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0c18794e | 1 | /** @file\r |
2 | Implement authentication services for the authenticated variable\r | |
3 | service in UEFI2.2.\r | |
4 | \r | |
5 | Copyright (c) 2009 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r | |
2d3fb919 | 6 | This program and the accompanying materials\r |
7 | are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r | |
8 | which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r | |
0c18794e | 9 | http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r |
10 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 11 | THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r |
0c18794e | 12 | WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r |
13 | \r | |
14 | **/\r | |
15 | \r | |
16 | #include "Variable.h"\r | |
17 | #include "AuthService.h"\r | |
18 | \r | |
19 | ///\r | |
20 | /// Global database array for scratch\r | |
2d3fb919 | 21 | ///\r |
0c18794e | 22 | UINT8 mPubKeyStore[MAX_KEYDB_SIZE];\r |
23 | UINT32 mPubKeyNumber;\r | |
24 | UINT32 mPlatformMode;\r | |
25 | EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[SIGSUPPORT_NUM] = {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID};\r | |
26 | //\r | |
27 | // Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r | |
28 | //\r | |
29 | CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r | |
30 | //\r | |
31 | // Hash context pointer\r | |
32 | //\r | |
33 | VOID *mHashCtx = NULL;\r | |
34 | \r | |
0c18794e | 35 | //\r |
2d3fb919 | 36 | // Pointer to runtime buffer.\r |
37 | // For "Append" operation to an existing variable, a read/modify/write operation\r | |
38 | // is supported by firmware internally. Reserve runtime buffer to cache previous\r | |
0c18794e | 39 | // variable data in runtime phase because memory allocation is forbidden in virtual mode.\r |
40 | //\r | |
41 | VOID *mStorageArea = NULL;\r | |
42 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 43 | //\r |
44 | // The serialization of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r | |
45 | // parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r | |
46 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value\r | |
47 | // i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)\r | |
48 | //\r | |
49 | UINT8 *mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = NULL;\r | |
50 | \r | |
d912bad7 | 51 | //\r |
52 | // Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.\r | |
53 | // These data are used to peform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.\r | |
54 | //\r | |
55 | EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {\r | |
56 | //{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }\r | |
57 | {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },\r | |
58 | {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
59 | {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
60 | {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },\r | |
61 | {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
62 | {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},\r | |
63 | {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },\r | |
64 | {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },\r | |
65 | {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 }\r | |
66 | };\r | |
67 | \r | |
0c18794e | 68 | /**\r |
2d3fb919 | 69 | Internal function to delete a Variable given its name and GUID, no authentication\r |
70 | required.\r | |
0c18794e | 71 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 72 | @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r |
73 | @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r | |
0c18794e | 74 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 75 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable deleted successfully.\r |
76 | @retval Others The driver failded to start the device.\r | |
0c18794e | 77 | \r |
78 | **/\r | |
79 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
2d3fb919 | 80 | DeleteVariable (\r |
81 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
82 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r | |
83 | )\r | |
84 | {\r | |
85 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
86 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
87 | \r | |
88 | Status = FindVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal);\r | |
89 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
90 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
91 | }\r | |
92 | \r | |
93 | ASSERT (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL);\r | |
94 | return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, &Variable, NULL);\r | |
95 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 96 | \r |
97 | /**\r | |
98 | Initializes for authenticated varibale service.\r | |
99 | \r | |
100 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Function successfully executed.\r | |
101 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Fail to allocate enough memory resources.\r | |
102 | \r | |
103 | **/\r | |
104 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
105 | AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (\r | |
106 | VOID\r | |
107 | )\r | |
108 | {\r | |
109 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
110 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
7aaf2fd6 | 111 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r |
0c18794e | 112 | UINT8 VarValue;\r |
113 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r | |
114 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
115 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
116 | UINTN CtxSize;\r | |
beda2356 | 117 | UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r |
118 | UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 119 | \r |
0c18794e | 120 | //\r |
121 | // Initialize hash context.\r | |
122 | //\r | |
123 | CtxSize = Sha256GetContextSize ();\r | |
124 | mHashCtx = AllocateRuntimePool (CtxSize);\r | |
125 | if (mHashCtx == NULL) {\r | |
126 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
127 | }\r | |
128 | \r | |
129 | //\r | |
130 | // Reserved runtime buffer for "Append" operation in virtual mode.\r | |
131 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 132 | mStorageArea = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize));\r |
0c18794e | 133 | if (mStorageArea == NULL) {\r |
134 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
135 | }\r | |
136 | \r | |
137 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 138 | // Prepare runtime buffer for serialized data of time-based authenticated\r |
139 | // Variable, i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r | |
140 | //\r | |
141 | mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) + sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r | |
142 | if (mSerializationRuntimeBuffer == NULL) {\r | |
143 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
144 | }\r | |
145 | \r | |
146 | //\r | |
147 | // Check "AuthVarKeyDatabase" variable's existence.\r | |
148 | // If it doesn't exist, create a new one with initial value of 0 and EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
0c18794e | 149 | //\r |
150 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 151 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r |
152 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
153 | &Variable,\r | |
0c18794e | 154 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
155 | );\r | |
156 | \r | |
157 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
158 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
159 | VarValue = 0;\r | |
160 | mPubKeyNumber = 0;\r | |
161 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
162 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
163 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
164 | &VarValue,\r | |
165 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
166 | VarAttr,\r | |
167 | 0,\r | |
168 | 0,\r | |
169 | &Variable,\r | |
170 | NULL\r | |
171 | );\r | |
172 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
173 | return Status;\r | |
174 | }\r | |
175 | } else {\r | |
176 | //\r | |
177 | // Load database in global variable for cache.\r | |
178 | //\r | |
179 | DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r | |
180 | Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r | |
181 | ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r | |
182 | CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r | |
183 | mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r | |
184 | }\r | |
7aaf2fd6 | 185 | \r |
186 | FindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &PkVariable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal);\r | |
