307 /**
1308 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set
1309
1310 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
1311 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.
1312 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.
1313 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like
1314 buffer overflow, integer overflow.
1315 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.
1316
1317 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.
1318 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
1319
1320 @param[in] Data Data pointer.
1321 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.
1322 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.
1323 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.
1324
1325 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
1326 @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with
1327 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
1328 @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The Database to save the public key is full.
1329 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
1330 set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation
1331 check carried out by the firmware.
1332 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.
1333
1334 **/
1335 EFI_STATUS
1336 ProcessVariable (
1337 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
1338 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
1339 IN VOID *Data,
1340 IN UINTN DataSize,
1341 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,
1342 IN UINT32 Attributes
1343 )
1344 {
1345 EFI_STATUS Status;
1346 BOOLEAN IsDeletion;
1347 BOOLEAN IsFirstTime;
1348 UINT8 *PubKey;
1349 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;
1350 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;
1351 UINT32 KeyIndex;
1352 UINT64 MonotonicCount;
1353 VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY VariableDataEntry;
1354
1355 KeyIndex = 0;
1356 CertData = NULL;
1357 CertBlock = NULL;
1358 PubKey = NULL;
1359 IsDeletion = FALSE;
1360 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
1361
1362 if (UserPhysicalPresent()) {
1363 //
1364 // Allow the delete operation of common authenticated variable at user physical presence.
1365 //
1366 if (IsDeleteAuthVariable (Data, DataSize, Variable, Attributes)) {
1367 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {
1368 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);
1369 }
1370 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1371 Status = UpdateVariable (
1372 VariableName,
1373 VendorGuid,
1374 NULL,
1375 0,
1376 0,
1377 0,
1378 0,
1379 Variable,
1380 NULL
1381 );
1382 }
1383 return Status;
1384 }
1385 } else {
1386 if (NeedPhysicallyPresent(VariableName, VendorGuid)) {
1387 //
1388 // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.
1389 //
1390 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
1391 }
1392 }
1393
1394 //
1395 // A time-based authenticated variable and a count-based authenticated variable
1396 // can't be updated by each other.
1397 //
1398 if (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) {
1399 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&
1400 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {
1401 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
1402 }
1403
1404 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&
1405 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {
1406 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
1407 }
1408 }
1409
1410 //
1411 // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.
1412 //
1413 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {
1414 return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (
1415 VariableName,
1416 VendorGuid,
1417 Data,
1418 DataSize,
1419 Variable,
1420 Attributes,
1421 AuthVarTypePriv,
1422 NULL
1423 );
1424 }
1425
1426 //
1427 // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.
1428 //
1429 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {
1430 //
1431 // Determine current operation type.
1432 //
1433 if (DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) {
1434 IsDeletion = TRUE;
1435 }
1436 //
1437 // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
1438 //
1439 if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {
1440 IsFirstTime = TRUE;
1441 } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {
1442 IsFirstTime = TRUE;
1443 } else {
1444 KeyIndex = Variable->CurrPtr->PubKeyIndex;
1445 IsFirstTime = FALSE;
1446 }
1447 } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) &&
1448 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)
1449 ) {
1450 //
1451 // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.
1452 //
1453 return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;
1454 } else {
1455 //
1456 // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.
1457 // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.
1458 //
1459 Status = UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes, 0, 0, Variable, NULL);
1460 return Status;
1461 }
1462
1463 //
1464 // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.
1465 //
1466 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;
1467 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);
1468 PubKey = CertBlock->PublicKey;
1469
1470 //
1471 // Update Monotonic Count value.
1472 //
1473 MonotonicCount = CertData->MonotonicCount;
1474
1475 if (!IsFirstTime) {
1476 //
1477 // 2 cases need to check here
1478 // 1. Internal PubKey variable. PubKeyIndex is always 0
1479 // 2. Other counter-based AuthVariable. Check input PubKey.
1480 //
1481 if (KeyIndex == 0 || CompareMem (PubKey, mPubKeyStore + (KeyIndex - 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) != 0) {
1482 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
1483 }
1484 //
1485 // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable
1486 // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.
1487 //
1488 if (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount) {
1489 //
1490 // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.
1491 //
1492 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
1493 }
1494 }
1495 //
1496 // Verify the certificate in Data payload.
1497 //
1498 Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, PubKey);
1499 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1500 return Status;
1501 }
1502
1503 //
1504 // Now, the signature has been verified!
