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0c18794e | 1 | /** @file\r |
2 | Implement authentication services for the authenticated variable\r | |
3 | service in UEFI2.2.\r | |
4 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 5 | Copyright (c) 2009 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r |
2d3fb919 | 6 | This program and the accompanying materials\r |
7 | are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r | |
8 | which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r | |
0c18794e | 9 | http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r |
10 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 11 | THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r |
0c18794e | 12 | WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r |
13 | \r | |
14 | **/\r | |
15 | \r | |
16 | #include "Variable.h"\r | |
17 | #include "AuthService.h"\r | |
18 | \r | |
19 | ///\r | |
20 | /// Global database array for scratch\r | |
2d3fb919 | 21 | ///\r |
0c18794e | 22 | UINT8 mPubKeyStore[MAX_KEYDB_SIZE];\r |
23 | UINT32 mPubKeyNumber;\r | |
24 | UINT32 mPlatformMode;\r | |
ae09f979 | 25 | EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[] = {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, EFI_CERT_X509_GUID};\r |
0c18794e | 26 | //\r |
27 | // Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r | |
28 | //\r | |
29 | CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r | |
30 | //\r | |
31 | // Hash context pointer\r | |
32 | //\r | |
33 | VOID *mHashCtx = NULL;\r | |
34 | \r | |
0c18794e | 35 | //\r |
2d3fb919 | 36 | // Pointer to runtime buffer.\r |
37 | // For "Append" operation to an existing variable, a read/modify/write operation\r | |
38 | // is supported by firmware internally. Reserve runtime buffer to cache previous\r | |
0c18794e | 39 | // variable data in runtime phase because memory allocation is forbidden in virtual mode.\r |
40 | //\r | |
41 | VOID *mStorageArea = NULL;\r | |
42 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 43 | //\r |
44 | // The serialization of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r | |
45 | // parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r | |
46 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value\r | |
47 | // i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)\r | |
48 | //\r | |
49 | UINT8 *mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = NULL;\r | |
50 | \r | |
d912bad7 | 51 | //\r |
52 | // Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.\r | |
53 | // These data are used to peform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.\r | |
54 | //\r | |
55 | EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {\r | |
56 | //{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }\r | |
57 | {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },\r | |
58 | {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
59 | {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
60 | {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },\r | |
61 | {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
62 | {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},\r | |
63 | {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },\r | |
64 | {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },\r | |
65 | {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 }\r | |
66 | };\r | |
67 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 68 | /**\r |
69 | Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.\r | |
70 | \r | |
71 | @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r | |
72 | @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r | |
73 | \r | |
74 | @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.\r | |
75 | @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.\r | |
76 | \r | |
77 | **/\r | |
78 | BOOLEAN\r | |
79 | NeedPhysicallyPresent(\r | |
80 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
81 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r | |
82 | )\r | |
83 | {\r | |
84 | if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))\r | |
85 | || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {\r | |
86 | return TRUE;\r | |
87 | }\r | |
88 | \r | |
89 | return FALSE;\r | |
90 | }\r | |
91 | \r | |
92 | /**\r | |
93 | Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.\r | |
94 | \r | |
95 | @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.\r | |
96 | @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.\r | |
97 | \r | |
98 | **/\r | |
99 | BOOLEAN\r | |
100 | InCustomMode (\r | |
101 | VOID\r | |
102 | )\r | |
103 | {\r | |
104 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
105 | \r | |
106 | FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r | |
107 | if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL && *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr)) == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {\r | |
108 | return TRUE;\r | |
109 | }\r | |
110 | \r | |
111 | return FALSE;\r | |
112 | }\r | |
113 | \r | |
114 | \r | |
0c18794e | 115 | /**\r |
2d3fb919 | 116 | Internal function to delete a Variable given its name and GUID, no authentication\r |
117 | required.\r | |
0c18794e | 118 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 119 | @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r |
120 | @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r | |
0c18794e | 121 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 122 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable deleted successfully.\r |
123 | @retval Others The driver failded to start the device.\r | |
0c18794e | 124 | \r |
125 | **/\r | |
126 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
2d3fb919 | 127 | DeleteVariable (\r |
128 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
129 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r | |
130 | )\r | |
131 | {\r | |
132 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
133 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
134 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 135 | Status = FindVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r |
2d3fb919 | 136 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
137 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
138 | }\r | |
139 | \r | |
140 | ASSERT (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL);\r | |
141 | return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, &Variable, NULL);\r | |
142 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 143 | \r |
144 | /**\r | |
145 | Initializes for authenticated varibale service.\r | |
146 | \r | |
147 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Function successfully executed.\r | |
148 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Fail to allocate enough memory resources.\r | |
149 | \r | |
150 | **/\r | |
151 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
152 | AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (\r | |
153 | VOID\r | |
154 | )\r | |
155 | {\r | |
156 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
157 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
7aaf2fd6 | 158 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r |
0c18794e | 159 | UINT8 VarValue;\r |
160 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r | |
161 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
162 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
163 | UINTN CtxSize;\r | |
beda2356 | 164 | UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r |
165 | UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r | |
ecc722ad | 166 | UINT8 CustomMode;\r |
2d3fb919 | 167 | \r |
0c18794e | 168 | //\r |
169 | // Initialize hash context.\r | |
170 | //\r | |
171 | CtxSize = Sha256GetContextSize ();\r | |
172 | mHashCtx = AllocateRuntimePool (CtxSize);\r | |
173 | if (mHashCtx == NULL) {\r | |
174 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
175 | }\r | |
176 | \r | |
177 | //\r | |
178 | // Reserved runtime buffer for "Append" operation in virtual mode.\r | |
179 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 180 | mStorageArea = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize));\r |
0c18794e | 181 | if (mStorageArea == NULL) {\r |
182 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
183 | }\r | |
184 | \r | |
185 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 186 | // Prepare runtime buffer for serialized data of time-based authenticated\r |
187 | // Variable, i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r | |
188 | //\r | |
189 | mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) + sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r | |
190 | if (mSerializationRuntimeBuffer == NULL) {\r | |
191 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
192 | }\r | |
193 | \r | |
194 | //\r | |
195 | // Check "AuthVarKeyDatabase" variable's existence.\r | |
196 | // If it doesn't exist, create a new one with initial value of 0 and EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
0c18794e | 197 | //\r |
198 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 199 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r |
200 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
201 | &Variable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 202 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
203 | FALSE\r | |
0c18794e | 204 | );\r |
