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a6811666 SZ |
1 | /** @file\r |
2 | Implement authentication services for the authenticated variables.\r | |
3 | \r | |
4 | Caution: This module requires additional review when modified.\r | |
5 | This driver will have external input - variable data. It may be input in SMM mode.\r | |
6 | This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r | |
7 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
8 | Variable attribute should also be checked to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
9 | The whole SMM authentication variable design relies on the integrity of flash part and SMM.\r | |
10 | which is assumed to be protected by platform. All variable code and metadata in flash/SMM Memory\r | |
11 | may not be modified without authorization. If platform fails to protect these resources,\r | |
12 | the authentication service provided in this driver will be broken, and the behavior is undefined.\r | |
13 | \r | |
14 | ProcessVarWithPk(), ProcessVarWithKek() and ProcessVariable() are the function to do\r | |
15 | variable authentication.\r | |
16 | \r | |
17 | VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate() and VerifyCounterBasedPayload() are sub function to do verification.\r | |
18 | They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library\r | |
19 | to verify the signature.\r | |
20 | \r | |
c035e373 | 21 | Copyright (c) 2009 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r |
a6811666 SZ |
22 | This program and the accompanying materials\r |
23 | are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r | |
24 | which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r | |
25 | http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r | |
26 | \r | |
27 | THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r | |
28 | WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r | |
29 | \r | |
30 | **/\r | |
31 | \r | |
32 | #include "AuthServiceInternal.h"\r | |
33 | \r | |
34 | //\r | |
35 | // Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r | |
36 | //\r | |
37 | CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r | |
38 | \r | |
c035e373 ZL |
39 | CONST UINT8 mSha256OidValue[] = { 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01 };\r |
40 | \r | |
a6811666 SZ |
41 | //\r |
42 | // Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.\r | |
43 | // These data are used to perform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.\r | |
44 | //\r | |
45 | EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {\r | |
46 | //{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }\r | |
47 | {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },\r | |
48 | {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
49 | {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
50 | {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },\r | |
51 | {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
52 | {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},\r | |
53 | {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },\r | |
54 | {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },\r | |
55 | {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 },\r | |
56 | {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, 0, 48 },\r | |
57 | {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, 0, 64 },\r | |
58 | {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, 0, 80 }\r | |
59 | };\r | |
60 | \r | |
61 | /**\r | |
62 | Finds variable in storage blocks of volatile and non-volatile storage areas.\r | |
63 | \r | |
64 | This code finds variable in storage blocks of volatile and non-volatile storage areas.\r | |
65 | If VariableName is an empty string, then we just return the first\r | |
66 | qualified variable without comparing VariableName and VendorGuid.\r | |
67 | \r | |
68 | @param[in] VariableName Name of the variable to be found.\r | |
69 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID to be found.\r | |
70 | @param[out] Data Pointer to data address.\r | |
71 | @param[out] DataSize Pointer to data size.\r | |
72 | \r | |
73 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER If VariableName is not an empty string,\r | |
74 | while VendorGuid is NULL.\r | |
75 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable successfully found.\r | |
76 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Variable not found\r | |
77 | \r | |
78 | **/\r | |
79 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
80 | AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
81 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
82 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
83 | OUT VOID **Data,\r | |
84 | OUT UINTN *DataSize\r | |
85 | )\r | |
86 | {\r | |
87 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
88 | AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r | |
89 | \r | |
90 | ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r | |
91 | Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r | |
92 | VariableName,\r | |
93 | VendorGuid,\r | |
94 | &AuthVariableInfo\r | |
95 | );\r | |
96 | *Data = AuthVariableInfo.Data;\r | |
97 | *DataSize = AuthVariableInfo.DataSize;\r | |
98 | return Status;\r | |
99 | }\r | |
100 | \r | |
101 | /**\r | |
102 | Update the variable region with Variable information.\r | |
103 | \r | |
104 | @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.\r | |
105 | @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.\r | |
106 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
107 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
108 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
109 | \r | |
110 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.\r | |
111 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
112 | @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.\r | |
113 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r | |
114 | \r | |
115 | **/\r | |
116 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
117 | AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r | |
118 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
119 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
120 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
121 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
122 | IN UINT32 Attributes\r | |
123 | )\r | |
124 | {\r | |
125 | AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r | |
126 | \r | |
127 | ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r | |
128 | AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;\r | |
129 | AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;\r | |
130 | AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;\r | |
131 | AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;\r | |
132 | AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;\r | |
133 | \r | |
134 | return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (\r | |
135 | &AuthVariableInfo\r | |
136 | );\r | |
137 | }\r | |
138 | \r | |
139 | /**\r | |
140 | Update the variable region with Variable information.\r | |
141 | \r | |
142 | @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.\r | |
143 | @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.\r | |
144 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
145 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
146 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
147 | @param[in] KeyIndex Index of associated public key.\r | |
148 | @param[in] MonotonicCount Value of associated monotonic count.\r | |
149 | \r | |
150 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.\r | |
151 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
152 | @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.\r | |
153 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r | |
154 | \r | |
155 | **/\r | |
156 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
157 | AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithMonotonicCount (\r | |
158 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
159 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
160 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
161 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
162 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r | |
163 | IN UINT32 KeyIndex,\r | |
164 | IN UINT64 MonotonicCount\r | |
165 | )\r | |
166 | {\r | |
167 | AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r | |
168 | \r | |
560ac77e ZC |
169 | ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r |
170 | AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;\r | |
171 | AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;\r | |
172 | AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;\r | |
173 | AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;\r | |
174 | AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;\r | |
175 | AuthVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex = KeyIndex;\r | |
176 | AuthVariableInfo.MonotonicCount = MonotonicCount;\r | |
4fc08e8d | 177 | \r |
560ac77e ZC |
178 | return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (\r |
179 | &AuthVariableInfo\r | |
180 | );\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
181 | }\r |
182 | \r | |
183 | /**\r | |
560ac77e | 184 | Update the variable region with Variable information.\r |
a6811666 | 185 | \r |
560ac77e ZC |
186 | @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.\r |
187 | @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.\r | |
188 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
189 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
190 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
191 | @param[in] TimeStamp Value of associated TimeStamp.\r | |
a6811666 | 192 | \r |
560ac77e ZC |
193 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.\r |
194 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
195 | @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
196 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r |
197 | \r | |
198 | **/\r | |
199 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
560ac77e ZC |
200 | AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r |
201 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
202 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
203 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
204 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
205 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r | |
206 | IN EFI_TIME *TimeStamp\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
207 | )\r |
208 | {\r | |
560ac77e ZC |
209 | EFI_STATUS FindStatus;\r |
210 | VOID *OrgData;\r | |
211 | UINTN OrgDataSize;\r | |
212 | AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r | |
213 | \r | |
214 | FindStatus = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
215 | VariableName,\r | |
216 | VendorGuid,\r | |
217 | &OrgData,\r | |
218 | &OrgDataSize\r | |
219 | );\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
220 | \r |
221 | //\r | |
560ac77e | 222 | // EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute only effects for existing variable\r |
a6811666 | 223 | //\r |
560ac77e ZC |
224 | if (!EFI_ERROR (FindStatus) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) != 0)) {\r |
225 | if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&\r | |
226 | ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||\r | |
227 | (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0))) ||\r | |
228 | (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0))) {\r | |
229 | //\r | |
230 | // For variables with formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, the driver shall not perform an append of\r | |
231 | // EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA values that are already part of the existing variable value.\r | |
232 | //\r | |
233 | FilterSignatureList (\r | |
234 | OrgData,\r | |
235 | OrgDataSize,\r | |
236 | Data,\r | |
237 | &DataSize\r | |
238 | );\r | |
239 | }\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
240 | }\r |
241 | \r | |
560ac77e ZC |
242 | ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r |
243 | AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;\r | |
244 | AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;\r | |
245 | AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;\r | |
246 | AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;\r | |
247 | AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;\r | |
248 | AuthVariableInfo.TimeStamp = TimeStamp;\r | |
249 | return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (\r | |
250 | &AuthVariableInfo\r | |
251 | );\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
252 | }\r |
253 | \r | |
254 | /**\r | |
255 | Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.\r | |
256 | \r | |
257 | @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r | |
258 | @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r | |
259 | \r | |
260 | @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.\r | |
261 | @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.\r | |
262 | \r | |
263 | **/\r | |
264 | BOOLEAN\r | |
265 | NeedPhysicallyPresent(\r | |
266 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
267 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r | |
268 | )\r | |
269 | {\r | |
270 | if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))\r | |
271 | || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {\r | |
272 | return TRUE;\r | |
273 | }\r | |
274 | \r | |
275 | return FALSE;\r | |
276 | }\r | |
277 | \r | |
278 | /**\r | |
279 | Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.\r | |
280 | \r | |
281 | @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.\r | |
282 | @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.\r | |
283 | \r | |
284 | **/\r | |
285 | BOOLEAN\r | |
286 | InCustomMode (\r | |
287 | VOID\r | |
288 | )\r | |
289 | {\r | |
290 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
