Safety option to keep boot IRQs enabled. This
should never be necessary.
diff --git a/drivers/pci/quirks.c b/drivers/pci/quirks.c
-index 92302d5749d8..71387b9aca33 100644
+index 139df46ed306..08450329f1a3 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/quirks.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/quirks.c
@@ -287,6 +287,106 @@ static int __init pci_apply_final_quirks(void)
/*
* Decoding should be disabled for a PCI device during BAR sizing to avoid
* conflict. But doing so may cause problems on host bridge and perhaps other
-@@ -5069,6 +5169,8 @@ static const struct pci_dev_acs_enabled {
+@@ -5071,6 +5171,8 @@ static const struct pci_dev_acs_enabled {
{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_CAVIUM, 0xA060, pci_quirk_mf_endpoint_acs },
/* APM X-Gene */
{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMCC, 0xE004, pci_quirk_xgene_acs },
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
-index 69a3e544676c..56a45b9b602e 100644
+index fe8c46c46505..db9ce84f2006 100644
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
-@@ -10269,7 +10269,7 @@ static struct net_device *netdev_wait_allrefs_any(struct list_head *list)
+@@ -10298,7 +10298,7 @@ static struct net_device *netdev_wait_allrefs_any(struct list_head *list)
if (time_after(jiffies, warning_time +
READ_ONCE(netdev_unregister_timeout_secs) * HZ)) {
list_for_each_entry(dev, list, todo_list) {
3 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
-index d3432687c9e6..2c20da9aa2ac 100644
+index 7bdc66abfc92..e2b67975869c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -249,6 +249,12 @@ static u64 cpuid_get_supported_xcr0(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries, int nent)
int cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
-index c381770bcbf1..6690a3722007 100644
+index 7bcf1a76a6ab..aa225f430299 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
-@@ -5413,6 +5413,19 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+@@ -5424,6 +5424,19 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
if (fpstate_is_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu))
return 0;
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
-index a377f8e0a414..3be334d34317 100644
+index 656b2150643e..06fefd2a4bfa 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
@@ -298,6 +298,7 @@ static int dmar_map_gfx = 1;
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2023 12:41:03 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Revert "nSVM: Check for reserved encodings of TLB_CONTROL in
+ nested VMCB"
+
+Revert KVM's made-up consistency check on SVM's TLB control. The APM says
+that unsupported encodings are reserved, but the APM doesn't state that
+VMRUN checks for a supported encoding. Unless something is called out
+in "Canonicalization and Consistency Checks" or listed as MBZ (Must Be
+Zero), AMD behavior is typically to let software shoot itself in the foot.
+
+This reverts commit 174a921b6975ef959dd82ee9e8844067a62e3ec1.
+
+Fixes: 174a921b6975 ("nSVM: Check for reserved encodings of TLB_CONTROL in nested VMCB")
+Reported-by: Stefan Sterz <s.sterz@proxmox.com>
+Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b9915c9c-4cf6-051a-2d91-44cc6380f455%40proxmox.com
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c | 15 ---------------
+ 1 file changed, 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
+index 36482780a42f..43481f26a34b 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
+@@ -247,18 +247,6 @@ static bool nested_svm_check_bitmap_pa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 pa, u32 size)
+ kvm_vcpu_is_legal_gpa(vcpu, addr + size - 1);
+ }
+
+-static bool nested_svm_check_tlb_ctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 tlb_ctl)
+-{
+- /* Nested FLUSHBYASID is not supported yet. */
+- switch(tlb_ctl) {
+- case TLB_CONTROL_DO_NOTHING:
+- case TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ALL_ASID:
+- return true;
+- default:
+- return false;
+- }
+-}
+-
+ static bool __nested_vmcb_check_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct vmcb_ctrl_area_cached *control)
+ {
+@@ -278,9 +266,6 @@ static bool __nested_vmcb_check_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ IOPM_SIZE)))
+ return false;
+
+- if (CC(!nested_svm_check_tlb_ctl(vcpu, control->tlb_ctl)))
+- return false;
+-
+ if (CC((control->int_ctl & V_NMI_ENABLE_MASK) &&
+ !vmcb12_is_intercept(control, INTERCEPT_NMI))) {
+ return false;
+++ /dev/null
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
-Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2023 08:26:47 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] net: thunderbolt: Fix TCPv6 GSO checksum calculation
-
-Alex reported that running ssh over IPv6 does not work with
-Thunderbolt/USB4 networking driver. The reason for that is that driver
-should call skb_is_gso() before calling skb_is_gso_v6(), and it should
-not return false after calculates the checksum successfully. This probably
-was a copy paste error from the original driver where it was done properly.