1505 //
1506 if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {
1507 VariableDataEntry.VariableSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;
1508 VariableDataEntry.Guid = VendorGuid;
1509 VariableDataEntry.Name = VariableName;
1510
1511 //
1512 // Update public key database variable if need.
1513 //
1514 KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey, &VariableDataEntry);
1515 if (KeyIndex == 0) {
1516 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
1517 }
1518 }
1519
1520 //
1521 // Verification pass.
1522 //
1523 return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, Attributes, KeyIndex, MonotonicCount, Variable, NULL);
1524 }
1525
1526 /**
1527 Merge two buffers which formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. Only the new EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
1528 will be appended to the original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, duplicate EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA
1529 will be ignored.
1530
1531 @param[in, out] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.
1532 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.
1533 @param[in] FreeBufSize Size of free data buffer
1534 @param[in] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST to be appended.
1535 @param[in] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.
1536 @param[out] MergedBufSize Size of the merged buffer
1537
1538 @return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if input Data buffer overflowed
1539
1540 **/
1541 EFI_STATUS
1542 AppendSignatureList (
1543 IN OUT VOID *Data,
1544 IN UINTN DataSize,
1545 IN UINTN FreeBufSize,
1546 IN VOID *NewData,
1547 IN UINTN NewDataSize,
1548 OUT UINTN *MergedBufSize
1549 )
1550 {
1551 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;
1552 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;
1553 UINTN CertCount;
1554 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;
1555 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;
1556 UINTN NewCertCount;
1557 UINTN Index;
1558 UINTN Index2;
1559 UINTN Size;
1560 UINT8 *Tail;
1561 UINTN CopiedCount;
1562 UINTN SignatureListSize;
1563 BOOLEAN IsNewCert;
1564
1565 Tail = (UINT8 *) Data + DataSize;
1566
1567 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;
1568 while ((NewDataSize > 0) && (NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {
1569 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
1570 NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;
1571
1572 CopiedCount = 0;
1573 for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {
1574 IsNewCert = TRUE;
1575
1576 Size = DataSize;
1577 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
1578 while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
1579 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&
1580 (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {
1581 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
1582 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
1583 for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {
1584 //
1585 // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.
1586 //
1587 if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {
1588 IsNewCert = FALSE;
1589 break;
1590 }
1591 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);
1592 }
1593 }
1594
1595 if (!IsNewCert) {
1596 break;
1597 }
1598 Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
1599 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);
1600 }
1601
1602 if (IsNewCert) {
1603 //
1604 // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, append it.
1605 //
1606 if (CopiedCount == 0) {
1607 if (FreeBufSize < sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) {
1608 return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
1609 }
1610
1611 //
1612 // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.
1613 //
1614
1615 CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
1616 Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;
1617 FreeBufSize -= sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;
1618 }
1619
1620 if (FreeBufSize < NewCertList->SignatureSize) {
1621 return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
1622 }
1623 CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);
1624 Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;
1625 FreeBufSize -= NewCertList->SignatureSize;
1626 CopiedCount++;
1627 }
1628
1629 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);
1630 }
1631
1632 //
1633 // Update SignatureListSize in newly appended EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.
1634 //
1635 if (CopiedCount != 0) {
1636 SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);
1637 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);
1638 CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;
1639 }
1640
1641 NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;
1642 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);
1643 }
1644
1645 *MergedBufSize = (Tail - (UINT8 *) Data);
1646 return EFI_SUCCESS;
1647 }
1648
1649 /**
1650 Compare two EFI_TIME data.
1651
1652
1653 @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.
1654 @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.
1655
1656 @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.
1657 @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.
1658
1659 **/
1660 BOOLEAN
1661 CompareTimeStamp (
1662 IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,
1663 IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime
1664 )
1665 {
1666 if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {
1667 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);
1668 } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {
1669 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);
1670 } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {
1671 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);
1672 } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {
1673 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);
1674 } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {
1675 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < SecondTime->Minute);
1676 }
1677
1678 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);
1679 }
1680
1681 /**
1682 Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable
1683 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".
1684
1685 The data format of "certdb":
1686 //
1687 // UINT32 CertDbListSize;
1688 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];
1689 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs2[];
1690 // /// ...
1691 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certsn[];
1692 //
1693
1694 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.
1695 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.
1696 @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb".
1697 @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb".
1698 @param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.
1699 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.
1700 @param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from
1701 starting of Data.