291 | VOID *Data;\r | |
292 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
293 | \r | |
294 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Data, &DataSize);\r | |
295 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && (*(UINT8 *) Data == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE)) {\r | |
296 | return TRUE;\r | |
297 | }\r | |
298 | \r | |
299 | return FALSE;\r | |
300 | }\r | |
301 | \r | |
302 | /**\r | |
303 | Get available public key index.\r | |
304 | \r | |
305 | @param[in] PubKey Pointer to Public Key data.\r | |
306 | \r | |
307 | @return Public key index, 0 if no any public key index available.\r | |
308 | \r | |
309 | **/\r | |
310 | UINT32\r | |
311 | GetAvailableKeyIndex (\r | |
312 | IN UINT8 *PubKey\r | |
313 | )\r | |
314 | {\r | |
315 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
316 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
317 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
318 | UINT8 *Ptr;\r | |
319 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
320 | BOOLEAN IsFound;\r | |
321 | EFI_GUID VendorGuid;\r | |
322 | CHAR16 Name[1];\r | |
323 | AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r | |
324 | UINT32 KeyIndex;\r | |
325 | \r | |
326 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
327 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
328 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
329 | (VOID **) &Data,\r | |
330 | &DataSize\r | |
331 | );\r | |
332 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
333 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Get public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r | |
334 | return 0;\r | |
335 | }\r | |
336 | \r | |
337 | if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {\r | |
338 | Name[0] = 0;\r | |
339 | AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = Name;\r | |
340 | ZeroMem (&VendorGuid, sizeof (VendorGuid));\r | |
341 | AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = &VendorGuid;\r | |
342 | mPubKeyNumber = 0;\r | |
343 | //\r | |
344 | // Collect valid key data.\r | |
345 | //\r | |
346 | do {\r | |
347 | Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindNextVariable (AuthVariableInfo.VariableName, AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid, &AuthVariableInfo);\r | |
348 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
349 | if (AuthVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex != 0) {\r | |
350 | for (Ptr = Data; Ptr < (Data + DataSize); Ptr += sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA)) {\r | |
351 | if (ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) Ptr)->KeyIndex)) == AuthVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex) {\r | |
352 | //\r | |
353 | // Check if the key data has been collected.\r | |
354 | //\r | |
355 | for (Index = 0; Index < mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r | |
356 | if (ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyIndex)) == AuthVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex) {\r | |
357 | break;\r | |
358 | }\r | |
359 | }\r | |
360 | if (Index == mPubKeyNumber) {\r | |
361 | //\r | |
362 | // New key data.\r | |
363 | //\r | |
364 | CopyMem ((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber, Ptr, sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA));\r | |
365 | mPubKeyNumber++;\r | |
366 | }\r | |
367 | break;\r | |
368 | }\r | |
369 | }\r | |
370 | }\r | |
371 | }\r | |
372 | } while (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND);\r | |
373 | \r | |
374 | //\r | |
375 | // No available space to add new public key.\r | |
376 | //\r | |
377 | if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {\r | |
378 | return 0;\r | |
379 | }\r | |
380 | }\r | |
381 | \r | |
382 | //\r | |
383 | // Find available public key index.\r | |
384 | //\r | |
385 | for (KeyIndex = 1; KeyIndex <= mMaxKeyNumber; KeyIndex++) {\r | |
386 | IsFound = FALSE;\r | |
387 | for (Ptr = mPubKeyStore; Ptr < (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA)); Ptr += sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA)) {\r | |
388 | if (ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) Ptr)->KeyIndex)) == KeyIndex) {\r | |
389 | IsFound = TRUE;\r | |
390 | break;\r | |
391 | }\r | |
392 | }\r | |
393 | if (!IsFound) {\r | |
394 | break;\r | |
395 | }\r | |
396 | }\r | |
397 | \r | |
398 | return KeyIndex;\r | |
399 | }\r | |
400 | \r | |
401 | /**\r | |
402 | Add public key in store and return its index.\r | |
403 | \r | |
404 | @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data.\r | |
405 | @param[in] VariableDataEntry The variable data entry.\r | |
406 | \r | |
407 | @return Index of new added public key.\r | |
408 | \r | |
409 | **/\r | |
410 | UINT32\r | |
411 | AddPubKeyInStore (\r | |
412 | IN UINT8 *PubKey,\r | |
413 | IN VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY *VariableDataEntry\r | |
414 | )\r | |
415 | {\r | |
416 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
417 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
418 | VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY PublicKeyEntry;\r | |
419 | UINT32 Attributes;\r | |
420 | UINT32 KeyIndex;\r | |
421 | \r | |
422 | if (PubKey == NULL) {\r | |
423 | return 0;\r | |
424 | }\r | |
425 | \r | |
426 | //\r | |
427 | // Check whether the public key entry does exist.\r | |
428 | //\r | |
429 | for (Index = 0; Index < mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r | |
430 | if (CompareMem (((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyData, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r | |
431 | return ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyIndex));\r | |
432 | }\r | |
433 | }\r | |
434 | \r | |
435 | KeyIndex = GetAvailableKeyIndex (PubKey);\r | |
436 | if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r | |
437 | return 0;\r | |
438 | }\r | |
439 | \r | |
440 | //\r | |
441 | // Check the variable space for both public key and variable data.\r | |
442 | //\r | |
443 | PublicKeyEntry.VariableSize = (mPubKeyNumber + 1) * sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA);\r | |
444 | PublicKeyEntry.Guid = &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid;\r | |
445 | PublicKeyEntry.Name = AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME;\r | |
446 | Attributes = VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
447 | \r | |
448 | if (!mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (Attributes, &PublicKeyEntry, VariableDataEntry, NULL)) {\r | |
449 | //\r | |
450 | // No enough variable space.\r | |
451 | //\r | |
452 | return 0;\r | |
453 | }\r | |
454 | \r | |
455 | WriteUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber)->KeyIndex), KeyIndex);\r | |
456 | CopyMem (((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber)->KeyData, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r | |
457 | mPubKeyNumber++;\r | |
458 | \r | |
459 | //\r | |
460 | // Update public key database variable.\r | |
461 | //\r | |
462 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r | |
463 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
464 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
465 | mPubKeyStore,\r | |
466 | mPubKeyNumber * sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA),\r | |
467 | Attributes\r | |
468 | );\r | |
469 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
470 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r | |
471 | return 0;\r | |
472 | }\r | |
473 | \r | |
474 | return KeyIndex;\r | |
475 | }\r | |
476 | \r | |
477 | /**\r | |
478 | Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID type.\r | |
479 | Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.\r | |
480 | \r | |
481 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
482 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
483 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
484 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
485 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
486 | \r | |
487 | @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.\r | |
488 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
489 | @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.\r | |
490 | \r | |
491 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
492 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.\r | |
493 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.\r | |
494 | \r | |
495 | **/\r | |
496 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
497 | VerifyCounterBasedPayload (\r | |
498 | IN UINT8 *Data,\r | |
499 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
500 | IN UINT8 *PubKey\r | |
501 | )\r | |
502 | {\r | |
503 | BOOLEAN Status;\r | |
504 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r | |
505 | EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r | |
506 | UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r | |
507 | VOID *Rsa;\r | |
508 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
509 | \r | |
510 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r | |
511 | Rsa = NULL;\r | |
512 | CertData = NULL;\r | |
513 | CertBlock = NULL;\r | |
514 | \r | |
515 | if (Data == NULL || PubKey == NULL) {\r | |
516 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
517 | }\r | |
518 | \r | |
519 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r | |
520 | CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r | |
521 | \r | |
522 | //\r | |
523 | // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r | |
524 | // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID.\r | |
525 | //\r | |
526 | if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r | |
527 | !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)) {\r | |
528 | //\r | |
529 | // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
530 | //\r | |
531 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
532 | }\r | |
533 | //\r | |
534 | // Hash data payload with SHA256.\r | |
535 | //\r | |
536 | ZeroMem (Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r | |
537 | Status = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r | |
538 | if (!Status) {\r | |
539 | goto Done;\r | |
540 | }\r | |
541 | Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, PayloadSize);\r | |
542 | if (!Status) {\r | |
543 | goto Done;\r | |
544 | }\r | |
545 | //\r | |
546 | // Hash Size.\r | |
547 | //\r | |
548 | Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &PayloadSize, sizeof (UINTN));\r | |
549 | if (!Status) {\r | |
550 | goto Done;\r | |
551 | }\r | |
552 | //\r | |
553 | // Hash Monotonic Count.\r | |
554 | //\r | |
555 | Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &CertData->MonotonicCount, sizeof (UINT64));\r | |
556 | if (!Status) {\r | |
557 | goto Done;\r | |
558 | }\r | |
559 | Status = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Digest);\r | |
560 | if (!Status) {\r | |
561 | goto Done;\r | |
562 | }\r | |
563 | //\r | |
564 | // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.\r | |
565 | //\r | |
566 | Rsa = RsaNew ();\r | |
567 | ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);\r | |
568 | //\r | |
569 | // Set RSA Key Components.\r | |
570 | // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r | |
571 | //\r | |
572 | Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r | |
573 | if (!Status) {\r | |
574 | goto Done;\r | |
575 | }\r | |
576 | Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r | |
577 | if (!Status) {\r | |
578 | goto Done;\r | |
579 | }\r | |
580 | //\r | |
581 | // Verify the signature.\r | |
582 | //\r | |
583 | Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r | |
584 | Rsa,\r | |
585 | Digest,\r | |
586 | SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,\r | |
587 | CertBlock->Signature,\r | |
588 | EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r | |
589 | );\r | |
590 | \r | |
591 | Done:\r | |
592 | if (Rsa != NULL) {\r | |
593 | RsaFree (Rsa);\r | |
594 | }\r | |
595 | if (Status) {\r | |
596 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
597 | } else {\r | |
598 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
599 | }\r | |
600 | }\r | |
601 | \r | |
560ac77e ZC |
602 | /**\r |
603 | Update platform mode.\r | |
604 | \r | |
605 | @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r | |
606 | \r | |
607 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
608 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r | |
609 | \r | |
610 | **/\r | |
611 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
612 | UpdatePlatformMode (\r | |
613 | IN UINT32 Mode\r | |
614 | )\r | |
615 | {\r | |
616 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
617 | VOID *Data;\r | |
618 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
619 | UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r | |
620 | UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r | |
621 | UINTN VariableDataSize;\r | |
622 | \r | |
623 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
624 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r | |
625 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
626 | &Data,\r | |
627 | &DataSize\r | |
628 | );\r | |
629 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
630 | return Status;\r | |
631 | }\r | |
632 | \r | |
633 | //\r | |
634 | // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r | |
635 | // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r | |
636 | //\r | |
637 | mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;\r | |
638 | CopyMem (Data, &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r | |
639 | \r | |
640 | if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {\r | |
641 | //\r | |
642 | // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r | |
643 | // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r | |
644 | // Variable in runtime.\r | |
645 | //\r | |
646 | return Status;\r | |
647 | }\r | |
648 | \r | |
649 | //\r | |
650 | // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r | |