205 | \r | |
206 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
207 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
208 | VarValue = 0;\r | |
209 | mPubKeyNumber = 0;\r | |
210 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
211 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
212 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
213 | &VarValue,\r | |
214 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
215 | VarAttr,\r | |
216 | 0,\r | |
217 | 0,\r | |
218 | &Variable,\r | |
219 | NULL\r | |
220 | );\r | |
221 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
222 | return Status;\r | |
223 | }\r | |
224 | } else {\r | |
225 | //\r | |
226 | // Load database in global variable for cache.\r | |
227 | //\r | |
228 | DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r | |
229 | Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r | |
230 | ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r | |
231 | CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r | |
232 | mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r | |
233 | }\r | |
7aaf2fd6 | 234 | \r |
ecc722ad | 235 | FindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &PkVariable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r |
7aaf2fd6 | 236 | if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r |
237 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r | |
238 | } else {\r | |
239 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r | |
240 | }\r | |
241 | \r | |
0c18794e | 242 | //\r |
2d3fb919 | 243 | // Check "SetupMode" variable's existence.\r |
0c18794e | 244 | // If it doesn't exist, check PK database's existence to determine the value.\r |
2d3fb919 | 245 | // Then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r |
0c18794e | 246 | //\r |
247 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 248 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r |
249 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
250 | &Variable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 251 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
252 | FALSE\r | |
0c18794e | 253 | );\r |
254 | \r | |
255 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
7aaf2fd6 | 256 | if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r |
0c18794e | 257 | mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;\r |
258 | } else {\r | |
259 | mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;\r | |
260 | }\r | |
261 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 262 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r |
0c18794e | 263 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
264 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r | |
265 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
266 | &mPlatformMode,\r | |
267 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
268 | VarAttr,\r | |
269 | 0,\r | |
270 | 0,\r | |
271 | &Variable,\r | |
272 | NULL\r | |
273 | );\r | |
274 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
275 | return Status;\r | |
276 | }\r | |
277 | } else {\r | |
278 | mPlatformMode = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r | |
279 | }\r | |
280 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 281 | // Check "SignatureSupport" variable's existence.\r |
282 | // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
0c18794e | 283 | //\r |
284 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 285 | EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r |
286 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
287 | &Variable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 288 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
289 | FALSE\r | |
0c18794e | 290 | );\r |
291 | \r | |
292 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
293 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
294 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
295 | EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r | |
296 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
297 | mSignatureSupport,\r | |
ae09f979 | 298 | sizeof(mSignatureSupport),\r |
0c18794e | 299 | VarAttr,\r |
300 | 0,\r | |
301 | 0,\r | |
302 | &Variable,\r | |
303 | NULL\r | |
304 | );\r | |
305 | }\r | |
beda2356 | 306 | \r |
307 | //\r | |
308 | // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 309 | // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in USER_MODE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.\r |
beda2356 | 310 | // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.\r |
311 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 312 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r |
ecc722ad | 313 | FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r |
beda2356 | 314 | if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r |
315 | SecureBootEnable = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r | |
2d3fb919 | 316 | } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r |
317 | //\r | |
318 | // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in USER_MODE.\r | |
319 | //\r | |
320 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r | |
beda2356 | 321 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
2d3fb919 | 322 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r |
323 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
324 | &SecureBootEnable,\r | |
325 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
326 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
327 | 0,\r | |
328 | 0,\r | |
beda2356 | 329 | &Variable,\r |
330 | NULL\r | |
331 | );\r | |
332 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
333 | return Status;\r | |
334 | }\r | |
335 | }\r | |
336 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 337 | if (SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE && mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r |
338 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r | |
339 | } else {\r | |
340 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
341 | }\r | |
ecc722ad | 342 | FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r |
2d3fb919 | 343 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
344 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r | |
345 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
346 | &SecureBootMode,\r | |
347 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
348 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r | |
349 | 0,\r | |
350 | 0,\r | |
351 | &Variable,\r | |
352 | NULL\r | |
353 | );\r | |
354 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
355 | return Status;\r | |
356 | }\r | |
357 | \r | |
7aaf2fd6 | 358 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, mPlatformMode));\r |
359 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBootMode));\r | |
360 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));\r | |
361 | \r | |
0c18794e | 362 | //\r |
ecc722ad | 363 | // Check "CustomMode" variable's existence.\r |
0c18794e | 364 | //\r |
ecc722ad | 365 | FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r |
366 | if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r | |
367 | CustomMode = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r | |
368 | } else {\r | |
0c18794e | 369 | //\r |
ecc722ad | 370 | // "CustomMode" not exist, initialize it in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE.\r |
0c18794e | 371 | //\r |
ecc722ad | 372 | CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r |
373 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
374 | EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r | |
375 | &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r | |
376 | &CustomMode,\r | |
377 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
378 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
379 | 0,\r | |
380 | 0,\r | |
381 | &Variable,\r | |
382 | NULL\r | |
383 | );\r | |
2d3fb919 | 384 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
385 | return Status;\r | |
0c18794e | 386 | }\r |
0c18794e | 387 | }\r |
ecc722ad | 388 | \r |
389 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, CustomMode));\r | |
2d3fb919 | 390 | \r |
0c18794e | 391 | return Status;\r |
392 | }\r | |
393 | \r | |
394 | /**\r | |
395 | Add public key in store and return its index.\r | |
396 | \r | |
397 | @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data\r | |
398 | \r | |
399 | @return Index of new added item\r | |
400 | \r | |
401 | **/\r | |
402 | UINT32\r | |
403 | AddPubKeyInStore (\r | |
404 | IN UINT8 *PubKey\r | |
405 | )\r | |
406 | {\r | |
407 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
408 | BOOLEAN IsFound;\r | |
409 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
410 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
411 | UINT8 *Ptr;\r | |
412 | \r | |
413 | if (PubKey == NULL) {\r | |
414 | return 0;\r | |
415 | }\r | |
416 | \r | |
417 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
418 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
419 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
420 | &Variable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 421 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
422 | FALSE\r | |
0c18794e | 423 | );\r |
424 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r | |
425 | //\r | |
426 | // Check whether the public key entry does exist.\r | |