1702 @param[out] CertNodeSize Length of AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA in bytes.
1703
1704 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.
1705 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.
1706 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.
1707
1708 **/
1709 EFI_STATUS
1710 FindCertsFromDb (
1711 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
1712 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
1713 IN UINT8 *Data,
1714 IN UINTN DataSize,
1715 OUT UINT32 *CertOffset, OPTIONAL
1716 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize, OPTIONAL
1717 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset,OPTIONAL
1718 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL
1719 )
1720 {
1721 UINT32 Offset;
1722 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;
1723 UINT32 CertSize;
1724 UINT32 NameSize;
1725 UINT32 NodeSize;
1726 UINT32 CertDbListSize;
1727
1728 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (Data == NULL)) {
1729 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1730 }
1731
1732 //
1733 // Check whether DataSize matches recorded CertDbListSize.
1734 //
1735 if (DataSize < sizeof (UINT32)) {
1736 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1737 }
1738
1739 CertDbListSize = ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) Data);
1740
1741 if (CertDbListSize != (UINT32) DataSize) {
1742 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1743 }
1744
1745 Offset = sizeof (UINT32);
1746
1747 //
1748 // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.
1749 //
1750 while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {
1751 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);
1752 //
1753 // Check whether VendorGuid matches.
1754 //
1755 if (CompareGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid)) {
1756 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);
1757 NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);
1758 CertSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertDataSize);
1759
1760 if (NodeSize != sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3 + CertSize +
1761 sizeof (CHAR16) * NameSize) {
1762 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1763 }
1764
1765 Offset = Offset + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3;
1766 //
1767 // Check whether VariableName matches.
1768 //
1769 if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) &&
1770 (CompareMem (Data + Offset, VariableName, NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)) == 0)) {
1771 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);
1772
1773 if (CertOffset != NULL) {
1774 *CertOffset = Offset;
1775 }
1776
1777 if (CertDataSize != NULL) {
1778 *CertDataSize = CertSize;
1779 }
1780
1781 if (CertNodeOffset != NULL) {
1782 *CertNodeOffset = (UINT32) ((UINT8 *) Ptr - Data);
1783 }
1784
1785 if (CertNodeSize != NULL) {
1786 *CertNodeSize = NodeSize;
1787 }
1788
1789 return EFI_SUCCESS;
1790 } else {
1791 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16) + CertSize;
1792 }
1793 } else {
1794 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);
1795 Offset = Offset + NodeSize;
1796 }
1797 }
1798
1799 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
1800 }
1801
1802 /**
1803 Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable
1804 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".
1805
1806 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.
1807 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.
1808 @param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.
1809 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.
1810
1811 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.
1812 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.
1813 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.
1814
1815 **/
1816 EFI_STATUS
1817 GetCertsFromDb (
1818 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
1819 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
1820 OUT UINT8 **CertData,
1821 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize
1822 )
1823 {
1824 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;
1825 EFI_STATUS Status;
1826 UINT8 *Data;
1827 UINTN DataSize;
1828 UINT32 CertOffset;
1829
1830 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) || (CertDataSize == NULL)) {
1831 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1832 }
1833
1834 //
1835 // Get variable "certdb".
1836 //
1837 Status = FindVariable (
1838 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,
1839 &gEfiCertDbGuid,
1840 &CertDbVariable,
1841 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,
1842 FALSE
1843 );
1844 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1845 return Status;
1846 }
1847
1848 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);
1849 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);
1850 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {
1851 ASSERT (FALSE);
1852 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
1853 }
1854
1855 Status = FindCertsFromDb (
1856 VariableName,
1857 VendorGuid,
1858 Data,
1859 DataSize,
1860 &CertOffset,
1861 CertDataSize,
1862 NULL,
1863 NULL
1864 );
1865
1866 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1867 return Status;
1868 }
1869
1870 *CertData = Data + CertOffset;
1871 return EFI_SUCCESS;
1872 }
1873
1874 /**
1875 Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated
1876 variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".
1877
1878 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.
1879 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.
1880
1881 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.
1882 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.
1883 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.
1884 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.
1885
1886 **/
1887 EFI_STATUS
1888 DeleteCertsFromDb (
1889 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
1890 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid
1891 )
1892 {
1893 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;
1894 EFI_STATUS Status;
1895 UINT8 *Data;
1896 UINTN DataSize;
1897 UINT32 VarAttr;
1898 UINT32 CertNodeOffset;
1899 UINT32 CertNodeSize;
1900 UINT8 *NewCertDb;
1901 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;
1902
1903 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {
1904 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1905 }
1906
1907 //
1908 // Get variable "certdb".