-
-Reported-by: Alex Balcanquall <alex@alexbal.com>
-Fixes: e69b6c02b4c3 ("net: Add support for networking over Thunderbolt cable")
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
-Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
-Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
----
- drivers/net/thunderbolt/main.c | 3 +--
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/net/thunderbolt/main.c b/drivers/net/thunderbolt/main.c
-index 0c1e8970ee58..0a53ec293d04 100644
---- a/drivers/net/thunderbolt/main.c
-+++ b/drivers/net/thunderbolt/main.c
-@@ -1049,12 +1049,11 @@ static bool tbnet_xmit_csum_and_map(struct tbnet *net, struct sk_buff *skb,
- *tucso = ~csum_tcpudp_magic(ip_hdr(skb)->saddr,
- ip_hdr(skb)->daddr, 0,
- ip_hdr(skb)->protocol, 0);
-- } else if (skb_is_gso_v6(skb)) {
-+ } else if (skb_is_gso(skb) && skb_is_gso_v6(skb)) {
- tucso = dest + ((void *)&(tcp_hdr(skb)->check) - data);
- *tucso = ~csum_ipv6_magic(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr,
- &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr, 0,
- IPPROTO_TCP, 0);
-- return false;
- } else if (protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) {
- tucso = dest + skb_checksum_start_offset(skb) + skb->csum_offset;
- *tucso = ~csum_ipv6_magic(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr,
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2023 12:41:04 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] KVM: nSVM: Advertise support for flush-by-ASID
+
+Advertise support for FLUSHBYASID when nested SVM is enabled, as KVM can
+always emulate flushing TLB entries for a vmcb12 ASID, e.g. by running L2
+with a new, fresh ASID in vmcb02. Some modern hypervisors, e.g. VMWare
+Workstation 17, require FLUSHBYASID support and will refuse to run if it's
+not present.
+
+Punt on proper support, as "Honor L1's request to flush an ASID on nested
+VMRUN" is one of the TODO items in the (incomplete) list of issues that
+need to be addressed in order for KVM to NOT do a full TLB flush on every
+nested SVM transition (see nested_svm_transition_tlb_flush()).
+
+Reported-by: Stefan Sterz <s.sterz@proxmox.com>
+Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b9915c9c-4cf6-051a-2d91-44cc6380f455%40proxmox.com
+Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Sterz <s.sterz@proxmox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+index c8466bc64b87..6154eda73d41 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+@@ -4983,6 +4983,7 @@ static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void)
+ if (nested) {
+ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SVM);
+ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VMCBCLEAN);
++ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_FLUSHBYASID);
+
+ if (nrips)
+ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS);
+++ /dev/null
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
-Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2023 16:02:30 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] thunderbolt: Restart XDomain discovery handshake after
- failure
-
-Alex reported that after rebooting the other host the peer-to-peer link
-does not come up anymore. The reason for this is that the host that was
-not rebooted tries to send the UUID request only 10 times according to
-the USB4 Inter-Domain spec and gives up if it does not get reply. Then
-when the other side is actually ready it cannot get the link established
-anymore. The USB4 Inter-Domain spec requires that the discovery protocol
-is restarted in that case so implement this now.
-
-Reported-by: Alex Balcanquall <alex@alexbal.com>
-Fixes: 8e1de7042596 ("thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain lane bonding")
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
----
- drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c b/drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c
-index 5b5566862318..9803f0bbf20d 100644
---- a/drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c
-+++ b/drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c
-@@ -703,6 +703,27 @@ static void update_property_block(struct tb_xdomain *xd)
- mutex_unlock(&xdomain_lock);
- }
-
-+static void start_handshake(struct tb_xdomain *xd)
-+{
-+ xd->state = XDOMAIN_STATE_INIT;
-+ queue_delayed_work(xd->tb->wq, &xd->state_work,
-+ msecs_to_jiffies(XDOMAIN_SHORT_TIMEOUT));
-+}
-+
-+/* Can be called from state_work */
-+static void __stop_handshake(struct tb_xdomain *xd)
-+{
-+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&xd->properties_changed_work);
-+ xd->properties_changed_retries = 0;
-+ xd->state_retries = 0;
-+}
-+
-+static void stop_handshake(struct tb_xdomain *xd)
-+{
-+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&xd->state_work);
-+ __stop_handshake(xd);
-+}
-+
- static void tb_xdp_handle_request(struct work_struct *work)
- {
- struct xdomain_request_work *xw = container_of(work, typeof(*xw), work);
-@@ -765,6 +786,15 @@ static void tb_xdp_handle_request(struct work_struct *work)
- case UUID_REQUEST:
- tb_dbg(tb, "%llx: received XDomain UUID request\n", route);
- ret = tb_xdp_uuid_response(ctl, route, sequence, uuid);
-+ /*
-+ * If we've stopped the discovery with an error such as
-+ * timing out, we will restart the handshake now that we
-+ * received UUID request from the remote host.
