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a6811666 SZ |
1 | /** @file\r |
2 | Implement authentication services for the authenticated variables.\r | |
3 | \r | |
4 | Caution: This module requires additional review when modified.\r | |
5 | This driver will have external input - variable data. It may be input in SMM mode.\r | |
6 | This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r | |
7 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
8 | Variable attribute should also be checked to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
9 | The whole SMM authentication variable design relies on the integrity of flash part and SMM.\r | |
10 | which is assumed to be protected by platform. All variable code and metadata in flash/SMM Memory\r | |
11 | may not be modified without authorization. If platform fails to protect these resources,\r | |
12 | the authentication service provided in this driver will be broken, and the behavior is undefined.\r | |
13 | \r | |
14 | ProcessVarWithPk(), ProcessVarWithKek() and ProcessVariable() are the function to do\r | |
15 | variable authentication.\r | |
16 | \r | |
17 | VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate() and VerifyCounterBasedPayload() are sub function to do verification.\r | |
18 | They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library\r | |
19 | to verify the signature.\r | |
20 | \r | |
e90ea947 | 21 | Copyright (c) 2009 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r |
28f4616f | 22 | Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.\r |
289b714b | 23 | SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent\r |
a6811666 SZ |
24 | \r |
25 | **/\r | |
26 | \r | |
27 | #include "AuthServiceInternal.h"\r | |
28 | \r | |
28f4616f BB |
29 | #include <Protocol/VariablePolicy.h>\r |
30 | #include <Library/VariablePolicyLib.h>\r | |
31 | \r | |
a6811666 SZ |
32 | //\r |
33 | // Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r | |
34 | //\r | |
c411b485 | 35 | CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r |
a6811666 | 36 | \r |
c411b485 | 37 | CONST UINT8 mSha256OidValue[] = { 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01 };\r |
c035e373 | 38 | \r |
a6811666 SZ |
39 | //\r |
40 | // Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.\r | |
41 | // These data are used to perform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.\r | |
42 | //\r | |
c411b485 MK |
43 | EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {\r |
44 | // {SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }\r | |
45 | { EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },\r | |
46 | { EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
47 | { EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
48 | { EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },\r | |
49 | { EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
50 | { EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0) },\r | |
51 | { EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },\r | |
52 | { EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },\r | |
53 | { EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 },\r | |
54 | { EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, 0, 48 },\r | |
55 | { EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, 0, 64 },\r | |
56 | { EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, 0, 80 }\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
57 | };\r |
58 | \r | |
59 | /**\r | |
60 | Finds variable in storage blocks of volatile and non-volatile storage areas.\r | |
61 | \r | |
62 | This code finds variable in storage blocks of volatile and non-volatile storage areas.\r | |
63 | If VariableName is an empty string, then we just return the first\r | |
64 | qualified variable without comparing VariableName and VendorGuid.\r | |
65 | \r | |
66 | @param[in] VariableName Name of the variable to be found.\r | |
67 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID to be found.\r | |
68 | @param[out] Data Pointer to data address.\r | |
69 | @param[out] DataSize Pointer to data size.\r | |
70 | \r | |
71 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER If VariableName is not an empty string,\r | |
72 | while VendorGuid is NULL.\r | |
73 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable successfully found.\r | |
74 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Variable not found\r | |
75 | \r | |
76 | **/\r | |
77 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
78 | AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
c411b485 MK |
79 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r |
80 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
81 | OUT VOID **Data,\r | |
82 | OUT UINTN *DataSize\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
83 | )\r |
84 | {\r | |
c411b485 MK |
85 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
86 | AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
87 | \r |
88 | ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r | |
89 | Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r | |
c411b485 MK |
90 | VariableName,\r |
91 | VendorGuid,\r | |
92 | &AuthVariableInfo\r | |
93 | );\r | |
94 | *Data = AuthVariableInfo.Data;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
95 | *DataSize = AuthVariableInfo.DataSize;\r |
96 | return Status;\r | |
97 | }\r | |
98 | \r | |
99 | /**\r | |
100 | Update the variable region with Variable information.\r | |
101 | \r | |
102 | @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.\r | |
103 | @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.\r | |
104 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
105 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
106 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
107 | \r | |
108 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.\r | |
109 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
110 | @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.\r | |
111 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r | |
112 | \r | |
113 | **/\r | |
114 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
115 | AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r | |
c411b485 MK |
116 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r |
117 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
118 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
119 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
120 | IN UINT32 Attributes\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
121 | )\r |
122 | {\r | |
c411b485 | 123 | AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r |
a6811666 SZ |
124 | \r |
125 | ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r | |
126 | AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;\r | |
c411b485 MK |
127 | AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;\r |
128 | AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;\r | |
129 | AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;\r | |
130 | AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
131 | \r |
132 | return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (\r | |
c411b485 MK |
133 | &AuthVariableInfo\r |
134 | );\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
135 | }\r |
136 | \r | |
a6811666 | 137 | /**\r |
560ac77e | 138 | Update the variable region with Variable information.\r |
a6811666 | 139 | \r |
560ac77e ZC |
140 | @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.\r |
141 | @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.\r | |
142 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
143 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
144 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
145 | @param[in] TimeStamp Value of associated TimeStamp.\r | |
a6811666 | 146 | \r |
560ac77e ZC |
147 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.\r |
148 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
149 | @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
150 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r |
151 | \r | |
152 | **/\r | |
153 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
560ac77e | 154 | AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r |
c411b485 MK |
155 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r |
156 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
157 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
158 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
159 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r | |
160 | IN EFI_TIME *TimeStamp\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
161 | )\r |
162 | {\r | |
c411b485 MK |
163 | EFI_STATUS FindStatus;\r |
164 | VOID *OrgData;\r | |
165 | UINTN OrgDataSize;\r | |
166 | AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r | |
560ac77e ZC |
167 | \r |
168 | FindStatus = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
169 | VariableName,\r | |
170 | VendorGuid,\r | |
171 | &OrgData,\r | |
172 | &OrgDataSize\r | |
173 | );\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
174 | \r |
175 | //\r | |
560ac77e | 176 | // EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute only effects for existing variable\r |
a6811666 | 177 | //\r |
560ac77e ZC |
178 | if (!EFI_ERROR (FindStatus) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) != 0)) {\r |
179 | if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&\r | |
c411b485 MK |
180 | ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||\r |
181 | (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0))) ||\r | |
182 | (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)))\r | |
183 | {\r | |
560ac77e ZC |
184 | //\r |
185 | // For variables with formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, the driver shall not perform an append of\r | |
186 | // EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA values that are already part of the existing variable value.\r | |
187 | //\r | |
188 | FilterSignatureList (\r | |
189 | OrgData,\r | |
190 | OrgDataSize,\r | |
191 | Data,\r | |
192 | &DataSize\r | |
193 | );\r | |
194 | }\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
195 | }\r |
196 | \r | |
560ac77e ZC |
197 | ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r |
198 | AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;\r | |
c411b485 MK |
199 | AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;\r |
200 | AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;\r | |
201 | AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;\r | |
202 | AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;\r | |
203 | AuthVariableInfo.TimeStamp = TimeStamp;\r | |
560ac77e | 204 | return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (\r |
c411b485 MK |
205 | &AuthVariableInfo\r |
206 | );\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
207 | }\r |
208 | \r | |
209 | /**\r | |
210 | Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.\r | |
211 | \r | |
212 | @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r | |
213 | @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r | |
214 | \r | |
215 | @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.\r | |
216 | @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.\r | |
217 | \r | |
218 | **/\r | |
219 | BOOLEAN\r | |
c411b485 MK |
220 | NeedPhysicallyPresent (\r |
221 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
222 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
223 | )\r |
224 | {\r | |
28f4616f | 225 | // If the VariablePolicy engine is disabled, allow deletion of any authenticated variables.\r |
c411b485 MK |
226 | if (IsVariablePolicyEnabled ()) {\r |
227 | if ( (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))\r | |
228 | || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0)))\r | |
229 | {\r | |
28f4616f BB |
230 | return TRUE;\r |
231 | }\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
232 | }\r |
233 | \r | |
234 | return FALSE;\r | |
235 | }\r | |
236 | \r | |
237 | /**\r | |
238 | Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.\r | |
239 | \r | |
240 | @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.\r | |
241 | @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.\r | |
242 | \r | |
243 | **/\r | |
244 | BOOLEAN\r | |
245 | InCustomMode (\r | |
246 | VOID\r | |
247 | )\r | |
248 | {\r | |
c411b485 MK |
249 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
250 | VOID *Data;\r | |
251 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
252 | \r |
253 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Data, &DataSize);\r | |
c411b485 | 254 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && (*(UINT8 *)Data == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE)) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
255 | return TRUE;\r |
256 | }\r | |
257 | \r | |
258 | return FALSE;\r | |
259 | }\r | |
260 | \r | |
560ac77e ZC |
261 | /**\r |
262 | Update platform mode.\r | |
263 | \r | |
264 | @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r | |
265 | \r | |
266 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
267 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r | |
268 | \r | |
269 | **/\r | |
270 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
271 | UpdatePlatformMode (\r | |
c411b485 | 272 | IN UINT32 Mode\r |
560ac77e ZC |
273 | )\r |
274 | {\r | |
c411b485 MK |
275 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
276 | VOID *Data;\r | |
277 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
278 | UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r | |
279 | UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r | |
280 | UINTN VariableDataSize;\r | |
560ac77e ZC |
281 | \r |
