+ @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
+ @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable deleted successfully.\r
+ @retval Others The driver failed to start the device.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+DeleteVariable (\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
+ IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ VOID* Variable;\r
+ UINT8 *Data;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINT32 Attr;\r
+\r
+ GetVariable2 (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, NULL);\r
+ if (Variable == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ }\r
+ FreePool (Variable);\r
+\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
+\r
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &Data);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable (\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ VendorGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ DataSize,\r
+ Data\r
+ );\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+\r
+ Set the platform secure boot mode into "Custom" or "Standard" mode.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] SecureBootMode New secure boot mode: STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE or\r
+ CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE.\r
+\r
+ @return EFI_SUCCESS The platform has switched to the special mode successfully.\r
+ @return other Fail to operate the secure boot mode.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+SetSecureBootMode (\r
+ IN UINT8 SecureBootMode\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ return gRT->SetVariable (\r
+ EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
+ sizeof (UINT8),\r
+ &SecureBootMode\r
+ );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Generate the PK signature list from the X509 Certificate storing file (.cer)\r
+\r
+ @param[in] X509File FileHandle of X509 Certificate storing file.\r
+ @param[out] PkCert Point to the data buffer to store the signature list.\r
+\r
+ @return EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported Key Length.\r
+ @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough memory resourses to form the signature list.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+CreatePkX509SignatureList (\r
+ IN EFI_FILE_HANDLE X509File,\r
+ OUT EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **PkCert\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINT8 *X509Data;\r
+ UINTN X509DataSize;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *PkCertData;\r
+\r
+ X509Data = NULL;\r
+ PkCertData = NULL;\r
+ X509DataSize = 0;\r
+\r
+ Status = ReadFileContent (X509File, (VOID**) &X509Data, &X509DataSize, 0);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Allocate space for PK certificate list and initialize it.\r
+ // Create PK database entry with SignatureHeaderSize equals 0.\r
+ //\r
+ *PkCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) AllocateZeroPool (\r
+ sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r
+ + X509DataSize\r
+ );\r
+ if (*PkCert == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ (*PkCert)->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
+ + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r
+ + X509DataSize);\r
+ (*PkCert)->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);\r
+ (*PkCert)->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
+ CopyGuid (&(*PkCert)->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid);\r
+ PkCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) ((UINTN)(*PkCert)\r
+ + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
+ + (*PkCert)->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
+ CopyGuid (&PkCertData->SignatureOwner, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid);\r
+ //\r
+ // Fill the PK database with PKpub data from X509 certificate file.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (&(PkCertData->SignatureData[0]), X509Data, X509DataSize);\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+\r
+ if (X509Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (X509Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status) && *PkCert != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (*PkCert);\r
+ *PkCert = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Enroll new PK into the System without original PK's authentication.\r
+\r
+ The SignatureOwner GUID will be the same with PK's vendorguid.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New PK enrolled successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EnrollPlatformKey (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA* Private\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINT32 Attr;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *PkCert;\r
+ UINT16* FilePostFix;\r
+ UINTN NameLength;\r
+\r
+ if (Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ PkCert = NULL;\r
+\r
+ Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Parse the file's postfix. Only support DER encoded X.509 certificate files.\r
+ //\r
+ NameLength = StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName);\r
+ if (NameLength <= 4) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+ FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + NameLength - 4;\r
+ if (!IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Unsupported file type, only DER encoded certificate (%s) is supported.", mSupportX509Suffix));\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "FileName= %s\n", Private->FileContext->FileName));\r
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "FilePostFix = %s\n", FilePostFix));\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Prase the selected PK file and generature PK certificate list.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = CreatePkX509SignatureList (\r
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
+ &PkCert\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ ASSERT (PkCert != NULL);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Set Platform Key variable.\r
+ //\r
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
+ DataSize = PkCert->SignatureListSize;\r
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, (UINT8**) &PkCert);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
+ EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ DataSize,\r
+ PkCert\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ if (Status == EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES) {\r
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Enroll PK failed with out of resource.\n"));\r
+ }\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+\r
+ if (PkCert != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool(PkCert);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Remove the PK variable.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete PK successfully.\r
+ @retval Others Could not allow to delete PK.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+DeletePlatformKey (\r
+ VOID\r
+)\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+\r
+ Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = DeleteVariable (\r
+ EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid\r
+ );\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Enroll a new KEK item from public key storing file (*.pbk).\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New KEK enrolled successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported command.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EnrollRsa2048ToKek (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINT32 Attr;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *KekSigList;\r
+ UINTN KeyBlobSize;\r
+ UINT8 *KeyBlob;\r
+ CPL_KEY_INFO *KeyInfo;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KEKSigData;\r
+ UINTN KekSigListSize;\r
+ UINT8 *KeyBuffer;\r
+ UINTN KeyLenInBytes;\r
+\r
+ Attr = 0;\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ KeyBuffer = NULL;\r
+ KeyBlobSize = 0;\r
+ KeyBlob = NULL;\r
+ KeyInfo = NULL;\r
+ KEKSigData = NULL;\r
+ KekSigList = NULL;\r
+ KekSigListSize = 0;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Form the KeKpub certificate list into EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST type.\r
+ // First, We have to parse out public key data from the pbk key file.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = ReadFileContent (\r
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
+ (VOID**) &KeyBlob,\r
+ &KeyBlobSize,\r
+ 0\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ ASSERT (KeyBlob != NULL);\r
+ KeyInfo = (CPL_KEY_INFO *) KeyBlob;\r
+ if (KeyInfo->KeyLengthInBits / 8 != WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Unsupported key length, Only RSA2048 is supported.\n"));\r
+ Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Convert the Public key to fix octet string format represented in RSA PKCS#1.\r
+ //\r
+ KeyLenInBytes = KeyInfo->KeyLengthInBits / 8;\r
+ KeyBuffer = AllocateZeroPool (KeyLenInBytes);\r
+ if (KeyBuffer == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ Int2OctStr (\r
+ (UINTN*) (KeyBlob + sizeof (CPL_KEY_INFO)),\r
+ KeyLenInBytes / sizeof (UINTN),\r
+ KeyBuffer,\r
+ KeyLenInBytes\r
+ );\r
+ CopyMem(KeyBlob + sizeof(CPL_KEY_INFO), KeyBuffer, KeyLenInBytes);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Form an new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
+ //\r
+ KekSigListSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
+ + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r
+ + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
+\r
+ KekSigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) AllocateZeroPool (KekSigListSize);\r
+ if (KekSigList == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ KekSigList->SignatureListSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
+ + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r
+ + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
+ KekSigList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
+ KekSigList->SignatureSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
+ CopyGuid (&KekSigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid);\r
+\r
+ KEKSigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*)((UINT8*)KekSigList + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r
+ CopyGuid (&KEKSigData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ CopyMem (\r
+ KEKSigData->SignatureData,\r
+ KeyBlob + sizeof(CPL_KEY_INFO),\r
+ WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check if KEK entry has been already existed.\r
+ // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the\r
+ // new KEK to original variable.\r
+ //\r
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&KekSigListSize, (UINT8**) &KekSigList);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ &DataSize,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
+ } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Done. Now we have formed the correct KEKpub database item, just set it into variable storage,\r
+ //\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ KekSigListSize,\r
+ KekSigList\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
+\r
+ if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (KeyBlob != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (KeyBlob);\r
+ }\r
+ if (KeyBuffer != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (KeyBuffer);\r
+ }\r
+ if (KekSigList != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (KekSigList);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Enroll a new KEK item from X509 certificate file.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New X509 is enrolled successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported command.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EnrollX509ToKek (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINTN X509DataSize;\r
+ VOID *X509Data;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KEKSigData;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *KekSigList;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINTN KekSigListSize;\r
+ UINT32 Attr;\r
+\r
+ X509Data = NULL;\r
+ X509DataSize = 0;\r
+ KekSigList = NULL;\r
+ KekSigListSize = 0;\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ KEKSigData = NULL;\r
+\r
+ Status = ReadFileContent (\r
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
+ &X509Data,\r
+ &X509DataSize,\r
+ 0\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);\r
+\r
+ KekSigListSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize;\r
+ KekSigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) AllocateZeroPool (KekSigListSize);\r
+ if (KekSigList == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Fill Certificate Database parameters.\r
+ //\r
+ KekSigList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) KekSigListSize;\r
+ KekSigList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
+ KekSigList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);\r
+ CopyGuid (&KekSigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid);\r