-+ */
-+ if (!ret && xd && xd->state == XDOMAIN_STATE_ERROR) {
-+ dev_dbg(&xd->dev, "restarting handshake\n");
-+ start_handshake(xd);
-+ }
- break;
-
- case LINK_STATE_STATUS_REQUEST:
-@@ -1521,6 +1551,13 @@ static void tb_xdomain_queue_properties_changed(struct tb_xdomain *xd)
- msecs_to_jiffies(XDOMAIN_SHORT_TIMEOUT));
- }
-
-+static void tb_xdomain_failed(struct tb_xdomain *xd)
-+{
-+ xd->state = XDOMAIN_STATE_ERROR;
-+ queue_delayed_work(xd->tb->wq, &xd->state_work,
-+ msecs_to_jiffies(XDOMAIN_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT));
-+}
-+
- static void tb_xdomain_state_work(struct work_struct *work)
- {
- struct tb_xdomain *xd = container_of(work, typeof(*xd), state_work.work);
-@@ -1547,7 +1584,7 @@ static void tb_xdomain_state_work(struct work_struct *work)
- if (ret) {
- if (ret == -EAGAIN)
- goto retry_state;
-- xd->state = XDOMAIN_STATE_ERROR;
-+ tb_xdomain_failed(xd);
- } else {
- tb_xdomain_queue_properties_changed(xd);
- if (xd->bonding_possible)
-@@ -1612,7 +1649,7 @@ static void tb_xdomain_state_work(struct work_struct *work)
- if (ret) {
- if (ret == -EAGAIN)
- goto retry_state;
-- xd->state = XDOMAIN_STATE_ERROR;
-+ tb_xdomain_failed(xd);
- } else {
- xd->state = XDOMAIN_STATE_ENUMERATED;
- }
-@@ -1623,6 +1660,8 @@ static void tb_xdomain_state_work(struct work_struct *work)
- break;
-
- case XDOMAIN_STATE_ERROR:
-+ dev_dbg(&xd->dev, "discovery failed, stopping handshake\n");
-+ __stop_handshake(xd);
- break;
-
- default:
-@@ -1833,21 +1872,6 @@ static void tb_xdomain_release(struct device *dev)
- kfree(xd);
- }
-
--static void start_handshake(struct tb_xdomain *xd)
--{
-- xd->state = XDOMAIN_STATE_INIT;
-- queue_delayed_work(xd->tb->wq, &xd->state_work,
-- msecs_to_jiffies(XDOMAIN_SHORT_TIMEOUT));
--}
--
--static void stop_handshake(struct tb_xdomain *xd)
--{
-- cancel_delayed_work_sync(&xd->properties_changed_work);
-- cancel_delayed_work_sync(&xd->state_work);
-- xd->properties_changed_retries = 0;
-- xd->state_retries = 0;
--}
--
- static int __maybe_unused tb_xdomain_suspend(struct device *dev)
- {
- stop_handshake(tb_to_xdomain(dev));
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
+Date: Mon, 6 Nov 2023 10:17:02 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] revert "memfd: improve userspace warnings for missing
+ exec-related flags".
+
+This warning is telling userspace developers to pass MFD_EXEC and
+MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL to memfd_create(). Commit 434ed3350f57 ("memfd: improve
+userspace warnings for missing exec-related flags") made the warning more
+frequent and visible in the hope that this would accelerate the fixing of
+errant userspace.
+
+But the overall effect is to generate far too much dmesg noise.
+
+Fixes: 434ed3350f57 ("memfd: improve userspace warnings for missing exec-related flags")
+Reported-by: Damian Tometzki <dtometzki@fedoraproject.org>
+Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ZPFzCSIgZ4QuHsSC@fedora.fritz.box
+Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
+Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
+Cc: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org>
+Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
+Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+ (cherry picked from commit 2562d67b1bdf91c7395b0225d60fdeb26b4bc5a0)
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
+---
+ mm/memfd.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c
+index 2dba2cb6f0d0..1c077e98e116 100644
+--- a/mm/memfd.c
++++ b/mm/memfd.c
+@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ static int check_sysctl_memfd_noexec(unsigned int *flags)
+ }
+
+ if (!(*flags & MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL) && sysctl >= MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_ENFORCED) {
+- pr_err_ratelimited(
++ pr_warn_once(
+ "%s[%d]: memfd_create() requires MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL with vm.memfd_noexec=%d\n",
+ current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), sysctl);
+ return -EACCES;
+++ /dev/null
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>
-Date: Sat, 7 Oct 2023 12:57:02 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] x86/cpu: Fix AMD erratum #1485 on Zen4-based CPUs
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Fix erratum #1485 on Zen4 parts where running with STIBP disabled can
-cause an #UD exception. The performance impact of the fix is negligible.