282 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
283 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r | |
284 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
285 | &Data,\r | |
286 | &DataSize\r | |
287 | );\r | |
288 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
289 | return Status;\r | |
290 | }\r | |
291 | \r | |
292 | //\r | |
293 | // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r | |
294 | // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r | |
295 | //\r | |
c411b485 MK |
296 | mPlatformMode = (UINT8)Mode;\r |
297 | CopyMem (Data, &mPlatformMode, sizeof (UINT8));\r | |
560ac77e ZC |
298 | \r |
299 | if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {\r | |
300 | //\r | |
301 | // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r | |
302 | // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r | |
303 | // Variable in runtime.\r | |
304 | //\r | |
305 | return Status;\r | |
306 | }\r | |
307 | \r | |
308 | //\r | |
309 | // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r | |
310 | // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r | |
311 | // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r | |
312 | //\r | |
313 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
314 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r | |
315 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
316 | &Data,\r | |
317 | &DataSize\r | |
318 | );\r | |
319 | //\r | |
320 | // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r | |
321 | // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r | |
322 | // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r | |
323 | //\r | |
324 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
325 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
326 | } else {\r | |
327 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r | |
328 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r | |
329 | } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r | |
330 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
331 | } else {\r | |
332 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
333 | }\r | |
334 | }\r | |
335 | \r | |
c411b485 MK |
336 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r |
337 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r | |
338 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
339 | &SecureBootMode,\r | |
340 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
341 | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r | |
342 | );\r | |
560ac77e ZC |
343 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
344 | return Status;\r | |
345 | }\r | |
346 | \r | |
347 | //\r | |
348 | // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r | |
349 | //\r | |
350 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
351 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r | |
352 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
353 | &Data,\r | |
354 | &DataSize\r | |
355 | );\r | |
356 | \r | |
357 | if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r | |
358 | //\r | |
359 | // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r | |
360 | //\r | |
361 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r | |
362 | VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r | |
363 | } else {\r | |
364 | //\r | |
365 | // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r | |
366 | // variable is not in secure boot state.\r | |
367 | //\r | |
368 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
369 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
370 | }\r | |
c411b485 | 371 | \r |
560ac77e ZC |
372 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r |
373 | VariableDataSize = 0;\r | |
374 | }\r | |
375 | \r | |
376 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r | |
377 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r | |
378 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
379 | &SecureBootEnable,\r | |
380 | VariableDataSize,\r | |
381 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r | |
382 | );\r | |
383 | return Status;\r | |
384 | }\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
385 | \r |
386 | /**\r | |
387 | Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx/dbt variable.\r | |
388 | \r | |
389 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.\r | |
390 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
391 | @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.\r | |
392 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
393 | \r | |
394 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.\r | |
395 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.\r | |
396 | \r | |
397 | **/\r | |
398 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
c411b485 MK |
399 | CheckSignatureListFormat (\r |
400 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
401 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
402 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
403 | IN UINTN DataSize\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
404 | )\r |
405 | {\r | |
c411b485 MK |
406 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r |
407 | UINTN SigDataSize;\r | |
408 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
409 | UINT32 SigCount;\r | |
410 | BOOLEAN IsPk;\r | |
411 | VOID *RsaContext;\r | |
412 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;\r | |
413 | UINTN CertLen;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
414 | \r |
415 | if (DataSize == 0) {\r | |
416 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
417 | }\r | |
418 | \r | |
419 | ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);\r | |
420 | \r | |
c411b485 | 421 | if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
422 | IsPk = TRUE;\r |
423 | } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)) ||\r | |
424 | (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&\r | |
c411b485 MK |
425 | ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||\r |
426 | (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0))))\r | |
427 | {\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
428 | IsPk = FALSE;\r |
429 | } else {\r | |
430 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
431 | }\r | |
432 | \r | |
c411b485 MK |
433 | SigCount = 0;\r |
434 | SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data;\r | |
435 | SigDataSize = DataSize;\r | |
436 | RsaContext = NULL;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
437 | \r |
438 | //\r | |
d6b926e7 | 439 | // Walk through the input signature list and check the data format.\r |
a6811666 SZ |
440 | // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.\r |
441 | //\r | |
442 | while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
443 | for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {\r | |
444 | if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {\r | |
445 | //\r | |
446 | // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner\r | |
447 | // component) add the data length according to signature type.\r | |
448 | //\r | |
c411b485 MK |
449 | if ((mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0)) &&\r |
450 | ((SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize))\r | |
451 | {\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
452 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r |
453 | }\r | |
c411b485 MK |
454 | \r |
455 | if ((mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINT32) ~0)) &&\r | |
456 | (SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize))\r | |
457 | {\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
458 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r |
459 | }\r | |
c411b485 | 460 | \r |
a6811666 SZ |
461 | break;\r |
462 | }\r | |
463 | }\r | |
464 | \r | |
465 | if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {\r | |
466 | //\r | |
467 | // Undefined signature type.\r | |
468 | //\r | |
469 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
470 | }\r | |
471 | \r | |
472 | if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
473 | //\r | |
474 | // Try to retrieve the RSA public key from the X.509 certificate.\r | |
475 | // If this operation fails, it's not a valid certificate.\r | |
476 | //\r | |
477 | RsaContext = RsaNew ();\r | |
478 | if (RsaContext == NULL) {\r | |
479 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
480 | }\r | |
c411b485 MK |
481 | \r |
482 | CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
483 | CertLen = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
484 | if (!RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (CertData->SignatureData, CertLen, &RsaContext)) {\r |
485 | RsaFree (RsaContext);\r | |
486 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
487 | }\r | |
c411b485 | 488 | \r |
a6811666 SZ |
489 | RsaFree (RsaContext);\r |
490 | }\r | |
491 | \r | |
492 | if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {\r | |
493 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
494 | }\r | |
c411b485 | 495 | \r |
a6811666 SZ |
496 | SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;\r |
497 | \r | |
498 | SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
c411b485 | 499 | SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)((UINT8 *)SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r |
a6811666 SZ |
500 | }\r |
501 | \r | |
c411b485 | 502 | if (((UINTN)SigList - (UINTN)Data) != DataSize) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
503 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r |
504 | }\r | |
505 | \r | |
c411b485 | 506 | if (IsPk && (SigCount > 1)) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
507 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r |
508 | }\r | |
509 | \r | |
510 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
511 | }\r | |
512 | \r | |
513 | /**\r | |
514 | Update "VendorKeys" variable to record the out of band secure boot key modification.\r | |
515 | \r | |
516 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is updated successfully.\r | |
517 | @return Others Failed to update variable.\r | |
518 | \r | |
519 | **/\r | |
520 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
521 | VendorKeyIsModified (\r | |
522 | VOID\r | |
523 | )\r | |
524 | {\r | |
c411b485 | 525 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
a6811666 SZ |
526 | \r |
527 | if (mVendorKeyState == VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED) {\r | |
528 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
529 | }\r | |
c411b485 | 530 | \r |
a6811666 SZ |
531 | mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED;\r |
532 | \r | |
533 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r | |
534 | EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,\r | |
535 | &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,\r | |
536 | &mVendorKeyState,\r | |
537 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
538 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r | |
539 | );\r | |
540 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
541 | return Status;\r | |
542 | }\r | |
543 | \r | |
544 | return AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r | |
545 | EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,\r | |
546 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
547 | &mVendorKeyState,\r | |
548 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
549 | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r | |
550 | );\r | |
551 | }\r | |
552 | \r | |
553 | /**\r | |
554 | Process variable with platform key for verification.\r | |
555 | \r | |
556 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
557 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
558 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
559 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
560 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
561 | This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
562 | \r | |
563 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
564 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
565 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
566 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
567 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
568 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r | |
569 | @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r | |
570 | \r | |
571 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
572 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.\r | |
573 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
574 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r | |
575 | \r | |
576 | **/\r | |
577 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
578 | ProcessVarWithPk (\r | |
c411b485 MK |
579 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r |
580 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
581 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
582 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
583 | IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r | |
584 | IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
585 | )\r |
586 | {\r | |
c411b485 MK |
587 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
588 | BOOLEAN Del;\r | |
589 | UINT8 *Payload;\r | |
590 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
a6811666 | 591 | \r |
c411b485 MK |
592 | if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0) ||\r |
593 | ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0))\r | |
594 | {\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
595 | //\r |
596 | // PK, KEK and db/dbx/dbt should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r | |
597 | // authenticated variable.\r | |
598 | //\r | |