+\r
+ KEKSigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) ((UINT8*) KekSigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r
+ CopyGuid (&KEKSigData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ CopyMem (KEKSigData->SignatureData, X509Data, X509DataSize);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check if KEK been already existed.\r
+ // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the\r
+ // new kek to original variable\r
+ //\r
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&KekSigListSize, (UINT8**) &KekSigList);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ &DataSize,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
+ } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ KekSigListSize,\r
+ KekSigList\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
+\r
+ if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (KekSigList != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (KekSigList);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Enroll new KEK into the System without PK's authentication.\r
+ The SignatureOwner GUID will be Private->SignatureGUID.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New KEK enrolled successful.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
+ @retval others Fail to enroll KEK data.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EnrollKeyExchangeKey (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ UINT16* FilePostFix;\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINTN NameLength;\r
+\r
+ if ((Private->FileContext->FHandle == NULL) || (Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Parse the file's postfix. Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate,\r
+ // and .pbk as RSA public key file.\r
+ //\r
+ NameLength = StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName);\r
+ if (NameLength <= 4) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+ FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + NameLength - 4;\r
+ if (IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) {\r
+ return EnrollX509ToKek (Private);\r
+ } else if (CompareMem (FilePostFix, L".pbk",4) == 0) {\r
+ return EnrollRsa2048ToKek (Private);\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // File type is wrong, simply close it\r
+ //\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
+\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Enroll a new X509 certificate into Signature Database (DB or DBX or DBT) without\r
+ KEK's authentication.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New X509 is enrolled successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EnrollX509toSigDB (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINTN X509DataSize;\r
+ VOID *X509Data;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigDBCert;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *SigDBCertData;\r
+ VOID *Data;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINTN SigDBSize;\r
+ UINT32 Attr;\r
+\r
+ X509DataSize = 0;\r
+ SigDBSize = 0;\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ X509Data = NULL;\r
+ SigDBCert = NULL;\r
+ SigDBCertData = NULL;\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+\r
+ Status = ReadFileContent (\r
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
+ &X509Data,\r
+ &X509DataSize,\r
+ 0\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);\r
+\r
+ SigDBSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize;\r
+\r
+ Data = AllocateZeroPool (SigDBSize);\r
+ if (Data == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Fill Certificate Database parameters.\r
+ //\r
+ SigDBCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) Data;\r
+ SigDBCert->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SigDBSize;\r
+ SigDBCert->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
+ SigDBCert->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);\r
+ CopyGuid (&SigDBCert->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid);\r
+\r
+ SigDBCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) ((UINT8* ) SigDBCert + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r
+ CopyGuid (&SigDBCertData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ CopyMem ((UINT8* ) (SigDBCertData->SignatureData), X509Data, X509DataSize);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check if signature database entry has been already existed.\r
+ // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the\r
+ // new signature data to original variable\r
+ //\r
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&SigDBSize, (UINT8**) &Data);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ &DataSize,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
+ } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ SigDBSize,\r
+ Data\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
+\r
+ if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (X509Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (X509Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Check whether signature is in specified database.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] VariableName Name of database variable that is searched in.\r
+ @param[in] Signature Pointer to signature that is searched for.\r
+ @param[in] SignatureSize Size of Signature.\r
+\r
+ @return TRUE Found the signature in the variable database.\r
+ @return FALSE Not found the signature in the variable database.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
+ IN UINT8 *Signature,\r
+ IN UINTN SignatureSize\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINT8 *Data;\r
+ UINTN Index;\r
+ UINTN CertCount;\r
+ BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read signature database variable.\r
+ //\r
+ IsFound = FALSE;\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
+ if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
+ if (Data == NULL) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Enumerate all signature data in SigDB to check if executable's signature exists.\r
+ //\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
+ while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
+ if ((CertList->SignatureSize == sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + SignatureSize) && (CompareGuid(&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid))) {\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
+ if (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, Signature, SignatureSize) == 0) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Find the signature in database.\r
+ //\r
+ IsFound = TRUE;\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (IsFound) {\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+Done:\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return IsFound;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Calculate the hash of a certificate data with the specified hash algorithm.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] CertData The certificate data to be hashed.\r
+ @param[in] CertSize The certificate size in bytes.\r
+ @param[in] HashAlg The specified hash algorithm.\r
+ @param[out] CertHash The output digest of the certificate\r
+\r
+ @retval TRUE Successfully got the hash of the CertData.\r
+ @retval FALSE Failed to get the hash of CertData.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+CalculateCertHash (\r
+ IN UINT8 *CertData,\r
+ IN UINTN CertSize,\r
+ IN UINT32 HashAlg,\r
+ OUT UINT8 *CertHash\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ BOOLEAN Status;\r
+ VOID *HashCtx;\r
+ UINTN CtxSize;\r
+ UINT8 *TBSCert;\r
+ UINTN TBSCertSize;\r
+\r
+ HashCtx = NULL;\r
+ Status = FALSE;\r
+\r
+ if (HashAlg >= HASHALG_MAX) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Retrieve the TBSCertificate for Hash Calculation.\r
+ //\r
+ if (!X509GetTBSCert (CertData, CertSize, &TBSCert, &TBSCertSize)) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // 1. Initialize context of hash.\r
+ //\r
+ CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize ();\r
+ HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);\r
+ ASSERT (HashCtx != NULL);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // 2. Initialize a hash context.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit (HashCtx);\r
+ if (!Status) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // 3. Calculate the hash.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate (HashCtx, TBSCert, TBSCertSize);\r
+ if (!Status) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // 4. Get the hash result.\r
+ //\r
+ ZeroMem (CertHash, mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength);\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal (HashCtx, CertHash);\r
+\r
+Done:\r
+ if (HashCtx != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (HashCtx);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Check whether the hash of an X.509 certificate is in forbidden database (DBX).\r
+\r
+ @param[in] Certificate Pointer to X.509 Certificate that is searched for.\r
+ @param[in] CertSize Size of X.509 Certificate.\r
+\r
+ @return TRUE Found the certificate hash in the forbidden database.\r
+ @return FALSE Certificate hash is Not found in the forbidden database.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+IsCertHashFoundInDbx (\r
+ IN UINT8 *Certificate,\r
+ IN UINTN CertSize\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *DbxList;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertHash;\r
+ UINTN CertHashCount;\r
+ UINTN Index;\r
+ UINT32 HashAlg;\r
+ UINT8 CertDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
+ UINT8 *DbxCertHash;\r
+ UINTN SiglistHeaderSize;\r
+ UINT8 *Data;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+\r
+ IsFound = FALSE;\r
+ HashAlg = HASHALG_MAX;\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read signature database variable.\r
+ //\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
+ if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
+ if (Data == NULL) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check whether the certificate hash exists in the forbidden database.\r
+ //\r
+ DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
+ while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= DbxList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Determine Hash Algorithm of Certificate in the forbidden database.\r
+ //\r
+ if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid)) {\r
+ HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA256;\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid)) {\r
+ HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA384;\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid)) {\r
+ HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA512;\r
+ } else {\r
+ DataSize -= DbxList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + DbxList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ continue;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Calculate the hash value of current db certificate for comparision.\r
+ //\r
+ if (!CalculateCertHash (Certificate, CertSize, HashAlg, CertDigest)) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ SiglistHeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + DbxList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
+ CertHash = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + SiglistHeaderSize);\r
+ CertHashCount = (DbxList->SignatureListSize - SiglistHeaderSize) / DbxList->SignatureSize;\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertHashCount; Index++) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.\r
+ //\r
+ DbxCertHash = CertHash->SignatureData;\r
+ if (CompareMem (DbxCertHash, CertDigest, mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength) == 0) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Hash of Certificate is found in forbidden database.\r
+ //\r
+ IsFound = TRUE;\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+ CertHash = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertHash + DbxList->SignatureSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ DataSize -= DbxList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + DbxList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+Done:\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return IsFound;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Check whether the signature list exists in given variable data.\r
+\r
+ It searches the signature list for the ceritificate hash by CertType.\r
+ If the signature list is found, get the offset of Database for the\r
+ next hash of a certificate.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] Database Variable data to save signature list.\r
+ @param[in] DatabaseSize Variable size.\r
+ @param[in] SignatureType The type of the signature.\r
+ @param[out] Offset The offset to save a new hash of certificate.\r
+\r
+ @return TRUE The signature list is found in the forbidden database.\r
+ @return FALSE The signature list is not found in the forbidden database.\r
+**/\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+GetSignaturelistOffset (\r