-
-Reported-by: René Rebe <rene@exactcode.de>
-Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
-Tested-by: René Rebe <rene@exactcode.de>
-Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
-Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/D99589F4-BC5D-430B-87B2-72C20370CF57@exactcode.com
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
----
- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 9 +++++++--
- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 8 ++++++++
- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
-index 1d111350197f..b37abb55e948 100644
---- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
-+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
-@@ -637,12 +637,17 @@
- /* AMD Last Branch Record MSRs */
- #define MSR_AMD64_LBR_SELECT 0xc000010e
-
--/* Fam 17h MSRs */
--#define MSR_F17H_IRPERF 0xc00000e9
-+/* Zen4 */
-+#define MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG 0xc001102e
-+#define MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_SHARED_BTB_FIX_BIT 5
-
-+/* Zen 2 */
- #define MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN 0xc00110e3
- #define MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN_BIT BIT_ULL(1)
-
-+/* Fam 17h MSRs */
-+#define MSR_F17H_IRPERF 0xc00000e9
-+
- /* Fam 16h MSRs */
- #define MSR_F16H_L2I_PERF_CTL 0xc0010230
- #define MSR_F16H_L2I_PERF_CTR 0xc0010231
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
-index 7eca6a8abbb1..981bc23665a3 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
-@@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ static const int amd_div0[] =
- AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x00, 0x0, 0x2f, 0xf),
- AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x50, 0x0, 0x5f, 0xf));
-
-+static const int amd_erratum_1485[] =
-+ AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x19, 0x10, 0x0, 0x1f, 0xf),
-+ AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x19, 0x60, 0x0, 0xaf, 0xf));
-+
- static bool cpu_has_amd_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *cpu, const int *erratum)
- {
- int osvw_id = *erratum++;
-@@ -1140,6 +1144,10 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
- pr_notice_once("AMD Zen1 DIV0 bug detected. Disable SMT for full protection.\n");
- setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_DIV0);
- }
-+
-+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) &&
-+ cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_erratum_1485))
-+ msr_set_bit(MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG, MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_SHARED_BTB_FIX_BIT);
- }
-
- #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
--- /dev/null
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
+Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2023 09:26:16 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: ceph: make sure all the files
+ successfully put before unmounting"
+
+This reverts commit a53dba9297be9597eac7b17738723bd44bac97ea, which
+was an early attempt to fix a bug that was actually present in the
+ceph layer, as confirmed by the original patch author [0], and fixed
+actually there now [1].
+
+[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/8443166a-7182-7777-a489-14b5dab20bd5@redhat.com/
+[1]: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/ceph-devel/patch/20221221093031.132792-1-xiubli@redhat.com/
+Hide
+
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
+---
+ fs/crypto/keyring.c | 6 +-----
+ fs/inode.c | 5 +----
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyring.c b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
+index 147b9a11c62c..7cbb1fd872ac 100644
+--- a/fs/crypto/keyring.c
++++ b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
+@@ -237,11 +237,7 @@ void fscrypt_destroy_keyring(struct super_block *sb)
+ * with ->mk_secret. There should be no structural refs
+ * beyond the one associated with the active ref.
+ */
+- if (refcount_read(&mk->mk_active_refs) != 1) {
+- printk("fscrypt_destroy_keyring: mk_active_refs = %d\n",
+- refcount_read(&mk->mk_active_refs));
+- WARN_ON_ONCE(refcount_read(&mk->mk_active_refs) != 1);
+- }
++ WARN_ON_ONCE(refcount_read(&mk->mk_active_refs) != 1);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(refcount_read(&mk->mk_struct_refs) != 1);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret));
+ wipe_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret);
+diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
+index 3b8abad427b4..67611a360031 100644
+--- a/fs/inode.c
++++ b/fs/inode.c
+@@ -716,11 +716,8 @@ void evict_inodes(struct super_block *sb)
+ again:
+ spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(inode, next, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) {
+- if (atomic_read(&inode->i_count)) {
+- printk("evict_inodes inode %p, i_count = %d, was skipped!\n",
+- inode, atomic_read(&inode->i_count));
++ if (atomic_read(&inode->i_count))
+ continue;
+- }
+
+ spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
+ if (inode->i_state & (I_NEW | I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE)) {
+++ /dev/null
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
-Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2023 12:41:03 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] Revert "nSVM: Check for reserved encodings of TLB_CONTROL in
- nested VMCB"
-
-Revert KVM's made-up consistency check on SVM's TLB control. The APM says
-that unsupported encodings are reserved, but the APM doesn't state that
-VMRUN checks for a supported encoding. Unless something is called out
-in "Canonicalization and Consistency Checks" or listed as MBZ (Must Be
-Zero), AMD behavior is typically to let software shoot itself in the foot.