427 | //\r | |
428 | IsFound = FALSE;\r | |
429 | for (Ptr = mPubKeyStore, Index = 1; Index <= mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r | |
430 | if (CompareMem (Ptr, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r | |
431 | IsFound = TRUE;\r | |
432 | break;\r | |
433 | }\r | |
434 | Ptr += EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r | |
435 | }\r | |
436 | \r | |
437 | if (!IsFound) {\r | |
438 | //\r | |
439 | // Add public key in database.\r | |
440 | //\r | |
441 | if (mPubKeyNumber == MAX_KEY_NUM) {\r | |
442 | //\r | |
443 | // Notes: Database is full, need enhancement here, currently just return 0.\r | |
444 | //\r | |
445 | return 0;\r | |
446 | }\r | |
447 | \r | |
448 | CopyMem (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r | |
449 | Index = ++mPubKeyNumber;\r | |
450 | //\r | |
451 | // Update public key database variable.\r | |
452 | //\r | |
453 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
454 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
455 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
456 | mPubKeyStore,\r | |
457 | mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE,\r | |
458 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r | |
459 | 0,\r | |
460 | 0,\r | |
461 | &Variable,\r | |
462 | NULL\r | |
463 | );\r | |
464 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r | |
465 | }\r | |
466 | \r | |
467 | return Index;\r | |
468 | }\r | |
469 | \r | |
470 | /**\r | |
85560919 | 471 | Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID type.\r |
0c18794e | 472 | Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.\r |
473 | \r | |
474 | @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.\r | |
475 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
476 | @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.\r | |
477 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 478 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r |
0c18794e | 479 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.\r |
2d3fb919 | 480 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.\r |
0c18794e | 481 | \r |
482 | **/\r | |
483 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
484 | VerifyCounterBasedPayload (\r | |
485 | IN UINT8 *Data,\r | |
486 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
487 | IN UINT8 *PubKey\r | |
488 | )\r | |
489 | {\r | |
490 | BOOLEAN Status;\r | |
491 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r | |
492 | EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r | |
493 | UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r | |
494 | VOID *Rsa;\r | |
495 | \r | |
496 | Rsa = NULL;\r | |
497 | CertData = NULL;\r | |
498 | CertBlock = NULL;\r | |
499 | \r | |
500 | if (Data == NULL || PubKey == NULL) {\r | |
501 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
502 | }\r | |
503 | \r | |
504 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r | |
505 | CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r | |
506 | \r | |
507 | //\r | |
508 | // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r | |
85560919 | 509 | // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID.\r |
0c18794e | 510 | //\r |
511 | if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r | |
85560919 | 512 | !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)\r |
0c18794e | 513 | ) {\r |
514 | //\r | |
515 | // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
516 | //\r | |
517 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
518 | }\r | |
519 | //\r | |
520 | // Hash data payload with SHA256.\r | |
521 | //\r | |
522 | ZeroMem (Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r | |
523 | Status = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r | |
524 | if (!Status) {\r | |
525 | goto Done;\r | |
526 | }\r | |
527 | Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, (UINTN) (DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE));\r | |
528 | if (!Status) {\r | |
529 | goto Done;\r | |
530 | }\r | |
531 | //\r | |
532 | // Hash Monotonic Count.\r | |
533 | //\r | |
534 | Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &CertData->MonotonicCount, sizeof (UINT64));\r | |
535 | if (!Status) {\r | |
536 | goto Done;\r | |
537 | }\r | |
538 | Status = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Digest);\r | |
539 | if (!Status) {\r | |
540 | goto Done;\r | |
541 | }\r | |
542 | //\r | |
543 | // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.\r | |
544 | //\r | |
545 | Rsa = RsaNew ();\r | |
546 | ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);\r | |
2d3fb919 | 547 | //\r |
0c18794e | 548 | // Set RSA Key Components.\r |
549 | // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r | |
550 | //\r | |
551 | Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r | |
552 | if (!Status) {\r | |
553 | goto Done;\r | |
554 | }\r | |
555 | Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r | |
556 | if (!Status) {\r | |
557 | goto Done;\r | |
558 | }\r | |
559 | //\r | |
560 | // Verify the signature.\r | |
561 | //\r | |
562 | Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 563 | Rsa,\r |
564 | Digest,\r | |
565 | SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,\r | |
566 | CertBlock->Signature,\r | |
0c18794e | 567 | EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r |
568 | );\r | |
569 | \r | |
570 | Done:\r | |
571 | if (Rsa != NULL) {\r | |
572 | RsaFree (Rsa);\r | |
573 | }\r | |
574 | if (Status) {\r | |
575 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
576 | } else {\r | |
577 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
578 | }\r | |
579 | }\r | |
580 | \r | |
0c18794e | 581 | /**\r |
582 | Update platform mode.\r | |
583 | \r | |
584 | @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r | |
585 | \r | |
586 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
587 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r | |
588 | \r | |
589 | **/\r | |
590 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
591 | UpdatePlatformMode (\r | |
592 | IN UINT32 Mode\r | |
593 | )\r | |
594 | {\r | |
595 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
596 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
597 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r | |
598 | UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r | |
beda2356 | 599 | UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r |
600 | UINTN VariableDataSize;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 601 | \r |
0c18794e | 602 | Status = FindVariable (\r |
2d3fb919 | 603 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r |
604 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
605 | &Variable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 606 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
607 | FALSE\r | |
0c18794e | 608 | );\r |
609 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
610 | return Status;\r | |
611 | }\r | |
612 | \r | |
613 | mPlatformMode = Mode;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 614 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r |
0c18794e | 615 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
616 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r | |
617 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
618 | &mPlatformMode,\r | |
619 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
620 | VarAttr,\r | |
621 | 0,\r | |
622 | 0,\r | |
623 | &Variable,\r | |
624 | NULL\r | |
625 | );\r | |
626 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
627 | return Status;\r | |
628 | }\r | |
629 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 630 | if (AtRuntime ()) {\r |
631 | //\r | |
632 | // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r | |
633 | // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r | |
634 | // Variable in runtime.\r | |
635 | //\r | |
636 | return Status;\r | |
637 | }\r | |
638 | \r | |
0c18794e | 639 | //\r |
640 | // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r | |
641 | // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r | |
642 | // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r | |
643 | //\r | |
644 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 645 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r |
646 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
647 | &Variable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 648 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
649 | FALSE\r | |
0c18794e | 650 | );\r |
651 | //\r | |
652 | // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r | |
653 | // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r | |
654 | // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r | |
655 | //\r | |
656 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
657 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
658 | } else {\r | |
659 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r | |
660 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r | |
661 | } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r | |
662 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
663 | } else {\r | |
664 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
665 | }\r | |
666 | }\r | |
667 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 668 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r |