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *Database,\r
+ IN UINTN DatabaseSize,\r
+ IN EFI_GUID *SignatureType,\r
+ OUT UINTN *Offset\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r
+ UINTN SiglistSize;\r
+\r
+ if ((Database == NULL) || (DatabaseSize == 0)) {\r
+ *Offset = 0;\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ SigList = Database;\r
+ SiglistSize = DatabaseSize;\r
+ while ((SiglistSize > 0) && (SiglistSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+ if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, SignatureType)) {\r
+ *Offset = DatabaseSize - SiglistSize;\r
+ return TRUE;\r
+ }\r
+ SiglistSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ }\r
+ *Offset = 0;\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Enroll a new X509 certificate hash into Signature Database (dbx) without\r
+ KEK's authentication.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] HashAlg The hash algorithm to enroll the certificate.\r
+ @param[in] RevocationDate The revocation date of the certificate.\r
+ @param[in] RevocationTime The revocation time of the certificate.\r
+ @param[in] AlwaysRevocation Indicate whether the certificate is always revoked.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New X509 is enrolled successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EnrollX509HashtoSigDB (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
+ IN UINT32 HashAlg,\r
+ IN EFI_HII_DATE *RevocationDate,\r
+ IN EFI_HII_TIME *RevocationTime,\r
+ IN BOOLEAN AlwaysRevocation\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINTN X509DataSize;\r
+ VOID *X509Data;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList;\r
+ UINTN SignatureListSize;\r
+ UINT8 *Data;\r
+ UINT8 *NewData;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINTN DbSize;\r
+ UINT32 Attr;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *SignatureData;\r
+ UINTN SignatureSize;\r
+ EFI_GUID SignatureType;\r
+ UINTN Offset;\r
+ UINT8 CertHash[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
+ UINT16* FilePostFix;\r
+ UINTN NameLength;\r
+ EFI_TIME *Time;\r
+\r
+ X509DataSize = 0;\r
+ DbSize = 0;\r
+ X509Data = NULL;\r
+ SignatureData = NULL;\r
+ SignatureList = NULL;\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+ NewData = NULL;\r
+\r
+ if ((Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->FileContext->FHandle == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = SetSecureBootMode (CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Parse the file's postfix.\r
+ //\r
+ NameLength = StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName);\r
+ if (NameLength <= 4) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+ FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + NameLength - 4;\r
+ if (!IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Only supports DER-encoded X509 certificate.\r
+ //\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get the certificate from file and calculate its hash.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = ReadFileContent (\r
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
+ &X509Data,\r
+ &X509DataSize,\r
+ 0\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);\r
+\r
+ if (!CalculateCertHash (X509Data, X509DataSize, HashAlg, CertHash)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get the variable for enrollment.\r
+ //\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
+ if (Data == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Allocate memory for Signature and fill the Signature\r
+ //\r
+ SignatureSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength;\r
+ SignatureData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureSize);\r
+ if (SignatureData == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ }\r
+ CopyGuid (&SignatureData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ CopyMem (SignatureData->SignatureData, CertHash, mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Fill the time.\r
+ //\r
+ if (!AlwaysRevocation) {\r
+ Time = (EFI_TIME *)(&SignatureData->SignatureData + mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength);\r
+ Time->Year = RevocationDate->Year;\r
+ Time->Month = RevocationDate->Month;\r
+ Time->Day = RevocationDate->Day;\r
+ Time->Hour = RevocationTime->Hour;\r
+ Time->Minute = RevocationTime->Minute;\r
+ Time->Second = RevocationTime->Second;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Determine the GUID for certificate hash.\r
+ //\r
+ switch (HashAlg) {\r
+ case HASHALG_SHA256:\r
+ SignatureType = gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid;\r
+ break;\r
+ case HASHALG_SHA384:\r
+ SignatureType = gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid;\r
+ break;\r
+ case HASHALG_SHA512:\r
+ SignatureType = gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid;\r
+ break;\r
+ default:\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Add signature into the new variable data buffer\r
+ //\r
+ if (GetSignaturelistOffset((EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data, DataSize, &SignatureType, &Offset)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Add the signature to the found signaturelist.\r
+ //\r
+ DbSize = DataSize + SignatureSize;\r
+ NewData = AllocateZeroPool (DbSize);\r
+ if (NewData == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(Data + Offset);\r
+ SignatureListSize = (UINTN) ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)&SignatureList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ CopyMem (NewData, Data, Offset + SignatureListSize);\r
+\r
+ SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(NewData + Offset);\r
+ WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &SignatureList->SignatureListSize, (UINT32)(SignatureListSize + SignatureSize));\r
+\r
+ Offset += SignatureListSize;\r
+ CopyMem (NewData + Offset, SignatureData, SignatureSize);\r
+ CopyMem (NewData + Offset + SignatureSize, Data + Offset, DataSize - Offset);\r
+\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ Data = NewData;\r
+ DataSize = DbSize;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Create a new signaturelist, and add the signature into the signaturelist.\r
+ //\r
+ DbSize = DataSize + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SignatureSize;\r
+ NewData = AllocateZeroPool (DbSize);\r
+ if (NewData == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ //\r
+ // Fill Certificate Database parameters.\r
+ //\r
+ SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) (NewData + DataSize);\r
+ SignatureListSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SignatureSize;\r
+ WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &SignatureList->SignatureListSize, (UINT32) SignatureListSize);\r
+ WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &SignatureList->SignatureSize, (UINT32) SignatureSize);\r
+ CopyGuid (&SignatureList->SignatureType, &SignatureType);\r
+ CopyMem ((UINT8* ) SignatureList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST), SignatureData, SignatureSize);\r
+ if ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL)) {\r
+ CopyMem (NewData, Data, DataSize);\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+ Data = NewData;\r
+ DataSize = DbSize;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, (UINT8**) &Data);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ DataSize,\r
+ Data\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
+\r
+ if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (SignatureData != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (SignatureData);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (X509Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (X509Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Check whether a certificate from a file exists in dbx.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.\r
+\r
+ @retval TRUE The X509 certificate is found in dbx successfully.\r
+ @retval FALSE The X509 certificate is not found in dbx.\r
+**/\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+IsX509CertInDbx (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINTN X509DataSize;\r
+ VOID *X509Data;\r
+ BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read the certificate from file\r
+ //\r
+ X509DataSize = 0;\r
+ X509Data = NULL;\r
+ Status = ReadFileContent (\r
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
+ &X509Data,\r
+ &X509DataSize,\r
+ 0\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check the raw certificate.\r
+ //\r
+ IsFound = FALSE;\r
+ if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, X509Data, X509DataSize)) {\r
+ IsFound = TRUE;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check the hash of certificate.\r
+ //\r
+ if (IsCertHashFoundInDbx (X509Data, X509DataSize)) {\r
+ IsFound = TRUE;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+ if (X509Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (X509Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return IsFound;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Reads contents of a PE/COFF image in memory buffer.\r
+\r
+ Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
+ PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will make sure the PE/COFF image content\r
+ read is within the image buffer.\r
+\r
+ @param FileHandle Pointer to the file handle to read the PE/COFF image.\r
+ @param FileOffset Offset into the PE/COFF image to begin the read operation.\r
+ @param ReadSize On input, the size in bytes of the requested read operation.\r
+ On output, the number of bytes actually read.\r
+ @param Buffer Output buffer that contains the data read from the PE/COFF image.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The specified portion of the PE/COFF image was read and the size\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EFIAPI\r
+SecureBootConfigImageRead (\r
+ IN VOID *FileHandle,\r
+ IN UINTN FileOffset,\r
+ IN OUT UINTN *ReadSize,\r
+ OUT VOID *Buffer\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ UINTN EndPosition;\r
+\r
+ if (FileHandle == NULL || ReadSize == NULL || Buffer == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (MAX_ADDRESS - FileOffset < *ReadSize) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ EndPosition = FileOffset + *ReadSize;\r
+ if (EndPosition > mImageSize) {\r
+ *ReadSize = (UINT32)(mImageSize - FileOffset);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (FileOffset >= mImageSize) {\r
+ *ReadSize = 0;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ CopyMem (Buffer, (UINT8 *)((UINTN) FileHandle + FileOffset), *ReadSize);\r
+\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Load PE/COFF image information into internal buffer and check its validity.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successful\r
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Invalid PE/COFF file\r
+ @retval EFI_ABORTED Serious error occurs, like file I/O error etc.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+LoadPeImage (\r
+ VOID\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *NtHeader32;\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *NtHeader64;\r
+ PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext;\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+\r
+ NtHeader32 = NULL;\r
+ NtHeader64 = NULL;\r
+\r
+ ZeroMem (&ImageContext, sizeof (ImageContext));\r
+ ImageContext.Handle = (VOID *) mImageBase;\r
+ ImageContext.ImageRead = (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE) SecureBootConfigImageRead;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get information about the image being loaded\r
+ //\r
+ Status = PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo (&ImageContext);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // The information can't be got from the invalid PeImage\r
+ //\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "SecureBootConfigDxe: PeImage invalid. \n"));\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read the Dos header\r
+ //\r
+ DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER*)(mImageBase);\r
+ if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE)\r
+ {\r
+ //\r
+ // DOS image header is present,\r
+ // So read the PE header after the DOS image header\r
+ //\r
+ mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;\r
+ }\r
+ else\r
+ {\r
+ mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read PE header and check the signature validity and machine compatibility\r
+ //\r
+ NtHeader32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32*) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r
+ if (NtHeader32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE)\r
+ {\r
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ mNtHeader.Pe32 = NtHeader32;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check the architecture field of PE header and get the Certificate Data Directory data\r
+ // Note the size of FileHeader field is constant for both IA32 and X64 arch\r
+ //\r
+ if ((NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_IA32)\r
+ || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_EBC)\r
+ || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_ARMTHUMB_MIXED)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // 32-bits Architecture\r
+ //\r
+ mImageType = ImageType_IA32;\r
+ mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY*) &(NtHeader32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]);\r
+ }\r
+ else if ((NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_IA64)\r
+ || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_X64)\r
+ || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_AARCH64)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // 64-bits Architecture\r
+ //\r
+ mImageType = ImageType_X64;\r
+ NtHeader64 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r
+ mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY*) &(NtHeader64->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]);\r
+ } else {\r
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Calculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in\r
+ PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A\r
+\r
+ Notes: PE/COFF image has been checked by BasePeCoffLib PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo() in \r
+ the function LoadPeImage ().\r
+\r
+ @param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type.\r
+\r
+ @retval TRUE Successfully hash image.\r
+ @retval FALSE Fail in hash image.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+BOOLEAN\r
+HashPeImage (\r
+ IN UINT32 HashAlg\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ BOOLEAN Status;\r
+ UINT16 Magic;\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;\r
+ VOID *HashCtx;\r
+ UINTN CtxSize;\r
+ UINT8 *HashBase;\r
+ UINTN HashSize;\r
+ UINTN SumOfBytesHashed;\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;\r
+ UINTN Index;\r
+ UINTN Pos;\r
+\r
+ HashCtx = NULL;\r
+ SectionHeader = NULL;\r
+ Status = FALSE;\r
+\r
+ if (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256) {\r
+ return FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Initialize context of hash.\r
+ //\r
+ ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);\r
+\r
+ mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;\r
+ mCertType = gEfiCertSha256Guid;\r
+\r
+ CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize();\r
+\r
+ HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);\r
+ ASSERT (HashCtx != NULL);\r
+\r
+ // 1. Load the image header into memory.\r
+\r
+ // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context.\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit(HashCtx);\r
+ if (!Status) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+ //\r
+ // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;\r
+ // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded\r
+ //\r
+ if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ //\r
+ // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value\r
+ // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the\r
+ // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC\r
+ // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC\r
+ //\r
+ Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header\r
+ //\r
+ Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.\r
+ // 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.\r
+ //\r
+ HashBase = mImageBase;\r
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32 offset.\r
+ //\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32+ offset.\r
+ //\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
+ if (!Status) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+ //\r
+ // 5. Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).\r
+ // 6. Get the address of the beginning of the Cert Directory.\r
+ // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.\r
+ //\r
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32 offset.\r
+ //\r
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32+ offset.\r
+ //\r
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - (UINTN) HashBase;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
+ if (!Status) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+ //\r
+ // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)\r
+ // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.\r
+ //\r
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32 offset\r
+ //\r
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r
+ HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - ((UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - (UINTN) mImageBase);\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32+ offset.\r
+ //\r
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];\r
+ HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - ((UINTN) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - (UINTN) mImageBase);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
+ if (!Status) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+ //\r
+ // 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header.\r
+ //\r
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32 offset.\r
+ //\r
+ SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32+ offset\r
+ //\r
+ SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // 11. Build a temporary table of pointers to all the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER\r
+ // structures in the image. The 'NumberOfSections' field of the image\r
+ // header indicates how big the table should be. Do not include any\r
+ // IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.\r
+ //\r
+ SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);\r
+ ASSERT (SectionHeader != NULL);\r
+ //\r
+ // 12. Using the 'PointerToRawData' in the referenced section headers as\r
+ // a key, arrange the elements in the table in ascending order. In other\r
+ // words, sort the section headers according to the disk-file offset of\r
+ // the section.\r
+ //\r
+ Section = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) (\r
+ mImageBase +\r
+ mPeCoffHeaderOffset +\r
+ sizeof (UINT32) +\r
+ sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) +\r
+ mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader\r
+ );\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r
+ Pos = Index;\r
+ while ((Pos > 0) && (Section->PointerToRawData < SectionHeader[Pos - 1].PointerToRawData)) {\r
+ CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], &SectionHeader[Pos - 1], sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r
+ Pos--;\r
+ }\r
+ CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], Section, sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));\r
+ Section += 1;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // 13. Walk through the sorted table, bring the corresponding section\r
+ // into memory, and hash the entire section (using the 'SizeOfRawData'\r
+ // field in the section header to determine the amount of data to hash).\r
+ // 14. Add the section's 'SizeOfRawData' to SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED .\r
+ // 15. Repeat steps 13 and 14 for all the sections in the sorted table.\r
+ //\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {\r
+ Section = &SectionHeader[Index];\r
+ if (Section->SizeOfRawData == 0) {\r
+ continue;\r
+ }\r
+ HashBase = mImageBase + Section->PointerToRawData;\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN) Section->SizeOfRawData;\r
+\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
+ if (!Status) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ SumOfBytesHashed += HashSize;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // 16. If the file size is greater than SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED, there is extra\r
+ // data in the file that needs to be added to the hash. This data begins\r
+ // at file offset SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED and its length is:\r
+ // FileSize - (CertDirectory->Size)\r
+ //\r
+ if (mImageSize > SumOfBytesHashed) {\r
+ HashBase = mImageBase + SumOfBytesHashed;\r
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32 offset.\r
+ //\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN)(\r
+ mImageSize -\r
+ mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -\r
+ SumOfBytesHashed);\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32+ offset.\r
+ //\r
+ HashSize = (UINTN)(\r
+ mImageSize -\r
+ mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -\r
+ SumOfBytesHashed);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);\r
+ if (!Status) {\r
+ goto Done;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal(HashCtx, mImageDigest);\r
+\r
+Done:\r
+ if (HashCtx != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (HashCtx);\r
+ }\r
+ if (SectionHeader != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (SectionHeader);\r
+ }\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and calculate hash of\r
+ Pe/Coff image based on the authenticated image hashing in PE/COFF Specification\r
+ 8.0 Appendix A\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported.\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+HashPeImageByType (\r
+ VOID\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ UINT8 Index;\r
+ WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;\r
+\r
+ PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->Offset);\r
+\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r
+ // According to PKCS#7 Definition:\r
+ // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {\r
+ // version Version,\r
+ // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,\r
+ // contentInfo ContentInfo,\r
+ // .... }\r
+ // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing\r
+ // This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.\r
+ // Fixed offset (+32) is calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.\r
+ //\r
+ if ((*(PkcsCertData->CertData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Only support two bytes of Long Form of Length Encoding.\r
+ //\r
+ continue;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ if (CompareMem (PkcsCertData->CertData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) {\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (Index == HASHALG_MAX) {\r
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // HASH PE Image based on Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.\r
+ //\r
+ if (!HashPeImage(Index)) {\r
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Enroll a new executable's signature into Signature Database.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1\r
+ or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New signature is enrolled successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported command.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EnrollAuthentication2Descriptor (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ VOID *Data;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINT32 Attr;\r
+\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // DBT only support DER-X509 Cert Enrollment\r
+ //\r
+ if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0) {\r
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read the whole file content\r
+ //\r
+ Status = ReadFileContent(\r
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
+ (VOID **) &mImageBase,\r
+ &mImageSize,\r
+ 0\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ ASSERT (mImageBase != NULL);\r
+\r
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check if SigDB variable has been already existed.\r
+ // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the\r
+ // new signature data to original variable\r
+ //\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ &DataSize,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
+ } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Diretly set AUTHENTICATION_2 data to SetVariable\r
+ //\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ mImageSize,\r
+ mImageBase\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ DEBUG((DEBUG_INFO, "Enroll AUTH_2 data to Var:%s Status: %x\n", VariableName, Status));\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
+\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (mImageBase != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (mImageBase);\r
+ mImageBase = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+\r
+}\r
+\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Enroll a new executable's signature into Signature Database.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1\r
+ or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New signature is enrolled successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported command.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigDBCert;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *SigDBCertData;\r
+ VOID *Data;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINTN SigDBSize;\r
+ UINT32 Attr;\r
+ WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *GuidCertData;\r
+\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+ GuidCertData = NULL;\r
+\r
+ if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0) {\r