651 | // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r | |
652 | // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r | |
653 | //\r | |
654 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
655 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r | |
656 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
657 | &Data,\r | |
658 | &DataSize\r | |
659 | );\r | |
660 | //\r | |
661 | // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r | |
662 | // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r | |
663 | // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r | |
664 | //\r | |
665 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
666 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
667 | } else {\r | |
668 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r | |
669 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r | |
670 | } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r | |
671 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
672 | } else {\r | |
673 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
674 | }\r | |
675 | }\r | |
676 | \r | |
677 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r | |
678 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r | |
679 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
680 | &SecureBootMode,\r | |
681 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
682 | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r | |
683 | );\r | |
684 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
685 | return Status;\r | |
686 | }\r | |
687 | \r | |
688 | //\r | |
689 | // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r | |
690 | //\r | |
691 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
692 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r | |
693 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
694 | &Data,\r | |
695 | &DataSize\r | |
696 | );\r | |
697 | \r | |
698 | if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r | |
699 | //\r | |
700 | // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r | |
701 | //\r | |
702 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r | |
703 | VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r | |
704 | } else {\r | |
705 | //\r | |
706 | // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r | |
707 | // variable is not in secure boot state.\r | |
708 | //\r | |
709 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
710 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
711 | }\r | |
712 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r | |
713 | VariableDataSize = 0;\r | |
714 | }\r | |
715 | \r | |
716 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r | |
717 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r | |
718 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
719 | &SecureBootEnable,\r | |
720 | VariableDataSize,\r | |
721 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r | |
722 | );\r | |
723 | return Status;\r | |
724 | }\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
725 | \r |
726 | /**\r | |
727 | Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx/dbt variable.\r | |
728 | \r | |
729 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.\r | |
730 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
731 | @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.\r | |
732 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
733 | \r | |
734 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.\r | |
735 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.\r | |
736 | \r | |
737 | **/\r | |
738 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
739 | CheckSignatureListFormat(\r | |
740 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
741 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
742 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
743 | IN UINTN DataSize\r | |
744 | )\r | |
745 | {\r | |
746 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r | |
747 | UINTN SigDataSize;\r | |
748 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
749 | UINT32 SigCount;\r | |
750 | BOOLEAN IsPk;\r | |
751 | VOID *RsaContext;\r | |
752 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;\r | |
753 | UINTN CertLen;\r | |
754 | \r | |
755 | if (DataSize == 0) {\r | |
756 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
757 | }\r | |
758 | \r | |
759 | ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);\r | |
760 | \r | |
761 | if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){\r | |
762 | IsPk = TRUE;\r | |
763 | } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)) ||\r | |
764 | (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&\r | |
765 | ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||\r | |
766 | (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0)))) {\r | |
767 | IsPk = FALSE;\r | |
768 | } else {\r | |
769 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
770 | }\r | |
771 | \r | |
772 | SigCount = 0;\r | |
773 | SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
774 | SigDataSize = DataSize;\r | |
775 | RsaContext = NULL;\r | |
776 | \r | |
777 | //\r | |
778 | // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.\r | |
779 | // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.\r | |
780 | //\r | |
781 | while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
782 | for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {\r | |
783 | if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {\r | |
784 | //\r | |
785 | // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner\r | |
786 | // component) add the data length according to signature type.\r | |
787 | //\r | |
788 | if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) &&\r | |
789 | (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {\r | |
790 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
791 | }\r | |
792 | if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINT32) ~0) &&\r | |
793 | SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {\r | |
794 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
795 | }\r | |
796 | break;\r | |
797 | }\r | |
798 | }\r | |
799 | \r | |
800 | if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {\r | |
801 | //\r | |
802 | // Undefined signature type.\r | |
803 | //\r | |
804 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
805 | }\r | |
806 | \r | |
807 | if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
808 | //\r | |
809 | // Try to retrieve the RSA public key from the X.509 certificate.\r | |
810 | // If this operation fails, it's not a valid certificate.\r | |
811 | //\r | |
812 | RsaContext = RsaNew ();\r | |
813 | if (RsaContext == NULL) {\r | |
814 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
815 | }\r | |
816 | CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
817 | CertLen = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r | |
818 | if (!RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (CertData->SignatureData, CertLen, &RsaContext)) {\r | |
819 | RsaFree (RsaContext);\r | |
820 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
821 | }\r | |
822 | RsaFree (RsaContext);\r | |
823 | }\r | |
824 | \r | |
825 | if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {\r | |
826 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
827 | }\r | |
828 | SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;\r | |
829 | \r | |
830 | SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
831 | SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
832 | }\r | |
833 | \r | |
834 | if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {\r | |
835 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
836 | }\r | |
837 | \r | |
838 | if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {\r | |
839 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
840 | }\r | |
841 | \r | |
842 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
843 | }\r | |
844 | \r | |
845 | /**\r | |
846 | Update "VendorKeys" variable to record the out of band secure boot key modification.\r | |
847 | \r | |
848 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is updated successfully.\r | |
849 | @return Others Failed to update variable.\r | |
850 | \r | |
851 | **/\r | |
852 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
853 | VendorKeyIsModified (\r | |
854 | VOID\r | |
855 | )\r | |
856 | {\r | |
857 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
858 | \r | |
859 | if (mVendorKeyState == VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED) {\r | |
860 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
861 | }\r | |
862 | mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED;\r | |
863 | \r | |
864 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r | |
865 | EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,\r | |
866 | &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,\r | |
867 | &mVendorKeyState,\r | |
868 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
869 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r | |
870 | );\r | |
871 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
872 | return Status;\r | |
873 | }\r | |
874 | \r | |
875 | return AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r | |
876 | EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,\r | |
877 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
878 | &mVendorKeyState,\r | |
879 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
880 | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r | |
881 | );\r | |
882 | }\r | |
883 | \r | |
884 | /**\r | |
885 | Process variable with platform key for verification.\r | |
886 | \r | |
887 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
888 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
889 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
890 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
891 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
892 | This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
893 | \r | |
894 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
895 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
896 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
897 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
898 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
899 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r | |
900 | @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r | |
901 | \r | |
902 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
903 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.\r | |
904 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
905 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r | |
906 | \r | |
907 | **/\r | |
908 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
909 | ProcessVarWithPk (\r | |
910 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
911 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
912 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
913 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
914 | IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r | |
915 | IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r | |
916 | )\r | |
917 | {\r | |
918 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
919 | BOOLEAN Del;\r | |
920 | UINT8 *Payload;\r | |
921 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
922 | \r | |
923 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r | |
924 | (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r | |
925 | //\r | |
926 | // PK, KEK and db/dbx/dbt should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r | |
927 | // authenticated variable.\r | |
928 | //\r | |
929 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
930 | }\r | |
931 | \r | |
4fc08e8d CZ |
932 | //\r |
933 | // Init state of Del. State may change due to secure check\r | |
934 | //\r | |
a6811666 | 935 | Del = FALSE;\r |
76bfc7e3 | 936 | if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !IsPk)) {\r |
560ac77e ZC |
937 | Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r |
938 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
939 | if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r | |
940 | Del = TRUE;\r | |
941 | }\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
942 | \r |
943 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r | |
944 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
945 | return Status;\r | |
946 | }\r | |
947 | \r | |
948 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r | |
949 | VariableName,\r | |
950 | VendorGuid,\r | |
951 | Payload,\r | |
952 | PayloadSize,\r | |
953 | Attributes,\r | |
954 | &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r | |
955 | );\r | |
956 | if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r | |
957 | return Status;\r | |
958 | }\r | |
959 | \r | |
560ac77e | 960 | if ((mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) || IsPk) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
961 | Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r |
962 | }\r | |
560ac77e | 963 | } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
964 | //\r |
965 | // Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.\r | |
966 | //\r | |
967 | Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r | |
968 | VariableName,\r | |
969 | VendorGuid,\r | |
970 | Data,\r | |
971 | DataSize,\r | |
972 | Attributes,\r | |
973 | AuthVarTypePk,\r | |
974 | &Del\r | |
975 | );\r | |
976 | } else {\r | |
977 | //\r | |
978 | // Verify against the certificate in data payload.\r | |
979 | //\r | |
980 | Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r | |
981 | VariableName,\r | |
982 | VendorGuid,\r | |
983 | Data,\r | |
984 | DataSize,\r | |
985 | Attributes,\r | |
986 | AuthVarTypePayload,\r | |
987 | &Del\r | |
988 | );\r | |
989 | }\r | |
990 | \r | |
991 | if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {\r | |
560ac77e ZC |
992 | if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !Del) {\r |