187 | if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
188 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r | |
189 | } else {\r | |
190 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r | |
191 | }\r | |
192 | \r | |
0c18794e | 193 | //\r |
2d3fb919 | 194 | // Check "SetupMode" variable's existence.\r |
0c18794e | 195 | // If it doesn't exist, check PK database's existence to determine the value.\r |
2d3fb919 | 196 | // Then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r |
0c18794e | 197 | //\r |
198 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 199 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r |
200 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
201 | &Variable,\r | |
0c18794e | 202 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
203 | );\r | |
204 | \r | |
205 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
7aaf2fd6 | 206 | if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r |
0c18794e | 207 | mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;\r |
208 | } else {\r | |
209 | mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;\r | |
210 | }\r | |
211 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 212 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r |
0c18794e | 213 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
214 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r | |
215 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
216 | &mPlatformMode,\r | |
217 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
218 | VarAttr,\r | |
219 | 0,\r | |
220 | 0,\r | |
221 | &Variable,\r | |
222 | NULL\r | |
223 | );\r | |
224 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
225 | return Status;\r | |
226 | }\r | |
227 | } else {\r | |
228 | mPlatformMode = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r | |
229 | }\r | |
230 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 231 | // Check "SignatureSupport" variable's existence.\r |
232 | // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
0c18794e | 233 | //\r |
234 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 235 | EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r |
236 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
237 | &Variable,\r | |
0c18794e | 238 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
239 | );\r | |
240 | \r | |
241 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
242 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
243 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
244 | EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r | |
245 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
246 | mSignatureSupport,\r | |
247 | SIGSUPPORT_NUM * sizeof(EFI_GUID),\r | |
248 | VarAttr,\r | |
249 | 0,\r | |
250 | 0,\r | |
251 | &Variable,\r | |
252 | NULL\r | |
253 | );\r | |
254 | }\r | |
beda2356 | 255 | \r |
256 | //\r | |
257 | // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 258 | // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in USER_MODE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.\r |
beda2356 | 259 | // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.\r |
260 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 261 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r |
beda2356 | 262 | FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal);\r |
263 | if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r | |
264 | SecureBootEnable = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r | |
2d3fb919 | 265 | } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r |
266 | //\r | |
267 | // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in USER_MODE.\r | |
268 | //\r | |
269 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r | |
beda2356 | 270 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
2d3fb919 | 271 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r |
272 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
273 | &SecureBootEnable,\r | |
274 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
275 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
276 | 0,\r | |
277 | 0,\r | |
beda2356 | 278 | &Variable,\r |
279 | NULL\r | |
280 | );\r | |
281 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
282 | return Status;\r | |
283 | }\r | |
284 | }\r | |
285 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 286 | if (SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE && mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r |
287 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r | |
288 | } else {\r | |
289 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
290 | }\r | |
291 | FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal);\r | |
292 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
293 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r | |
294 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
295 | &SecureBootMode,\r | |
296 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
297 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r | |
298 | 0,\r | |
299 | 0,\r | |
300 | &Variable,\r | |
301 | NULL\r | |
302 | );\r | |
303 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
304 | return Status;\r | |
305 | }\r | |
306 | \r | |
7aaf2fd6 | 307 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, mPlatformMode));\r |
308 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBootMode));\r | |
309 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));\r | |
310 | \r | |
0c18794e | 311 | //\r |
312 | // Detect whether a secure platform-specific method to clear PK(Platform Key)\r | |
2d3fb919 | 313 | // is configured by platform owner. This method is provided for users force to clear PK\r |
0c18794e | 314 | // in case incorrect enrollment mis-haps.\r |
315 | //\r | |
316 | if (ForceClearPK ()) {\r | |
7aaf2fd6 | 317 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable PK/KEK/DB/DBX will be cleared in clear PK mode.\n"));\r |
318 | \r | |
0c18794e | 319 | //\r |
2d3fb919 | 320 | // 1. Clear PK.\r |
0c18794e | 321 | //\r |
2d3fb919 | 322 | Status = DeleteVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid);\r |
323 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
324 | return Status;\r | |
0c18794e | 325 | }\r |
326 | \r | |
327 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 328 | // 2. Update "SetupMode" variable to SETUP_MODE.\r |
0c18794e | 329 | //\r |
330 | UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r | |
2d3fb919 | 331 | \r |
332 | //\r | |
333 | // 3. Clear KEK, DB and DBX.\r | |
334 | //\r | |
335 | DeleteVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid);\r | |
336 | DeleteVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid);\r | |
337 | DeleteVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid);\r | |
0c18794e | 338 | }\r |
2d3fb919 | 339 | \r |
0c18794e | 340 | return Status;\r |
341 | }\r | |
342 | \r | |
343 | /**\r | |
344 | Add public key in store and return its index.\r | |
345 | \r | |
346 | @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data\r | |
347 | \r | |
348 | @return Index of new added item\r | |
349 | \r | |
350 | **/\r | |
351 | UINT32\r | |
352 | AddPubKeyInStore (\r | |
353 | IN UINT8 *PubKey\r | |
354 | )\r | |
355 | {\r | |
356 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
357 | BOOLEAN IsFound;\r | |
358 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
359 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
360 | UINT8 *Ptr;\r | |
361 | \r | |
362 | if (PubKey == NULL) {\r | |
363 | return 0;\r | |
364 | }\r | |
365 | \r | |
366 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
367 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
368 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
369 | &Variable,\r | |
370 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r | |
371 | );\r | |
372 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r | |
373 | //\r | |
374 | // Check whether the public key entry does exist.\r | |
375 | //\r | |
376 | IsFound = FALSE;\r | |
377 | for (Ptr = mPubKeyStore, Index = 1; Index <= mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r | |
378 | if (CompareMem (Ptr, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r | |
379 | IsFound = TRUE;\r | |
380 | break;\r | |
381 | }\r | |
382 | Ptr += EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r | |
383 | }\r | |
384 | \r | |
385 | if (!IsFound) {\r | |
386 | //\r | |
387 | // Add public key in database.\r | |
388 | //\r | |
389 | if (mPubKeyNumber == MAX_KEY_NUM) {\r | |
390 | //\r | |
391 | // Notes: Database is full, need enhancement here, currently just return 0.\r | |
392 | //\r | |
393 | return 0;\r | |
394 | }\r | |
395 | \r | |
396 | CopyMem (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r | |