599 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
600 | }\r | |
601 | \r | |
4fc08e8d CZ |
602 | //\r |
603 | // Init state of Del. State may change due to secure check\r | |
604 | //\r | |
a6811666 | 605 | Del = FALSE;\r |
566cdfc6 JB |
606 | if ( (InCustomMode () && UserPhysicalPresent ())\r |
607 | || ( (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE)\r | |
608 | && !(FeaturePcdGet (PcdRequireSelfSignedPk) && IsPk)))\r | |
609 | {\r | |
c411b485 | 610 | Payload = (UINT8 *)Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r |
560ac77e ZC |
611 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r |
612 | if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r | |
613 | Del = TRUE;\r | |
614 | }\r | |
a6811666 | 615 | \r |
c411b485 | 616 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat (VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r |
a6811666 SZ |
617 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
618 | return Status;\r | |
619 | }\r | |
620 | \r | |
621 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r | |
622 | VariableName,\r | |
623 | VendorGuid,\r | |
624 | Payload,\r | |
625 | PayloadSize,\r | |
626 | Attributes,\r | |
c411b485 | 627 | &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *)Data)->TimeStamp\r |
a6811666 | 628 | );\r |
c411b485 | 629 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
630 | return Status;\r |
631 | }\r | |
632 | \r | |
566cdfc6 JB |
633 | if ( (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE)\r |
634 | || (FeaturePcdGet (PcdRequireSelfSignedPk) && IsPk))\r | |
635 | {\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
636 | Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r |
637 | }\r | |
560ac77e | 638 | } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
639 | //\r |
640 | // Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.\r | |
641 | //\r | |
642 | Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r | |
643 | VariableName,\r | |
644 | VendorGuid,\r | |
645 | Data,\r | |
646 | DataSize,\r | |
647 | Attributes,\r | |
648 | AuthVarTypePk,\r | |
649 | &Del\r | |
650 | );\r | |
651 | } else {\r | |
652 | //\r | |
653 | // Verify against the certificate in data payload.\r | |
654 | //\r | |
655 | Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r | |
656 | VariableName,\r | |
657 | VendorGuid,\r | |
658 | Data,\r | |
659 | DataSize,\r | |
660 | Attributes,\r | |
661 | AuthVarTypePayload,\r | |
662 | &Del\r | |
663 | );\r | |
664 | }\r | |
665 | \r | |
c411b485 MK |
666 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && IsPk) {\r |
667 | if ((mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) && !Del) {\r | |
560ac77e ZC |
668 | //\r |
669 | // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r | |
670 | //\r | |
671 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r | |
c411b485 | 672 | } else if ((mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) && Del) {\r |
560ac77e ZC |
673 | //\r |
674 | // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r | |
675 | //\r | |
676 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
677 | }\r |
678 | }\r | |
679 | \r | |
680 | return Status;\r | |
681 | }\r | |
682 | \r | |
683 | /**\r | |
684 | Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r | |
685 | \r | |
686 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
687 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
688 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
689 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
690 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
691 | This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
692 | \r | |
693 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
694 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
695 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
696 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
697 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
698 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
699 | \r | |
700 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
701 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r | |
702 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
703 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r | |
704 | \r | |
705 | **/\r | |
706 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
707 | ProcessVarWithKek (\r | |
c411b485 MK |
708 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r |
709 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
710 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
711 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
712 | IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
713 | )\r |
714 | {\r | |
c411b485 MK |
715 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
716 | UINT8 *Payload;\r | |
717 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
a6811666 | 718 | \r |
c411b485 MK |
719 | if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0) ||\r |
720 | ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0))\r | |
721 | {\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
722 | //\r |
723 | // DB, DBX and DBT should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r | |
724 | // authenticated variable.\r | |
725 | //\r | |
726 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
727 | }\r | |
728 | \r | |
729 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
c411b485 | 730 | if ((mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) && !(InCustomMode () && UserPhysicalPresent ())) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
731 | //\r |
732 | // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r | |
733 | //\r | |
734 | return VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r | |
735 | VariableName,\r | |
736 | VendorGuid,\r | |
737 | Data,\r | |
738 | DataSize,\r | |
739 | Attributes,\r | |
740 | AuthVarTypeKek,\r | |
741 | NULL\r | |
742 | );\r | |
743 | } else {\r | |
744 | //\r | |
745 | // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.\r | |
746 | //\r | |
c411b485 | 747 | Payload = (UINT8 *)Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r |
a6811666 SZ |
748 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r |
749 | \r | |
c411b485 | 750 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat (VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r |
a6811666 SZ |
751 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
752 | return Status;\r | |
753 | }\r | |
754 | \r | |
755 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r | |
756 | VariableName,\r | |
757 | VendorGuid,\r | |
758 | Payload,\r | |
759 | PayloadSize,\r | |
760 | Attributes,\r | |
c411b485 | 761 | &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *)Data)->TimeStamp\r |
a6811666 SZ |
762 | );\r |
763 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
764 | return Status;\r | |
765 | }\r | |
766 | \r | |
560ac77e | 767 | if (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
768 | Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r |
769 | }\r | |
770 | }\r | |
771 | \r | |
772 | return Status;\r | |
773 | }\r | |
774 | \r | |
775 | /**\r | |
776 | Check if it is to delete auth variable.\r | |
777 | \r | |
778 | @param[in] OrgAttributes Original attribute value of the variable.\r | |
779 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
780 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
781 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
782 | \r | |
783 | @retval TRUE It is to delete auth variable.\r | |
784 | @retval FALSE It is not to delete auth variable.\r | |
785 | \r | |
786 | **/\r | |
787 | BOOLEAN\r | |
788 | IsDeleteAuthVariable (\r | |
c411b485 MK |
789 | IN UINT32 OrgAttributes,\r |
790 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
791 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
792 | IN UINT32 Attributes\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
793 | )\r |
794 | {\r | |
c411b485 MK |
795 | BOOLEAN Del;\r |
796 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
797 | \r |
798 | Del = FALSE;\r | |
799 | \r | |
800 | //\r | |
801 | // To delete a variable created with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r | |
802 | // or the EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute,\r | |
803 | // SetVariable must be used with attributes matching the existing variable\r | |
804 | // and the DataSize set to the size of the AuthInfo descriptor.\r | |
805 | //\r | |
806 | if ((Attributes == OrgAttributes) &&\r | |
c411b485 MK |
807 | ((Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0))\r |
808 | {\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
809 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r |
810 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
811 | if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r | |
812 | Del = TRUE;\r | |
813 | }\r | |
814 | } else {\r | |
815 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r | |
816 | if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r | |
817 | Del = TRUE;\r | |
818 | }\r | |
819 | }\r | |
820 | }\r | |
821 | \r | |
822 | return Del;\r | |
823 | }\r | |
824 | \r | |
825 | /**\r | |
0130fdde | 826 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r |
a6811666 SZ |
827 | \r |
828 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
829 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
830 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
831 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
832 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
833 | This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
834 | \r | |
835 | @param[in] VariableName Name of the variable.\r | |
836 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
837 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
838 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
839 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
840 | \r | |
841 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
842 | @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r | |
0130fdde | 843 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS or EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r |
a6811666 | 844 | @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The Database to save the public key is full.\r |
0130fdde | 845 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r |
a6811666 SZ |
846 | set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r |
847 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
848 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r | |
849 | \r | |
850 | **/\r | |
851 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
852 | ProcessVariable (\r | |
c411b485 MK |
853 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r |
854 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
855 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
856 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
857 | IN UINT32 Attributes\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
858 | )\r |
859 | {\r | |
c411b485 MK |
860 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
861 | AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO OrgVariableInfo;\r | |
a6811666 | 862 | \r |
c411b485 | 863 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
a6811666 SZ |
864 | \r |
865 | ZeroMem (&OrgVariableInfo, sizeof (OrgVariableInfo));\r | |
866 | Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r | |
c411b485 MK |
867 | VariableName,\r |
868 | VendorGuid,\r | |
869 | &OrgVariableInfo\r | |
870 | );\r | |
a6811666 | 871 | \r |
28f4616f | 872 | // If the VariablePolicy engine is disabled, allow deletion of any authenticated variables.\r |
c411b485 | 873 | if ((!EFI_ERROR (Status)) && IsDeleteAuthVariable (OrgVariableInfo.Attributes, Data, DataSize, Attributes) && (UserPhysicalPresent () || !IsVariablePolicyEnabled ())) {\r |
a6811666 | 874 | //\r |
0130fdde | 875 | // Allow the delete operation of common authenticated variable(AT or AW) at user physical presence.\r |
a6811666 | 876 | //\r |
64b6a3ff | 877 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r |
c411b485 MK |
878 | VariableName,\r |
879 | VendorGuid,\r | |
880 | NULL,\r | |
881 | 0,\r | |
882 | 0\r | |
883 | );\r | |
64b6a3ff | 884 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r |
98c2d961 | 885 | Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes);\r |
a6811666 | 886 | }\r |
64b6a3ff | 887 | \r |
a6811666 SZ |
888 | return Status;\r |
889 | }\r | |
890 | \r | |
c411b485 | 891 | if (NeedPhysicallyPresent (VariableName, VendorGuid) && !UserPhysicalPresent ()) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
892 | //\r |
893 | // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.\r | |
894 | //\r | |
895 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
896 | }\r | |
897 | \r | |
898 | //\r | |
0130fdde ZC |
899 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r |
900 | //\r | |
901 | // Reject Counter Based Auth Variable processing request.\r | |
902 | //\r | |
903 | return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;\r | |
904 | } else if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
905 | //\r | |
906 | // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r | |
907 | //\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
908 | return VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r |
909 | VariableName,\r | |
910 | VendorGuid,\r | |
911 | Data,\r | |
912 | DataSize,\r | |
913 | Attributes,\r | |
914 | AuthVarTypePriv,\r | |
915 | NULL\r | |
916 | );\r | |
917 | }\r | |
918 | \r | |
0130fdde | 919 | if ((OrgVariableInfo.Data != NULL) &&\r |
c411b485 MK |
920 | ((OrgVariableInfo.Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0))\r |
