+Meltdown / Spectre related CPU flags
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+There are several CPU flags related to the Meltdown and Spectre vulnerabilities
+footnote:[Meltdown Attack https://meltdownattack.com/] which need to be set
+manually unless the selected CPU type of your VM already enables them by default.
+
+There are two requirements that need to be fulfilled in order to use these
+CPU flags:
+
+* The host CPU(s) must support the feature and propagate it to the guest's virtual CPU(s)
+* The guest operating system must be updated to a version which mitigates the
+ attacks and is able to utilize the CPU feature
+
+Otherwise you need to set the desired CPU flag of the virtual CPU, either by
+editing the CPU options in the WebUI, or by setting the 'flags' property of the
+'cpu' option in the VM configuration file.
+
+For Spectre v1,v2,v4 fixes, your CPU or system vendor also needs to provide a
+so-called ``microcode update'' footnote:[You can use `intel-microcode' /
+`amd-microcode' from Debian non-free if your vendor does not provide such an
+update. Note that not all affected CPUs can be updated to support spec-ctrl.]
+for your CPU.
+
+
+To check if the {pve} host is vulnerable, execute the following command as root:
+
+----
+for f in /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/*; do echo "${f##*/} -" $(cat "$f"); done
+----
+
+A community script is also available to detect is the host is still vulnerable.
+footnote:[spectre-meltdown-checker https://meltdown.ovh/]
+
+Intel processors
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+* 'pcid'
++
+This reduces the performance impact of the Meltdown (CVE-2017-5754) mitigation
+called 'Kernel Page-Table Isolation (KPTI)', which effectively hides
+the Kernel memory from the user space. Without PCID, KPTI is quite an expensive
+mechanism footnote:[PCID is now a critical performance/security feature on x86
+https://groups.google.com/forum/m/#!topic/mechanical-sympathy/L9mHTbeQLNU].
++
+To check if the {pve} host supports PCID, execute the following command as root:
++
+----
+# grep ' pcid ' /proc/cpuinfo
+----
++
+If this does not return empty your host's CPU has support for 'pcid'.
+
+* 'spec-ctrl'
++
+Required to enable the Spectre v1 (CVE-2017-5753) and Spectre v2 (CVE-2017-5715) fix,
+in cases where retpolines are not sufficient.
+Included by default in Intel CPU models with -IBRS suffix.
+Must be explicitly turned on for Intel CPU models without -IBRS suffix.
+Requires an updated host CPU microcode (intel-microcode >= 20180425).
++
+* 'ssbd'
++
+Required to enable the Spectre V4 (CVE-2018-3639) fix. Not included by default in any Intel CPU model.
+Must be explicitly turned on for all Intel CPU models.
+Requires an updated host CPU microcode(intel-microcode >= 20180703).
+
+
+AMD processors
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+* 'ibpb'
++
+Required to enable the Spectre v1 (CVE-2017-5753) and Spectre v2 (CVE-2017-5715) fix,
+in cases where retpolines are not sufficient.
+Included by default in AMD CPU models with -IBPB suffix.
+Must be explicitly turned on for AMD CPU models without -IBPB suffix.
+Requires the host CPU microcode to support this feature before it can be used for guest CPUs.
+
+
+
+* 'virt-ssbd'
++
+Required to enable the Spectre v4 (CVE-2018-3639) fix.
+Not included by default in any AMD CPU model.
+Must be explicitly turned on for all AMD CPU models.
+This should be provided to guests, even if amd-ssbd is also provided, for maximum guest compatibility.
+Note that this must be explicitly enabled when when using the "host" cpu model,
+because this is a virtual feature which does not exist in the physical CPUs.
+
+
+* 'amd-ssbd'
++
+Required to enable the Spectre v4 (CVE-2018-3639) fix.
+Not included by default in any AMD CPU model. Must be explicitly turned on for all AMD CPU models.
+This provides higher performance than virt-ssbd, therefore a host supporting this should always expose this to guests if possible.
+virt-ssbd should none the less also be exposed for maximum guest compatibility as some kernels only know about virt-ssbd.
+
+
+* 'amd-no-ssb'
++
+Recommended to indicate the host is not vulnerable to Spectre V4 (CVE-2018-3639).
+Not included by default in any AMD CPU model.
+Future hardware generations of CPU will not be vulnerable to CVE-2018-3639,
+and thus the guest should be told not to enable its mitigations, by exposing amd-no-ssb.
+This is mutually exclusive with virt-ssbd and amd-ssbd.
+
+
+NUMA
+^^^^
+You can also optionally emulate a *NUMA*
+footnote:[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-uniform_memory_access] architecture
+in your VMs. The basics of the NUMA architecture mean that instead of having a
+global memory pool available to all your cores, the memory is spread into local
+banks close to each socket.