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Form the SigDB certificate list.\r
+ // Format the data item into EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST type.\r
+ //\r
+ // We need to parse executable's signature data from specified signed executable file.\r
+ // In current implementation, we simply trust the pass-in signed executable file.\r
+ // In reality, it's OS's responsibility to verify the signed executable file.\r
+ //\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read the whole file content\r
+ //\r
+ Status = ReadFileContent(\r
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,\r
+ (VOID **) &mImageBase,\r
+ &mImageSize,\r
+ 0\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ ASSERT (mImageBase != NULL);\r
+\r
+ Status = LoadPeImage ();\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (mSecDataDir->SizeOfCert == 0) {\r
+ if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r
+ Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ } else {\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read the certificate data\r
+ //\r
+ mCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *)(mImageBase + mSecDataDir->Offset);\r
+\r
+ if (mCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) {\r
+ GuidCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID*) mCertificate;\r
+ if (CompareMem (&GuidCertData->CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid, sizeof(EFI_GUID)) != 0) {\r
+ Status = EFI_ABORTED;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r
+ Status = EFI_ABORTED;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ } else if (mCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {\r
+\r
+ Status = HashPeImageByType ();\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;;\r
+ }\r
+ } else {\r
+ Status = EFI_ABORTED;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Create a new SigDB entry.\r
+ //\r
+ SigDBSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
+ + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1\r
+ + (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;\r
+\r
+ Data = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (SigDBSize);\r
+ if (Data == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Adjust the Certificate Database parameters.\r
+ //\r
+ SigDBCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) Data;\r
+ SigDBCert->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SigDBSize;\r
+ SigDBCert->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
+ SigDBCert->SignatureSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;\r
+ CopyGuid (&SigDBCert->SignatureType, &mCertType);\r
+\r
+ SigDBCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*)((UINT8*)SigDBCert + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r
+ CopyGuid (&SigDBCertData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ CopyMem (SigDBCertData->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize);\r
+\r
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&SigDBSize, (UINT8**) &Data);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check if SigDB variable has been already existed.\r
+ // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the\r
+ // new signature data to original variable\r
+ //\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable(\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ &DataSize,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;\r
+ } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Enroll the variable.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ SigDBSize,\r
+ Data\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+\r
+ CloseEnrolledFile(Private->FileContext);\r
+\r
+ if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);\r
+ Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (mImageBase != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (mImageBase);\r
+ mImageBase = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Enroll signature into DB/DBX/DBT without KEK's authentication.\r
+ The SignatureOwner GUID will be Private->SignatureGUID.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New signature enrolled successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.\r
+ @retval others Fail to enroll signature data.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EnrollSignatureDatabase (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ UINT16* FilePostFix;\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINTN NameLength;\r
+\r
+ if ((Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->FileContext->FHandle == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = SetSecureBootMode (CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Parse the file's postfix.\r
+ //\r
+ NameLength = StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName);\r
+ if (NameLength <= 4) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+ FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + NameLength - 4;\r
+ if (IsDerEncodeCertificate (FilePostFix)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate.\r
+ //\r
+ return EnrollX509toSigDB (Private, VariableName);\r
+ } else if (IsAuthentication2Format(Private->FileContext->FHandle)){\r
+ return EnrollAuthentication2Descriptor(Private, VariableName);\r
+ } else {\r
+ return EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB (Private, VariableName);\r
+ }\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ List all signatures in specified signature database (e.g. KEK/DB/DBX/DBT)\r
+ by GUID in the page for user to select and delete as needed.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] VariableName The variable name of the vendor's signature database.\r
+ @param[in] VendorGuid A unique identifier for the vendor.\r
+ @param[in] LabelNumber Label number to insert opcodes.\r
+ @param[in] FormId Form ID of current page.\r
+ @param[in] QuestionIdBase Base question id of the signature list.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Success to update the signature list page\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Unable to allocate required resources.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+UpdateDeletePage (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
+ IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
+ IN UINT16 LabelNumber,\r
+ IN EFI_FORM_ID FormId,\r
+ IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionIdBase\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINT32 Index;\r
+ UINTN CertCount;\r
+ UINTN GuidIndex;\r
+ VOID *StartOpCodeHandle;\r
+ VOID *EndOpCodeHandle;\r
+ EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *StartLabel;\r
+ EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *EndLabel;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINT8 *Data;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
+ UINT32 ItemDataSize;\r
+ CHAR16 *GuidStr;\r
+ EFI_STRING_ID GuidID;\r
+ EFI_STRING_ID Help;\r
+\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+ CertList = NULL;\r
+ Cert = NULL;\r
+ GuidStr = NULL;\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle = NULL;\r
+ EndOpCodeHandle = NULL;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Initialize the container for dynamic opcodes.\r
+ //\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
+ if (StartOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ EndOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
+ if (EndOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Create Hii Extend Label OpCode.\r
+ //\r
+ StartLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *) HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle,\r
+ &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r
+ );\r
+ StartLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
+ StartLabel->Number = LabelNumber;\r
+\r
+ EndLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *) HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r
+ EndOpCodeHandle,\r
+ &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r
+ );\r
+ EndLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
+ EndLabel->Number = LABEL_END;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read Variable.\r
+ //\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
+ if (Data == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ GuidStr = AllocateZeroPool (100);\r
+ if (GuidStr == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Enumerate all KEK pub data.\r
+ //\r
+ ItemDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
+ GuidIndex = 0;\r
+\r
+ while ((ItemDataSize > 0) && (ItemDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+\r
+ if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {\r
+ Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
+ Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_PCKS7_GUID);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha1Guid)) {\r
+ Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_SHA1_GUID);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha256Guid)) {\r
+ Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_SHA256_GUID);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid)) {\r
+ Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_X509_SHA256_GUID);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid)) {\r
+ Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_X509_SHA384_GUID);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid)) {\r
+ Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_X509_SHA512_GUID);\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // The signature type is not supported in current implementation.\r
+ //\r
+ ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ continue;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList\r
+ + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)\r
+ + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize\r
+ + Index * CertList->SignatureSize);\r
+ //\r
+ // Display GUID and help\r
+ //\r
+ GuidToString (&Cert->SignatureOwner, GuidStr, 100);\r
+ GuidID = HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, 0, GuidStr, NULL);\r
+ HiiCreateCheckBoxOpCode (\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle,\r
+ (EFI_QUESTION_ID) (QuestionIdBase + GuidIndex++),\r
+ 0,\r
+ 0,\r
+ GuidID,\r
+ Help,\r
+ EFI_IFR_FLAG_CALLBACK,\r
+ 0,\r
+ NULL\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+ HiiUpdateForm (\r
+ PrivateData->HiiHandle,\r
+ &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid,\r
+ FormId,\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle,\r
+ EndOpCodeHandle\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ if (StartOpCodeHandle != NULL) {\r
+ HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (StartOpCodeHandle);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (EndOpCodeHandle != NULL) {\r
+ HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (EndOpCodeHandle);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (GuidStr != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (GuidStr);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Delete a KEK entry from KEK database.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] QuestionId Question id of the KEK item to delete.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete kek item successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+DeleteKeyExchangeKey (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,\r
+ IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionId\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINT8 *Data;\r
+ UINT8 *OldData;\r
+ UINT32 Attr;\r
+ UINT32 Index;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
+ UINTN CertCount;\r
+ UINT32 Offset;\r
+ BOOLEAN IsKEKItemFound;\r
+ UINT32 KekDataSize;\r
+ UINTN DeleteKekIndex;\r
+ UINTN GuidIndex;\r
+\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+ OldData = NULL;\r
+ CertList = NULL;\r
+ Cert = NULL;\r
+ Attr = 0;\r
+ DeleteKekIndex = QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID;\r
+\r
+ Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get original KEK variable.\r
+ //\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ OldData = (UINT8*)AllocateZeroPool(DataSize);\r
+ if (OldData == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Attr, &DataSize, OldData);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Allocate space for new variable.\r
+ //\r
+ Data = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
+ if (Data == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Enumerate all KEK pub data and erasing the target item.\r
+ //\r
+ IsKEKItemFound = FALSE;\r
+ KekDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) OldData;\r
+ Offset = 0;\r
+ GuidIndex = 0;\r
+ while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+ if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid) ||\r
+ CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
+ CopyMem (Data + Offset, CertList, (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize));\r
+ NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(Data + Offset);\r
+ Offset += (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