-
-This reverts commit 174a921b6975ef959dd82ee9e8844067a62e3ec1.
-
-Fixes: 174a921b6975 ("nSVM: Check for reserved encodings of TLB_CONTROL in nested VMCB")
-Reported-by: Stefan Sterz <s.sterz@proxmox.com>
-Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b9915c9c-4cf6-051a-2d91-44cc6380f455%40proxmox.com
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
----
- arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c | 15 ---------------
- 1 file changed, 15 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
-index 96936ddf1b3c..92db000409a9 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
-@@ -247,18 +247,6 @@ static bool nested_svm_check_bitmap_pa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 pa, u32 size)
- kvm_vcpu_is_legal_gpa(vcpu, addr + size - 1);
- }
-
--static bool nested_svm_check_tlb_ctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 tlb_ctl)
--{
-- /* Nested FLUSHBYASID is not supported yet. */
-- switch(tlb_ctl) {
-- case TLB_CONTROL_DO_NOTHING:
-- case TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ALL_ASID:
-- return true;
-- default:
-- return false;
-- }
--}
--
- static bool __nested_vmcb_check_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- struct vmcb_ctrl_area_cached *control)
- {
-@@ -278,9 +266,6 @@ static bool __nested_vmcb_check_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- IOPM_SIZE)))
- return false;
-
-- if (CC(!nested_svm_check_tlb_ctl(vcpu, control->tlb_ctl)))
-- return false;
--
- if (CC((control->int_ctl & V_NMI_ENABLE_MASK) &&
- !vmcb12_is_intercept(control, INTERCEPT_NMI))) {
- return false;
+++ /dev/null
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
-Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2023 12:41:04 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] KVM: nSVM: Advertise support for flush-by-ASID
-
-Advertise support for FLUSHBYASID when nested SVM is enabled, as KVM can
-always emulate flushing TLB entries for a vmcb12 ASID, e.g. by running L2
-with a new, fresh ASID in vmcb02. Some modern hypervisors, e.g. VMWare
-Workstation 17, require FLUSHBYASID support and will refuse to run if it's
-not present.
-
-Punt on proper support, as "Honor L1's request to flush an ASID on nested
-VMRUN" is one of the TODO items in the (incomplete) list of issues that
-need to be addressed in order for KVM to NOT do a full TLB flush on every
-nested SVM transition (see nested_svm_transition_tlb_flush()).
-
-Reported-by: Stefan Sterz <s.sterz@proxmox.com>
-Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b9915c9c-4cf6-051a-2d91-44cc6380f455%40proxmox.com
-Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Sterz <s.sterz@proxmox.com>
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
----
- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
-index 2ec76ab525ea..ef3215286428 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
-@@ -4969,6 +4969,7 @@ static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void)
- if (nested) {
- kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SVM);
- kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VMCBCLEAN);
-+ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_FLUSHBYASID);
-
- if (nrips)
- kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS);
+++ /dev/null
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
-Date: Wed, 27 Sep 2023 17:19:52 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] x86/fpu: Allow caller to constrain xfeatures when copying to
- uabi buffer
-
-Plumb an xfeatures mask into __copy_xstate_to_uabi_buf() so that KVM can
-constrain which xfeatures are saved into the userspace buffer without
-having to modify the user_xfeatures field in KVM's guest_fpu state.
-
-KVM's ABI for KVM_GET_XSAVE{2} is that features that are not exposed to
-guest must not show up in the effective xstate_bv field of the buffer.
-Saving only the guest-supported xfeatures allows userspace to load the
-saved state on a different host with a fewer xfeatures, so long as the
-target host supports the xfeatures that are exposed to the guest.
-
-KVM currently sets user_xfeatures directly to restrict KVM_GET_XSAVE{2} to
-the set of guest-supported xfeatures, but doing so broke KVM's historical
-ABI for KVM_SET_XSAVE, which allows userspace to load any xfeatures that
-are supported by the *host*.