921 | {\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
922 | //\r |
923 | // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r | |
924 | //\r | |
925 | return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
926 | }\r |
927 | \r | |
928 | //\r | |
0130fdde | 929 | // Not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r |
a6811666 | 930 | //\r |
0130fdde ZC |
931 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes);\r |
932 | return Status;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
933 | }\r |
934 | \r | |
935 | /**\r | |
936 | Filter out the duplicated EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA from the new data by comparing to the original data.\r | |
937 | \r | |
938 | @param[in] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r | |
939 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r | |
940 | @param[in, out] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r | |
941 | @param[in, out] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r | |
942 | \r | |
943 | **/\r | |
944 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
945 | FilterSignatureList (\r | |
c411b485 MK |
946 | IN VOID *Data,\r |
947 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
948 | IN OUT VOID *NewData,\r | |
949 | IN OUT UINTN *NewDataSize\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
950 | )\r |
951 | {\r | |
c411b485 MK |
952 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r |
953 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
954 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
955 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r | |
956 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;\r | |
957 | UINTN NewCertCount;\r | |
958 | UINTN Index;\r | |
959 | UINTN Index2;\r | |
960 | UINTN Size;\r | |
961 | UINT8 *Tail;\r | |
962 | UINTN CopiedCount;\r | |
963 | UINTN SignatureListSize;\r | |
964 | BOOLEAN IsNewCert;\r | |
965 | UINT8 *TempData;\r | |
966 | UINTN TempDataSize;\r | |
967 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
968 | \r |
969 | if (*NewDataSize == 0) {\r | |
970 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
971 | }\r | |
972 | \r | |
973 | TempDataSize = *NewDataSize;\r | |
c411b485 | 974 | Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->GetScratchBuffer (&TempDataSize, (VOID **)&TempData);\r |
a6811666 SZ |
975 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
976 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
977 | }\r | |
978 | \r | |
979 | Tail = TempData;\r | |
980 | \r | |
c411b485 | 981 | NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)NewData;\r |
a6811666 | 982 | while ((*NewDataSize > 0) && (*NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r |
c411b485 | 983 | NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r |
a6811666 SZ |
984 | NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r |
985 | \r | |
986 | CopiedCount = 0;\r | |
987 | for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {\r | |
988 | IsNewCert = TRUE;\r | |
989 | \r | |
c411b485 MK |
990 | Size = DataSize;\r |
991 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
992 | while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r |
993 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&\r | |
c411b485 MK |
994 | (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize))\r |
995 | {\r | |
996 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
997 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r |
998 | for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {\r | |
999 | //\r | |
1000 | // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.\r | |
1001 | //\r | |
1002 | if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {\r | |
1003 | IsNewCert = FALSE;\r | |
1004 | break;\r | |
1005 | }\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1006 | \r |
1007 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1008 | }\r |
1009 | }\r | |
1010 | \r | |
1011 | if (!IsNewCert) {\r | |
1012 | break;\r | |
1013 | }\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1014 | \r |
1015 | Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1016 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)((UINT8 *)CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1017 | }\r |
1018 | \r | |
1019 | if (IsNewCert) {\r | |
1020 | //\r | |
1021 | // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, keep it.\r | |
1022 | //\r | |
1023 | if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r | |
1024 | //\r | |
1025 | // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r | |
1026 | //\r | |
1027 | CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1028 | Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r | |
1029 | }\r | |
1030 | \r | |
1031 | CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1032 | Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1033 | CopiedCount++;\r | |
1034 | }\r | |
1035 | \r | |
c411b485 | 1036 | NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1037 | }\r |
1038 | \r | |
1039 | //\r | |
1040 | // Update SignatureListSize in the kept EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r | |
1041 | //\r | |
1042 | if (CopiedCount != 0) {\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1043 | SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r |
1044 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(Tail - SignatureListSize);\r | |
1045 | CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32)SignatureListSize;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1046 | }\r |
1047 | \r | |
1048 | *NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
c411b485 | 1049 | NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)((UINT8 *)NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1050 | }\r |
1051 | \r | |
c411b485 | 1052 | TempDataSize = (Tail - (UINT8 *)TempData);\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1053 | \r |
1054 | CopyMem (NewData, TempData, TempDataSize);\r | |
1055 | *NewDataSize = TempDataSize;\r | |
1056 | \r | |
1057 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1058 | }\r | |
1059 | \r | |
1060 | /**\r | |
1061 | Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1062 | \r | |
1063 | \r | |
1064 | @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1065 | @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1066 | \r | |
1067 | @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r | |
1068 | @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r | |
1069 | \r | |
1070 | **/\r | |
1071 | BOOLEAN\r | |
1072 | AuthServiceInternalCompareTimeStamp (\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1073 | IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r |
1074 | IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1075 | )\r |
1076 | {\r | |
1077 | if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r | |
c411b485 | 1078 | return (BOOLEAN)(FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r |
a6811666 | 1079 | } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r |
c411b485 | 1080 | return (BOOLEAN)(FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r |
a6811666 | 1081 | } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r |
c411b485 | 1082 | return (BOOLEAN)(FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r |
a6811666 | 1083 | } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r |
c411b485 | 1084 | return (BOOLEAN)(FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r |
a6811666 | 1085 | } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r |
c411b485 | 1086 | return (BOOLEAN)(FirstTime->Minute < SecondTime->Minute);\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1087 | }\r |
1088 | \r | |
c411b485 | 1089 | return (BOOLEAN)(FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1090 | }\r |
1091 | \r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1092 | /**\r |
1093 | Calculate SHA256 digest of SignerCert CommonName + ToplevelCert tbsCertificate\r | |
1094 | SignerCert and ToplevelCert are inside the signer certificate chain.\r | |
1095 | \r | |
1096 | @param[in] SignerCert A pointer to SignerCert data.\r | |
1097 | @param[in] SignerCertSize Length of SignerCert data.\r | |
1098 | @param[in] TopLevelCert A pointer to TopLevelCert data.\r | |
1099 | @param[in] TopLevelCertSize Length of TopLevelCert data.\r | |
1100 | @param[out] Sha256Digest Sha256 digest calculated.\r | |
1101 | \r | |
1102 | @return EFI_ABORTED Digest process failed.\r | |
d6b926e7 | 1103 | @return EFI_SUCCESS SHA256 Digest is successfully calculated.\r |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1104 | \r |
1105 | **/\r | |
1106 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1107 | CalculatePrivAuthVarSignChainSHA256Digest (\r |
1108 | IN UINT8 *SignerCert,\r | |
1109 | IN UINTN SignerCertSize,\r | |
1110 | IN UINT8 *TopLevelCert,\r | |
1111 | IN UINTN TopLevelCertSize,\r | |
1112 | OUT UINT8 *Sha256Digest\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1113 | )\r |
1114 | {\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1115 | UINT8 *TbsCert;\r |
1116 | UINTN TbsCertSize;\r | |
1117 | CHAR8 CertCommonName[128];\r | |
1118 | UINTN CertCommonNameSize;\r | |
1119 | BOOLEAN CryptoStatus;\r | |
1120 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
53c6ff18 | 1121 | \r |
c411b485 | 1122 | CertCommonNameSize = sizeof (CertCommonName);\r |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1123 | \r |
1124 | //\r | |
1125 | // Get SignerCert CommonName\r | |
1126 | //\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1127 | Status = X509GetCommonName (SignerCert, SignerCertSize, CertCommonName, &CertCommonNameSize);\r |
1128 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1129 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a Get SignerCert CommonName failed with status %x\n", __FUNCTION__, Status));\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1130 | return EFI_ABORTED;\r |
1131 | }\r | |
1132 | \r | |
1133 | //\r | |
1134 | // Get TopLevelCert tbsCertificate\r | |
1135 | //\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1136 | if (!X509GetTBSCert (TopLevelCert, TopLevelCertSize, &TbsCert, &TbsCertSize)) {\r |
1137 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a Get Top-level Cert tbsCertificate failed!\n", __FUNCTION__));\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1138 | return EFI_ABORTED;\r |
1139 | }\r | |
1140 | \r | |
1141 | //\r | |
1142 | // Digest SignerCert CN + TopLevelCert tbsCertificate\r | |
1143 | //\r | |
1144 | ZeroMem (Sha256Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r | |
1145 | CryptoStatus = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r | |
1146 | if (!CryptoStatus) {\r | |
1147 | return EFI_ABORTED;\r | |
1148 | }\r | |
1149 | \r | |
1150 | //\r | |
1151 | // '\0' is forced in CertCommonName. No overflow issue\r | |
1152 | //\r | |
11b74aa4 LE |
1153 | CryptoStatus = Sha256Update (\r |
1154 | mHashCtx,\r | |
1155 | CertCommonName,\r | |
1156 | AsciiStrLen (CertCommonName)\r | |
1157 | );\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1158 | if (!CryptoStatus) {\r |
1159 | return EFI_ABORTED;\r | |
1160 | }\r | |
1161 | \r | |
1162 | CryptoStatus = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, TbsCert, TbsCertSize);\r | |
1163 | if (!CryptoStatus) {\r | |
1164 | return EFI_ABORTED;\r | |
1165 | }\r | |
1166 | \r | |
c411b485 | 1167 | CryptoStatus = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Sha256Digest);\r |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1168 | if (!CryptoStatus) {\r |
1169 | return EFI_ABORTED;\r | |
1170 | }\r | |
1171 | \r | |
1172 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1173 | }\r | |
1174 | \r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1175 | /**\r |
1176 | Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r | |
98c2d961 | 1177 | by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 | 1178 | \r |
98c2d961 | 1179 | The data format of "certdb" or "certdbv":\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1180 | //\r |
1181 | // UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r | |
1182 | // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];\r | |
1183 | // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs2[];\r | |
1184 | // /// ...\r | |
1185 | // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certsn[];\r | |
1186 | //\r | |
1187 | \r | |
1188 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1189 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
1190 | @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
1191 | @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1192 | @param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.\r |
1193 | @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r | |
1194 | @param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from\r | |
1195 | starting of Data.\r | |
1196 | @param[out] CertNodeSize Length of AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA in bytes.\r | |
1197 | \r | |
1198 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
1199 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.\r | |
1200 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.\r | |
1201 | \r | |
1202 | **/\r | |
1203 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1204 | FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1205 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r |
1206 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1207 | IN UINT8 *Data,\r | |
1208 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1209 | OUT UINT32 *CertOffset OPTIONAL,\r | |
1210 | OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize OPTIONAL,\r | |