993 | //\r | |
994 | // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r | |
995 | //\r | |
996 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r | |
997 | } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && Del){\r | |
998 | //\r | |
999 | // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r | |
1000 | //\r | |
1001 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1002 | }\r |
1003 | }\r | |
1004 | \r | |
1005 | return Status;\r | |
1006 | }\r | |
1007 | \r | |
1008 | /**\r | |
1009 | Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r | |
1010 | \r | |
1011 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
1012 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
1013 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
1014 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
1015 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
1016 | This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
1017 | \r | |
1018 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
1019 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
1020 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
1021 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
1022 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
1023 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
1024 | \r | |
1025 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
1026 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r | |
1027 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
1028 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r | |
1029 | \r | |
1030 | **/\r | |
1031 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1032 | ProcessVarWithKek (\r | |
1033 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1034 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1035 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
1036 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1037 | IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r | |
1038 | )\r | |
1039 | {\r | |
1040 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1041 | UINT8 *Payload;\r | |
1042 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
1043 | \r | |
1044 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r | |
1045 | (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r | |
1046 | //\r | |
1047 | // DB, DBX and DBT should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r | |
1048 | // authenticated variable.\r | |
1049 | //\r | |
1050 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1051 | }\r | |
1052 | \r | |
1053 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
76bfc7e3 | 1054 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1055 | //\r |
1056 | // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r | |
1057 | //\r | |
1058 | return VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r | |
1059 | VariableName,\r | |
1060 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1061 | Data,\r | |
1062 | DataSize,\r | |
1063 | Attributes,\r | |
1064 | AuthVarTypeKek,\r | |
1065 | NULL\r | |
1066 | );\r | |
1067 | } else {\r | |
1068 | //\r | |
1069 | // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.\r | |
1070 | //\r | |
1071 | Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
1072 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
1073 | \r | |
1074 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r | |
1075 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1076 | return Status;\r | |
1077 | }\r | |
1078 | \r | |
1079 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r | |
1080 | VariableName,\r | |
1081 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1082 | Payload,\r | |
1083 | PayloadSize,\r | |
1084 | Attributes,\r | |
1085 | &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r | |
1086 | );\r | |
1087 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1088 | return Status;\r | |
1089 | }\r | |
1090 | \r | |
560ac77e | 1091 | if (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1092 | Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r |
1093 | }\r | |
1094 | }\r | |
1095 | \r | |
1096 | return Status;\r | |
1097 | }\r | |
1098 | \r | |
1099 | /**\r | |
1100 | Check if it is to delete auth variable.\r | |
1101 | \r | |
1102 | @param[in] OrgAttributes Original attribute value of the variable.\r | |
1103 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
1104 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
1105 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
1106 | \r | |
1107 | @retval TRUE It is to delete auth variable.\r | |
1108 | @retval FALSE It is not to delete auth variable.\r | |
1109 | \r | |
1110 | **/\r | |
1111 | BOOLEAN\r | |
1112 | IsDeleteAuthVariable (\r | |
1113 | IN UINT32 OrgAttributes,\r | |
1114 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
1115 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1116 | IN UINT32 Attributes\r | |
1117 | )\r | |
1118 | {\r | |
1119 | BOOLEAN Del;\r | |
1120 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
1121 | \r | |
1122 | Del = FALSE;\r | |
1123 | \r | |
1124 | //\r | |
1125 | // To delete a variable created with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r | |
1126 | // or the EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute,\r | |
1127 | // SetVariable must be used with attributes matching the existing variable\r | |
1128 | // and the DataSize set to the size of the AuthInfo descriptor.\r | |
1129 | //\r | |
1130 | if ((Attributes == OrgAttributes) &&\r | |
1131 | ((Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)) {\r | |
1132 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
1133 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
1134 | if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r | |
1135 | Del = TRUE;\r | |
1136 | }\r | |
1137 | } else {\r | |
1138 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r | |
1139 | if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r | |
1140 | Del = TRUE;\r | |
1141 | }\r | |
1142 | }\r | |
1143 | }\r | |
1144 | \r | |
1145 | return Del;\r | |
1146 | }\r | |
1147 | \r | |
1148 | /**\r | |
1149 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r | |
1150 | \r | |
1151 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
1152 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
1153 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
1154 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
1155 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
1156 | This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
1157 | \r | |
1158 | @param[in] VariableName Name of the variable.\r | |
1159 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
1160 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
1161 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
1162 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
1163 | \r | |
1164 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
1165 | @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r | |
1166 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
1167 | @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The Database to save the public key is full.\r | |
1168 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r | |
1169 | set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r | |
1170 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
1171 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r | |
1172 | \r | |
1173 | **/\r | |
1174 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1175 | ProcessVariable (\r | |
1176 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1177 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1178 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
1179 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
98c2d961 | 1180 | IN UINT32 Attributes\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1181 | )\r |
1182 | {\r | |
1183 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1184 | BOOLEAN IsDeletion;\r | |
1185 | BOOLEAN IsFirstTime;\r | |
1186 | UINT8 *PubKey;\r | |
1187 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r | |
1188 | EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r | |
1189 | UINT32 KeyIndex;\r | |
1190 | UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r | |
1191 | VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY VariableDataEntry;\r | |
1192 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
1193 | AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO OrgVariableInfo;\r | |
1194 | \r | |
1195 | KeyIndex = 0;\r | |
1196 | CertData = NULL;\r | |
1197 | CertBlock = NULL;\r | |
1198 | PubKey = NULL;\r | |
1199 | IsDeletion = FALSE;\r | |
1200 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1201 | \r | |
1202 | ZeroMem (&OrgVariableInfo, sizeof (OrgVariableInfo));\r | |
1203 | Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r | |
1204 | VariableName,\r | |
1205 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1206 | &OrgVariableInfo\r | |
1207 | );\r | |
1208 | \r | |
76bfc7e3 | 1209 | if ((!EFI_ERROR (Status)) && IsDeleteAuthVariable (OrgVariableInfo.Attributes, Data, DataSize, Attributes) && UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1210 | //\r |
1211 | // Allow the delete operation of common authenticated variable at user physical presence.\r | |
1212 | //\r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
1213 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r |
1214 | VariableName,\r | |
1215 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1216 | NULL,\r | |
1217 | 0,\r | |
1218 | 0\r | |
1219 | );\r | |
1220 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r | |
98c2d961 | 1221 | Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes);\r |
a6811666 | 1222 | }\r |
64b6a3ff | 1223 | \r |
a6811666 SZ |
1224 | return Status;\r |
1225 | }\r | |
1226 | \r | |
76bfc7e3 | 1227 | if (NeedPhysicallyPresent (VariableName, VendorGuid) && !UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1228 | //\r |
1229 | // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.\r | |
1230 | //\r | |
1231 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1232 | }\r | |
1233 | \r | |
1234 | //\r | |
1235 | // A time-based authenticated variable and a count-based authenticated variable\r | |
1236 | // can't be updated by each other.\r | |
1237 | //\r | |
1238 | if (OrgVariableInfo.Data != NULL) {\r | |
1239 | if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&\r | |
1240 | ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r | |
1241 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1242 | }\r | |
1243 | \r | |
1244 | if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&\r | |
1245 | ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r | |
1246 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1247 | }\r | |
1248 | }\r | |
1249 | \r | |
1250 | //\r | |
1251 | // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r | |
1252 | //\r | |
1253 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
1254 | return VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r | |
1255 | VariableName,\r | |
1256 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1257 | Data,\r | |
1258 | DataSize,\r | |
1259 | Attributes,\r | |
1260 | AuthVarTypePriv,\r | |
1261 | NULL\r | |
1262 | );\r | |
1263 | }\r | |
1264 | \r | |
1265 | //\r | |
1266 | // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.\r | |
1267 | //\r | |
1268 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
1269 | //\r | |
1270 | // Determine current operation type.\r | |
1271 | //\r | |
1272 | if (DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) {\r | |
1273 | IsDeletion = TRUE;\r | |
1274 | }\r | |
1275 | //\r | |
1276 | // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
1277 | //\r | |
1278 | if (OrgVariableInfo.Data == NULL) {\r | |
1279 | IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r | |
1280 | } else if ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r | |
1281 | IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r | |
1282 | } else {\r | |
1283 | KeyIndex = OrgVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex;\r | |
1284 | IsFirstTime = FALSE;\r | |
1285 | }\r | |
1286 | } else if ((OrgVariableInfo.Data != NULL) &&\r | |
1287 | ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)\r | |
1288 | ) {\r | |
1289 | //\r | |
1290 | // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r | |
1291 | //\r | |
1292 | return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r | |
1293 | } else {\r | |
1294 | //\r | |
1295 | // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.\r | |
1296 | // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r | |
1297 | //\r | |
1298 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes);\r | |
1299 | return Status;\r | |
1300 | }\r | |
1301 | \r | |
1302 | //\r | |
1303 | // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.\r | |
1304 | //\r | |
1305 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r | |
1306 | CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r | |
1307 | PubKey = CertBlock->PublicKey;\r | |
1308 | \r | |
1309 | //\r | |
1310 | // Update Monotonic Count value.\r | |
1311 | //\r | |
1312 | MonotonicCount = CertData->MonotonicCount;\r | |
1313 | \r | |
1314 | if (!IsFirstTime) {\r | |
1315 | //\r | |
1316 | // 2 cases need to check here\r | |
1317 | // 1. Internal PubKey variable. PubKeyIndex is always 0\r | |
1318 | // 2. Other counter-based AuthVariable. Check input PubKey.\r | |
1319 | //\r | |
1320 | if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r | |
1321 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1322 | }\r | |
1323 | for (Index = 0; Index < mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r | |
1324 | if (ReadUnaligned32 (&(((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyIndex)) == KeyIndex) {\r | |
1325 | if (CompareMem (((AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA *) mPubKeyStore + Index)->KeyData, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r | |