+ if (GuidIndex == DeleteKekIndex ) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Find it! Skip it!\r
+ //\r
+ NewCertList->SignatureListSize -= CertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ IsKEKItemFound = TRUE;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // This item doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (Data + Offset, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize);\r
+ Offset += CertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ }\r
+ GuidIndex++;\r
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8*) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
+ }\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // This List doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (Data + Offset, CertList, CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) ((UINT8*) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (!IsKEKItemFound) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Doesn't find the Kek Item!\r
+ //\r
+ Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Delete the Signature header if there is no signature in the list.\r
+ //\r
+ KekDataSize = Offset;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) Data;\r
+ Offset = 0;\r
+ ZeroMem (OldData, KekDataSize);\r
+ while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " CertCount = %x\n", CertCount));\r
+ if (CertCount != 0) {\r
+ CopyMem (OldData + Offset, CertList, CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ }\r
+ KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ DataSize = Offset;\r
+ if ((Attr & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &OldData);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ DataSize,\r
+ OldData\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to set variable, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool(Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (OldData != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool(OldData);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return UpdateDeletePage (\r
+ PrivateData,\r
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ LABEL_KEK_DELETE,\r
+ FORMID_DELETE_KEK_FORM,\r
+ OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID\r
+ );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Delete a signature entry from signature database.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] VariableName The variable name of the vendor's signature database.\r
+ @param[in] VendorGuid A unique identifier for the vendor.\r
+ @param[in] LabelNumber Label number to insert opcodes.\r
+ @param[in] FormId Form ID of current page.\r
+ @param[in] QuestionIdBase Base question id of the signature list.\r
+ @param[in] DeleteIndex Signature index to delete.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete signature successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Can't find the signature item,\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+DeleteSignature (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
+ IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
+ IN UINT16 LabelNumber,\r
+ IN EFI_FORM_ID FormId,\r
+ IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionIdBase,\r
+ IN UINTN DeleteIndex\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINT8 *Data;\r
+ UINT8 *OldData;\r
+ UINT32 Attr;\r
+ UINT32 Index;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
+ UINTN CertCount;\r
+ UINT32 Offset;\r
+ BOOLEAN IsItemFound;\r
+ UINT32 ItemDataSize;\r
+ UINTN GuidIndex;\r
+\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+ OldData = NULL;\r
+ CertList = NULL;\r
+ Cert = NULL;\r
+ Attr = 0;\r
+\r
+ Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get original signature list data.\r
+ //\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ OldData = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
+ if (OldData == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Attr, &DataSize, OldData);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Allocate space for new variable.\r
+ //\r
+ Data = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
+ if (Data == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Enumerate all signature data and erasing the target item.\r
+ //\r
+ IsItemFound = FALSE;\r
+ ItemDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) OldData;\r
+ Offset = 0;\r
+ GuidIndex = 0;\r
+ while ((ItemDataSize > 0) && (ItemDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+ if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid) ||\r
+ CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid) ||\r
+ CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha1Guid) ||\r
+ CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha256Guid) ||\r
+ CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid) ||\r
+ CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid) ||\r
+ CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid)\r
+ ) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header then calculate the signature count in this list.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (Data + Offset, CertList, (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize));\r
+ NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) (Data + Offset);\r
+ Offset += (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
+ if (GuidIndex == DeleteIndex) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Find it! Skip it!\r
+ //\r
+ NewCertList->SignatureListSize -= CertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ IsItemFound = TRUE;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // This item doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (Data + Offset, (UINT8*)(Cert), CertList->SignatureSize);\r
+ Offset += CertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ }\r
+ GuidIndex++;\r
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
+ }\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // This List doesn't match. Just copy it to the Data buffer.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (Data + Offset, (UINT8*)(CertList), CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (!IsItemFound) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Doesn't find the signature Item!\r
+ //\r
+ Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Delete the EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header if there is no signature in the list.\r
+ //\r
+ ItemDataSize = Offset;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
+ Offset = 0;\r
+ ZeroMem (OldData, ItemDataSize);\r
+ while ((ItemDataSize > 0) && (ItemDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " CertCount = %x\n", CertCount));\r
+ if (CertCount != 0) {\r
+ CopyMem (OldData + Offset, (UINT8*)(CertList), CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ }\r
+ ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ DataSize = Offset;\r
+ if ((Attr & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &OldData);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable(\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ VendorGuid,\r
+ Attr,\r
+ DataSize,\r
+ OldData\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to set variable, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+ if (Data != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool(Data);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (OldData != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool(OldData);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return UpdateDeletePage (\r
+ PrivateData,\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ VendorGuid,\r
+ LabelNumber,\r
+ FormId,\r
+ QuestionIdBase\r
+ );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ This function to delete signature list or data, according by DelType.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] DelType Indicate delete signature list or data.\r
+ @param[in] CheckedCount Indicate how many signature data have\r
+ been checked in current signature list.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Success to update the signature list page\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Unable to allocate required resources.\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+DeleteSignatureEx (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,\r
+ IN SIGNATURE_DELETE_TYPE DelType,\r
+ IN UINT32 CheckedCount\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *ListWalker;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *DataWalker;\r
+ CHAR16 VariableName[BUFFER_MAX_SIZE];\r
+ UINT32 VariableAttr;\r
+ UINTN VariableDataSize;\r
+ UINTN RemainingSize;\r
+ UINTN ListIndex;\r
+ UINTN Index;\r
+ UINTN Offset;\r
+ UINT8 *VariableData;\r
+ UINT8 *NewVariableData;\r
+\r
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ VariableAttr = 0;\r
+ VariableDataSize = 0;\r
+ ListIndex = 0;\r
+ Offset = 0;\r
+ VariableData = NULL;\r
+ NewVariableData = NULL;\r
+\r
+ if (PrivateData->VariableName == Variable_DB) {\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (VariableName, sizeof (VariableName), EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE);\r
+ } else if (PrivateData->VariableName == Variable_DBX) {\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (VariableName, sizeof (VariableName), EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1);\r
+ } else if (PrivateData->VariableName == Variable_DBT) {\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (VariableName, sizeof (VariableName), EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2);\r
+ } else {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ &VariableAttr,\r
+ &VariableDataSize,\r
+ VariableData\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ VariableData = AllocateZeroPool (VariableDataSize);\r
+ if (VariableData == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ &VariableAttr,\r
+ &VariableDataSize,\r
+ VariableData\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = SetSecureBootMode (CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ NewVariableData = AllocateZeroPool (VariableDataSize);\r
+ if (NewVariableData == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ RemainingSize = VariableDataSize;\r
+ ListWalker = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(VariableData);\r
+ if (DelType == Delete_Signature_List_All) {\r
+ VariableDataSize = 0;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //
+ // Traverse to target EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST but others will be skipped.
+ //
+ while ((RemainingSize > 0) && (RemainingSize >= ListWalker->SignatureListSize) && ListIndex < PrivateData->ListIndex) {\r
+ CopyMem ((UINT8 *)NewVariableData + Offset, ListWalker, ListWalker->SignatureListSize);\r
+ Offset += ListWalker->SignatureListSize;\r
+\r
+ RemainingSize -= ListWalker->SignatureListSize;\r
+ ListWalker = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)((UINT8 *)ListWalker + ListWalker->SignatureListSize);\r
+ ListIndex++;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //
+ // Handle the target EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.
+ // If CheckedCount == SIGNATURE_DATA_COUNTS (ListWalker) or DelType == Delete_Signature_List_One
+ // it means delete the whole EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, So we just skip this EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.
+ //
+ if (CheckedCount < SIGNATURE_DATA_COUNTS (ListWalker) && DelType == Delete_Signature_Data) {
+ NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(NewVariableData + Offset);\r
+ //\r
+ // Copy header.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem ((UINT8 *)NewVariableData + Offset, ListWalker, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + ListWalker->SignatureHeaderSize);
+ Offset += sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + ListWalker->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
+\r
+ DataWalker = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)ListWalker + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + ListWalker->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < SIGNATURE_DATA_COUNTS(ListWalker); Index = Index + 1) {\r
+ if (PrivateData->CheckArray[Index]) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Delete checked signature data, and update the size of whole signature list.\r
+ //\r
+ NewCertList->SignatureListSize -= NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Remain the unchecked signature data.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem ((UINT8 *)NewVariableData + Offset, DataWalker, ListWalker->SignatureSize);\r
+ Offset += ListWalker->SignatureSize;\r
+ }\r
+ DataWalker = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)DataWalker + ListWalker->SignatureSize);\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ RemainingSize -= ListWalker->SignatureListSize;
+ ListWalker = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)((UINT8 *)ListWalker + ListWalker->SignatureListSize);
+
+ //\r
+ // Copy remaining data, maybe 0.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem((UINT8 *)NewVariableData + Offset, ListWalker, RemainingSize);\r