1211 | OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset OPTIONAL,\r | |
1212 | OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1213 | )\r |
1214 | {\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1215 | UINT32 Offset;\r |
1216 | AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r | |
1217 | UINT32 CertSize;\r | |
1218 | UINT32 NameSize;\r | |
1219 | UINT32 NodeSize;\r | |
1220 | UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1221 | \r |
1222 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1223 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1224 | }\r | |
1225 | \r | |
1226 | //\r | |
1227 | // Check whether DataSize matches recorded CertDbListSize.\r | |
1228 | //\r | |
1229 | if (DataSize < sizeof (UINT32)) {\r | |
1230 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1231 | }\r | |
1232 | \r | |
c411b485 | 1233 | CertDbListSize = ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)Data);\r |
a6811666 | 1234 | \r |
c411b485 | 1235 | if (CertDbListSize != (UINT32)DataSize) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1236 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r |
1237 | }\r | |
1238 | \r | |
1239 | Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
1240 | \r | |
1241 | //\r | |
1242 | // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r | |
1243 | //\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1244 | while (Offset < (UINT32)DataSize) {\r |
1245 | Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *)(Data + Offset);\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1246 | //\r |
1247 | // Check whether VendorGuid matches.\r | |
1248 | //\r | |
1249 | if (CompareGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid)) {\r | |
1250 | NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r | |
1251 | NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r | |
1252 | CertSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertDataSize);\r | |
1253 | \r | |
1254 | if (NodeSize != sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3 + CertSize +\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1255 | sizeof (CHAR16) * NameSize)\r |
1256 | {\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1257 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r |
1258 | }\r | |
1259 | \r | |
1260 | Offset = Offset + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3;\r | |
1261 | //\r | |
1262 | // Check whether VariableName matches.\r | |
1263 | //\r | |
1264 | if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) &&\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1265 | (CompareMem (Data + Offset, VariableName, NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)) == 0))\r |
1266 | {\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1267 | Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r |
1268 | \r | |
1269 | if (CertOffset != NULL) {\r | |
1270 | *CertOffset = Offset;\r | |
1271 | }\r | |
1272 | \r | |
1273 | if (CertDataSize != NULL) {\r | |
1274 | *CertDataSize = CertSize;\r | |
1275 | }\r | |
1276 | \r | |
1277 | if (CertNodeOffset != NULL) {\r | |
c411b485 | 1278 | *CertNodeOffset = (UINT32)((UINT8 *)Ptr - Data);\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1279 | }\r |
1280 | \r | |
1281 | if (CertNodeSize != NULL) {\r | |
1282 | *CertNodeSize = NodeSize;\r | |
1283 | }\r | |
1284 | \r | |
1285 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1286 | } else {\r | |
1287 | Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16) + CertSize;\r | |
1288 | }\r | |
1289 | } else {\r | |
1290 | NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r | |
1291 | Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r | |
1292 | }\r | |
1293 | }\r | |
1294 | \r | |
1295 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1296 | }\r | |
1297 | \r | |
1298 | /**\r | |
1299 | Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
1300 | by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb"\r |
1301 | or "certdbv" according to authenticated variable attributes.\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1302 | \r |
1303 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1304 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
98c2d961 | 1305 | @param[in] Attributes Attributes of authenticated variable.\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1306 | @param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r |
1307 | @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r | |
1308 | \r | |
1309 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
98c2d961 | 1310 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb"/"certdbv" or matching certs.\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1311 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.\r |
1312 | \r | |
1313 | **/\r | |
1314 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1315 | GetCertsFromDb (\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1316 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r |
1317 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1318 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r | |
1319 | OUT UINT8 **CertData,\r | |
1320 | OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1321 | )\r |
1322 | {\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1323 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
1324 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1325 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1326 | UINT32 CertOffset;\r | |
1327 | CHAR16 *DbName;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1328 | \r |
1329 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) || (CertDataSize == NULL)) {\r | |
1330 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1331 | }\r | |
1332 | \r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
1333 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) != 0) {\r |
1334 | //\r | |
1335 | // Get variable "certdb".\r | |
1336 | //\r | |
1337 | DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_NAME;\r | |
1338 | } else {\r | |
1339 | //\r | |
1340 | // Get variable "certdbv".\r | |
1341 | //\r | |
1342 | DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_VOLATILE_NAME;\r | |
1343 | }\r | |
1344 | \r | |
a6811666 | 1345 | //\r |
98c2d961 | 1346 | // Get variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1347 | //\r |
1348 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
98c2d961 | 1349 | DbName,\r |
a6811666 | 1350 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r |
c411b485 | 1351 | (VOID **)&Data,\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1352 | &DataSize\r |
1353 | );\r | |
1354 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1355 | return Status;\r | |
1356 | }\r | |
1357 | \r | |
1358 | if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1359 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1360 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1361 | }\r | |
1362 | \r | |
1363 | Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1364 | VariableName,\r | |
1365 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1366 | Data,\r | |
1367 | DataSize,\r | |
1368 | &CertOffset,\r | |
1369 | CertDataSize,\r | |
1370 | NULL,\r | |
1371 | NULL\r | |
1372 | );\r | |
1373 | \r | |
1374 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1375 | return Status;\r | |
1376 | }\r | |
1377 | \r | |
1378 | *CertData = Data + CertOffset;\r | |
1379 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1380 | }\r | |
1381 | \r | |
1382 | /**\r | |
1383 | Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated\r | |
b3548d32 | 1384 | variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb" or\r |
98c2d961 | 1385 | "certdbv" according to authenticated variable attributes.\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1386 | \r |
1387 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1388 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
98c2d961 | 1389 | @param[in] Attributes Attributes of authenticated variable.\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1390 | \r |
1391 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
98c2d961 | 1392 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb"/"certdbv" or matching certs.\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1393 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r |
1394 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r | |
1395 | \r | |
1396 | **/\r | |
1397 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1398 | DeleteCertsFromDb (\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1399 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r |
1400 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1401 | IN UINT32 Attributes\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1402 | )\r |
1403 | {\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1404 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
1405 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1406 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1407 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r | |
1408 | UINT32 CertNodeOffset;\r | |
1409 | UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r | |
1410 | UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r | |
1411 | UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r | |
1412 | CHAR16 *DbName;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1413 | \r |
1414 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {\r | |
1415 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1416 | }\r | |
1417 | \r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
1418 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) != 0) {\r |
1419 | //\r | |
1420 | // Get variable "certdb".\r | |
1421 | //\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1422 | DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_NAME;\r |
1423 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
1424 | } else {\r |
1425 | //\r | |
1426 | // Get variable "certdbv".\r | |
1427 | //\r | |
c411b485 | 1428 | DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_VOLATILE_NAME;\r |
98c2d961 CZ |
1429 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r |
1430 | }\r | |
1431 | \r | |
a6811666 | 1432 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r |
98c2d961 | 1433 | DbName,\r |
a6811666 | 1434 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r |
c411b485 | 1435 | (VOID **)&Data,\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1436 | &DataSize\r |
1437 | );\r | |
98c2d961 | 1438 | \r |
a6811666 SZ |
1439 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
1440 | return Status;\r | |
1441 | }\r | |
1442 | \r | |
1443 | if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1444 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1445 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1446 | }\r | |
1447 | \r | |
1448 | if (DataSize == sizeof (UINT32)) {\r | |
1449 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 1450 | // There is no certs in "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1451 | //\r |
1452 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1453 | }\r | |
1454 | \r | |
1455 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 1456 | // Get corresponding cert node from "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1457 | //\r |
1458 | Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1459 | VariableName,\r | |
1460 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1461 | Data,\r | |
1462 | DataSize,\r | |
1463 | NULL,\r | |
1464 | NULL,\r | |
1465 | &CertNodeOffset,\r | |
1466 | &CertNodeSize\r | |
1467 | );\r | |
1468 | \r | |
1469 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1470 | return Status;\r | |
1471 | }\r | |
1472 | \r | |
1473 | if (DataSize < (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r | |
1474 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1475 | }\r | |
1476 | \r | |
1477 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 1478 | // Construct new data content of variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 | 1479 | //\r |
c411b485 MK |
1480 | NewCertDbSize = (UINT32)DataSize - CertNodeSize;\r |
1481 | NewCertDb = (UINT8 *)mCertDbStore;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1482 | \r |
1483 | //\r | |
1484 | // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r | |
1485 | //\r | |
1486 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, CertNodeOffset);\r | |
1487 | //\r | |
1488 | // Update CertDbListSize.\r | |
1489 | //\r | |
1490 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
1491 | //\r | |
1492 | // Copy the DB entries after deleting node.\r | |
1493 | //\r | |
1494 | if (DataSize > (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r | |
1495 | CopyMem (\r | |
1496 | NewCertDb + CertNodeOffset,\r | |
1497 | Data + CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize,\r | |
1498 | DataSize - CertNodeOffset - CertNodeSize\r | |
1499 | );\r | |
1500 | }\r | |
1501 | \r | |
1502 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 1503 | // Set "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 | 1504 | //\r |
c411b485 MK |
1505 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r |
1506 | DbName,\r | |
1507 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
1508 | NewCertDb,\r | |
1509 | NewCertDbSize,\r | |
1510 | VarAttr\r | |
1511 | );\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1512 | \r |
1513 | return Status;\r | |
1514 | }\r | |
1515 | \r | |
1516 | /**\r | |
1517 | Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName\r | |
98c2d961 | 1518 | and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb" or "certdbv" according to\r |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1519 | time based authenticated variable attributes. CertData is the SHA256 digest of\r |