1326 | break;\r | |
1327 | } else {\r | |
1328 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1329 | }\r | |
1330 | }\r | |
1331 | }\r | |
1332 | if (Index == mPubKeyNumber) {\r | |
1333 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1334 | }\r | |
1335 | \r | |
1336 | //\r | |
1337 | // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable\r | |
1338 | // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.\r | |
1339 | //\r | |
1340 | if (MonotonicCount <= OrgVariableInfo.MonotonicCount) {\r | |
1341 | //\r | |
1342 | // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
1343 | //\r | |
1344 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1345 | }\r | |
1346 | }\r | |
1347 | //\r | |
1348 | // Verify the certificate in Data payload.\r | |
1349 | //\r | |
1350 | Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, PubKey);\r | |
1351 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1352 | return Status;\r | |
1353 | }\r | |
1354 | \r | |
1355 | //\r | |
1356 | // Now, the signature has been verified!\r | |
1357 | //\r | |
1358 | if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {\r | |
1359 | VariableDataEntry.VariableSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r | |
1360 | VariableDataEntry.Guid = VendorGuid;\r | |
1361 | VariableDataEntry.Name = VariableName;\r | |
1362 | \r | |
1363 | //\r | |
1364 | // Update public key database variable if need.\r | |
1365 | //\r | |
1366 | KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey, &VariableDataEntry);\r | |
1367 | if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r | |
1368 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1369 | }\r | |
1370 | }\r | |
1371 | \r | |
1372 | //\r | |
1373 | // Verification pass.\r | |
1374 | //\r | |
1375 | return AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithMonotonicCount (VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, Attributes, KeyIndex, MonotonicCount);\r | |
1376 | }\r | |
1377 | \r | |
1378 | /**\r | |
1379 | Filter out the duplicated EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA from the new data by comparing to the original data.\r | |
1380 | \r | |
1381 | @param[in] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r | |
1382 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r | |
1383 | @param[in, out] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r | |
1384 | @param[in, out] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r | |
1385 | \r | |
1386 | **/\r | |
1387 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1388 | FilterSignatureList (\r | |
1389 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
1390 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1391 | IN OUT VOID *NewData,\r | |
1392 | IN OUT UINTN *NewDataSize\r | |
1393 | )\r | |
1394 | {\r | |
1395 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1396 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1397 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
1398 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r | |
1399 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;\r | |
1400 | UINTN NewCertCount;\r | |
1401 | UINTN Index;\r | |
1402 | UINTN Index2;\r | |
1403 | UINTN Size;\r | |
1404 | UINT8 *Tail;\r | |
1405 | UINTN CopiedCount;\r | |
1406 | UINTN SignatureListSize;\r | |
1407 | BOOLEAN IsNewCert;\r | |
1408 | UINT8 *TempData;\r | |
1409 | UINTN TempDataSize;\r | |
1410 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1411 | \r | |
1412 | if (*NewDataSize == 0) {\r | |
1413 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1414 | }\r | |
1415 | \r | |
1416 | TempDataSize = *NewDataSize;\r | |
1417 | Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->GetScratchBuffer (&TempDataSize, (VOID **) &TempData);\r | |
1418 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1419 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1420 | }\r | |
1421 | \r | |
1422 | Tail = TempData;\r | |
1423 | \r | |
1424 | NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;\r | |
1425 | while ((*NewDataSize > 0) && (*NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1426 | NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1427 | NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1428 | \r | |
1429 | CopiedCount = 0;\r | |
1430 | for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1431 | IsNewCert = TRUE;\r | |
1432 | \r | |
1433 | Size = DataSize;\r | |
1434 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
1435 | while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1436 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&\r | |
1437 | (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {\r | |
1438 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1439 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1440 | for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {\r | |
1441 | //\r | |
1442 | // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.\r | |
1443 | //\r | |
1444 | if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {\r | |
1445 | IsNewCert = FALSE;\r | |
1446 | break;\r | |
1447 | }\r | |
1448 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1449 | }\r | |
1450 | }\r | |
1451 | \r | |
1452 | if (!IsNewCert) {\r | |
1453 | break;\r | |
1454 | }\r | |
1455 | Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1456 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1457 | }\r | |
1458 | \r | |
1459 | if (IsNewCert) {\r | |
1460 | //\r | |
1461 | // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, keep it.\r | |
1462 | //\r | |
1463 | if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r | |
1464 | //\r | |
1465 | // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r | |
1466 | //\r | |
1467 | CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1468 | Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r | |
1469 | }\r | |
1470 | \r | |
1471 | CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1472 | Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1473 | CopiedCount++;\r | |
1474 | }\r | |
1475 | \r | |
1476 | NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1477 | }\r | |
1478 | \r | |
1479 | //\r | |
1480 | // Update SignatureListSize in the kept EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r | |
1481 | //\r | |
1482 | if (CopiedCount != 0) {\r | |
1483 | SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1484 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);\r | |
1485 | CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r | |
1486 | }\r | |
1487 | \r | |
1488 | *NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1489 | NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1490 | }\r | |
1491 | \r | |
1492 | TempDataSize = (Tail - (UINT8 *) TempData);\r | |
1493 | \r | |
1494 | CopyMem (NewData, TempData, TempDataSize);\r | |
1495 | *NewDataSize = TempDataSize;\r | |
1496 | \r | |
1497 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1498 | }\r | |
1499 | \r | |
1500 | /**\r | |
1501 | Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1502 | \r | |
1503 | \r | |
1504 | @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1505 | @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1506 | \r | |
1507 | @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r | |
1508 | @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r | |
1509 | \r | |
1510 | **/\r | |
1511 | BOOLEAN\r | |
1512 | AuthServiceInternalCompareTimeStamp (\r | |
1513 | IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r | |
1514 | IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r | |
1515 | )\r | |
1516 | {\r | |
1517 | if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r | |
1518 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r | |
1519 | } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r | |
1520 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r | |
1521 | } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r | |
1522 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r | |
1523 | } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r | |
1524 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r | |
1525 | } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r | |
1526 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < SecondTime->Minute);\r | |
1527 | }\r | |
1528 | \r | |
1529 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r | |
1530 | }\r | |
1531 | \r | |
1532 | /**\r | |
1533 | Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r | |
98c2d961 | 1534 | by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 | 1535 | \r |
98c2d961 | 1536 | The data format of "certdb" or "certdbv":\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1537 | //\r |
1538 | // UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r | |
1539 | // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];\r | |
1540 | // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs2[];\r | |
1541 | // /// ...\r | |
1542 | // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certsn[];\r | |
1543 | //\r | |
1544 | \r | |
1545 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1546 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
1547 | @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
1548 | @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1549 | @param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.\r |
1550 | @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r | |
1551 | @param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from\r | |
1552 | starting of Data.\r | |
1553 | @param[out] CertNodeSize Length of AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA in bytes.\r | |
1554 | \r | |
1555 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
1556 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.\r | |
1557 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.\r | |
1558 | \r | |
1559 | **/\r | |
1560 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1561 | FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1562 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1563 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1564 | IN UINT8 *Data,\r | |
1565 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1566 | OUT UINT32 *CertOffset, OPTIONAL\r | |
1567 | OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize, OPTIONAL\r | |
1568 | OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset,OPTIONAL\r | |
1569 | OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL\r | |
1570 | )\r | |
1571 | {\r | |
1572 | UINT32 Offset;\r | |
1573 | AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r | |
1574 | UINT32 CertSize;\r | |
1575 | UINT32 NameSize;\r | |
1576 | UINT32 NodeSize;\r | |
1577 | UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r | |
1578 | \r | |
1579 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1580 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1581 | }\r | |
1582 | \r | |
1583 | //\r | |
1584 | // Check whether DataSize matches recorded CertDbListSize.\r | |
1585 | //\r | |
1586 | if (DataSize < sizeof (UINT32)) {\r | |
1587 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1588 | }\r | |
1589 | \r | |
1590 | CertDbListSize = ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) Data);\r | |
1591 | \r | |
1592 | if (CertDbListSize != (UINT32) DataSize) {\r | |
1593 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1594 | }\r | |
1595 | \r | |
1596 | Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
1597 | \r | |
1598 | //\r | |
1599 | // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r | |
1600 | //\r | |
1601 | while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r | |
1602 | Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r | |
1603 | //\r | |
1604 | // Check whether VendorGuid matches.\r | |
1605 | //\r | |
1606 | if (CompareGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid)) {\r | |
1607 | NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r | |
1608 | NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r | |
1609 | CertSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertDataSize);\r | |
1610 | \r | |
1611 | if (NodeSize != sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3 + CertSize +\r | |
1612 | sizeof (CHAR16) * NameSize) {\r | |
1613 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1614 | }\r | |
1615 | \r | |
1616 | Offset = Offset + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3;\r | |
1617 | //\r | |
1618 | // Check whether VariableName matches.\r | |
1619 | //\r | |
1620 | if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) &&\r | |
1621 | (CompareMem (Data + Offset, VariableName, NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)) == 0)) {\r | |
1622 | Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
1623 | \r | |
1624 | if (CertOffset != NULL) {\r | |
1625 | *CertOffset = Offset;\r | |
1626 | }\r | |
1627 | \r | |
1628 | if (CertDataSize != NULL) {\r | |
1629 | *CertDataSize = CertSize;\r | |
1630 | }\r | |
1631 | \r | |
1632 | if (CertNodeOffset != NULL) {\r | |
1633 | *CertNodeOffset = (UINT32) ((UINT8 *) Ptr - Data);\r | |
1634 | }\r | |
1635 | \r | |
1636 | if (CertNodeSize != NULL) {\r | |
1637 | *CertNodeSize = NodeSize;\r | |
1638 | }\r | |
1639 | \r | |
1640 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1641 | } else {\r | |
1642 | Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16) + CertSize;\r | |
1643 | }\r | |
1644 | } else {\r | |
1645 | NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r | |
1646 | Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r | |
1647 | }\r | |
1648 | }\r | |
1649 | \r | |
1650 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1651 | }\r | |
1652 | \r | |
1653 | /**\r | |
1654 | Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
1655 | by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb"\r |
1656 | or "certdbv" according to authenticated variable attributes.\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1657 | \r |