+ Offset += RemainingSize;\r
+\r
+ VariableDataSize = Offset;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if ((VariableAttr & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&VariableDataSize, &NewVariableData);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable (\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
+ VariableAttr,\r
+ VariableDataSize,\r
+ NewVariableData\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to set variable, Status = %r", Status));\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_NULL (VariableData);\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_NULL (NewVariableData);\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+\r
+ Update SecureBoot strings based on new Secure Boot Mode State. String includes STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT\r
+ and STR_CUR_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_CONTENT.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r
+\r
+ @return EFI_SUCCESS Update secure boot strings successfully.\r
+ @return other Fail to update secure boot strings.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+UpdateSecureBootString(\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ UINT8 *SecureBoot;\r
+\r
+ SecureBoot = NULL;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get current secure boot state.\r
+ //\r
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBoot, NULL);\r
+ if (SecureBoot == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (*SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r
+ HiiSetString (Private->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT), L"Enabled", NULL);\r
+ } else {\r
+ HiiSetString (Private->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT), L"Disabled", NULL);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ FreePool(SecureBoot);\r
+\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ This function extracts configuration from variable.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] Private Point to SecureBoot configuration driver private data.\r
+ @param[in, out] ConfigData Point to SecureBoot configuration private data.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+VOID\r
+SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,\r
+ IN OUT SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION *ConfigData\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ UINT8 *SecureBootEnable;\r
+ UINT8 *SetupMode;\r
+ UINT8 *SecureBootMode;\r
+ EFI_TIME CurrTime;\r
+\r
+ SecureBootEnable = NULL;\r
+ SetupMode = NULL;\r
+ SecureBootMode = NULL;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Initilize the Date and Time using system time.\r
+ //\r
+ ConfigData->CertificateFormat = HASHALG_RAW;\r
+ ConfigData->AlwaysRevocation = TRUE;\r
+ gRT->GetTime (&CurrTime, NULL);\r
+ ConfigData->RevocationDate.Year = CurrTime.Year;\r
+ ConfigData->RevocationDate.Month = CurrTime.Month;\r
+ ConfigData->RevocationDate.Day = CurrTime.Day;\r
+ ConfigData->RevocationTime.Hour = CurrTime.Hour;\r
+ ConfigData->RevocationTime.Minute = CurrTime.Minute;\r
+ ConfigData->RevocationTime.Second = 0;\r
+ if (Private->FileContext->FHandle != NULL) {\r
+ ConfigData->FileEnrollType = Private->FileContext->FileType;\r
+ } else {\r
+ ConfigData->FileEnrollType = UNKNOWN_FILE_TYPE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // If it is Physical Presence User, set the PhysicalPresent to true.\r
+ //\r
+ if (UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r
+ ConfigData->PhysicalPresent = TRUE;\r
+ } else {\r
+ ConfigData->PhysicalPresent = FALSE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // If there is no PK then the Delete Pk button will be gray.\r
+ //\r
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SetupMode, NULL);\r
+ if (SetupMode == NULL || (*SetupMode) == SETUP_MODE) {\r
+ ConfigData->HasPk = FALSE;\r
+ } else {\r
+ ConfigData->HasPk = TRUE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check SecureBootEnable & Pk status, fix the inconsistence. \r
+ // If the SecureBootEnable Variable doesn't exist, hide the SecureBoot Enable/Disable\r
+ // Checkbox.\r
+ //\r
+ ConfigData->AttemptSecureBoot = FALSE;\r
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL); \r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Fix Pk, SecureBootEnable inconsistence\r
+ //\r
+ if ((SetupMode != NULL) && (*SetupMode) == USER_MODE) {\r
+ ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = FALSE;\r
+ if ((SecureBootEnable != NULL) && (*SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE)) {\r
+ ConfigData->AttemptSecureBoot = TRUE;\r
+ }\r
+ } else {\r
+ ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = TRUE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get the SecureBootMode from CustomMode variable.\r
+ //\r
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootMode, NULL);\r
+ if (SecureBootMode == NULL) {\r
+ ConfigData->SecureBootMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r
+ } else {\r
+ ConfigData->SecureBootMode = *(SecureBootMode);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (SecureBootEnable != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (SecureBootEnable);\r
+ }\r
+ if (SetupMode != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (SetupMode);\r
+ }\r
+ if (SecureBootMode != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool (SecureBootMode);\r
+ }\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ This function allows a caller to extract the current configuration for one\r
+ or more named elements from the target driver.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] This Points to the EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.\r
+ @param[in] Request A null-terminated Unicode string in\r
+ <ConfigRequest> format.\r
+ @param[out] Progress On return, points to a character in the Request\r
+ string. Points to the string's null terminator if\r
+ request was successful. Points to the most recent\r
+ '&' before the first failing name/value pair (or\r
+ the beginning of the string if the failure is in\r
+ the first name/value pair) if the request was not\r
+ successful.\r
+ @param[out] Results A null-terminated Unicode string in\r
+ <ConfigAltResp> format which has all values filled\r
+ in for the names in the Request string. String to\r
+ be allocated by the called function.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The Results is filled with the requested values.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough memory to store the results.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Request is illegal syntax, or unknown name.\r
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Routing data doesn't match any storage in this\r
+ driver.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EFIAPI\r
+SecureBootExtractConfig (\r
+ IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,\r
+ IN CONST EFI_STRING Request,\r
+ OUT EFI_STRING *Progress,\r
+ OUT EFI_STRING *Results\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINTN BufferSize;\r
+ UINTN Size;\r
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION Configuration;\r
+ EFI_STRING ConfigRequest;\r
+ EFI_STRING ConfigRequestHdr;\r
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData;\r
+ BOOLEAN AllocatedRequest;\r
+\r
+ if (Progress == NULL || Results == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ AllocatedRequest = FALSE;\r
+ ConfigRequestHdr = NULL;\r
+ ConfigRequest = NULL;\r
+ Size = 0;\r
+\r
+ ZeroMem (&Configuration, sizeof (Configuration));\r
+ PrivateData = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_FROM_THIS (This);\r
+ *Progress = Request;\r
+\r
+ if ((Request != NULL) && !HiiIsConfigHdrMatch (Request, &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName)) {\r
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ZeroMem(&Configuration, sizeof(SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION));\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get Configuration from Variable.\r
+ //\r
+ SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (PrivateData, &Configuration);\r
+\r
+ BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);\r
+ ConfigRequest = Request;\r
+ if ((Request == NULL) || (StrStr (Request, L"OFFSET") == NULL)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Request is set to NULL or OFFSET is NULL, construct full request string.\r
+ //\r
+ // Allocate and fill a buffer large enough to hold the <ConfigHdr> template\r
+ // followed by "&OFFSET=0&WIDTH=WWWWWWWWWWWWWWWW" followed by a Null-terminator\r
+ //\r
+ ConfigRequestHdr = HiiConstructConfigHdr (&gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName, PrivateData->DriverHandle);\r
+ Size = (StrLen (ConfigRequestHdr) + 32 + 1) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
+ ConfigRequest = AllocateZeroPool (Size);\r
+ ASSERT (ConfigRequest != NULL);\r
+ AllocatedRequest = TRUE;\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (ConfigRequest, Size, L"%s&OFFSET=0&WIDTH=%016LX", ConfigRequestHdr, (UINT64)BufferSize);\r
+ FreePool (ConfigRequestHdr);\r
+ ConfigRequestHdr = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = gHiiConfigRouting->BlockToConfig (\r
+ gHiiConfigRouting,\r
+ ConfigRequest,\r
+ (UINT8 *) &Configuration,\r
+ BufferSize,\r
+ Results,\r
+ Progress\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Free the allocated config request string.\r
+ //\r
+ if (AllocatedRequest) {\r
+ FreePool (ConfigRequest);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Set Progress string to the original request string.\r
+ //\r
+ if (Request == NULL) {\r
+ *Progress = NULL;\r
+ } else if (StrStr (Request, L"OFFSET") == NULL) {\r
+ *Progress = Request + StrLen (Request);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ This function processes the results of changes in configuration.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] This Points to the EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.\r
+ @param[in] Configuration A null-terminated Unicode string in <ConfigResp>\r
+ format.\r
+ @param[out] Progress A pointer to a string filled in with the offset of\r
+ the most recent '&' before the first failing\r
+ name/value pair (or the beginning of the string if\r
+ the failure is in the first name/value pair) or\r
+ the terminating NULL if all was successful.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The Results is processed successfully.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Configuration is NULL.\r
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Routing data doesn't match any storage in this\r
+ driver.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EFIAPI\r
+SecureBootRouteConfig (\r
+ IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,\r
+ IN CONST EFI_STRING Configuration,\r
+ OUT EFI_STRING *Progress\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION IfrNvData;\r
+ UINTN BufferSize;\r
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData;\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+\r
+ if (Configuration == NULL || Progress == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ *Progress = Configuration;\r
+ if (!HiiIsConfigHdrMatch (Configuration, &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName)) {\r
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ PrivateData = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_FROM_THIS (This);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get Configuration from Variable.\r
+ //\r
+ SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (PrivateData, &IfrNvData);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Map the Configuration to the configuration block.\r
+ //\r
+ BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);\r
+ Status = gHiiConfigRouting->ConfigToBlock (\r
+ gHiiConfigRouting,\r
+ Configuration,\r
+ (UINT8 *)&IfrNvData,\r
+ &BufferSize,\r
+ Progress\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Store Buffer Storage back to EFI variable if needed\r
+ //\r
+ if (!IfrNvData.HideSecureBoot) {\r
+ Status = SaveSecureBootVariable (IfrNvData.AttemptSecureBoot);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ *Progress = Configuration + StrLen (Configuration);\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ This function to load signature list, the update the menu page.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.\r
+ @param[in] LabelId Label number to insert opcodes.\r
+ @param[in] FormId Form ID of current page.\r
+ @param[in] QuestionIdBase Base question id of the signature list.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Success to update the signature list page\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Unable to allocate required resources.\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+LoadSignatureList (\r
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,\r
+ IN UINT16 LabelId,\r
+ IN EFI_FORM_ID FormId,\r
+ IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionIdBase\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ EFI_STRING_ID ListType;\r