beda2356 | 669 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
0c18794e | 670 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r |
671 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
672 | &SecureBootMode,\r | |
673 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
674 | VarAttr,\r | |
675 | 0,\r | |
676 | 0,\r | |
677 | &Variable,\r | |
678 | NULL\r | |
679 | );\r | |
beda2356 | 680 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
681 | return Status;\r | |
682 | }\r | |
683 | \r | |
684 | //\r | |
685 | // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r | |
686 | //\r | |
687 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 688 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r |
689 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
690 | &Variable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 691 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
692 | FALSE\r | |
beda2356 | 693 | );\r |
2d3fb919 | 694 | \r |
beda2356 | 695 | if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r |
696 | //\r | |
697 | // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r | |
698 | //\r | |
699 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r | |
700 | VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r | |
701 | } else {\r | |
702 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 703 | // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r |
beda2356 | 704 | // variable is not in secure boot state.\r |
705 | //\r | |
706 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL || EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
707 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
708 | }\r | |
709 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r | |
710 | VariableDataSize = 0;\r | |
711 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 712 | \r |
beda2356 | 713 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
2d3fb919 | 714 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r |
715 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
716 | &SecureBootEnable,\r | |
717 | VariableDataSize,\r | |
718 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
719 | 0,\r | |
720 | 0,\r | |
beda2356 | 721 | &Variable,\r |
722 | NULL\r | |
723 | );\r | |
724 | return Status;\r | |
0c18794e | 725 | }\r |
726 | \r | |
d912bad7 | 727 | /**\r |
728 | Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK variable.\r | |
729 | \r | |
730 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.\r | |
731 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
732 | @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.\r | |
733 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
734 | \r | |
735 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.\r | |
736 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.\r | |
737 | \r | |
738 | **/\r | |
739 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
740 | CheckSignatureListFormat(\r | |
741 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
742 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
743 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
744 | IN UINTN DataSize\r | |
745 | )\r | |
746 | {\r | |
747 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r | |
748 | UINTN SigDataSize;\r | |
749 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
750 | UINT32 SigCount;\r | |
751 | BOOLEAN IsPk;\r | |
752 | \r | |
753 | if (DataSize == 0) {\r | |
754 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
755 | }\r | |
756 | \r | |
757 | ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);\r | |
758 | \r | |
759 | if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){\r | |
760 | IsPk = TRUE;\r | |
761 | } else if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)) {\r | |
762 | IsPk = FALSE;\r | |
763 | } else {\r | |
764 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
765 | }\r | |
766 | \r | |
767 | SigCount = 0;\r | |
768 | SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
769 | SigDataSize = DataSize;\r | |
770 | \r | |
771 | //\r | |
772 | // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.\r | |
773 | // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.\r | |
774 | //\r | |
775 | while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
776 | for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {\r | |
777 | if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {\r | |
778 | //\r | |
779 | // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner \r | |
780 | // component) add the data length according to signature type.\r | |
781 | //\r | |
782 | if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) && \r | |
783 | (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {\r | |
784 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
785 | }\r | |
786 | if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINTN) ~0) &&\r | |
787 | SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {\r | |
788 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
789 | }\r | |
790 | break;\r | |
791 | }\r | |
792 | }\r | |
793 | \r | |
794 | if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {\r | |
795 | //\r | |
796 | // Undefined signature type.\r | |
797 | //\r | |
798 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
799 | }\r | |
800 | \r | |
801 | if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {\r | |
802 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
803 | }\r | |
804 | SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;\r | |
805 | \r | |
806 | SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
807 | SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
808 | }\r | |
809 | \r | |
810 | if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {\r | |
811 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
812 | }\r | |
813 | \r | |
814 | if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {\r | |
815 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
816 | }\r | |
817 | \r | |
818 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
819 | }\r | |
820 | \r | |
0c18794e | 821 | /**\r |
822 | Process variable with platform key for verification.\r | |
823 | \r | |
824 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
825 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
826 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
827 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
828 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
829 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
830 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r | |
831 | @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r | |
832 | \r | |
833 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 834 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.\r |
835 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
0c18794e | 836 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r |
837 | \r | |
838 | **/\r | |
839 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
840 | ProcessVarWithPk (\r | |
841 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
842 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
843 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
844 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
845 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
846 | IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r | |
847 | IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r | |
848 | )\r | |
849 | {\r | |
850 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
851 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r | |
852 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *OldPkList;\r | |
853 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *OldPkData;\r | |
854 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r | |
855 | BOOLEAN TimeBase;\r | |
856 | BOOLEAN Del;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 857 | UINT8 *Payload;\r |
858 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
859 | UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r | |
860 | EFI_TIME *TimeStamp;\r | |
0c18794e | 861 | \r |
862 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0) {\r | |
863 | //\r | |
864 | // PK and KEK should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute.\r | |
865 | //\r | |
866 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
867 | }\r | |
868 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 869 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r |
0c18794e | 870 | \r |
871 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
872 | //\r | |
873 | // EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute means time-based X509 Cert PK.\r | |
874 | //\r | |
875 | TimeBase = TRUE;\r | |
876 | } else if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
877 | //\r | |
878 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute means counter-based RSA-2048 Cert PK.\r | |
879 | //\r | |
880 | TimeBase = FALSE;\r | |
881 | } else {\r | |
882 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
883 | }\r | |
884 | \r | |
885 | if (TimeBase) {\r | |
886 | //\r | |
887 | // Verify against X509 Cert PK.\r | |
888 | //\r | |
889 | Del = FALSE;\r | |
890 | Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Variable, Attributes, TRUE, &Del);\r | |
891 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
892 | //\r | |