1658 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1659 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
98c2d961 | 1660 | @param[in] Attributes Attributes of authenticated variable.\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1661 | @param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r |
1662 | @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r | |
1663 | \r | |
1664 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
98c2d961 | 1665 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb"/"certdbv" or matching certs.\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1666 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.\r |
1667 | \r | |
1668 | **/\r | |
1669 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1670 | GetCertsFromDb (\r | |
1671 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1672 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
98c2d961 | 1673 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1674 | OUT UINT8 **CertData,\r |
1675 | OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize\r | |
1676 | )\r | |
1677 | {\r | |
1678 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1679 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1680 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1681 | UINT32 CertOffset;\r | |
98c2d961 | 1682 | CHAR16 *DbName;\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1683 | \r |
1684 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) || (CertDataSize == NULL)) {\r | |
1685 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1686 | }\r | |
1687 | \r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
1688 | \r |
1689 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) != 0) {\r | |
1690 | //\r | |
1691 | // Get variable "certdb".\r | |
1692 | //\r | |
1693 | DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_NAME;\r | |
1694 | } else {\r | |
1695 | //\r | |
1696 | // Get variable "certdbv".\r | |
1697 | //\r | |
1698 | DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_VOLATILE_NAME;\r | |
1699 | }\r | |
1700 | \r | |
a6811666 | 1701 | //\r |
98c2d961 | 1702 | // Get variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1703 | //\r |
1704 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
98c2d961 | 1705 | DbName,\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1706 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r |
1707 | (VOID **) &Data,\r | |
1708 | &DataSize\r | |
1709 | );\r | |
1710 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1711 | return Status;\r | |
1712 | }\r | |
1713 | \r | |
1714 | if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1715 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1716 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1717 | }\r | |
1718 | \r | |
1719 | Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1720 | VariableName,\r | |
1721 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1722 | Data,\r | |
1723 | DataSize,\r | |
1724 | &CertOffset,\r | |
1725 | CertDataSize,\r | |
1726 | NULL,\r | |
1727 | NULL\r | |
1728 | );\r | |
1729 | \r | |
1730 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1731 | return Status;\r | |
1732 | }\r | |
1733 | \r | |
1734 | *CertData = Data + CertOffset;\r | |
1735 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1736 | }\r | |
1737 | \r | |
1738 | /**\r | |
1739 | Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated\r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
1740 | variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb" or \r |
1741 | "certdbv" according to authenticated variable attributes.\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1742 | \r |
1743 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1744 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
98c2d961 | 1745 | @param[in] Attributes Attributes of authenticated variable.\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1746 | \r |
1747 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
98c2d961 | 1748 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb"/"certdbv" or matching certs.\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1749 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r |
1750 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r | |
1751 | \r | |
1752 | **/\r | |
1753 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1754 | DeleteCertsFromDb (\r | |
1755 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
1756 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r |
1757 | IN UINT32 Attributes\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1758 | )\r |
1759 | {\r | |
1760 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1761 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1762 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1763 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r | |
1764 | UINT32 CertNodeOffset;\r | |
1765 | UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r | |
1766 | UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r | |
1767 | UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r | |
98c2d961 | 1768 | CHAR16 *DbName;\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1769 | \r |
1770 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {\r | |
1771 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1772 | }\r | |
1773 | \r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
1774 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) != 0) {\r |
1775 | //\r | |
1776 | // Get variable "certdb".\r | |
1777 | //\r | |
1778 | DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_NAME;\r | |
1779 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
1780 | } else {\r | |
1781 | //\r | |
1782 | // Get variable "certdbv".\r | |
1783 | //\r | |
1784 | DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_VOLATILE_NAME;\r | |
1785 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
1786 | }\r | |
1787 | \r | |
a6811666 | 1788 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r |
98c2d961 | 1789 | DbName,\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1790 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r |
1791 | (VOID **) &Data,\r | |
1792 | &DataSize\r | |
1793 | );\r | |
98c2d961 | 1794 | \r |
a6811666 SZ |
1795 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
1796 | return Status;\r | |
1797 | }\r | |
1798 | \r | |
1799 | if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1800 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1801 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1802 | }\r | |
1803 | \r | |
1804 | if (DataSize == sizeof (UINT32)) {\r | |
1805 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 1806 | // There is no certs in "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1807 | //\r |
1808 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1809 | }\r | |
1810 | \r | |
1811 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 1812 | // Get corresponding cert node from "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1813 | //\r |
1814 | Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1815 | VariableName,\r | |
1816 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1817 | Data,\r | |
1818 | DataSize,\r | |
1819 | NULL,\r | |
1820 | NULL,\r | |
1821 | &CertNodeOffset,\r | |
1822 | &CertNodeSize\r | |
1823 | );\r | |
1824 | \r | |
1825 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1826 | return Status;\r | |
1827 | }\r | |
1828 | \r | |
1829 | if (DataSize < (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r | |
1830 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1831 | }\r | |
1832 | \r | |
1833 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 1834 | // Construct new data content of variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1835 | //\r |
1836 | NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize - CertNodeSize;\r | |
1837 | NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r | |
1838 | \r | |
1839 | //\r | |
1840 | // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r | |
1841 | //\r | |
1842 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, CertNodeOffset);\r | |
1843 | //\r | |
1844 | // Update CertDbListSize.\r | |
1845 | //\r | |
1846 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
1847 | //\r | |
1848 | // Copy the DB entries after deleting node.\r | |
1849 | //\r | |
1850 | if (DataSize > (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r | |
1851 | CopyMem (\r | |
1852 | NewCertDb + CertNodeOffset,\r | |
1853 | Data + CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize,\r | |
1854 | DataSize - CertNodeOffset - CertNodeSize\r | |
1855 | );\r | |
1856 | }\r | |
1857 | \r | |
1858 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 1859 | // Set "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 | 1860 | //\r |
a6811666 | 1861 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r |
98c2d961 | 1862 | DbName,\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1863 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r |
1864 | NewCertDb,\r | |
1865 | NewCertDbSize,\r | |
1866 | VarAttr\r | |
1867 | );\r | |
1868 | \r | |
1869 | return Status;\r | |
1870 | }\r | |
1871 | \r | |
1872 | /**\r | |
1873 | Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName\r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
1874 | and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb" or "certdbv" according to\r |
1875 | time based authenticated variable attributes.\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1876 | \r |
1877 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1878 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
98c2d961 | 1879 | @param[in] Attributes Attributes of authenticated variable.\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1880 | @param[in] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r |
1881 | @param[in] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r | |
1882 | \r | |
1883 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
1884 | @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName\r | |
1885 | and VendorGuid already exists.\r | |
1886 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r | |
98c2d961 | 1887 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb" or "certdbv"\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1888 | \r |
1889 | **/\r | |
1890 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1891 | InsertCertsToDb (\r | |
1892 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1893 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
98c2d961 | 1894 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1895 | IN UINT8 *CertData,\r |
1896 | IN UINTN CertDataSize\r | |
1897 | )\r | |
1898 | {\r | |
1899 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1900 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1901 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1902 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r | |
1903 | UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r | |
1904 | UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r | |
1905 | UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r | |
1906 | UINT32 NameSize;\r | |
1907 | AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r | |
98c2d961 | 1908 | CHAR16 *DbName;\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1909 | \r |
1910 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL)) {\r | |
1911 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1912 | }\r | |
1913 | \r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
1914 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) != 0) {\r |
1915 | //\r | |
1916 | // Get variable "certdb".\r | |
1917 | //\r | |
1918 | DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_NAME;\r | |
1919 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
1920 | } else {\r | |
1921 | //\r | |
1922 | // Get variable "certdbv".\r | |
1923 | //\r | |
1924 | DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_VOLATILE_NAME;\r | |
1925 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
1926 | }\r | |
1927 | \r | |
a6811666 | 1928 | //\r |
98c2d961 | 1929 | // Get variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1930 | //\r |
1931 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
98c2d961 | 1932 | DbName,\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1933 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r |
1934 | (VOID **) &Data,\r | |
1935 | &DataSize\r | |
1936 | );\r | |
1937 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1938 | return Status;\r | |
1939 | }\r | |
1940 | \r | |
1941 | if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1942 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1943 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1944 | }\r | |
1945 | \r | |
1946 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 1947 | // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1948 | // If yes return error.\r |
1949 | //\r | |
1950 | Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1951 | VariableName,\r | |
1952 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1953 | Data,\r | |
1954 | DataSize,\r | |
1955 | NULL,\r | |
1956 | NULL,\r | |
1957 | NULL,\r | |
1958 | NULL\r | |
1959 | );\r | |
1960 | \r | |
1961 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1962 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1963 | return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r | |
1964 | }\r | |
1965 | \r | |
1966 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 1967 | // Construct new data content of variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1968 | //\r |
1969 | NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);\r | |
1970 | CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
1971 | NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize;\r | |
1972 | if (NewCertDbSize > mMaxCertDbSize) {\r | |
1973 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1974 | }\r | |
1975 | NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r | |