1909 //
1910 Status = FindVariable (
1911 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,
1912 &gEfiCertDbGuid,
1913 &CertDbVariable,
1914 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,
1915 FALSE
1916 );
1917 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1918 return Status;
1919 }
1920
1921 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);
1922 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);
1923 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {
1924 ASSERT (FALSE);
1925 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
1926 }
1927
1928 if (DataSize == sizeof (UINT32)) {
1929 //
1930 // There is no certs in certdb.
1931 //
1932 return EFI_SUCCESS;
1933 }
1934
1935 //
1936 // Get corresponding cert node from certdb.
1937 //
1938 Status = FindCertsFromDb (
1939 VariableName,
1940 VendorGuid,
1941 Data,
1942 DataSize,
1943 NULL,
1944 NULL,
1945 &CertNodeOffset,
1946 &CertNodeSize
1947 );
1948
1949 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
1950 return Status;
1951 }
1952
1953 if (DataSize < (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {
1954 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
1955 }
1956
1957 //
1958 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".
1959 //
1960 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize - CertNodeSize;
1961 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;
1962
1963 //
1964 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.
1965 //
1966 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, CertNodeOffset);
1967 //
1968 // Update CertDbListSize.
1969 //
1970 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));
1971 //
1972 // Copy the DB entries after deleting node.
1973 //
1974 if (DataSize > (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {
1975 CopyMem (
1976 NewCertDb + CertNodeOffset,
1977 Data + CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize,
1978 DataSize - CertNodeOffset - CertNodeSize
1979 );
1980 }
1981
1982 //
1983 // Set "certdb".
1984 //
1985 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
1986 Status = UpdateVariable (
1987 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,
1988 &gEfiCertDbGuid,
1989 NewCertDb,
1990 NewCertDbSize,
1991 VarAttr,
1992 0,
1993 0,
1994 &CertDbVariable,
1995 NULL
1996 );
1997
1998 return Status;
1999 }
2000
2001 /**
2002 Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName
2003 and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb".
2004
2005 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.
2006 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.
2007 @param[in] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.
2008 @param[in] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.
2009
2010 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.
2011 @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName
2012 and VendorGuid already exists.
2013 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.
2014 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb"
2015
2016 **/
2017 EFI_STATUS
2018 InsertCertsToDb (
2019 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
2020 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
2021 IN UINT8 *CertData,
2022 IN UINTN CertDataSize
2023 )
2024 {
2025 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;
2026 EFI_STATUS Status;
2027 UINT8 *Data;
2028 UINTN DataSize;
2029 UINT32 VarAttr;
2030 UINT8 *NewCertDb;
2031 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;
2032 UINT32 CertNodeSize;
2033 UINT32 NameSize;
2034 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;
2035
2036 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL)) {
2037 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
2038 }
2039
2040 //
2041 // Get variable "certdb".
2042 //
2043 Status = FindVariable (
2044 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,
2045 &gEfiCertDbGuid,
2046 &CertDbVariable,
2047 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,
2048 FALSE
2049 );
2050 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
2051 return Status;
2052 }
2053
2054 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);
2055 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);
2056 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {
2057 ASSERT (FALSE);
2058 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
2059 }
2060
2061 //
2062 // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb".
2063 // If yes return error.
2064 //
2065 Status = FindCertsFromDb (
2066 VariableName,
2067 VendorGuid,
2068 Data,
2069 DataSize,
2070 NULL,
2071 NULL,
2072 NULL,
2073 NULL
2074 );
2075
2076 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
2077 ASSERT (FALSE);
2078 return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
2079 }
2080
2081 //
2082 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".
2083 //
2084 NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);
2085 CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);
2086 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize;
2087 if (NewCertDbSize > mMaxCertDbSize) {
2088 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
2089 }
2090 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;
2091
2092 //
2093 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.
2094 //
2095 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, DataSize);
2096 //
2097 // Update CertDbListSize.
2098 //
2099 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));
2100 //
2101 // Construct new cert node.