1520 | SignerCert CommonName + TopLevelCert tbsCertificate.\r | |
a6811666 | 1521 | \r |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1522 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r |
1523 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1524 | @param[in] Attributes Attributes of authenticated variable.\r | |
1525 | @param[in] SignerCert Signer certificate data.\r | |
1526 | @param[in] SignerCertSize Length of signer certificate.\r | |
1527 | @param[in] TopLevelCert Top-level certificate data.\r | |
1528 | @param[in] TopLevelCertSize Length of top-level certificate.\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1529 | \r |
1530 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
1531 | @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName\r | |
1532 | and VendorGuid already exists.\r | |
1533 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r | |
98c2d961 | 1534 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb" or "certdbv"\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1535 | \r |
1536 | **/\r | |
1537 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1538 | InsertCertsToDb (\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1539 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r |
1540 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1541 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r | |
1542 | IN UINT8 *SignerCert,\r | |
1543 | IN UINTN SignerCertSize,\r | |
1544 | IN UINT8 *TopLevelCert,\r | |
1545 | IN UINTN TopLevelCertSize\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1546 | )\r |
1547 | {\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1548 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
1549 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1550 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1551 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r | |
1552 | UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r | |
1553 | UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r | |
1554 | UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r | |
1555 | UINT32 NameSize;\r | |
1556 | UINT32 CertDataSize;\r | |
1557 | AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r | |
1558 | CHAR16 *DbName;\r | |
1559 | UINT8 Sha256Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r | |
1560 | \r | |
1561 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (SignerCert == NULL) || (TopLevelCert == NULL)) {\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1562 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r |
1563 | }\r | |
1564 | \r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
1565 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) != 0) {\r |
1566 | //\r | |
1567 | // Get variable "certdb".\r | |
1568 | //\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1569 | DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_NAME;\r |
1570 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
1571 | } else {\r |
1572 | //\r | |
1573 | // Get variable "certdbv".\r | |
1574 | //\r | |
c411b485 | 1575 | DbName = EFI_CERT_DB_VOLATILE_NAME;\r |
98c2d961 CZ |
1576 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r |
1577 | }\r | |
1578 | \r | |
a6811666 | 1579 | //\r |
98c2d961 | 1580 | // Get variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1581 | //\r |
1582 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
98c2d961 | 1583 | DbName,\r |
a6811666 | 1584 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r |
c411b485 | 1585 | (VOID **)&Data,\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1586 | &DataSize\r |
1587 | );\r | |
1588 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1589 | return Status;\r | |
1590 | }\r | |
1591 | \r | |
1592 | if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1593 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1594 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1595 | }\r | |
1596 | \r | |
1597 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 1598 | // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1599 | // If yes return error.\r |
1600 | //\r | |
1601 | Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1602 | VariableName,\r | |
1603 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1604 | Data,\r | |
1605 | DataSize,\r | |
1606 | NULL,\r | |
1607 | NULL,\r | |
1608 | NULL,\r | |
1609 | NULL\r | |
1610 | );\r | |
1611 | \r | |
1612 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1613 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1614 | return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r | |
1615 | }\r | |
1616 | \r | |
1617 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 1618 | // Construct new data content of variable "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 | 1619 | //\r |
c411b485 MK |
1620 | NameSize = (UINT32)StrLen (VariableName);\r |
1621 | CertDataSize = sizeof (Sha256Digest);\r | |
1622 | CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32)CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
1623 | NewCertDbSize = (UINT32)DataSize + CertNodeSize;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1624 | if (NewCertDbSize > mMaxCertDbSize) {\r |
1625 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1626 | }\r | |
53c6ff18 | 1627 | \r |
c411b485 | 1628 | Status = CalculatePrivAuthVarSignChainSHA256Digest (\r |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1629 | SignerCert,\r |
1630 | SignerCertSize,\r | |
1631 | TopLevelCert,\r | |
1632 | TopLevelCertSize,\r | |
1633 | Sha256Digest\r | |
1634 | );\r | |
1635 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1636 | return Status;\r | |
1637 | }\r | |
1638 | \r | |
c411b485 | 1639 | NewCertDb = (UINT8 *)mCertDbStore;\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1640 | \r |
1641 | //\r | |
1642 | // Copy the DB entries before inserting node.\r | |
1643 | //\r | |
1644 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, DataSize);\r | |
1645 | //\r | |
1646 | // Update CertDbListSize.\r | |
1647 | //\r | |
1648 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
1649 | //\r | |
1650 | // Construct new cert node.\r | |
1651 | //\r | |
c411b485 | 1652 | Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *)(NewCertDb + DataSize);\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1653 | CopyGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid);\r |
1654 | CopyMem (&Ptr->CertNodeSize, &CertNodeSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
1655 | CopyMem (&Ptr->NameSize, &NameSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
1656 | CopyMem (&Ptr->CertDataSize, &CertDataSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
1657 | \r | |
1658 | CopyMem (\r | |
c411b485 | 1659 | (UINT8 *)Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA),\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1660 | VariableName,\r |
1661 | NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)\r | |
1662 | );\r | |
1663 | \r | |
1664 | CopyMem (\r | |
c411b485 | 1665 | (UINT8 *)Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16),\r |
53c6ff18 | 1666 | Sha256Digest,\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1667 | CertDataSize\r |
1668 | );\r | |
1669 | \r | |
1670 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 1671 | // Set "certdb" or "certdbv".\r |
a6811666 | 1672 | //\r |
c411b485 MK |
1673 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r |
1674 | DbName,\r | |
1675 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
1676 | NewCertDb,\r | |
1677 | NewCertDbSize,\r | |
1678 | VarAttr\r | |
1679 | );\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1680 | \r |
1681 | return Status;\r | |
1682 | }\r | |
1683 | \r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
1684 | /**\r |
1685 | Clean up signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r | |
1686 | by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r | |
f3964772 SZ |
1687 | System may break down during Timebased Variable update & certdb update,\r |
1688 | make them inconsistent, this function is called in AuthVariable Init\r | |
1689 | to ensure consistency.\r | |
1690 | \r | |
1691 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find variable "certdb".\r | |
1692 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r | |
1693 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
1694 | \r |
1695 | **/\r | |
1696 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1697 | CleanCertsFromDb (\r | |
1698 | VOID\r | |
72362a75 CZ |
1699 | )\r |
1700 | {\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1701 | UINT32 Offset;\r |
1702 | AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r | |
1703 | UINT32 NameSize;\r | |
1704 | UINT32 NodeSize;\r | |
1705 | CHAR16 *VariableName;\r | |
1706 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1707 | BOOLEAN CertCleaned;\r | |
1708 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1709 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1710 | EFI_GUID AuthVarGuid;\r | |
1711 | AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
1712 | \r |
1713 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1714 | \r | |
1715 | //\r | |
1716 | // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r | |
1717 | //\r | |
1718 | do {\r | |
1719 | CertCleaned = FALSE;\r | |
1720 | \r | |
1721 | //\r | |
1722 | // Get latest variable "certdb"\r | |
1723 | //\r | |
1724 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
1725 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
1726 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
c411b485 | 1727 | (VOID **)&Data,\r |
64b6a3ff CZ |
1728 | &DataSize\r |
1729 | );\r | |
1730 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1731 | return Status;\r | |
1732 | }\r | |
1733 | \r | |
1734 | if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1735 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1736 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1737 | }\r | |
1738 | \r | |
1739 | Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
1740 | \r | |
c411b485 MK |
1741 | while (Offset < (UINT32)DataSize) {\r |
1742 | Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *)(Data + Offset);\r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
1743 | NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r |
1744 | NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r | |
1745 | \r | |
1746 | //\r | |
1747 | // Get VarName tailed with '\0'\r | |
1748 | //\r | |
c411b485 | 1749 | VariableName = AllocateZeroPool ((NameSize + 1) * sizeof (CHAR16));\r |
64b6a3ff CZ |
1750 | if (VariableName == NULL) {\r |
1751 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1752 | }\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1753 | \r |
1754 | CopyMem (VariableName, (UINT8 *)Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA), NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16));\r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
1755 | //\r |
1756 | // Keep VarGuid aligned\r | |
1757 | //\r | |
c411b485 | 1758 | CopyMem (&AuthVarGuid, &Ptr->VendorGuid, sizeof (EFI_GUID));\r |
64b6a3ff CZ |
1759 | \r |
1760 | //\r | |
1761 | // Find corresponding time auth variable\r | |
1762 | //\r | |
98c2d961 CZ |
1763 | ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r |
1764 | Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r | |
1765 | VariableName,\r | |
1766 | &AuthVarGuid,\r | |
1767 | &AuthVariableInfo\r | |
1768 | );\r | |
64b6a3ff | 1769 | \r |
c411b485 | 1770 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || ((AuthVariableInfo.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0)) {\r |
e90ea947 ZG |
1771 | //\r |
1772 | // While cleaning certdb, always delete the variable in certdb regardless of it attributes.\r | |
1773 | //\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1774 | Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (\r |
1775 | VariableName,\r | |
1776 | &AuthVarGuid,\r | |
1777 | AuthVariableInfo.Attributes | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE\r | |
1778 | );\r | |
64b6a3ff | 1779 | CertCleaned = TRUE;\r |
c411b485 MK |
1780 | DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Recovery!! Cert for Auth Variable %s Guid %g is removed for consistency\n", VariableName, &AuthVarGuid));\r |
1781 | FreePool (VariableName);\r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
1782 | break;\r |
1783 | }\r | |
1784 | \r | |
c411b485 | 1785 | FreePool (VariableName);\r |
64b6a3ff CZ |
1786 | Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r |
1787 | }\r | |
1788 | } while (CertCleaned);\r | |
1789 | \r | |
1790 | return Status;\r | |
1791 | }\r | |
1792 | \r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1793 | /**\r |
1794 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r | |
1795 | \r | |
1796 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
1797 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
1798 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
1799 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
1800 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
1801 | \r | |
1802 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
1803 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
1804 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
1805 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
1806 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
1807 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
1808 | @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r | |
1809 | @param[in] OrgTimeStamp Pointer to original time stamp,\r | |