1976 | \r | |
1977 | //\r | |
1978 | // Copy the DB entries before inserting node.\r | |
1979 | //\r | |
1980 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, DataSize);\r | |
1981 | //\r | |
1982 | // Update CertDbListSize.\r | |
1983 | //\r | |
1984 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
1985 | //\r | |
1986 | // Construct new cert node.\r | |
1987 | //\r | |
1988 | Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (NewCertDb + DataSize);\r | |
1989 | CopyGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid);\r | |
1990 | CopyMem (&Ptr->CertNodeSize, &CertNodeSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
1991 | CopyMem (&Ptr->NameSize, &NameSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
1992 | CopyMem (&Ptr->CertDataSize, &CertDataSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
1993 | \r | |
1994 | CopyMem (\r | |
1995 | (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA),\r | |
1996 | VariableName,\r | |
1997 | NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)\r | |
1998 | );\r | |
1999 | \r | |
2000 | CopyMem (\r | |
2001 | (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16),\r | |
2002 | CertData,\r | |
2003 | CertDataSize\r | |
2004 | );\r | |
2005 | \r | |
2006 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 2007 | // Set "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 | 2008 | //\r |
a6811666 | 2009 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r |
98c2d961 | 2010 | DbName,\r |
a6811666 SZ |
2011 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r |
2012 | NewCertDb,\r | |
2013 | NewCertDbSize,\r | |
2014 | VarAttr\r | |
2015 | );\r | |
2016 | \r | |
2017 | return Status;\r | |
2018 | }\r | |
2019 | \r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
2020 | /**\r |
2021 | Clean up signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r | |
2022 | by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r | |
f3964772 SZ |
2023 | System may break down during Timebased Variable update & certdb update,\r |
2024 | make them inconsistent, this function is called in AuthVariable Init\r | |
2025 | to ensure consistency.\r | |
2026 | \r | |
2027 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find variable "certdb".\r | |
2028 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r | |
2029 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
2030 | \r |
2031 | **/\r | |
2032 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
2033 | CleanCertsFromDb (\r | |
2034 | VOID\r | |
72362a75 CZ |
2035 | )\r |
2036 | {\r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
2037 | UINT32 Offset;\r |
2038 | AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r | |
2039 | UINT32 NameSize;\r | |
2040 | UINT32 NodeSize;\r | |
2041 | CHAR16 *VariableName;\r | |
2042 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
2043 | BOOLEAN CertCleaned;\r | |
2044 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
2045 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
64b6a3ff | 2046 | EFI_GUID AuthVarGuid;\r |
98c2d961 | 2047 | AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r |
64b6a3ff CZ |
2048 | \r |
2049 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
2050 | \r | |
2051 | //\r | |
2052 | // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r | |
2053 | //\r | |
2054 | do {\r | |
2055 | CertCleaned = FALSE;\r | |
2056 | \r | |
2057 | //\r | |
2058 | // Get latest variable "certdb"\r | |
2059 | //\r | |
2060 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
2061 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
2062 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
2063 | (VOID **) &Data,\r | |
2064 | &DataSize\r | |
2065 | );\r | |
2066 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2067 | return Status;\r | |
2068 | }\r | |
2069 | \r | |
2070 | if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
2071 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
2072 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
2073 | }\r | |
2074 | \r | |
2075 | Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
2076 | \r | |
2077 | while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r | |
2078 | Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
2079 | NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r |
2080 | NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r | |
2081 | \r | |
2082 | //\r | |
2083 | // Get VarName tailed with '\0'\r | |
2084 | //\r | |
2085 | VariableName = AllocateZeroPool((NameSize + 1) * sizeof(CHAR16));\r | |
2086 | if (VariableName == NULL) {\r | |
2087 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
2088 | }\r | |
2089 | CopyMem (VariableName, (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA), NameSize * sizeof(CHAR16));\r | |
2090 | //\r | |
2091 | // Keep VarGuid aligned\r | |
2092 | //\r | |
2093 | CopyMem (&AuthVarGuid, &Ptr->VendorGuid, sizeof(EFI_GUID));\r | |
2094 | \r | |
2095 | //\r | |
2096 | // Find corresponding time auth variable\r | |
2097 | //\r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
2098 | ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r |
2099 | Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r | |
2100 | VariableName,\r | |
2101 | &AuthVarGuid,\r | |
2102 | &AuthVariableInfo\r | |
2103 | );\r | |
64b6a3ff | 2104 | \r |
fd4d9c64 | 2105 | if (EFI_ERROR(Status) || (AuthVariableInfo.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r |
98c2d961 CZ |
2106 | Status = DeleteCertsFromDb(\r |
2107 | VariableName,\r | |
2108 | &AuthVarGuid,\r | |
2109 | AuthVariableInfo.Attributes\r | |
2110 | );\r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
2111 | CertCleaned = TRUE;\r |
2112 | DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Recovery!! Cert for Auth Variable %s Guid %g is removed for consistency\n", VariableName, &AuthVarGuid));\r | |
2113 | FreePool(VariableName);\r | |
2114 | break;\r | |
2115 | }\r | |
2116 | \r | |
2117 | FreePool(VariableName);\r | |
2118 | Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r | |
2119 | }\r | |
2120 | } while (CertCleaned);\r | |
2121 | \r | |
2122 | return Status;\r | |
2123 | }\r | |
2124 | \r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2125 | /**\r |
2126 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r | |
2127 | \r | |
2128 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
2129 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
2130 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
2131 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
2132 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
2133 | \r | |
2134 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
2135 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
2136 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
2137 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
2138 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
2139 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
2140 | @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r | |
2141 | @param[in] OrgTimeStamp Pointer to original time stamp,\r | |
2142 | original variable is not found if NULL.\r | |
2143 | @param[out] VarPayloadPtr Pointer to variable payload address.\r | |
2144 | @param[out] VarPayloadSize Pointer to variable payload size.\r | |
2145 | \r | |
2146 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
2147 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r | |
2148 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
2149 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r | |
2150 | of resources.\r | |
2151 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r | |
2152 | \r | |
2153 | **/\r | |
2154 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
2155 | VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
2156 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
2157 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
2158 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
2159 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
2160 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r | |
2161 | IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r | |
2162 | IN EFI_TIME *OrgTimeStamp,\r | |
2163 | OUT UINT8 **VarPayloadPtr,\r | |
2164 | OUT UINTN *VarPayloadSize\r | |
2165 | )\r | |
2166 | {\r | |
2167 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r | |
2168 | UINT8 *SigData;\r | |
2169 | UINT32 SigDataSize;\r | |
2170 | UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r | |
2171 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
2172 | UINT32 Attr;\r | |
2173 | BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r | |
2174 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
2175 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
2176 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
2177 | UINTN Index;\r | |
2178 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
2179 | UINT32 KekDataSize;\r | |
2180 | UINT8 *NewData;\r | |
2181 | UINTN NewDataSize;\r | |
2182 | UINT8 *Buffer;\r | |
2183 | UINTN Length;\r | |
2184 | UINT8 *RootCert;\r | |
2185 | UINTN RootCertSize;\r | |
2186 | UINT8 *SignerCerts;\r | |
2187 | UINTN CertStackSize;\r | |
2188 | UINT8 *CertsInCertDb;\r | |
2189 | UINT32 CertsSizeinDb;\r | |
2190 | \r | |
2191 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2192 | CertData = NULL;\r | |
2193 | NewData = NULL;\r | |
2194 | Attr = Attributes;\r | |
2195 | SignerCerts = NULL;\r | |
2196 | RootCert = NULL;\r | |
2197 | CertsInCertDb = NULL;\r | |
2198 | \r | |
2199 | //\r | |
2200 | // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is\r | |
2201 | // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r | |
2202 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new\r | |
2203 | // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new\r | |
2204 | // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not\r | |
2205 | // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r | |
2206 | //\r | |
2207 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r | |
2208 | \r | |
2209 | //\r | |
2210 | // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the\r | |
2211 | // TimeStamp value are set to zero.\r | |
2212 | //\r | |
2213 | if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||\r | |
2214 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||\r | |
2215 | (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r | |
2216 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r | |
2217 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {\r | |
2218 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
2219 | }\r | |
2220 | \r | |
2221 | if ((OrgTimeStamp != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r | |
2222 | if (AuthServiceInternalCompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, OrgTimeStamp)) {\r | |
2223 | //\r | |
2224 | // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
2225 | //\r | |
2226 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
2227 | }\r | |
2228 | }\r | |
2229 | \r | |
2230 | //\r | |
2231 | // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r | |
2232 | // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r | |
2233 | //\r | |
2234 | if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r | |
2235 | !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r | |
2236 | //\r | |
2237 | // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
2238 | //\r | |
2239 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
2240 | }\r | |
2241 | \r | |
2242 | //\r | |
2243 | // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r | |
2244 | // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r | |
2245 | //\r | |
2246 | SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;\r | |
2247 | SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r | |
2248 | \r | |
c035e373 ZL |
2249 | //\r |
2250 | // SignedData.digestAlgorithms shall contain the digest algorithm used when preparing the\r | |
2251 | // signature. Only a digest algorithm of SHA-256 is accepted.\r | |
2252 | //\r | |
2253 | // According to PKCS#7 Definition:\r | |
2254 | // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {\r | |
2255 | // version Version,\r | |
2256 | // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,\r | |
2257 | // contentInfo ContentInfo,\r | |
2258 | // .... }\r | |
2259 | // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm \r | |
2260 | // in VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r | |
2261 | // This field has the fixed offset (+13) and be calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.\r | |
2262 | //\r | |
2263 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
2264 | if (SigDataSize >= (13 + sizeof (mSha256OidValue))) {\r | |
2265 | if (((*(SigData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) || \r | |
2266 | (CompareMem (SigData + 13, &mSha256OidValue, sizeof (mSha256OidValue)) != 0)) {\r | |
2267 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
2268 | }\r | |
2269 | }\r | |
2270 | }\r | |
2271 | \r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2272 | //\r |
2273 | // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r | |
2274 | //\r | |
2275 | PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;\r | |
2276 | PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;\r | |
2277 | \r | |
2278 | //\r | |
2279 | // Construct a serialization buffer of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r | |
2280 | // parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r | |
2281 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value\r | |
2282 | // i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)\r | |
2283 | //\r | |
2284 | NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r | |
2285 | sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
2286 | \r | |
2287 | //\r | |
2288 | // Here is to reuse scratch data area(at the end of volatile variable store)\r | |
2289 | // to reduce SMRAM consumption for SMM variable driver.\r | |