2102 //
2103 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (NewCertDb + DataSize);
2104 CopyGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid);
2105 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertNodeSize, &CertNodeSize, sizeof (UINT32));
2106 CopyMem (&Ptr->NameSize, &NameSize, sizeof (UINT32));
2107 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertDataSize, &CertDataSize, sizeof (UINT32));
2108
2109 CopyMem (
2110 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA),
2111 VariableName,
2112 NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)
2113 );
2114
2115 CopyMem (
2116 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16),
2117 CertData,
2118 CertDataSize
2119 );
2120
2121 //
2122 // Set "certdb".
2123 //
2124 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
2125 Status = UpdateVariable (
2126 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,
2127 &gEfiCertDbGuid,
2128 NewCertDb,
2129 NewCertDbSize,
2130 VarAttr,
2131 0,
2132 0,
2133 &CertDbVariable,
2134 NULL
2135 );
2136
2137 return Status;
2138 }
2139
2140 /**
2141 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set
2142
2143 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
2144 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.
2145 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.
2146 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like
2147 buffer overflow, integer overflow.
2148
2149 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.
2150 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
2151 @param[in] Data Data pointer.
2152 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the
2153 data, this value contains the required size.
2154 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.
2155 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.
2156 @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.
2157 @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.
2158
2159 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
2160 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation
2161 check carried out by the firmware.
2162 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack
2163 of resources.
2164 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.
2165
2166 **/
2167 EFI_STATUS
2168 VerifyTimeBasedPayload (
2169 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
2170 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
2171 IN VOID *Data,
2172 IN UINTN DataSize,
2173 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,
2174 IN UINT32 Attributes,
2175 IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,
2176 OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel
2177 )
2178 {
2179 UINT8 *RootCert;
2180 UINT8 *SigData;
2181 UINT8 *PayloadPtr;
2182 UINTN RootCertSize;
2183 UINTN Index;
2184 UINTN CertCount;
2185 UINTN PayloadSize;
2186 UINT32 Attr;
2187 UINT32 SigDataSize;
2188 UINT32 KekDataSize;
2189 BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;
2190 EFI_STATUS Status;
2191 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;
2192 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;
2193 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable;
2194 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;
2195 UINT8 *NewData;
2196 UINTN NewDataSize;
2197 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;
2198 UINT8 *Buffer;
2199 UINTN Length;
2200 UINT8 *SignerCerts;
2201 UINT8 *WrapSigData;
2202 UINTN CertStackSize;
2203 UINT8 *CertsInCertDb;
2204 UINT32 CertsSizeinDb;
2205
2206 VerifyStatus = FALSE;
2207 CertData = NULL;
2208 NewData = NULL;
2209 Attr = Attributes;
2210 WrapSigData = NULL;
2211 SignerCerts = NULL;
2212 RootCert = NULL;
2213 CertsInCertDb = NULL;
2214
2215 //
2216 // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is
2217 // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)
2218 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new
2219 // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new
2220 // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not
2221 // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().
2222 //
2223 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;
2224
2225 //
2226 // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the
2227 // TimeStamp value are set to zero.
2228 //
2229 if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||
2230 (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||
2231 (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||
2232 (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||
2233 (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {
2234 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
2235 }
2236
2237 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {
2238 if (CompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, &Variable->CurrPtr->TimeStamp)) {
2239 //
2240 // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.
2241 //
2242 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
2243 }
2244 }
2245
2246 //
2247 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.
2248 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.
2249 //
2250 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||
2251 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {
2252 //
2253 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.
2254 //
2255 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
2256 }
2257
2258 //
2259 // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.
2260 // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.
2261 //
2262 SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;
2263 SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));
2264
2265 //
2266 // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.
2267 //
2268 PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;
2269 PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;
2270
2271 //
2272 // Construct a buffer to fill with (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).
2273 //
2274 NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +
2275 sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);
2276 NewData = mSerializationRuntimeBuffer;
2277
2278 Buffer = NewData;
2279 Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);
2280 CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);
2281 Buffer += Length;
2282
2283 Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);
2284 CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);
2285 Buffer += Length;
2286
2287 Length = sizeof (UINT32);
2288 CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);
2289 Buffer += Length;
2290
2291 Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);
2292 CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);
2293 Buffer += Length;
2294
2295 CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);
2296
2297 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {
2298 //
2299 // Verify that the signature has been made with the current Platform Key (no chaining for PK).
2300 // First, get signer's certificates from SignedData.
2301 //
2302 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (
2303 SigData,
2304 SigDataSize,
2305 &SignerCerts,
2306 &CertStackSize,
2307 &RootCert,
2308 &RootCertSize
2309 );
2310 if (!VerifyStatus) {
2311 goto Exit;
2312 }
2313
2314 //
2315 // Second, get the current platform key from variable. Check whether it's identical with signer's certificates
2316 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.