-
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
-Message-Id: <20230928001956.924301-2-seanjc@google.com>
-Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 18164f66e6c59fda15c198b371fa008431efdb22)
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
----
- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h | 3 ++-
- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 5 +++--
- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 7 +++++--
- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h | 3 ++-
- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 21 +++++++++------------
- 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
-index b475d9a582b8..e829fa4c6788 100644
---- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
-+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
-@@ -148,7 +148,8 @@ static inline void fpu_update_guest_xfd(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfd) {
- static inline void fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state(void) { }
- #endif
-
--extern void fpu_copy_guest_fpstate_to_uabi(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, void *buf, unsigned int size, u32 pkru);
-+extern void fpu_copy_guest_fpstate_to_uabi(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, void *buf,
-+ unsigned int size, u64 xfeatures, u32 pkru);
- extern int fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, const void *buf, u64 xcr0, u32 *vpkru);
-
- static inline void fpstate_set_confidential(struct fpu_guest *gfpu)
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
-index 98e507cc7d34..b582325b9c37 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
-@@ -369,14 +369,15 @@ int fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, bool enter_guest)
- EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate);
-
- void fpu_copy_guest_fpstate_to_uabi(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, void *buf,
-- unsigned int size, u32 pkru)
-+ unsigned int size, u64 xfeatures, u32 pkru)
- {
- struct fpstate *kstate = gfpu->fpstate;
- union fpregs_state *ustate = buf;
- struct membuf mb = { .p = buf, .left = size };
-
- if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE)) {
-- __copy_xstate_to_uabi_buf(mb, kstate, pkru, XSTATE_COPY_XSAVE);
-+ __copy_xstate_to_uabi_buf(mb, kstate, xfeatures, pkru,
-+ XSTATE_COPY_XSAVE);
- } else {
- memcpy(&ustate->fxsave, &kstate->regs.fxsave,
- sizeof(ustate->fxsave));
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
-index 1afbc4866b10..463ec0cd0dab 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
-@@ -1053,6 +1053,7 @@ static void copy_feature(bool from_xstate, struct membuf *to, void *xstate,
- * __copy_xstate_to_uabi_buf - Copy kernel saved xstate to a UABI buffer
- * @to: membuf descriptor
- * @fpstate: The fpstate buffer from which to copy
-+ * @xfeatures: The mask of xfeatures to save (XSAVE mode only)
- * @pkru_val: The PKRU value to store in the PKRU component
- * @copy_mode: The requested copy mode
- *
-@@ -1063,7 +1064,8 @@ static void copy_feature(bool from_xstate, struct membuf *to, void *xstate,
- * It supports partial copy but @to.pos always starts from zero.
- */
- void __copy_xstate_to_uabi_buf(struct membuf to, struct fpstate *fpstate,
-- u32 pkru_val, enum xstate_copy_mode copy_mode)
-+ u64 xfeatures, u32 pkru_val,
-+ enum xstate_copy_mode copy_mode)
- {
- const unsigned int off_mxcsr = offsetof(struct fxregs_state, mxcsr);
- struct xregs_state *xinit = &init_fpstate.regs.xsave;
-@@ -1087,7 +1089,7 @@ void __copy_xstate_to_uabi_buf(struct membuf to, struct fpstate *fpstate,
- break;
-
- case XSTATE_COPY_XSAVE:
-- header.xfeatures &= fpstate->user_xfeatures;
-+ header.xfeatures &= fpstate->user_xfeatures & xfeatures;
- break;
- }
-
-@@ -1189,6 +1191,7 @@ void copy_xstate_to_uabi_buf(struct membuf to, struct task_struct *tsk,
- enum xstate_copy_mode copy_mode)
- {
- __copy_xstate_to_uabi_buf(to, tsk->thread.fpu.fpstate,
-+ tsk->thread.fpu.fpstate->user_xfeatures,
- tsk->thread.pkru, copy_mode);
- }
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h
-index a4ecb04d8d64..3518fb26d06b 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h
-+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h
-@@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ enum xstate_copy_mode {
-
- struct membuf;
- extern void __copy_xstate_to_uabi_buf(struct membuf to, struct fpstate *fpstate,
-- u32 pkru_val, enum xstate_copy_mode copy_mode);
-+ u64 xfeatures, u32 pkru_val,
-+ enum xstate_copy_mode copy_mode);
- extern void copy_xstate_to_uabi_buf(struct membuf to, struct task_struct *tsk,
- enum xstate_copy_mode mode);
- extern int copy_uabi_from_kernel_to_xstate(struct fpstate *fpstate, const void *kbuf, u32 *pkru);
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
-index 6690a3722007..394d3a8b4682 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
-@@ -5385,26 +5385,23 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- return 0;
- }
-
--static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
-- struct kvm_xsave *guest_xsave)
-+
-+static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
-+ u8 *state, unsigned int size)
- {
- if (fpstate_is_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu))
- return;
-
-- fpu_copy_guest_fpstate_to_uabi(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu,
-- guest_xsave->region,
-- sizeof(guest_xsave->region),
-+ fpu_copy_guest_fpstate_to_uabi(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, state, size,
-+ vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->user_xfeatures,
- vcpu->arch.pkru);
- }
-
--static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
-- u8 *state, unsigned int size)
-+static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
-+ struct kvm_xsave *guest_xsave)
- {
-- if (fpstate_is_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu))
-- return;
--
-- fpu_copy_guest_fpstate_to_uabi(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu,
-- state, size, vcpu->arch.pkru);
-+ return kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave2(vcpu, (void *)guest_xsave->region,
-+ sizeof(guest_xsave->region));
- }
-
- static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+++ /dev/null
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
-Date: Wed, 27 Sep 2023 17:19:53 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Constrain guest-supported xfeatures only at
- KVM_GET_XSAVE{2}
-
-Mask off xfeatures that aren't exposed to the guest only when saving guest
-state via KVM_GET_XSAVE{2} instead of modifying user_xfeatures directly.