397 | Index = ++mPubKeyNumber;\r | |
398 | //\r | |
399 | // Update public key database variable.\r | |
400 | //\r | |
401 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
402 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
403 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
404 | mPubKeyStore,\r | |
405 | mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE,\r | |
406 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r | |
407 | 0,\r | |
408 | 0,\r | |
409 | &Variable,\r | |
410 | NULL\r | |
411 | );\r | |
412 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r | |
413 | }\r | |
414 | \r | |
415 | return Index;\r | |
416 | }\r | |
417 | \r | |
418 | /**\r | |
419 | Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256 type.\r | |
420 | Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.\r | |
421 | \r | |
422 | @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.\r | |
423 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
424 | @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.\r | |
425 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 426 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r |
0c18794e | 427 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.\r |
2d3fb919 | 428 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.\r |
0c18794e | 429 | \r |
430 | **/\r | |
431 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
432 | VerifyCounterBasedPayload (\r | |
433 | IN UINT8 *Data,\r | |
434 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
435 | IN UINT8 *PubKey\r | |
436 | )\r | |
437 | {\r | |
438 | BOOLEAN Status;\r | |
439 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r | |
440 | EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r | |
441 | UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r | |
442 | VOID *Rsa;\r | |
443 | \r | |
444 | Rsa = NULL;\r | |
445 | CertData = NULL;\r | |
446 | CertBlock = NULL;\r | |
447 | \r | |
448 | if (Data == NULL || PubKey == NULL) {\r | |
449 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
450 | }\r | |
451 | \r | |
452 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r | |
453 | CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r | |
454 | \r | |
455 | //\r | |
456 | // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r | |
457 | // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256.\r | |
458 | //\r | |
459 | if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r | |
460 | !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Sha256Guid)\r | |
461 | ) {\r | |
462 | //\r | |
463 | // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
464 | //\r | |
465 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
466 | }\r | |
467 | //\r | |
468 | // Hash data payload with SHA256.\r | |
469 | //\r | |
470 | ZeroMem (Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r | |
471 | Status = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r | |
472 | if (!Status) {\r | |
473 | goto Done;\r | |
474 | }\r | |
475 | Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, (UINTN) (DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE));\r | |
476 | if (!Status) {\r | |
477 | goto Done;\r | |
478 | }\r | |
479 | //\r | |
480 | // Hash Monotonic Count.\r | |
481 | //\r | |
482 | Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &CertData->MonotonicCount, sizeof (UINT64));\r | |
483 | if (!Status) {\r | |
484 | goto Done;\r | |
485 | }\r | |
486 | Status = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Digest);\r | |
487 | if (!Status) {\r | |
488 | goto Done;\r | |
489 | }\r | |
490 | //\r | |
491 | // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.\r | |
492 | //\r | |
493 | Rsa = RsaNew ();\r | |
494 | ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);\r | |
2d3fb919 | 495 | //\r |
0c18794e | 496 | // Set RSA Key Components.\r |
497 | // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r | |
498 | //\r | |
499 | Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r | |
500 | if (!Status) {\r | |
501 | goto Done;\r | |
502 | }\r | |
503 | Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r | |
504 | if (!Status) {\r | |
505 | goto Done;\r | |
506 | }\r | |
507 | //\r | |
508 | // Verify the signature.\r | |
509 | //\r | |
510 | Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 511 | Rsa,\r |
512 | Digest,\r | |
513 | SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,\r | |
514 | CertBlock->Signature,\r | |
0c18794e | 515 | EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r |
516 | );\r | |
517 | \r | |
518 | Done:\r | |
519 | if (Rsa != NULL) {\r | |
520 | RsaFree (Rsa);\r | |
521 | }\r | |
522 | if (Status) {\r | |
523 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
524 | } else {\r | |
525 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
526 | }\r | |
527 | }\r | |
528 | \r | |
0c18794e | 529 | /**\r |
530 | Update platform mode.\r | |
531 | \r | |
532 | @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r | |
533 | \r | |
534 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
535 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r | |
536 | \r | |
537 | **/\r | |
538 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
539 | UpdatePlatformMode (\r | |
540 | IN UINT32 Mode\r | |
541 | )\r | |
542 | {\r | |
543 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
544 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
545 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r | |
546 | UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r | |
beda2356 | 547 | UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r |
548 | UINTN VariableDataSize;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 549 | \r |
0c18794e | 550 | Status = FindVariable (\r |
2d3fb919 | 551 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r |
552 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
553 | &Variable,\r | |
0c18794e | 554 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
555 | );\r | |
556 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
557 | return Status;\r | |
558 | }\r | |
559 | \r | |
560 | mPlatformMode = Mode;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 561 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r |
0c18794e | 562 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
563 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r | |
564 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
565 | &mPlatformMode,\r | |
566 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
567 | VarAttr,\r | |
568 | 0,\r | |
569 | 0,\r | |
570 | &Variable,\r | |
571 | NULL\r | |
572 | );\r | |
573 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
574 | return Status;\r | |
575 | }\r | |
576 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 577 | if (AtRuntime ()) {\r |
578 | //\r | |
579 | // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r | |
580 | // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r | |
581 | // Variable in runtime.\r | |
582 | //\r | |
583 | return Status;\r | |
584 | }\r | |
585 | \r | |
0c18794e | 586 | //\r |
587 | // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r | |
588 | // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r | |
589 | // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r | |
590 | //\r | |
591 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 592 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r |
593 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
594 | &Variable,\r | |
0c18794e | 595 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
596 | );\r | |
597 | //\r | |
598 | // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r | |
599 | // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r | |
600 | // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r | |
601 | //\r | |
602 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
603 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
604 | } else {\r | |
605 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r | |
606 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r | |
607 | } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r | |
608 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
609 | } else {\r | |
610 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
611 | }\r | |
612 | }\r | |
613 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 614 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r |
beda2356 | 615 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
0c18794e | 616 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r |
617 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
618 | &SecureBootMode,\r | |
619 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
620 | VarAttr,\r | |
621 | 0,\r | |
622 | 0,\r | |
623 | &Variable,\r | |