893 | // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r | |
894 | //\r | |
895 | if (Del && IsPk) {\r | |
896 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r | |
897 | }\r | |
898 | }\r | |
899 | return Status;\r | |
900 | } else {\r | |
901 | //\r | |
902 | // Verify against RSA2048 Cert PK.\r | |
903 | //\r | |
904 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r | |
905 | if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount)) {\r | |
906 | //\r | |
907 | // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
908 | //\r | |
909 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
910 | }\r | |
911 | //\r | |
912 | // Get platform key from variable.\r | |
913 | //\r | |
914 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 915 | EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r |
916 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
917 | &PkVariable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 918 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
919 | FALSE\r | |
0c18794e | 920 | );\r |
921 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r | |
2d3fb919 | 922 | \r |
0c18794e | 923 | OldPkList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);\r |
924 | OldPkData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) OldPkList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + OldPkList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
925 | Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, OldPkData->SignatureData);\r | |
926 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
d912bad7 | 927 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(\r |
928 | VariableName,\r | |
929 | VendorGuid,\r | |
930 | (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r | |
931 | DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE);\r | |
932 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
933 | return Status;\r | |
934 | }\r | |
935 | \r | |
0c18794e | 936 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
2d3fb919 | 937 | VariableName,\r |
938 | VendorGuid,\r | |
939 | (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r | |
940 | DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r | |
941 | Attributes,\r | |
942 | 0,\r | |
943 | CertData->MonotonicCount,\r | |
0c18794e | 944 | Variable,\r |
945 | NULL\r | |
946 | );\r | |
2d3fb919 | 947 | \r |
0c18794e | 948 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
949 | //\r | |
950 | // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r | |
951 | //\r | |
952 | if ((DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) && IsPk) {\r | |
953 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r | |
954 | }\r | |
955 | }\r | |
956 | }\r | |
957 | }\r | |
958 | } else {\r | |
2d3fb919 | 959 | //\r |
ecc722ad | 960 | // Process PK or KEK in Setup mode or Custom Secure Boot mode.\r |
2d3fb919 | 961 | //\r |
962 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
963 | //\r | |
964 | // Time-based Authentication descriptor.\r | |
965 | //\r | |
966 | MonotonicCount = 0;\r | |
967 | TimeStamp = &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp;\r | |
968 | Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
969 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
970 | } else if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
971 | //\r | |
972 | // Counter-based Authentication descriptor.\r | |
973 | //\r | |
974 | MonotonicCount = ((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data)->MonotonicCount;\r | |
975 | TimeStamp = NULL;\r | |
976 | Payload = (UINT8*) Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r | |
977 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r | |
978 | } else {\r | |
979 | //\r | |
980 | // No Authentication descriptor.\r | |
981 | //\r | |
982 | MonotonicCount = 0;\r | |
983 | TimeStamp = NULL;\r | |
984 | Payload = Data;\r | |
985 | PayloadSize = DataSize;\r | |
986 | }\r | |
987 | \r | |
d912bad7 | 988 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r |
989 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
990 | return Status;\r | |
991 | }\r | |
992 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 993 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
994 | VariableName,\r | |
995 | VendorGuid,\r | |
996 | Payload,\r | |
997 | PayloadSize,\r | |
998 | Attributes,\r | |
999 | 0,\r | |
1000 | MonotonicCount,\r | |
1001 | Variable,\r | |
1002 | TimeStamp\r | |
1003 | );\r | |
ecc722ad | 1004 | \r |
1005 | if (IsPk) {\r | |
1006 | if (PayloadSize != 0) {\r | |
1007 | //\r | |
1008 | // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r | |
1009 | //\r | |
1010 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r | |
1011 | } else {\r | |
1012 | //\r | |
1013 | // If delete PK in custom mode, need change to setup mode.\r | |
1014 | //\r | |
1015 | UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r | |
1016 | }\r | |
1017 | } \r | |
0c18794e | 1018 | }\r |
1019 | \r | |
1020 | return Status;\r | |
1021 | }\r | |
1022 | \r | |
1023 | /**\r | |
1024 | Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r | |
1025 | \r | |
1026 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
1027 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
1028 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
1029 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
1030 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
1031 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
1032 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
1033 | \r | |
1034 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1035 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r |
1036 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
0c18794e | 1037 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r |
1038 | \r | |
1039 | **/\r | |
1040 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1041 | ProcessVarWithKek (\r | |
1042 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1043 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1044 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
1045 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1046 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
1047 | IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r | |
1048 | )\r | |
1049 | {\r | |
1050 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1051 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable;\r | |
1052 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *KekList;\r | |
1053 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KekItem;\r | |
1054 | UINT32 KekCount;\r | |
1055 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r | |
1056 | EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r | |
1057 | BOOLEAN IsFound;\r | |
1058 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
1059 | UINT32 KekDataSize;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1060 | UINT8 *Payload;\r |
1061 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
1062 | UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r | |
ecc722ad | 1063 | EFI_TIME *TimeStamp;\r |
1064 | \r | |
1065 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0) {\r | |
1066 | //\r | |
1067 | // DB and DBX should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute.\r | |
1068 | //\r | |
1069 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1070 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 1071 | \r |
ecc722ad | 1072 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
1073 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r | |
1074 | if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) &&\r | |
1075 | ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0)){\r | |
0c18794e | 1076 | //\r |
ecc722ad | 1077 | // In user mode, should set EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS or\r |
1078 | // EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute.\r | |
0c18794e | 1079 | //\r |
1080 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1081 | }\r | |
1082 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 1083 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r |
0c18794e | 1084 | //\r |
ecc722ad | 1085 | // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r |
0c18794e | 1086 | //\r |
ecc722ad | 1087 | return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Variable, Attributes, FALSE, NULL);\r |
1088 | } else if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
1089 | //\r | |
1090 | // Counter-based, verify against RSA2048 Cert KEK.\r | |
1091 | //\r | |
1092 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r | |
1093 | CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r | |
1094 | if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount)) {\r | |
1095 | //\r | |
1096 | // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
1097 | //\r | |
1098 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1099 | }\r | |
1100 | //\r | |
1101 | // Get KEK database from variable.\r | |
1102 | //\r | |
1103 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
1104 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r | |
1105 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
1106 | &KekVariable,\r | |
1107 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r | |
1108 | FALSE\r | |
1109 | );\r | |
1110 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r | |
0c18794e | 1111 | \r |