1810 | original variable is not found if NULL.\r | |
1811 | @param[out] VarPayloadPtr Pointer to variable payload address.\r | |
1812 | @param[out] VarPayloadSize Pointer to variable payload size.\r | |
1813 | \r | |
1814 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
1815 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r | |
1816 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
1817 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r | |
1818 | of resources.\r | |
1819 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r | |
1820 | \r | |
1821 | **/\r | |
1822 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1823 | VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1824 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r |
1825 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1826 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
1827 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1828 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r | |
1829 | IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r | |
1830 | IN EFI_TIME *OrgTimeStamp,\r | |
1831 | OUT UINT8 **VarPayloadPtr,\r | |
1832 | OUT UINTN *VarPayloadSize\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1833 | )\r |
1834 | {\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1835 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r |
1836 | UINT8 *SigData;\r | |
1837 | UINT32 SigDataSize;\r | |
1838 | UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r | |
1839 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
1840 | UINT32 Attr;\r | |
1841 | BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r | |
1842 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1843 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1844 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1845 | UINTN Index;\r | |
1846 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
1847 | UINT32 KekDataSize;\r | |
1848 | UINT8 *NewData;\r | |
1849 | UINTN NewDataSize;\r | |
1850 | UINT8 *Buffer;\r | |
1851 | UINTN Length;\r | |
1852 | UINT8 *TopLevelCert;\r | |
1853 | UINTN TopLevelCertSize;\r | |
1854 | UINT8 *TrustedCert;\r | |
1855 | UINTN TrustedCertSize;\r | |
1856 | UINT8 *SignerCerts;\r | |
1857 | UINTN CertStackSize;\r | |
1858 | UINT8 *CertsInCertDb;\r | |
1859 | UINT32 CertsSizeinDb;\r | |
1860 | UINT8 Sha256Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r | |
1861 | EFI_CERT_DATA *CertDataPtr;\r | |
a6811666 | 1862 | \r |
53c6ff18 ZC |
1863 | //\r |
1864 | // 1. TopLevelCert is the top-level issuer certificate in signature Signer Cert Chain\r | |
1865 | // 2. TrustedCert is the certificate which firmware trusts. It could be saved in protected\r | |
1866 | // storage or PK payload on PK init\r | |
1867 | //\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1868 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r |
1869 | CertData = NULL;\r | |
1870 | NewData = NULL;\r | |
1871 | Attr = Attributes;\r | |
1872 | SignerCerts = NULL;\r | |
1873 | TopLevelCert = NULL;\r | |
1874 | CertsInCertDb = NULL;\r | |
1875 | CertDataPtr = NULL;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1876 | \r |
1877 | //\r | |
1878 | // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is\r | |
1879 | // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r | |
1880 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new\r | |
1881 | // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new\r | |
1882 | // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not\r | |
1883 | // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r | |
1884 | //\r | |
c411b485 | 1885 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *)Data;\r |
a6811666 SZ |
1886 | \r |
1887 | //\r | |
1888 | // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the\r | |
1889 | // TimeStamp value are set to zero.\r | |
1890 | //\r | |
1891 | if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||\r | |
1892 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||\r | |
1893 | (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r | |
1894 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1895 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0))\r |
1896 | {\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1897 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
1898 | }\r | |
1899 | \r | |
1900 | if ((OrgTimeStamp != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r | |
1901 | if (AuthServiceInternalCompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, OrgTimeStamp)) {\r | |
1902 | //\r | |
1903 | // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
1904 | //\r | |
1905 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1906 | }\r | |
1907 | }\r | |
1908 | \r | |
1909 | //\r | |
1910 | // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r | |
1911 | // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r | |
1912 | //\r | |
1913 | if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1914 | !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid))\r |
1915 | {\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1916 | //\r |
1917 | // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
1918 | //\r | |
1919 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1920 | }\r | |
1921 | \r | |
1922 | //\r | |
1923 | // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r | |
1924 | // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r | |
1925 | //\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1926 | SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;\r |
1927 | SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32)(OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r | |
a6811666 | 1928 | \r |
c035e373 ZL |
1929 | //\r |
1930 | // SignedData.digestAlgorithms shall contain the digest algorithm used when preparing the\r | |
1931 | // signature. Only a digest algorithm of SHA-256 is accepted.\r | |
1932 | //\r | |
37d3eb02 | 1933 | // According to PKCS#7 Definition (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2315):\r |
c035e373 ZL |
1934 | // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {\r |
1935 | // version Version,\r | |
1936 | // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,\r | |
1937 | // contentInfo ContentInfo,\r | |
1938 | // .... }\r | |
b3548d32 | 1939 | // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm\r |
c035e373 | 1940 | // in VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r |
37d3eb02 JB |
1941 | // This field has the fixed offset (+13) or (+32) based on whether the DER-encoded\r |
1942 | // ContentInfo structure is present or not, and can be calculated based on two\r | |
1943 | // bytes of length encoding.\r | |
1944 | //\r | |
1945 | // Both condition can be handled in WrapPkcs7Data() in CryptPkcs7VerifyCommon.c.\r | |
1946 | //\r | |
1947 | // See below examples:\r | |
1948 | //\r | |
1949 | // 1. Without ContentInfo\r | |
1950 | // 30 82 0c da // SEQUENCE (5 element) (3294 BYTES) -- SignedData\r | |
1951 | // 02 01 01 // INTEGER 1 -- Version\r | |
1952 | // 31 0f // SET (1 element) (15 BYTES) -- DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers\r | |
1953 | // 30 0d // SEQUENCE (2 element) (13 BYTES) -- AlgorithmIdentifier\r | |
1954 | // 06 09 // OBJECT-IDENTIFIER (9 BYTES) -- algorithm\r | |
1955 | // 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 // sha256 [2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1]\r | |
1956 | // 05 00 // NULL (0 BYTES) -- parameters\r | |
1957 | //\r | |
1958 | // Example from: https://uefi.org/revocationlistfile\r | |
1959 | //\r | |
1960 | // 2. With ContentInfo\r | |
1961 | // 30 82 05 90 // SEQUENCE (1424 BYTES) -- ContentInfo\r | |
1962 | // 06 09 // OBJECT-IDENTIFIER (9 BYTES) -- ContentType\r | |
1963 | // 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 07 02 // signedData [1.2.840.113549.1.7.2]\r | |
1964 | // a0 82 05 81 // CONTEXT-SPECIFIC CONSTRUCTED TAG 0 (1409 BYTES) -- content\r | |
1965 | // 30 82 05 7d // SEQUENCE (1405 BYTES) -- SignedData\r | |
1966 | // 02 01 01 // INTEGER 1 -- Version\r | |
1967 | // 31 0f // SET (1 element) (15 BYTES) -- DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers\r | |
1968 | // 30 0d // SEQUENCE (13 BYTES) -- AlgorithmIdentifier\r | |
1969 | // 06 09 // OBJECT-IDENTIFIER (9 BYTES) -- algorithm\r | |
1970 | // 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 // sha256 [2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1]\r | |
1971 | // 05 00 // NULL (0 BYTES) -- parameters\r | |
1972 | //\r | |
1973 | // Example generated with: https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface/Secure_Boot#Manual_process\r | |
c035e373 ZL |
1974 | //\r |
1975 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
37d3eb02 JB |
1976 | if ( ( (SigDataSize >= (13 + sizeof (mSha256OidValue)))\r |
1977 | && ( ((*(SigData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE)\r | |
1978 | || (CompareMem (SigData + 13, &mSha256OidValue, sizeof (mSha256OidValue)) != 0)))\r | |
1979 | && ( (SigDataSize >= (32 + sizeof (mSha256OidValue)))\r | |
1980 | && ( ((*(SigData + 20) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE)\r | |
1981 | || (CompareMem (SigData + 32, &mSha256OidValue, sizeof (mSha256OidValue)) != 0))))\r | |
1982 | {\r | |
1983 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
c035e373 ZL |
1984 | }\r |
1985 | }\r | |
1986 | \r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1987 | //\r |
1988 | // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r | |
1989 | //\r | |
c411b485 MK |
1990 | PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;\r |
1991 | PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN)SigDataSize;\r | |
a6811666 | 1992 | \r |
28f4616f | 1993 | // If the VariablePolicy engine is disabled, allow deletion of any authenticated variables.\r |
c411b485 | 1994 | if ((PayloadSize == 0) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0) && !IsVariablePolicyEnabled ()) {\r |
28f4616f BB |
1995 | VerifyStatus = TRUE;\r |
1996 | goto Exit;\r | |
1997 | }\r | |
1998 | \r | |
a6811666 SZ |
1999 | //\r |
2000 | // Construct a serialization buffer of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r | |
2001 | // parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r | |
2002 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value\r | |
2003 | // i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)\r | |
2004 | //\r | |
2005 | NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r | |
2006 | sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
2007 | \r | |
2008 | //\r | |
2009 | // Here is to reuse scratch data area(at the end of volatile variable store)\r | |
2010 | // to reduce SMRAM consumption for SMM variable driver.\r | |
2011 | // The scratch buffer is enough to hold the serialized data and safe to use,\r | |
2012 | // because it is only used at here to do verification temporarily first\r | |
2013 | // and then used in UpdateVariable() for a time based auth variable set.\r | |
2014 | //\r | |
c411b485 | 2015 | Status = mAuthVarLibContextIn->GetScratchBuffer (&NewDataSize, (VOID **)&NewData);\r |
a6811666 SZ |
2016 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
2017 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
2018 | }\r | |
2019 | \r | |
2020 | Buffer = NewData;\r | |
2021 | Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
2022 | CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);\r | |
2023 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
2024 | \r | |
2025 | Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r | |
2026 | CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);\r | |
2027 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
2028 | \r | |
2029 | Length = sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
2030 | CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);\r | |
2031 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
2032 | \r | |
2033 | Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);\r | |
2034 | CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);\r | |
2035 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
2036 | \r | |
2037 | CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r | |
2038 | \r | |
2039 | if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {\r | |
2040 | //\r | |
2041 | // Verify that the signature has been made with the current Platform Key (no chaining for PK).\r | |
2042 | // First, get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r | |
2043 | //\r | |
2044 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r | |
2045 | SigData,\r | |
2046 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2047 | &SignerCerts,\r | |
2048 | &CertStackSize,\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
2049 | &TopLevelCert,\r |
2050 | &TopLevelCertSize\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2051 | );\r |
2052 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2053 | goto Exit;\r | |
2054 | }\r | |
2055 | \r | |
2056 | //\r | |
2057 | // Second, get the current platform key from variable. Check whether it's identical with signer's certificates\r | |
2058 | // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r | |
2059 | //\r | |
2060 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
2061 | EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r | |
2062 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
2063 | &Data,\r | |
2064 | &DataSize\r | |
2065 | );\r | |
2066 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2067 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2068 | goto Exit;\r | |
2069 | }\r | |
c411b485 MK |
2070 | \r |
2071 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data;\r | |