624 | NULL\r | |
625 | );\r | |
beda2356 | 626 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
627 | return Status;\r | |
628 | }\r | |
629 | \r | |
630 | //\r | |
631 | // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r | |
632 | //\r | |
633 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 634 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r |
635 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
636 | &Variable,\r | |
beda2356 | 637 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
638 | );\r | |
2d3fb919 | 639 | \r |
beda2356 | 640 | if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r |
641 | //\r | |
642 | // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r | |
643 | //\r | |
644 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r | |
645 | VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r | |
646 | } else {\r | |
647 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 648 | // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r |
beda2356 | 649 | // variable is not in secure boot state.\r |
650 | //\r | |
651 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL || EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
652 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
653 | }\r | |
654 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r | |
655 | VariableDataSize = 0;\r | |
656 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 657 | \r |
beda2356 | 658 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
2d3fb919 | 659 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r |
660 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
661 | &SecureBootEnable,\r | |
662 | VariableDataSize,\r | |
663 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
664 | 0,\r | |
665 | 0,\r | |
beda2356 | 666 | &Variable,\r |
667 | NULL\r | |
668 | );\r | |
669 | return Status;\r | |
0c18794e | 670 | }\r |
671 | \r | |
d912bad7 | 672 | /**\r |
673 | Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK variable.\r | |
674 | \r | |
675 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.\r | |
676 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
677 | @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.\r | |
678 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
679 | \r | |
680 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.\r | |
681 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.\r | |
682 | \r | |
683 | **/\r | |
684 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
685 | CheckSignatureListFormat(\r | |
686 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
687 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
688 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
689 | IN UINTN DataSize\r | |
690 | )\r | |
691 | {\r | |
692 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r | |
693 | UINTN SigDataSize;\r | |
694 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
695 | UINT32 SigCount;\r | |
696 | BOOLEAN IsPk;\r | |
697 | \r | |
698 | if (DataSize == 0) {\r | |
699 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
700 | }\r | |
701 | \r | |
702 | ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);\r | |
703 | \r | |
704 | if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){\r | |
705 | IsPk = TRUE;\r | |
706 | } else if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)) {\r | |
707 | IsPk = FALSE;\r | |
708 | } else {\r | |
709 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
710 | }\r | |
711 | \r | |
712 | SigCount = 0;\r | |
713 | SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
714 | SigDataSize = DataSize;\r | |
715 | \r | |
716 | //\r | |
717 | // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.\r | |
718 | // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.\r | |
719 | //\r | |
720 | while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
721 | for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {\r | |
722 | if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {\r | |
723 | //\r | |
724 | // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner \r | |
725 | // component) add the data length according to signature type.\r | |
726 | //\r | |
727 | if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) && \r | |
728 | (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {\r | |
729 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
730 | }\r | |
731 | if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINTN) ~0) &&\r | |
732 | SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {\r | |
733 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
734 | }\r | |
735 | break;\r | |
736 | }\r | |
737 | }\r | |
738 | \r | |
739 | if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {\r | |
740 | //\r | |
741 | // Undefined signature type.\r | |
742 | //\r | |
743 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
744 | }\r | |
745 | \r | |
746 | if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {\r | |
747 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
748 | }\r | |
749 | SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;\r | |
750 | \r | |
751 | SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
752 | SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
753 | }\r | |
754 | \r | |
755 | if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {\r | |
756 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
757 | }\r | |
758 | \r | |
759 | if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {\r | |
760 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
761 | }\r | |
762 | \r | |
763 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
764 | }\r | |
765 | \r | |
0c18794e | 766 | /**\r |
767 | Process variable with platform key for verification.\r | |
768 | \r | |
769 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
770 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
771 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
772 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
773 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
774 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
775 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r | |
776 | @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r | |
777 | \r | |
778 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 779 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.\r |
780 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
0c18794e | 781 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r |
782 | \r | |
783 | **/\r | |
784 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
785 | ProcessVarWithPk (\r | |
786 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
787 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
788 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
789 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
790 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
791 | IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r | |
792 | IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r | |
793 | )\r | |
794 | {\r | |
795 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
796 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r | |
797 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *OldPkList;\r | |
798 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *OldPkData;\r | |
799 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r | |
800 | BOOLEAN TimeBase;\r | |
801 | BOOLEAN Del;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 802 | UINT8 *Payload;\r |
803 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
804 | UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r | |
805 | EFI_TIME *TimeStamp;\r | |
0c18794e | 806 | \r |
807 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0) {\r | |
808 | //\r | |
809 | // PK and KEK should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute.\r | |
810 | //\r | |
811 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
812 | }\r | |
813 | \r | |
814 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r | |
815 | \r | |
816 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
817 | //\r | |
818 | // EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute means time-based X509 Cert PK.\r | |
819 | //\r | |
820 | TimeBase = TRUE;\r | |
821 | } else if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
822 | //\r | |
823 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute means counter-based RSA-2048 Cert PK.\r | |
824 | //\r | |
825 | TimeBase = FALSE;\r | |
826 | } else {\r | |
827 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
828 | }\r | |
829 | \r | |
830 | if (TimeBase) {\r | |
831 | //\r | |
832 | // Verify against X509 Cert PK.\r | |
833 | //\r | |
834 | Del = FALSE;\r | |