-Preserving the maximal set of xfeatures in user_xfeatures restores KVM's
-ABI for KVM_SET_XSAVE, which prior to commit ad856280ddea ("x86/kvm/fpu:
-Limit guest user_xfeatures to supported bits of XCR0") allowed userspace
-to load xfeatures that are supported by the host, irrespective of what
-xfeatures are exposed to the guest.
-
-There is no known use case where userspace *intentionally* loads xfeatures
-that aren't exposed to the guest, but the bug fixed by commit ad856280ddea
-was specifically that KVM_GET_SAVE{2} would save xfeatures that weren't
-exposed to the guest, e.g. would lead to userspace unintentionally loading
-guest-unsupported xfeatures when live migrating a VM.
-
-Restricting KVM_SET_XSAVE to guest-supported xfeatures is especially
-problematic for QEMU-based setups, as QEMU has a bug where instead of
-terminating the VM if KVM_SET_XSAVE fails, QEMU instead simply stops
-loading guest state, i.e. resumes the guest after live migration with
-incomplete guest state, and ultimately results in guest data corruption.
-
-Note, letting userspace restore all host-supported xfeatures does not fix
-setups where a VM is migrated from a host *without* commit ad856280ddea,
-to a target with a subset of host-supported xfeatures. However there is
-no way to safely address that scenario, e.g. KVM could silently drop the
-unsupported features, but that would be a clear violation of KVM's ABI and
-so would require userspace to opt-in, at which point userspace could
-simply be updated to sanitize the to-be-loaded XSAVE state.
-
-Reported-by: Tyler Stachecki <stachecki.tyler@gmail.com>
-Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230914010003.358162-1-tstachecki@bloomberg.net
-Fixes: ad856280ddea ("x86/kvm/fpu: Limit guest user_xfeatures to supported bits of XCR0")
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Cc: Leonardo Bras <leobras@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
-Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
-Message-Id: <20230928001956.924301-3-seanjc@google.com>
-Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 8647c52e9504c99752a39f1d44f6268f82c40a5c)
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
----
- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 5 +----
- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 8 --------
- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
-index 463ec0cd0dab..ebe698f8af73 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
-@@ -1543,10 +1543,7 @@ static int fpstate_realloc(u64 xfeatures, unsigned int ksize,
- fpregs_restore_userregs();
-
- newfps->xfeatures = curfps->xfeatures | xfeatures;
--
-- if (!guest_fpu)
-- newfps->user_xfeatures = curfps->user_xfeatures | xfeatures;
--
-+ newfps->user_xfeatures = curfps->user_xfeatures | xfeatures;
- newfps->xfd = curfps->xfd & ~xfeatures;
-
- /* Do the final updates within the locked region */
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
-index 2c20da9aa2ac..e2b67975869c 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
-@@ -332,14 +332,6 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
- vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 =
- cpuid_get_supported_xcr0(vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries, vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent);
-
-- /*
-- * FP+SSE can always be saved/restored via KVM_{G,S}ET_XSAVE, even if
-- * XSAVE/XCRO are not exposed to the guest, and even if XSAVE isn't
-- * supported by the host.
-- */
-- vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->user_xfeatures = vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 |
-- XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE;
--
- kvm_update_pv_runtime(vcpu);
-
- vcpu->arch.maxphyaddr = cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(vcpu);
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
-index 394d3a8b4682..e0cea0f8380a 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
-@@ -5389,12 +5389,26 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- u8 *state, unsigned int size)
- {
-+ /*
-+ * Only copy state for features that are enabled for the guest. The
-+ * state itself isn't problematic, but setting bits in the header for
-+ * features that are supported in *this* host but not exposed to the
-+ * guest can result in KVM_SET_XSAVE failing when live migrating to a
-+ * compatible host without the features that are NOT exposed to the
-+ * guest.