2072 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
53c6ff18 | 2073 | if ((TopLevelCertSize != (CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1))) ||\r |
c411b485 MK |
2074 | (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, TopLevelCert, TopLevelCertSize) != 0))\r |
2075 | {\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2076 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r |
2077 | goto Exit;\r | |
2078 | }\r | |
2079 | \r | |
2080 | //\r | |
2081 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
2082 | //\r | |
2083 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2084 | SigData,\r | |
2085 | SigDataSize,\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
2086 | TopLevelCert,\r |
2087 | TopLevelCertSize,\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2088 | NewData,\r |
2089 | NewDataSize\r | |
2090 | );\r | |
a6811666 | 2091 | } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypeKek) {\r |
a6811666 SZ |
2092 | //\r |
2093 | // Get KEK database from variable.\r | |
2094 | //\r | |
2095 | Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r | |
2096 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r | |
2097 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
2098 | &Data,\r | |
2099 | &DataSize\r | |
2100 | );\r | |
2101 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2102 | return Status;\r | |
2103 | }\r | |
2104 | \r | |
2105 | //\r | |
2106 | // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r | |
2107 | //\r | |
c411b485 MK |
2108 | KekDataSize = (UINT32)DataSize;\r |
2109 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2110 | while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r |
2111 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
c411b485 MK |
2112 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r |
2113 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2114 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r |
2115 | //\r | |
2116 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r | |
2117 | //\r | |
c411b485 MK |
2118 | TrustedCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r |
2119 | TrustedCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2120 | \r |
2121 | //\r | |
2122 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
2123 | //\r | |
2124 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2125 | SigData,\r | |
2126 | SigDataSize,\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
2127 | TrustedCert,\r |
2128 | TrustedCertSize,\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2129 | NewData,\r |
2130 | NewDataSize\r | |
2131 | );\r | |
2132 | if (VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2133 | goto Exit;\r | |
2134 | }\r | |
c411b485 MK |
2135 | \r |
2136 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2137 | }\r |
2138 | }\r | |
c411b485 | 2139 | \r |
a6811666 | 2140 | KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r |
c411b485 | 2141 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)((UINT8 *)CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r |
a6811666 SZ |
2142 | }\r |
2143 | } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2144 | //\r |
2145 | // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX/DBT.\r | |
2146 | // Get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r | |
2147 | //\r | |
2148 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r | |
2149 | SigData,\r | |
2150 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2151 | &SignerCerts,\r | |
2152 | &CertStackSize,\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
2153 | &TopLevelCert,\r |
2154 | &TopLevelCertSize\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2155 | );\r |
2156 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2157 | goto Exit;\r | |
2158 | }\r | |
2159 | \r | |
2160 | //\r | |
98c2d961 | 2161 | // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb or certdbv for existing\r |
a6811666 SZ |
2162 | // variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates\r |
2163 | // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r | |
2164 | //\r | |
2165 | if (OrgTimeStamp != NULL) {\r | |
2166 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2167 | \r | |
98c2d961 | 2168 | Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);\r |
a6811666 SZ |
2169 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
2170 | goto Exit;\r | |
2171 | }\r | |
2172 | \r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
2173 | if (CertsSizeinDb == SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) {\r |
2174 | //\r | |
2175 | // Check hash of signer cert CommonName + Top-level issuer tbsCertificate against data in CertDb\r | |
2176 | //\r | |
62ba0feb | 2177 | CertDataPtr = (EFI_CERT_DATA *)(SignerCerts + 1);\r |
c411b485 MK |
2178 | Status = CalculatePrivAuthVarSignChainSHA256Digest (\r |
2179 | CertDataPtr->CertDataBuffer,\r | |
2180 | ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)&(CertDataPtr->CertDataLength)),\r | |
2181 | TopLevelCert,\r | |
2182 | TopLevelCertSize,\r | |
2183 | Sha256Digest\r | |
2184 | );\r | |
2185 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || (CompareMem (Sha256Digest, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0)) {\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
2186 | goto Exit;\r |
2187 | }\r | |
2188 | } else {\r | |
c411b485 MK |
2189 | //\r |
2190 | // Keep backward compatible with previous solution which saves whole signer certs stack in CertDb\r | |
2191 | //\r | |
2192 | if ((CertStackSize != CertsSizeinDb) ||\r | |
2193 | (CompareMem (SignerCerts, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0))\r | |
2194 | {\r | |
2195 | goto Exit;\r | |
2196 | }\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2197 | }\r |
2198 | }\r | |
2199 | \r | |
2200 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2201 | SigData,\r | |
2202 | SigDataSize,\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
2203 | TopLevelCert,\r |
2204 | TopLevelCertSize,\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2205 | NewData,\r |
2206 | NewDataSize\r | |
2207 | );\r | |
2208 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2209 | goto Exit;\r | |
2210 | }\r | |
2211 | \r | |
64b6a3ff | 2212 | if ((OrgTimeStamp == NULL) && (PayloadSize != 0)) {\r |
a6811666 | 2213 | //\r |
53c6ff18 | 2214 | // When adding a new common authenticated variable, always save Hash of cn of signer cert + tbsCertificate of Top-level issuer\r |
a6811666 | 2215 | //\r |
62ba0feb | 2216 | CertDataPtr = (EFI_CERT_DATA *)(SignerCerts + 1);\r |
c411b485 MK |
2217 | Status = InsertCertsToDb (\r |
2218 | VariableName,\r | |
2219 | VendorGuid,\r | |
2220 | Attributes,\r | |
2221 | CertDataPtr->CertDataBuffer,\r | |
2222 | ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)&(CertDataPtr->CertDataLength)),\r | |
2223 | TopLevelCert,\r | |
2224 | TopLevelCertSize\r | |
2225 | );\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2226 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
2227 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2228 | goto Exit;\r | |
2229 | }\r | |
2230 | }\r | |
2231 | } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePayload) {\r | |
c411b485 MK |
2232 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)PayloadPtr;\r |
2233 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)((UINT8 *)CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
2234 | TrustedCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r |
2235 | TrustedCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2236 | //\r |
2237 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
2238 | //\r | |
2239 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2240 | SigData,\r | |
2241 | SigDataSize,\r | |
53c6ff18 ZC |
2242 | TrustedCert,\r |
2243 | TrustedCertSize,\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2244 | NewData,\r |
2245 | NewDataSize\r | |
2246 | );\r | |
2247 | } else {\r | |
2248 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
2249 | }\r | |
2250 | \r | |
2251 | Exit:\r | |
2252 | \r | |
c411b485 | 2253 | if ((AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) || (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv)) {\r |
28f4616f | 2254 | if (TopLevelCert != NULL) {\r |
c411b485 | 2255 | Pkcs7FreeSigners (TopLevelCert);\r |
28f4616f | 2256 | }\r |
c411b485 | 2257 | \r |
28f4616f | 2258 | if (SignerCerts != NULL) {\r |
c411b485 | 2259 | Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);\r |
28f4616f | 2260 | }\r |
a6811666 SZ |
2261 | }\r |
2262 | \r | |
2263 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2264 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
2265 | }\r | |
2266 | \r | |
c411b485 | 2267 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat (VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r |
a6811666 SZ |
2268 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
2269 | return Status;\r | |
2270 | }\r | |
2271 | \r | |
c411b485 | 2272 | *VarPayloadPtr = PayloadPtr;\r |
a6811666 SZ |
2273 | *VarPayloadSize = PayloadSize;\r |
2274 | \r | |
2275 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
2276 | }\r | |
2277 | \r | |
2278 | /**\r | |
2279 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r | |
2280 | \r | |
2281 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r | |
2282 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
2283 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
2284 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
2285 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
2286 | \r | |
2287 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
2288 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
2289 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
2290 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
2291 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
2292 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
2293 | @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r | |
2294 | @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r | |
2295 | \r | |
2296 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
2297 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r | |
2298 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
2299 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r | |
2300 | of resources.\r | |
2301 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r | |
2302 | \r | |
2303 | **/\r | |
2304 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
2305 | VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r | |
c411b485 MK |
2306 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r |
2307 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
2308 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
2309 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
2310 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r | |
2311 | IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r | |
2312 | OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2313 | )\r |
2314 | {\r | |
c411b485 MK |
2315 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r |
2316 | EFI_STATUS FindStatus;\r | |
2317 | UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r | |
2318 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
2319 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r | |
2320 | AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO OrgVariableInfo;\r | |
2321 | BOOLEAN IsDel;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2322 | \r |
2323 | ZeroMem (&OrgVariableInfo, sizeof (OrgVariableInfo));\r | |
2324 | FindStatus = mAuthVarLibContextIn->FindVariable (\r | |
c411b485 MK |
2325 | VariableName,\r |
2326 | VendorGuid,\r | |
2327 | &OrgVariableInfo\r | |
2328 | );\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2329 | \r |
2330 | Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
2331 | VariableName,\r | |
2332 | VendorGuid,\r | |
2333 | Data,\r | |
2334 | DataSize,\r | |
2335 | Attributes,\r | |
2336 | AuthVarType,\r | |
2337 | (!EFI_ERROR (FindStatus)) ? OrgVariableInfo.TimeStamp : NULL,\r | |
2338 | &PayloadPtr,\r | |
2339 | &PayloadSize\r | |
2340 | );\r | |
2341 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2342 | return Status;\r | |
2343 | }\r | |
2344 | \r | |
c411b485 MK |
2345 | if ( !EFI_ERROR (FindStatus)\r |
2346 | && (PayloadSize == 0)\r | |
2347 | && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0))\r | |
2348 | {\r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
2349 | IsDel = TRUE;\r |
2350 | } else {\r | |
2351 | IsDel = FALSE;\r | |
a6811666 SZ |
2352 | }\r |
2353 | \r | |
c411b485 | 2354 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *)Data;\r |
a6811666 SZ |
2355 | \r |
2356 | //\r | |
2357 | // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r | |
2358 | //\r | |
64b6a3ff CZ |
2359 | Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r |
2360 | VariableName,\r | |
2361 | VendorGuid,\r | |
2362 | PayloadPtr,\r | |
2363 | PayloadSize,\r | |
2364 | Attributes,\r | |
2365 | &CertData->TimeStamp\r | |
2366 | );\r | |
2367 | \r | |
2368 | //\r | |
2369 | // Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.\r | |
2370 | //\r | |
c411b485 | 2371 | if (IsDel && (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) && !EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
98c2d961 | 2372 | Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes);\r |
64b6a3ff CZ |
2373 | }\r |
2374 | \r | |
2375 | if (VarDel != NULL) {\r | |
c411b485 | 2376 | if (IsDel && !EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
64b6a3ff CZ |
2377 | *VarDel = TRUE;\r |
2378 | } else {\r | |
2379 | *VarDel = FALSE;\r | |
2380 | }\r | |
2381 | }\r | |
2382 | \r | |
2383 | return Status;\r | |
a6811666 | 2384 | }\r |