ecc722ad | 1112 | KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r |
1113 | KekList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
0c18794e | 1114 | \r |
ecc722ad | 1115 | //\r |
1116 | // Enumerate all Kek items in this list to verify the variable certificate data.\r | |
1117 | // If anyone is authenticated successfully, it means the variable is correct!\r | |
1118 | //\r | |
1119 | IsFound = FALSE;\r | |
1120 | while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= KekList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1121 | if (CompareGuid (&KekList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {\r | |
1122 | KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + KekList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1123 | KekCount = (KekList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - KekList->SignatureHeaderSize) / KekList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1124 | for (Index = 0; Index < KekCount; Index++) {\r | |
1125 | if (CompareMem (KekItem->SignatureData, CertBlock->PublicKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r | |
1126 | IsFound = TRUE;\r | |
1127 | break;\r | |
1128 | }\r | |
1129 | KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekItem + KekList->SignatureSize);\r | |
0c18794e | 1130 | }\r |
0c18794e | 1131 | }\r |
ecc722ad | 1132 | KekDataSize -= KekList->SignatureListSize;\r |
1133 | KekList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + KekList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
0c18794e | 1134 | }\r |
2d3fb919 | 1135 | \r |
ecc722ad | 1136 | if (!IsFound) {\r |
1137 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1138 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 1139 | \r |
ecc722ad | 1140 | Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, CertBlock->PublicKey);\r |
1141 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1142 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
1143 | VariableName,\r | |
1144 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1145 | (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r | |
1146 | DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r | |
1147 | Attributes,\r | |
1148 | 0,\r | |
1149 | CertData->MonotonicCount,\r | |
1150 | Variable,\r | |
1151 | NULL\r | |
1152 | );\r | |
1153 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 1154 | }\r |
1155 | } else {\r | |
1156 | //\r | |
ecc722ad | 1157 | // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.\r |
0c18794e | 1158 | //\r |
ecc722ad | 1159 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r |
1160 | //\r | |
1161 | // Time-based Authentication descriptor.\r | |
1162 | //\r | |
1163 | MonotonicCount = 0;\r | |
1164 | TimeStamp = &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp;\r | |
1165 | Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
1166 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
1167 | } else if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1168 | //\r |
1169 | // Counter-based Authentication descriptor.\r | |
1170 | //\r | |
1171 | MonotonicCount = ((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data)->MonotonicCount;\r | |
ecc722ad | 1172 | TimeStamp = NULL;\r |
2d3fb919 | 1173 | Payload = (UINT8*) Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r |
1174 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r | |
1175 | } else {\r | |
1176 | //\r | |
1177 | // No Authentication descriptor.\r | |
1178 | //\r | |
1179 | MonotonicCount = 0;\r | |
ecc722ad | 1180 | TimeStamp = NULL;\r |
2d3fb919 | 1181 | Payload = Data;\r |
1182 | PayloadSize = DataSize;\r | |
1183 | }\r | |
1184 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1185 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
2d3fb919 | 1186 | VariableName,\r |
1187 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1188 | Payload,\r | |
1189 | PayloadSize,\r | |
1190 | Attributes,\r | |
1191 | 0,\r | |
1192 | MonotonicCount,\r | |
0c18794e | 1193 | Variable,\r |
ecc722ad | 1194 | TimeStamp\r |
0c18794e | 1195 | );\r |
1196 | }\r | |
1197 | \r | |
1198 | return Status;\r | |
1199 | }\r | |
1200 | \r | |
1201 | /**\r | |
1202 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r | |
1203 | \r | |
1204 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
1205 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
1206 | \r | |
1207 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
1208 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
1209 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
1210 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
1211 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
1212 | \r | |
1213 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
1214 | @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r | |
1215 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
1216 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1217 | set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r |
1218 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
0c18794e | 1219 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r |
1220 | \r | |
1221 | **/\r | |
1222 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1223 | ProcessVariable (\r | |
1224 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1225 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1226 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
1227 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1228 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
1229 | IN UINT32 Attributes\r | |
1230 | )\r | |
1231 | {\r | |
1232 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1233 | BOOLEAN IsDeletion;\r | |
1234 | BOOLEAN IsFirstTime;\r | |
1235 | UINT8 *PubKey;\r | |
1236 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r | |
1237 | EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r | |
1238 | UINT32 KeyIndex;\r | |
1239 | UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r | |
1240 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 1241 | KeyIndex = 0;\r |
0c18794e | 1242 | CertData = NULL;\r |
1243 | CertBlock = NULL;\r | |
1244 | PubKey = NULL;\r | |
1245 | IsDeletion = FALSE;\r | |
1246 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 1247 | if (NeedPhysicallyPresent(VariableName, VendorGuid) && !UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r |
1248 | //\r | |
1249 | // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.\r | |
1250 | //\r | |
1251 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1252 | }\r | |
1253 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1254 | //\r |
1255 | // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r | |
1256 | //\r | |
1257 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
1258 | return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Variable, Attributes, FALSE, NULL);\r | |
1259 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1260 | \r |
0c18794e | 1261 | //\r |
1262 | // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.\r | |
1263 | //\r | |
1264 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
1265 | //\r | |
1266 | // Determine current operation type.\r | |
1267 | //\r | |
1268 | if (DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) {\r | |
1269 | IsDeletion = TRUE;\r | |
1270 | }\r | |
1271 | //\r | |
1272 | // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
1273 | //\r | |
1274 | if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
1275 | IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r | |
1276 | } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r | |
1277 | IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r | |
1278 | } else {\r | |
1279 | KeyIndex = Variable->CurrPtr->PubKeyIndex;\r | |
1280 | IsFirstTime = FALSE;\r | |
1281 | }\r | |
1282 | } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) &&\r | |
1283 | (Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0\r | |
1284 | ) {\r | |
1285 | //\r | |
1286 | // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r | |
1287 | //\r | |
1288 | return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r | |
1289 | } else {\r | |
1290 | //\r | |
1291 | // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.\r | |
1292 | // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r | |
1293 | //\r | |
1294 | Status = UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes, 0, 0, Variable, NULL);\r | |
1295 | return Status;\r | |
1296 | }\r | |
1297 | \r | |
1298 | //\r | |
1299 | // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.\r | |
1300 | //\r | |
1301 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r | |
1302 | CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r | |
1303 | PubKey = CertBlock->PublicKey;\r | |
1304 | \r | |
1305 | //\r | |
1306 | // Update Monotonic Count value.\r | |
1307 | //\r | |
1308 | MonotonicCount = CertData->MonotonicCount;\r | |
1309 | \r | |
1310 | if (!IsFirstTime) {\r | |
1311 | //\r | |
1312 | // Check input PubKey.\r | |
1313 | //\r | |
1314 | if (CompareMem (PubKey, mPubKeyStore + (KeyIndex - 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) != 0) {\r | |
1315 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1316 | }\r | |
1317 | //\r | |
1318 | // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable\r | |
1319 | // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.\r | |
1320 | //\r | |