+ EFI_STRING FormatNameString;\r
+ EFI_STRING FormatHelpString;\r
+ EFI_STRING FormatTypeString;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *ListWalker;\r
+ EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *StartLabel;\r
+ EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *EndLabel;\r
+ EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *StartGoto;\r
+ EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *EndGoto;\r
+ EFI_FORM_ID DstFormId;\r
+ VOID *StartOpCodeHandle;\r
+ VOID *EndOpCodeHandle;\r
+ VOID *StartGotoHandle;\r
+ VOID *EndGotoHandle;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINTN RemainingSize;\r
+ UINT16 Index;\r
+ UINT8 *VariableData;\r
+ CHAR16 VariableName[BUFFER_MAX_SIZE];\r
+ CHAR16 NameBuffer[BUFFER_MAX_SIZE];\r
+ CHAR16 HelpBuffer[BUFFER_MAX_SIZE];\r
+\r
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ FormatNameString = NULL;\r
+ FormatHelpString = NULL;\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle = NULL;\r
+ EndOpCodeHandle = NULL;\r
+ StartGotoHandle = NULL;\r
+ EndGotoHandle = NULL;\r
+ Index = 0;\r
+ VariableData = NULL;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Initialize the container for dynamic opcodes.\r
+ //\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
+ if (StartOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ EndOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
+ if (EndOpCodeHandle == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ StartGotoHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
+ if (StartGotoHandle == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ EndGotoHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();\r
+ if (EndGotoHandle == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Create Hii Extend Label OpCode.\r
+ //\r
+ StartLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *)HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle,\r
+ &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r
+ );\r
+ StartLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
+ StartLabel->Number = LabelId;\r
+\r
+ EndLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *)HiiCreateGuidOpCode (\r
+ EndOpCodeHandle,\r
+ &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r
+ );\r
+ EndLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
+ EndLabel->Number = LABEL_END;\r
+\r
+ StartGoto = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *)HiiCreateGuidOpCode(\r
+ StartGotoHandle,\r
+ &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ sizeof(EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r
+ );\r
+ StartGoto->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
+ StartGoto->Number = LABEL_DELETE_ALL_LIST_BUTTON;\r
+\r
+ EndGoto = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *)HiiCreateGuidOpCode(\r
+ EndGotoHandle,\r
+ &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,\r
+ NULL,\r
+ sizeof(EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)\r
+ );\r
+ EndGoto->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;\r
+ EndGoto->Number = LABEL_END;\r
+\r
+ if (PrivateData->VariableName == Variable_DB) {\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (VariableName, sizeof (VariableName), EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE);\r
+ DstFormId = FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION_FORM;\r
+ } else if (PrivateData->VariableName == Variable_DBX) {\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (VariableName, sizeof (VariableName), EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1);\r
+ DstFormId = FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION_FORM;\r
+ } else if (PrivateData->VariableName == Variable_DBT) {\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (VariableName, sizeof (VariableName), EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2);\r
+ DstFormId = FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_DBT_OPTION_FORM;\r
+ } else {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ HiiCreateGotoOpCode (\r
+ StartGotoHandle,\r
+ DstFormId,\r
+ STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_ALL_LIST),\r
+ STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_ALL_LIST),\r
+ EFI_IFR_FLAG_CALLBACK,\r
+ KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_ALL_LIST\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read Variable, the variable name save in the PrivateData->VariableName.\r
+ //\r
+ DataSize = 0;\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, VariableData);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ VariableData = AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);\r
+ if (VariableData == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, VariableData);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ FormatNameString = HiiGetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SIGNATURE_LIST_NAME_FORMAT), NULL);\r
+ FormatHelpString = HiiGetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SIGNATURE_LIST_HELP_FORMAT), NULL);\r
+ if (FormatNameString == NULL || FormatHelpString == NULL) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ RemainingSize = DataSize;\r
+ ListWalker = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)VariableData;\r
+ while ((RemainingSize > 0) && (RemainingSize >= ListWalker->SignatureListSize)) {\r
+ if (CompareGuid (&ListWalker->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {\r
+ ListType = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&ListWalker->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
+ ListType = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_X509);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&ListWalker->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha1Guid)) {\r
+ ListType = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_SHA1);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&ListWalker->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha256Guid)) {\r
+ ListType = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_SHA256);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&ListWalker->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid)) {\r
+ ListType = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_X509_SHA256);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&ListWalker->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid)) {\r
+ ListType = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_X509_SHA384);\r
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&ListWalker->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid)) {\r
+ ListType = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_X509_SHA512);\r
+ } else {\r
+ ListType = STRING_TOKEN (STR_LIST_TYPE_UNKNOWN);\r
+ }\r
+ FormatTypeString = HiiGetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, ListType, NULL);\r
+ if (FormatTypeString == NULL) {\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ZeroMem (NameBuffer, sizeof (NameBuffer));\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (NameBuffer, sizeof (NameBuffer), FormatNameString, Index + 1);\r
+\r
+ ZeroMem (HelpBuffer, sizeof (HelpBuffer));\r
+ UnicodeSPrint (HelpBuffer,\r
+ sizeof (HelpBuffer),\r
+ FormatHelpString,\r
+ FormatTypeString,\r
+ SIGNATURE_DATA_COUNTS (ListWalker)\r
+ );\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_NULL (FormatTypeString);\r
+ FormatTypeString = NULL;\r
+\r
+ HiiCreateGotoOpCode (\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle,\r
+ SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_DATA_FORM,\r
+ HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, 0, NameBuffer, NULL),\r
+ HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, 0, HelpBuffer, NULL),\r
+ EFI_IFR_FLAG_CALLBACK,\r
+ QuestionIdBase + Index++\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ RemainingSize -= ListWalker->SignatureListSize;\r
+ ListWalker = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)((UINT8 *)ListWalker + ListWalker->SignatureListSize);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ON_EXIT:\r
+ HiiUpdateForm (\r
+ PrivateData->HiiHandle,\r
+ &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid,\r
+ FormId,\r
+ StartOpCodeHandle,\r
+ EndOpCodeHandle\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ HiiUpdateForm (\r
+ PrivateData->HiiHandle,\r
+ &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid,\r
+ FormId,\r
+ StartGotoHandle,\r
+ EndGotoHandle\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_OPCODE (StartOpCodeHandle);\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_OPCODE (EndOpCodeHandle);\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_OPCODE (StartGotoHandle);\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_OPCODE (EndGotoHandle);\r
+\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_NULL (VariableData);\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_NULL (FormatNameString);\r
+ SECUREBOOT_FREE_NON_NULL (FormatHelpString);\r
+\r
+ PrivateData->ListCount = Index;\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Parse hash value from EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, and save in the CHAR16 type array.\r
+ The buffer is callee allocated and should be freed by the caller.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] ListEntry The pointer point to the signature list.\r
+ @param[in] DataEntry The signature data we are processing.\r
+ @param[out] BufferToReturn Buffer to save the hash value.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid List or Data or Buffer.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES A memory allocation failed.\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Operation success.\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+ParseHashValue (\r
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *ListEntry,\r
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *DataEntry,\r
+ OUT CHAR16 **BufferToReturn\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ UINTN Index;\r
+ UINTN BufferIndex;\r
+ UINTN TotalSize;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINTN Line;\r
+ UINTN OneLineBytes;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Assume that, display 8 bytes in one line.\r
+ //\r
+ OneLineBytes = 8;\r
+\r
+ if (ListEntry == NULL || DataEntry == NULL || BufferToReturn == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ DataSize = ListEntry->SignatureSize - sizeof(EFI_GUID);\r
+ Line = (DataSize + OneLineBytes - 1) / OneLineBytes;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Each byte will split two Hex-number, and each line need additional memory to save '\r\n'.\r
+ //\r
+ TotalSize = ((DataSize + Line) * 2 * sizeof(CHAR16));\r
+\r
+ *BufferToReturn = AllocateZeroPool(TotalSize);\r
+ if (*BufferToReturn == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ for (Index = 0, BufferIndex = 0; Index < DataSize; Index = Index + 1) {\r
+ if ((Index > 0) && (Index % OneLineBytes == 0)) {\r
+ BufferIndex += UnicodeSPrint(&(*BufferToReturn)[BufferIndex], TotalSize - sizeof(CHAR16) * BufferIndex, L"\n");\r
+ }\r
+ BufferIndex += UnicodeSPrint(&(*BufferToReturn)[BufferIndex], TotalSize - sizeof(CHAR16) * BufferIndex, L"%02x", DataEntry->SignatureData[Index]);\r
+ }\r
+ BufferIndex += UnicodeSPrint(&(*BufferToReturn)[BufferIndex], TotalSize - sizeof(CHAR16) * BufferIndex, L"\n");\r
+\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Function to get the common name from the X509 format certificate.\r
+ The buffer is callee allocated and should be freed by the caller.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] ListEntry The pointer point to the signature list.\r
+ @param[in] DataEntry The signature data we are processing.\r
+ @param[out] BufferToReturn Buffer to save the CN of X509 certificate.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid List or Data or Buffer.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES A memory allocation failed.\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Operation success.\r
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Not found CN field in the X509 certificate.\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+GetCommonNameFromX509 (\r
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *ListEntry,\r
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *DataEntry,\r
+ OUT CHAR16 **BufferToReturn\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ CHAR8 *CNBuffer;\r
+ UINTN CNBufferSize;\r
+\r
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ CNBuffer = NULL;\r
+\r
+ CNBuffer = AllocateZeroPool(256);\r
+ if (CNBuffer == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ CNBufferSize = 256;\r
+ X509GetCommonName (\r
+ (UINT8 *)DataEntry + sizeof(EFI_GUID),\r
+ ListEntry->SignatureSize - sizeof(EFI_GUID),\r
+ CNBuffer,\r
+ &CNBufferSize\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ *BufferToReturn = AllocateZeroPool(256 * sizeof(CHAR16));\r
+ if (*BufferToReturn == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ goto ON_EXIT;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ AsciiStrToUnicodeStrS (CNBuffer, *BufferToReturn, 256);\r