835 | Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Variable, Attributes, TRUE, &Del);\r | |
836 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
837 | //\r | |
838 | // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r | |
839 | //\r | |
840 | if (Del && IsPk) {\r | |
841 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r | |
842 | }\r | |
843 | }\r | |
844 | return Status;\r | |
845 | } else {\r | |
846 | //\r | |
847 | // Verify against RSA2048 Cert PK.\r | |
848 | //\r | |
849 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r | |
850 | if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount)) {\r | |
851 | //\r | |
852 | // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
853 | //\r | |
854 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
855 | }\r | |
856 | //\r | |
857 | // Get platform key from variable.\r | |
858 | //\r | |
859 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 860 | EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r |
861 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
862 | &PkVariable,\r | |
0c18794e | 863 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
864 | );\r | |
865 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r | |
2d3fb919 | 866 | \r |
0c18794e | 867 | OldPkList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);\r |
868 | OldPkData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) OldPkList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + OldPkList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
869 | Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, OldPkData->SignatureData);\r | |
870 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
d912bad7 | 871 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(\r |
872 | VariableName,\r | |
873 | VendorGuid,\r | |
874 | (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r | |
875 | DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE);\r | |
876 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
877 | return Status;\r | |
878 | }\r | |
879 | \r | |
0c18794e | 880 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
2d3fb919 | 881 | VariableName,\r |
882 | VendorGuid,\r | |
883 | (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r | |
884 | DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r | |
885 | Attributes,\r | |
886 | 0,\r | |
887 | CertData->MonotonicCount,\r | |
0c18794e | 888 | Variable,\r |
889 | NULL\r | |
890 | );\r | |
2d3fb919 | 891 | \r |
0c18794e | 892 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
893 | //\r | |
894 | // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r | |
895 | //\r | |
896 | if ((DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) && IsPk) {\r | |
897 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r | |
898 | }\r | |
899 | }\r | |
900 | }\r | |
901 | }\r | |
902 | } else {\r | |
2d3fb919 | 903 | //\r |
904 | // Process PK or KEK in Setup mode.\r | |
905 | //\r | |
906 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
907 | //\r | |
908 | // Time-based Authentication descriptor.\r | |
909 | //\r | |
910 | MonotonicCount = 0;\r | |
911 | TimeStamp = &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp;\r | |
912 | Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
913 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
914 | } else if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
915 | //\r | |
916 | // Counter-based Authentication descriptor.\r | |
917 | //\r | |
918 | MonotonicCount = ((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data)->MonotonicCount;\r | |
919 | TimeStamp = NULL;\r | |
920 | Payload = (UINT8*) Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r | |
921 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r | |
922 | } else {\r | |
923 | //\r | |
924 | // No Authentication descriptor.\r | |
925 | //\r | |
926 | MonotonicCount = 0;\r | |
927 | TimeStamp = NULL;\r | |
928 | Payload = Data;\r | |
929 | PayloadSize = DataSize;\r | |
930 | }\r | |
931 | \r | |
d912bad7 | 932 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r |
933 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
934 | return Status;\r | |
935 | }\r | |
936 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 937 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
938 | VariableName,\r | |
939 | VendorGuid,\r | |
940 | Payload,\r | |
941 | PayloadSize,\r | |
942 | Attributes,\r | |
943 | 0,\r | |
944 | MonotonicCount,\r | |
945 | Variable,\r | |
946 | TimeStamp\r | |
947 | );\r | |
0c18794e | 948 | //\r |
949 | // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r | |
950 | //\r | |
951 | if ((DataSize != 0) && IsPk) {\r | |
952 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r | |
953 | }\r | |
954 | }\r | |
955 | \r | |
956 | return Status;\r | |
957 | }\r | |
958 | \r | |
959 | /**\r | |
960 | Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r | |
961 | \r | |
962 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
963 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
964 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
965 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
966 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
967 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
968 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
969 | \r | |
970 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 971 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r |
972 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
0c18794e | 973 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r |
974 | \r | |
975 | **/\r | |
976 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
977 | ProcessVarWithKek (\r | |
978 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
979 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
980 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
981 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
982 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
983 | IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r | |
984 | )\r | |
985 | {\r | |
986 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
987 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable;\r | |
988 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *KekList;\r | |
989 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KekItem;\r | |
990 | UINT32 KekCount;\r | |
991 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r | |
992 | EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r | |
993 | BOOLEAN IsFound;\r | |
994 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
995 | UINT32 KekDataSize;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 996 | UINT8 *Payload;\r |
997 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
998 | UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r | |
0c18794e | 999 | \r |
1000 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r | |
1001 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r | |
1002 | //\r | |
1003 | // In user mode, should set EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute.\r | |
1004 | //\r | |
1005 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1006 | }\r | |
1007 | \r | |
1008 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r | |
1009 | CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r | |
1010 | if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount)) {\r | |
1011 | //\r | |
1012 | // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
1013 | //\r | |
1014 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1015 | }\r | |
1016 | //\r | |
1017 | // Get KEK database from variable.\r | |
1018 | //\r | |
1019 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1020 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r |
1021 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
1022 | &KekVariable,\r | |
0c18794e | 1023 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
1024 | );\r | |
1025 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r | |
1026 | \r | |
1027 | KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r | |
1028 | KekList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1029 | \r | |
1030 | //\r | |
1031 | // Enumerate all Kek items in this list to verify the variable certificate data.\r | |
1032 | // If anyone is authenticated successfully, it means the variable is correct!\r | |
1033 | //\r | |
1034 | IsFound = FALSE;\r | |
1035 | while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= KekList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1036 | if (CompareGuid (&KekList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {\r | |