1321 | if (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount) {\r | |
1322 | //\r | |
1323 | // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
1324 | //\r | |
1325 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1326 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1327 | }\r |
0c18794e | 1328 | //\r |
1329 | // Verify the certificate in Data payload.\r | |
1330 | //\r | |
1331 | Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, PubKey);\r | |
1332 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1333 | return Status;\r | |
1334 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1335 | \r |
0c18794e | 1336 | //\r |
1337 | // Now, the signature has been verified!\r | |
1338 | //\r | |
1339 | if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {\r | |
1340 | //\r | |
1341 | // Update public key database variable if need.\r | |
1342 | //\r | |
1343 | KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey);\r | |
1344 | }\r | |
1345 | \r | |
1346 | //\r | |
1347 | // Verification pass.\r | |
1348 | //\r | |
1349 | return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, Attributes, KeyIndex, MonotonicCount, Variable, NULL);\r | |
1350 | }\r | |
1351 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 1352 | /**\r |
1353 | Merge two buffers which formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. Only the new EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r | |
1354 | will be appended to the original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, duplicate EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r | |
1355 | will be ignored.\r | |
1356 | \r | |
1357 | @param[in, out] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r | |
1358 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r | |
1359 | @param[in] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST to be appended.\r | |
1360 | @param[in] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r | |
1361 | \r | |
1362 | @return Size of the merged buffer.\r | |
1363 | \r | |
1364 | **/\r | |
1365 | UINTN\r | |
1366 | AppendSignatureList (\r | |
1367 | IN OUT VOID *Data,\r | |
1368 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1369 | IN VOID *NewData,\r | |
1370 | IN UINTN NewDataSize\r | |
1371 | )\r | |
1372 | {\r | |
1373 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1374 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1375 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
1376 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r | |
1377 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;\r | |
1378 | UINTN NewCertCount;\r | |
1379 | UINTN Index;\r | |
1380 | UINTN Index2;\r | |
1381 | UINTN Size;\r | |
1382 | UINT8 *Tail;\r | |
1383 | UINTN CopiedCount;\r | |
1384 | UINTN SignatureListSize;\r | |
1385 | BOOLEAN IsNewCert;\r | |
1386 | \r | |
1387 | Tail = (UINT8 *) Data + DataSize;\r | |
1388 | \r | |
1389 | NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;\r | |
1390 | while ((NewDataSize > 0) && (NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1391 | NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1392 | NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1393 | \r | |
1394 | CopiedCount = 0;\r | |
1395 | for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1396 | IsNewCert = TRUE;\r | |
1397 | \r | |
1398 | Size = DataSize;\r | |
1399 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
1400 | while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1401 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&\r | |
1402 | (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {\r | |
1403 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1404 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1405 | for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {\r | |
1406 | //\r | |
1407 | // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.\r | |
1408 | //\r | |
1409 | if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {\r | |
1410 | IsNewCert = FALSE;\r | |
1411 | break;\r | |
1412 | }\r | |
1413 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1414 | }\r | |
1415 | }\r | |
1416 | \r | |
1417 | if (!IsNewCert) {\r | |
1418 | break;\r | |
1419 | }\r | |
1420 | Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1421 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1422 | }\r | |
1423 | \r | |
1424 | if (IsNewCert) {\r | |
1425 | //\r | |
1426 | // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, append it.\r | |
1427 | //\r | |
1428 | if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r | |
1429 | //\r | |
1430 | // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r | |
1431 | //\r | |
1432 | CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1433 | Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r | |
1434 | }\r | |
1435 | \r | |
1436 | CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1437 | Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1438 | CopiedCount++;\r | |
1439 | }\r | |
1440 | \r | |
1441 | NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1442 | }\r | |
1443 | \r | |
1444 | //\r | |
1445 | // Update SignatureListSize in newly appended EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r | |
1446 | //\r | |
1447 | if (CopiedCount != 0) {\r | |
1448 | SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1449 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);\r | |
1450 | CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r | |
1451 | }\r | |
1452 | \r | |
1453 | NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1454 | NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1455 | }\r | |
1456 | \r | |
1457 | return (Tail - (UINT8 *) Data);\r | |
1458 | }\r | |
1459 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1460 | /**\r |
1461 | Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1462 | \r | |
1463 | \r | |
1464 | @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1465 | @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1466 | \r | |
1467 | @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r | |
1468 | @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r | |
1469 | \r | |
1470 | **/\r | |
1471 | BOOLEAN\r | |
1472 | CompareTimeStamp (\r | |
1473 | IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r | |
1474 | IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r | |
1475 | )\r | |
1476 | {\r | |
1477 | if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r | |
1478 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r | |
1479 | } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r | |
1480 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r | |
1481 | } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r | |
1482 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r | |
1483 | } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r | |
1484 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r | |
1485 | } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r | |
1486 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < FirstTime->Minute);\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1487 | }\r |
0c18794e | 1488 | \r |
1489 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r | |
1490 | }\r | |
1491 | \r | |
1492 | /**\r | |
1493 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r | |
1494 | \r | |
1495 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
1496 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
1497 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
1498 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
1499 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
1500 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
1501 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
1502 | @param[in] Pk Verify against PK or KEK database.\r | |
1503 | @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r | |
1504 | \r | |
1505 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1506 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r |
1507 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
0c18794e | 1508 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r |
1509 | of resources.\r | |
1510 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r | |
1511 | \r | |
1512 | **/\r | |
1513 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1514 | VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
1515 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1516 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1517 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
1518 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1519 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
1520 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r | |
1521 | IN BOOLEAN Pk,\r | |
1522 | OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r | |
1523 | )\r | |
1524 | {\r | |
1525 | UINT8 *RootCert;\r | |
1526 | UINT8 *SigData;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1527 | UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r |
0c18794e | 1528 | UINTN RootCertSize;\r |
1529 | UINTN Index;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1530 | UINTN CertCount;\r |
1531 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
0c18794e | 1532 | UINT32 Attr;\r |
1533 | UINT32 SigDataSize;\r | |
1534 | UINT32 KekDataSize;\r | |
1535 | BOOLEAN Result;\r | |
1536 | BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r | |