-+ *
-+ * FP+SSE can always be saved/restored via KVM_{G,S}ET_XSAVE, even if
-+ * XSAVE/XCRO are not exposed to the guest, and even if XSAVE isn't
-+ * supported by the host.
-+ */
-+ u64 supported_xcr0 = vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 |
-+ XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE;
-+
- if (fpstate_is_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu))
- return;
-
- fpu_copy_guest_fpstate_to_uabi(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, state, size,
-- vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->user_xfeatures,
-- vcpu->arch.pkru);
-+ supported_xcr0, vcpu->arch.pkru);
- }
-
- static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+++ /dev/null
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
-Date: Mon, 6 Nov 2023 10:17:02 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] revert "memfd: improve userspace warnings for missing
- exec-related flags".
-
-This warning is telling userspace developers to pass MFD_EXEC and
-MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL to memfd_create(). Commit 434ed3350f57 ("memfd: improve
-userspace warnings for missing exec-related flags") made the warning more
-frequent and visible in the hope that this would accelerate the fixing of
-errant userspace.
-
-But the overall effect is to generate far too much dmesg noise.
-
-Fixes: 434ed3350f57 ("memfd: improve userspace warnings for missing exec-related flags")
-Reported-by: Damian Tometzki <dtometzki@fedoraproject.org>
-Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ZPFzCSIgZ4QuHsSC@fedora.fritz.box
-Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
-Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
-Cc: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org>
-Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
-Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
-Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
- (cherry picked from commit 2562d67b1bdf91c7395b0225d60fdeb26b4bc5a0)
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
----
- mm/memfd.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c
-index 2dba2cb6f0d0..1c077e98e116 100644
---- a/mm/memfd.c
-+++ b/mm/memfd.c
-@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ static int check_sysctl_memfd_noexec(unsigned int *flags)
- }
-
- if (!(*flags & MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL) && sysctl >= MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_ENFORCED) {
-- pr_err_ratelimited(
-+ pr_warn_once(
- "%s[%d]: memfd_create() requires MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL with vm.memfd_noexec=%d\n",
- current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), sysctl);
- return -EACCES;
+++ /dev/null
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
-Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2023 09:26:16 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: ceph: make sure all the files
- successfully put before unmounting"
-
-This reverts commit a53dba9297be9597eac7b17738723bd44bac97ea, which
-was an early attempt to fix a bug that was actually present in the
-ceph layer, as confirmed by the original patch author [0], and fixed
-actually there now [1].
-
-[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/8443166a-7182-7777-a489-14b5dab20bd5@redhat.com/
-[1]: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/ceph-devel/patch/20221221093031.132792-1-xiubli@redhat.com/
-Hide
-
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
----
- fs/crypto/keyring.c | 6 +-----
- fs/inode.c | 5 +----
- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyring.c b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
-index 147b9a11c62c..7cbb1fd872ac 100644
---- a/fs/crypto/keyring.c
-+++ b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
-@@ -237,11 +237,7 @@ void fscrypt_destroy_keyring(struct super_block *sb)
- * with ->mk_secret. There should be no structural refs
- * beyond the one associated with the active ref.
- */
-- if (refcount_read(&mk->mk_active_refs) != 1) {
-- printk("fscrypt_destroy_keyring: mk_active_refs = %d\n",
-- refcount_read(&mk->mk_active_refs));
-- WARN_ON_ONCE(refcount_read(&mk->mk_active_refs) != 1);
-- }
-+ WARN_ON_ONCE(refcount_read(&mk->mk_active_refs) != 1);
- WARN_ON_ONCE(refcount_read(&mk->mk_struct_refs) != 1);
- WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret));
- wipe_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret);
-diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
-index 3b8abad427b4..67611a360031 100644
---- a/fs/inode.c
-+++ b/fs/inode.c
-@@ -716,11 +716,8 @@ void evict_inodes(struct super_block *sb)
- again:
- spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
- list_for_each_entry_safe(inode, next, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) {
-- if (atomic_read(&inode->i_count)) {
-- printk("evict_inodes inode %p, i_count = %d, was skipped!\n",
-- inode, atomic_read(&inode->i_count));
-+ if (atomic_read(&inode->i_count))
- continue;
-- }
-
- spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
- if (inode->i_state & (I_NEW | I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE)) {
-Subproject commit 67cc773d350984cd7fe77d26adb1f4f0fa434ebc
+Subproject commit 6897e6aedfb5c92966fd56014490c3d624c7c469
projects / pve-kernel.git / commitdiff