1037 | KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + KekList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1038 | KekCount = (KekList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - KekList->SignatureHeaderSize) / KekList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1039 | for (Index = 0; Index < KekCount; Index++) {\r | |
1040 | if (CompareMem (KekItem->SignatureData, CertBlock->PublicKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r | |
1041 | IsFound = TRUE;\r | |
1042 | break;\r | |
1043 | }\r | |
1044 | KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekItem + KekList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1045 | }\r | |
1046 | }\r | |
1047 | KekDataSize -= KekList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1048 | KekList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + KekList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1049 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1050 | \r |
0c18794e | 1051 | if (!IsFound) {\r |
1052 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1053 | }\r | |
1054 | \r | |
1055 | Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, CertBlock->PublicKey);\r | |
1056 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1057 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1058 | VariableName,\r |
1059 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1060 | (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r | |
1061 | DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE,\r | |
1062 | Attributes,\r | |
1063 | 0,\r | |
1064 | CertData->MonotonicCount,\r | |
0c18794e | 1065 | Variable,\r |
1066 | NULL\r | |
1067 | );\r | |
1068 | }\r | |
1069 | } else {\r | |
1070 | //\r | |
1071 | // If in setup mode, no authentication needed.\r | |
1072 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1073 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r |
1074 | //\r | |
1075 | // Counter-based Authentication descriptor.\r | |
1076 | //\r | |
1077 | MonotonicCount = ((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data)->MonotonicCount;\r | |
1078 | Payload = (UINT8*) Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r | |
1079 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r | |
1080 | } else {\r | |
1081 | //\r | |
1082 | // No Authentication descriptor.\r | |
1083 | //\r | |
1084 | MonotonicCount = 0;\r | |
1085 | Payload = Data;\r | |
1086 | PayloadSize = DataSize;\r | |
1087 | }\r | |
1088 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1089 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
2d3fb919 | 1090 | VariableName,\r |
1091 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1092 | Payload,\r | |
1093 | PayloadSize,\r | |
1094 | Attributes,\r | |
1095 | 0,\r | |
1096 | MonotonicCount,\r | |
0c18794e | 1097 | Variable,\r |
1098 | NULL\r | |
1099 | );\r | |
1100 | }\r | |
1101 | \r | |
1102 | return Status;\r | |
1103 | }\r | |
1104 | \r | |
1105 | /**\r | |
1106 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r | |
1107 | \r | |
1108 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
1109 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
1110 | \r | |
1111 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
1112 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
1113 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
1114 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
1115 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
1116 | \r | |
1117 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
1118 | @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r | |
1119 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
1120 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1121 | set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r |
1122 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
0c18794e | 1123 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r |
1124 | \r | |
1125 | **/\r | |
1126 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1127 | ProcessVariable (\r | |
1128 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1129 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1130 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
1131 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1132 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
1133 | IN UINT32 Attributes\r | |
1134 | )\r | |
1135 | {\r | |
1136 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1137 | BOOLEAN IsDeletion;\r | |
1138 | BOOLEAN IsFirstTime;\r | |
1139 | UINT8 *PubKey;\r | |
1140 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r | |
1141 | EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r | |
1142 | UINT32 KeyIndex;\r | |
1143 | UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r | |
1144 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 1145 | KeyIndex = 0;\r |
0c18794e | 1146 | CertData = NULL;\r |
1147 | CertBlock = NULL;\r | |
1148 | PubKey = NULL;\r | |
1149 | IsDeletion = FALSE;\r | |
1150 | \r | |
1151 | //\r | |
1152 | // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r | |
1153 | //\r | |
1154 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
1155 | return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Variable, Attributes, FALSE, NULL);\r | |
1156 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1157 | \r |
0c18794e | 1158 | //\r |
1159 | // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.\r | |
1160 | //\r | |
1161 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
1162 | //\r | |
1163 | // Determine current operation type.\r | |
1164 | //\r | |
1165 | if (DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) {\r | |
1166 | IsDeletion = TRUE;\r | |
1167 | }\r | |
1168 | //\r | |
1169 | // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
1170 | //\r | |
1171 | if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
1172 | IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r | |
1173 | } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r | |
1174 | IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r | |
1175 | } else {\r | |
1176 | KeyIndex = Variable->CurrPtr->PubKeyIndex;\r | |
1177 | IsFirstTime = FALSE;\r | |
1178 | }\r | |
1179 | } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) &&\r | |
1180 | (Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0\r | |
1181 | ) {\r | |
1182 | //\r | |
1183 | // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r | |
1184 | //\r | |
1185 | return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r | |
1186 | } else {\r | |
1187 | //\r | |
1188 | // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.\r | |
1189 | // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r | |
1190 | //\r | |
1191 | Status = UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes, 0, 0, Variable, NULL);\r | |
1192 | return Status;\r | |
1193 | }\r | |
1194 | \r | |
1195 | //\r | |
1196 | // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.\r | |
1197 | //\r | |
1198 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r | |
1199 | CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r | |
1200 | PubKey = CertBlock->PublicKey;\r | |
1201 | \r | |
1202 | //\r | |
1203 | // Update Monotonic Count value.\r | |
1204 | //\r | |
1205 | MonotonicCount = CertData->MonotonicCount;\r | |
1206 | \r | |
1207 | if (!IsFirstTime) {\r | |
1208 | //\r | |
1209 | // Check input PubKey.\r | |
1210 | //\r | |
1211 | if (CompareMem (PubKey, mPubKeyStore + (KeyIndex - 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) != 0) {\r | |
1212 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1213 | }\r | |
1214 | //\r | |
1215 | // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable\r | |
1216 | // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.\r | |
1217 | //\r | |
1218 | if (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount) {\r | |
1219 | //\r | |
1220 | // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
1221 | //\r | |
1222 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1223 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1224 | }\r |
0c18794e | 1225 | //\r |
1226 | // Verify the certificate in Data payload.\r | |
1227 | //\r | |
1228 | Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, PubKey);\r | |
1229 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1230 | return Status;\r | |
1231 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1232 | \r |
0c18794e | 1233 | //\r |
1234 | // Now, the signature has been verified!\r | |
1235 | //\r | |
1236 | if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {\r | |
1237 | //\r | |
1238 | // Update public key database variable if need.\r | |
1239 | //\r | |
1240 | KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey);\r | |
1241 | }\r | |
1242 | \r | |
1243 | //\r | |
1244 | // Verification pass.\r | |
1245 | //\r | |
1246 | return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, Attributes, KeyIndex, MonotonicCount, Variable, NULL);\r | |