2290 | // The scratch buffer is enough to hold the serialized data and safe to use,\r | |
2291 | // because it is only used at here to do verification temporarily first\r | |
2292 | // and then used in UpdateVariable() for a time based auth variable set.\r | |
2293 | //\r | |
2294 | Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->GetScratchBuffer (&NewDataSize, (VOID **) &NewData);\r | |
2295 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2296 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
2297 | }\r | |
2298 | \r | |
2299 | Buffer = NewData;\r | |
2300 | Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
2301 | CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);\r | |
2302 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
2303 | \r | |
2304 | Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r | |
2305 | CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);\r | |
2306 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
2307 | \r | |
2308 | Length = sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
2309 | CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);\r | |
2310 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
2311 | \r | |
2312 | Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);\r | |
2313 | CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);\r | |
2314 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
2315 | \r | |
2316 | CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r | |
2317 | \r | |
2318 | if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {\r | |
2319 | //\r | |
2320 | // Verify that the signature has been made with the current Platform Key (no chaining for PK).\r | |
2321 | // First, get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r | |
2322 | //\r | |
2323 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r | |
2324 | SigData,\r | |
2325 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2326 | &SignerCerts,\r | |
2327 | &CertStackSize,\r | |
2328 | &RootCert,\r | |
2329 | &RootCertSize\r | |
2330 | );\r | |
2331 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2332 | goto Exit;\r | |
2333 | }\r | |
2334 | \r | |
2335 | //\r | |
2336 | // Second, get the current platform key from variable. Check whether it's identical with signer's certificates\r | |
2337 | // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r | |
2338 | //\r | |
2339 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
2340 | EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r | |
2341 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
2342 | &Data,\r | |
2343 | &DataSize\r | |
2344 | );\r | |
2345 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2346 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2347 | goto Exit;\r | |
2348 | }\r | |
2349 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
2350 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
2351 | if ((RootCertSize != (CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1))) ||\r | |
2352 | (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, RootCert, RootCertSize) != 0)) {\r | |
2353 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2354 | goto Exit;\r | |
2355 | }\r | |
2356 | \r | |
2357 | //\r | |
2358 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
2359 | //\r | |
2360 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2361 | SigData,\r | |
2362 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2363 | RootCert,\r | |
2364 | RootCertSize,\r | |
2365 | NewData,\r | |
2366 | NewDataSize\r | |
2367 | );\r | |
2368 | \r | |
2369 | } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypeKek) {\r | |
2370 | \r | |
2371 | //\r | |
2372 | // Get KEK database from variable.\r | |
2373 | //\r | |
2374 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
2375 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r | |
2376 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
2377 | &Data,\r | |
2378 | &DataSize\r | |
2379 | );\r | |
2380 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2381 | return Status;\r | |
2382 | }\r | |
2383 | \r | |
2384 | //\r | |
2385 | // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r | |
2386 | //\r | |
2387 | KekDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;\r | |
2388 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
2389 | while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
2390 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
2391 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
2392 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
2393 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
2394 | //\r | |
2395 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r | |
2396 | //\r | |
2397 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r | |
2398 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r | |
2399 | \r | |
2400 | //\r | |
2401 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
2402 | //\r | |
2403 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2404 | SigData,\r | |
2405 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2406 | RootCert,\r | |
2407 | RootCertSize,\r | |
2408 | NewData,\r | |
2409 | NewDataSize\r | |
2410 | );\r | |
2411 | if (VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2412 | goto Exit;\r | |
2413 | }\r | |
2414 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
2415 | }\r | |
2416 | }\r | |
2417 | KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
2418 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
2419 | }\r | |
2420 | } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r | |
2421 | \r | |
2422 | //\r | |
2423 | // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX/DBT.\r | |
2424 | // Get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r | |
2425 | //\r | |
2426 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r | |
2427 | SigData,\r | |
2428 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2429 | &SignerCerts,\r | |
2430 | &CertStackSize,\r | |
2431 | &RootCert,\r | |
2432 | &RootCertSize\r | |
2433 | );\r | |
2434 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2435 | goto Exit;\r | |
2436 | }\r | |
2437 | \r | |
2438 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 2439 | // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb or certdbv for existing\r |
a6811666 SZ |
2440 | // variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates\r |
2441 | // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r | |
2442 | //\r | |
2443 | if (OrgTimeStamp != NULL) {\r | |
2444 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2445 | \r | |
98c2d961 | 2446 | Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);\r |
a6811666 SZ |
2447 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
2448 | goto Exit;\r | |
2449 | }\r | |
2450 | \r | |
2451 | if ((CertStackSize != CertsSizeinDb) ||\r | |
2452 | (CompareMem (SignerCerts, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0)) {\r | |
2453 | goto Exit;\r | |
2454 | }\r | |
2455 | }\r | |
2456 | \r | |
2457 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2458 | SigData,\r | |
2459 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2460 | RootCert,\r | |
2461 | RootCertSize,\r | |
2462 | NewData,\r | |
2463 | NewDataSize\r | |
2464 | );\r | |
2465 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2466 | goto Exit;\r | |
2467 | }\r | |
2468 | \r | |
64b6a3ff | 2469 | if ((OrgTimeStamp == NULL) && (PayloadSize != 0)) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
2470 | //\r |
2471 | // Insert signer's certificates when adding a new common authenticated variable.\r | |
2472 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 2473 | Status = InsertCertsToDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, SignerCerts, CertStackSize);\r |
a6811666 SZ |
2474 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
2475 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2476 | goto Exit;\r | |
2477 | }\r | |
2478 | }\r | |
2479 | } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePayload) {\r | |
2480 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) PayloadPtr;\r | |
2481 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
2482 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r | |
2483 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r | |
2484 | //\r | |
2485 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
2486 | //\r | |
2487 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2488 | SigData,\r | |
2489 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2490 | RootCert,\r | |
2491 | RootCertSize,\r | |
2492 | NewData,\r | |
2493 | NewDataSize\r | |
2494 | );\r | |
2495 | } else {\r | |
2496 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
2497 | }\r | |
2498 | \r | |
2499 | Exit:\r | |
2500 | \r | |
2501 | if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk || AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r | |
2502 | Pkcs7FreeSigners (RootCert);\r | |
2503 | Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);\r | |
2504 | }\r | |
2505 | \r | |
2506 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2507 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
2508 | }\r | |
2509 | \r | |
2510 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r | |
2511 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2512 | return Status;\r | |
2513 | }\r | |
2514 | \r | |
2515 | *VarPayloadPtr = PayloadPtr;\r | |
2516 | *VarPayloadSize = PayloadSize;\r | |
2517 | \r | |
2518 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
2519 | }\r | |
2520 | \r | |
2521 | /**\r | |
2522 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r | |
2523 | \r | |
2524 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
2525 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
2526 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
2527 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
2528 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
2529 | \r | |
2530 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
2531 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
2532 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
2533 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
2534 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
2535 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
2536 | @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r | |
2537 | @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r | |
2538 | \r | |
2539 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
2540 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r | |
2541 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
2542 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r | |
2543 | of resources.\r | |
2544 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r | |
2545 | \r | |
2546 | **/\r | |
2547 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
2548 | VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r | |
2549 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
2550 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
2551 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
2552 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
2553 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r | |
2554 | IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r | |
2555 | OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r | |
2556 | )\r | |
2557 | {\r | |
2558 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
2559 | EFI_STATUS FindStatus;\r | |
2560 | UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r | |
2561 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
2562 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r | |
2563 | AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO OrgVariableInfo;\r | |
64b6a3ff | 2564 | BOOLEAN IsDel;\r |
a6811666 SZ |
2565 | \r |
2566 | ZeroMem (&OrgVariableInfo, sizeof (OrgVariableInfo));\r | |
2567 | FindStatus = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r | |
2568 | VariableName,\r | |
2569 | VendorGuid,\r | |
2570 | &OrgVariableInfo\r | |
2571 | );\r | |
2572 | \r | |
2573 | Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
2574 | VariableName,\r | |
2575 | VendorGuid,\r | |
2576 | Data,\r | |
2577 | DataSize,\r | |
2578 | Attributes,\r | |
2579 | AuthVarType,\r | |
2580 | (!EFI_ERROR (FindStatus)) ? OrgVariableInfo.TimeStamp : NULL,\r | |
2581 | &PayloadPtr,\r | |
2582 | &PayloadSize\r | |
2583 | );\r | |
2584 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2585 | return Status;\r | |
2586 | }\r | |
2587 | \r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
2588 | if (!EFI_ERROR(FindStatus)\r |
2589 | && (PayloadSize == 0)\r | |
2590 | && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r | |
2591 | IsDel = TRUE;\r | |
2592 | } else {\r | |
2593 | IsDel = FALSE;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2594 | }\r |
2595 | \r | |
2596 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r | |
2597 | \r | |
2598 | //\r | |
2599 | // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r | |
2600 | //\r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
2601 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r |
2602 | VariableName,\r | |
2603 | VendorGuid,\r | |
2604 | PayloadPtr,\r | |
2605 | PayloadSize,\r | |
2606 | Attributes,\r | |
2607 | &CertData->TimeStamp\r | |
2608 | );\r | |
2609 | \r | |
2610 | //\r | |
2611 | // Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.\r | |
2612 | //\r | |
2613 | if (IsDel && AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv && !EFI_ERROR(Status) ) {\r | |
98c2d961 | 2614 | Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes);\r |
64b6a3ff CZ |
2615 | }\r |
2616 | \r | |
2617 | if (VarDel != NULL) {\r | |
2618 | if (IsDel && !EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r | |
2619 | *VarDel = TRUE;\r | |
2620 | } else {\r | |
2621 | *VarDel = FALSE;\r | |
2622 | }\r | |
2623 | }\r | |
2624 | \r | |
2625 | return Status;\r | |
a6811666 | 2626 | }\r |