2317 //
2318 Status = FindVariable (
2319 EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,
2320 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
2321 &PkVariable,
2322 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,
2323 FALSE
2324 );
2325 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
2326 VerifyStatus = FALSE;
2327 goto Exit;
2328 }
2329 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);
2330 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
2331 if ((RootCertSize != (CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1))) ||
2332 (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, RootCert, RootCertSize) != 0)) {
2333 VerifyStatus = FALSE;
2334 goto Exit;
2335 }
2336
2337 //
2338 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.
2339 //
2340 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (
2341 SigData,
2342 SigDataSize,
2343 RootCert,
2344 RootCertSize,
2345 NewData,
2346 NewDataSize
2347 );
2348
2349 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypeKek) {
2350
2351 //
2352 // Get KEK database from variable.
2353 //
2354 Status = FindVariable (
2355 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,
2356 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
2357 &KekVariable,
2358 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,
2359 FALSE
2360 );
2361 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
2362 return Status;
2363 }
2364
2365 //
2366 // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.
2367 //
2368 KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;
2369 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);
2370 while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
2371 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
2372 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
2373 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
2374 for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {
2375 //
2376 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify
2377 //
2378 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;
2379 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);
2380
2381 //
2382 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.
2383 //
2384 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (
2385 SigData,
2386 SigDataSize,
2387 RootCert,
2388 RootCertSize,
2389 NewData,
2390 NewDataSize
2391 );
2392 if (VerifyStatus) {
2393 goto Exit;
2394 }
2395 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);
2396 }
2397 }
2398 KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
2399 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);
2400 }
2401 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {
2402
2403 //
2404 // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX/DBT.
2405 // Get signer's certificates from SignedData.
2406 //
2407 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (
2408 SigData,
2409 SigDataSize,
2410 &SignerCerts,
2411 &CertStackSize,
2412 &RootCert,
2413 &RootCertSize
2414 );
2415 if (!VerifyStatus) {
2416 goto Exit;
2417 }
2418
2419 //
2420 // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb for existing
2421 // variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates
2422 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.
2423 //
2424 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL)) {
2425 VerifyStatus = FALSE;
2426
2427 Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);
2428 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
2429 goto Exit;
2430 }
2431
2432 if ((CertStackSize != CertsSizeinDb) ||
2433 (CompareMem (SignerCerts, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0)) {
2434 goto Exit;
2435 }
2436 }
2437
2438 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (
2439 SigData,
2440 SigDataSize,
2441 RootCert,
2442 RootCertSize,
2443 NewData,
2444 NewDataSize
2445 );
2446 if (!VerifyStatus) {
2447 goto Exit;
2448 }
2449
2450 //
2451 // Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.
2452 //
2453 if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {
2454 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);
2455 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
2456 VerifyStatus = FALSE;
2457 goto Exit;
2458 }
2459 } else if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL && PayloadSize != 0) {
2460 //
2461 // Insert signer's certificates when adding a new common authenticated variable.
2462 //
2463 Status = InsertCertsToDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, SignerCerts, CertStackSize);
2464 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
2465 VerifyStatus = FALSE;
2466 goto Exit;
2467 }
2468 }
2469 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePayload) {
2470 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) PayloadPtr;
2471 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
2472 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;
2473 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);
2474
2475 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.
2476 //
2477 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (
2478 SigData,
2479 SigDataSize,
2480 RootCert,
2481 RootCertSize,
2482 NewData,
2483 NewDataSize
2484 );
2485 } else {
2486 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
2487 }
2488
2489 Exit:
2490
2491 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk || AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {
2492 Pkcs7FreeSigners (RootCert);
2493 Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);
2494 }
2495
2496 if (!VerifyStatus) {
2497 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
2498 }
2499
2500 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);
2501 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
2502 return Status;
2503 }
2504
2505 if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (VarDel != NULL)) {
2506 *VarDel = TRUE;
2507 }
2508
2509 //
2510 // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify
2511 //
2512 return UpdateVariable (
2513 VariableName,
2514 VendorGuid,
2515 PayloadPtr,
2516 PayloadSize,
2517 Attributes,
2518 0,
2519 0,
2520 Variable,
2521 &CertData->TimeStamp
2522 );
2523 }