1247 | }\r | |
1248 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 1249 | /**\r |
1250 | Merge two buffers which formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. Only the new EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r | |
1251 | will be appended to the original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, duplicate EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r | |
1252 | will be ignored.\r | |
1253 | \r | |
1254 | @param[in, out] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r | |
1255 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r | |
1256 | @param[in] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST to be appended.\r | |
1257 | @param[in] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r | |
1258 | \r | |
1259 | @return Size of the merged buffer.\r | |
1260 | \r | |
1261 | **/\r | |
1262 | UINTN\r | |
1263 | AppendSignatureList (\r | |
1264 | IN OUT VOID *Data,\r | |
1265 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1266 | IN VOID *NewData,\r | |
1267 | IN UINTN NewDataSize\r | |
1268 | )\r | |
1269 | {\r | |
1270 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1271 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1272 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
1273 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r | |
1274 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;\r | |
1275 | UINTN NewCertCount;\r | |
1276 | UINTN Index;\r | |
1277 | UINTN Index2;\r | |
1278 | UINTN Size;\r | |
1279 | UINT8 *Tail;\r | |
1280 | UINTN CopiedCount;\r | |
1281 | UINTN SignatureListSize;\r | |
1282 | BOOLEAN IsNewCert;\r | |
1283 | \r | |
1284 | Tail = (UINT8 *) Data + DataSize;\r | |
1285 | \r | |
1286 | NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;\r | |
1287 | while ((NewDataSize > 0) && (NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1288 | NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1289 | NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1290 | \r | |
1291 | CopiedCount = 0;\r | |
1292 | for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1293 | IsNewCert = TRUE;\r | |
1294 | \r | |
1295 | Size = DataSize;\r | |
1296 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
1297 | while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1298 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&\r | |
1299 | (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {\r | |
1300 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1301 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1302 | for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {\r | |
1303 | //\r | |
1304 | // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.\r | |
1305 | //\r | |
1306 | if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {\r | |
1307 | IsNewCert = FALSE;\r | |
1308 | break;\r | |
1309 | }\r | |
1310 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1311 | }\r | |
1312 | }\r | |
1313 | \r | |
1314 | if (!IsNewCert) {\r | |
1315 | break;\r | |
1316 | }\r | |
1317 | Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1318 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1319 | }\r | |
1320 | \r | |
1321 | if (IsNewCert) {\r | |
1322 | //\r | |
1323 | // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, append it.\r | |
1324 | //\r | |
1325 | if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r | |
1326 | //\r | |
1327 | // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r | |
1328 | //\r | |
1329 | CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1330 | Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r | |
1331 | }\r | |
1332 | \r | |
1333 | CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1334 | Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1335 | CopiedCount++;\r | |
1336 | }\r | |
1337 | \r | |
1338 | NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1339 | }\r | |
1340 | \r | |
1341 | //\r | |
1342 | // Update SignatureListSize in newly appended EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r | |
1343 | //\r | |
1344 | if (CopiedCount != 0) {\r | |
1345 | SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1346 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);\r | |
1347 | CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r | |
1348 | }\r | |
1349 | \r | |
1350 | NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1351 | NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1352 | }\r | |
1353 | \r | |
1354 | return (Tail - (UINT8 *) Data);\r | |
1355 | }\r | |
1356 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1357 | /**\r |
1358 | Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1359 | \r | |
1360 | \r | |
1361 | @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1362 | @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1363 | \r | |
1364 | @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r | |
1365 | @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r | |
1366 | \r | |
1367 | **/\r | |
1368 | BOOLEAN\r | |
1369 | CompareTimeStamp (\r | |
1370 | IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r | |
1371 | IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r | |
1372 | )\r | |
1373 | {\r | |
1374 | if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r | |
1375 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r | |
1376 | } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r | |
1377 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r | |
1378 | } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r | |
1379 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r | |
1380 | } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r | |
1381 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r | |
1382 | } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r | |
1383 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < FirstTime->Minute);\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1384 | }\r |
0c18794e | 1385 | \r |
1386 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r | |
1387 | }\r | |
1388 | \r | |
1389 | /**\r | |
1390 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r | |
1391 | \r | |
1392 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r | |
1393 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
1394 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
1395 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
1396 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
1397 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
1398 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
1399 | @param[in] Pk Verify against PK or KEK database.\r | |
1400 | @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r | |
1401 | \r | |
1402 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1403 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r |
1404 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
0c18794e | 1405 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r |
1406 | of resources.\r | |
1407 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r | |
1408 | \r | |
1409 | **/\r | |
1410 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1411 | VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
1412 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1413 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1414 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
1415 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1416 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
1417 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r | |
1418 | IN BOOLEAN Pk,\r | |
1419 | OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r | |
1420 | )\r | |
1421 | {\r | |
1422 | UINT8 *RootCert;\r | |
1423 | UINT8 *SigData;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1424 | UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r |
0c18794e | 1425 | UINTN RootCertSize;\r |
1426 | UINTN Index;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1427 | UINTN CertCount;\r |
1428 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
0c18794e | 1429 | UINT32 Attr;\r |
1430 | UINT32 SigDataSize;\r | |
1431 | UINT32 KekDataSize;\r | |
1432 | BOOLEAN Result;\r | |
1433 | BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r | |
1434 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1435 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1436 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1437 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable;\r | |
1438 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r | |
1439 | UINT8 *NewData;\r | |
1440 | UINTN NewDataSize;\r | |
1441 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1442 | UINT8 *Buffer;\r |