1537 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1538 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1539 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1540 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable;\r | |
1541 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r | |
1542 | UINT8 *NewData;\r | |
1543 | UINTN NewDataSize;\r | |
1544 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1545 | UINT8 *Buffer;\r |
1546 | UINTN Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 1547 | \r |
1548 | Result = FALSE;\r | |
1549 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
1550 | CertData = NULL;\r | |
1551 | NewData = NULL;\r | |
1552 | Attr = Attributes;\r | |
1553 | \r | |
1554 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1555 | // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is\r |
0c18794e | 1556 | // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r |
2d3fb919 | 1557 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new\r |
1558 | // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new\r | |
1559 | // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not\r | |
0c18794e | 1560 | // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r |
1561 | //\r | |
1562 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1563 | \r |
1564 | //\r | |
1565 | // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the\r | |
1566 | // TimeStamp value are set to zero.\r | |
1567 | //\r | |
1568 | if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||\r | |
1569 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||\r | |
1570 | (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r | |
1571 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r | |
1572 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {\r | |
2e24814a | 1573 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
2d3fb919 | 1574 | }\r |
1575 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1576 | if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r |
1577 | if (CompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, &Variable->CurrPtr->TimeStamp)) {\r | |
1578 | //\r | |
1579 | // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
1580 | //\r | |
1581 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1582 | }\r | |
1583 | }\r | |
1584 | \r | |
1585 | //\r | |
1586 | // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r | |
1587 | // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r | |
1588 | //\r | |
1589 | if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1590 | !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r |
0c18794e | 1591 | //\r |
1592 | // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
1593 | //\r | |
1594 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1595 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1596 | \r |
0c18794e | 1597 | //\r |
1598 | // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r | |
1599 | // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r | |
1600 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1601 | SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;\r |
1602 | SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r | |
648f98d1 | 1603 | \r |
0c18794e | 1604 | //\r |
1605 | // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r | |
1606 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1607 | PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;\r |
1608 | PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;\r | |
0c18794e | 1609 | \r |
1610 | //\r | |
1611 | // Construct a buffer to fill with (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r | |
1612 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1613 | NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r |
1614 | sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
1615 | NewData = mSerializationRuntimeBuffer;\r | |
0c18794e | 1616 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 1617 | Buffer = NewData;\r |
1618 | Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
1619 | CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);\r | |
1620 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 1621 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 1622 | Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r |
1623 | CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);\r | |
1624 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 1625 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 1626 | Length = sizeof (UINT32);\r |
1627 | CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);\r | |
1628 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 1629 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 1630 | Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);\r |
1631 | CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);\r | |
1632 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 1633 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 1634 | CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r |
0c18794e | 1635 | \r |
1636 | if (Pk) {\r | |
1637 | //\r | |
1638 | // Get platform key from variable.\r | |
1639 | //\r | |
1640 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1641 | EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r |
1642 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
1643 | &PkVariable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 1644 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
1645 | FALSE\r | |
0c18794e | 1646 | );\r |
1647 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1648 | return Status;\r | |
1649 | }\r | |
1650 | \r | |
1651 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1652 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1653 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r | |
1654 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1655 | \r | |
1656 | \r | |
1657 | //\r | |
1658 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
1659 | //\r | |
1660 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
1661 | SigData,\r | |
1662 | SigDataSize,\r | |
1663 | RootCert,\r | |
1664 | RootCertSize,\r | |
1665 | NewData,\r | |
1666 | NewDataSize\r | |
1667 | );\r | |
1668 | \r | |
1669 | } else {\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1670 | \r |
0c18794e | 1671 | //\r |
1672 | // Get KEK database from variable.\r | |
1673 | //\r | |
1674 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1675 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r |
1676 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
1677 | &KekVariable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 1678 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
1679 | FALSE\r | |
0c18794e | 1680 | );\r |
1681 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1682 | return Status;\r | |
1683 | }\r | |
1684 | \r | |
1685 | //\r | |
1686 | // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1687 | //\r |
0c18794e | 1688 | KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r |
1689 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1690 | while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1691 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
1692 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1693 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1694 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1695 | //\r | |
1696 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r | |
1697 | //\r | |
1698 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r | |
1699 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1700 | \r |
0c18794e | 1701 | //\r |
1702 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
1703 | //\r | |
1704 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
1705 | SigData,\r | |
1706 | SigDataSize,\r | |
1707 | RootCert,\r | |
1708 | RootCertSize,\r | |
1709 | NewData,\r | |
1710 | NewDataSize\r | |
1711 | );\r | |
1712 | if (VerifyStatus) {\r | |
1713 | goto Exit;\r | |
1714 | }\r | |
1715 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1716 | }\r | |
1717 | }\r | |
1718 | KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1719 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1720 | }\r | |
1721 | }\r | |
1722 | \r | |
1723 | Exit:\r | |
1724 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1725 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r |
1726 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1727 | }\r | |
1728 | \r | |
d912bad7 | 1729 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r |
1730 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1731 | return Status;\r | |
1732 | }\r | |
1733 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 1734 | if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (VarDel != NULL)) {\r |
0c18794e | 1735 | *VarDel = TRUE;\r |
1736 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1737 | \r |
0c18794e | 1738 | //\r |
1739 | // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r | |
1740 | //\r | |
1741 | return UpdateVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1742 | VariableName,\r |
1743 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1744 | PayloadPtr,\r | |
1745 | PayloadSize,\r | |
1746 | Attributes,\r | |
1747 | 0,\r | |
1748 | 0,\r | |
0c18794e | 1749 | Variable,\r |
1750 | &CertData->TimeStamp\r | |
1751 | );\r | |
1752 | }\r |