1443 | UINTN Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 1444 | \r |
1445 | Result = FALSE;\r | |
1446 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
1447 | CertData = NULL;\r | |
1448 | NewData = NULL;\r | |
1449 | Attr = Attributes;\r | |
1450 | \r | |
1451 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1452 | // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is\r |
0c18794e | 1453 | // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r |
2d3fb919 | 1454 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new\r |
1455 | // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new\r | |
1456 | // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not\r | |
0c18794e | 1457 | // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r |
1458 | //\r | |
1459 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1460 | \r |
1461 | //\r | |
1462 | // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the\r | |
1463 | // TimeStamp value are set to zero.\r | |
1464 | //\r | |
1465 | if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||\r | |
1466 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||\r | |
1467 | (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r | |
1468 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r | |
1469 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {\r | |
1470 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1471 | }\r | |
1472 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1473 | if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r |
1474 | if (CompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, &Variable->CurrPtr->TimeStamp)) {\r | |
1475 | //\r | |
1476 | // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
1477 | //\r | |
1478 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1479 | }\r | |
1480 | }\r | |
1481 | \r | |
1482 | //\r | |
1483 | // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r | |
1484 | // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r | |
1485 | //\r | |
1486 | if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1487 | !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r |
0c18794e | 1488 | //\r |
1489 | // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
1490 | //\r | |
1491 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1492 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1493 | \r |
0c18794e | 1494 | //\r |
1495 | // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r | |
1496 | // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r | |
1497 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1498 | SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;\r |
1499 | SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r | |
648f98d1 | 1500 | \r |
0c18794e | 1501 | //\r |
1502 | // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r | |
1503 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1504 | PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;\r |
1505 | PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;\r | |
0c18794e | 1506 | \r |
1507 | //\r | |
1508 | // Construct a buffer to fill with (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r | |
1509 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1510 | NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r |
1511 | sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
1512 | NewData = mSerializationRuntimeBuffer;\r | |
0c18794e | 1513 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 1514 | Buffer = NewData;\r |
1515 | Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
1516 | CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);\r | |
1517 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 1518 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 1519 | Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r |
1520 | CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);\r | |
1521 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 1522 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 1523 | Length = sizeof (UINT32);\r |
1524 | CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);\r | |
1525 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 1526 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 1527 | Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);\r |
1528 | CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);\r | |
1529 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 1530 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 1531 | CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r |
0c18794e | 1532 | \r |
1533 | if (Pk) {\r | |
1534 | //\r | |
1535 | // Get platform key from variable.\r | |
1536 | //\r | |
1537 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1538 | EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r |
1539 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
1540 | &PkVariable,\r | |
0c18794e | 1541 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
1542 | );\r | |
1543 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1544 | return Status;\r | |
1545 | }\r | |
1546 | \r | |
1547 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1548 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1549 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r | |
1550 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1551 | \r | |
1552 | \r | |
1553 | //\r | |
1554 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
1555 | //\r | |
1556 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
1557 | SigData,\r | |
1558 | SigDataSize,\r | |
1559 | RootCert,\r | |
1560 | RootCertSize,\r | |
1561 | NewData,\r | |
1562 | NewDataSize\r | |
1563 | );\r | |
1564 | \r | |
1565 | } else {\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1566 | \r |
0c18794e | 1567 | //\r |
1568 | // Get KEK database from variable.\r | |
1569 | //\r | |
1570 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1571 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r |
1572 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
1573 | &KekVariable,\r | |
0c18794e | 1574 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal\r |
1575 | );\r | |
1576 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1577 | return Status;\r | |
1578 | }\r | |
1579 | \r | |
1580 | //\r | |
1581 | // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1582 | //\r |
0c18794e | 1583 | KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r |
1584 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1585 | while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1586 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
1587 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1588 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1589 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1590 | //\r | |
1591 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r | |
1592 | //\r | |
1593 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r | |
1594 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1595 | \r |
0c18794e | 1596 | //\r |
1597 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
1598 | //\r | |
1599 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
1600 | SigData,\r | |
1601 | SigDataSize,\r | |
1602 | RootCert,\r | |
1603 | RootCertSize,\r | |
1604 | NewData,\r | |
1605 | NewDataSize\r | |
1606 | );\r | |
1607 | if (VerifyStatus) {\r | |
1608 | goto Exit;\r | |
1609 | }\r | |
1610 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1611 | }\r | |
1612 | }\r | |
1613 | KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1614 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1615 | }\r | |
1616 | }\r | |
1617 | \r | |
1618 | Exit:\r | |
1619 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1620 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r |
1621 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1622 | }\r | |
1623 | \r | |
d912bad7 | 1624 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r |
1625 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1626 | return Status;\r | |
1627 | }\r | |
1628 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 1629 | if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (VarDel != NULL)) {\r |
0c18794e | 1630 | *VarDel = TRUE;\r |
1631 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1632 | \r |
0c18794e | 1633 | //\r |
1634 | // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r | |
1635 | //\r | |
1636 | return UpdateVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1637 | VariableName,\r |
1638 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1639 | PayloadPtr,\r | |
1640 | PayloadSize,\r | |
1641 | Attributes,\r | |
1642 | 0,\r | |
1643 | 0,\r | |
0c18794e | 1644 | Variable,\r |
1645 | &CertData->TimeStamp\r | |
1646 | );\r | |
1647 | }\r |