WrapPkcs7Data(), Pkcs7GetSigners(), Pkcs7Verify() will get UEFI Authenticated\r
Variable and will do basic check for data structure.\r
\r
-Copyright (c) 2009 - 2016, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
This program and the accompanying materials\r
are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r
STACK_OF(X509) *CertStack;\r
BOOLEAN Status;\r
INT32 Result;\r
+ BUF_MEM *Ptr;\r
INT32 Length;\r
VOID *Buffer;\r
\r
goto _Exit;\r
}\r
\r
- Length = (INT32)(((BUF_MEM *) CertBio->ptr)->length);\r
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr (CertBio, &Ptr);\r
+ Length = (INT32)(Ptr->length);\r
if (Length <= 0) {\r
goto _Exit;\r
}\r
in a ContentInfo structure.\r
\r
If P7Data, CertStack, StackLength, TrustedCert or CertLength is NULL, then\r
- return FALSE. If P7Length overflow, then return FAlSE.\r
+ return FALSE. If P7Length overflow, then return FALSE.\r
\r
Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
UEFI Authenticated Variable is external input, so this function will do basic\r
BOOLEAN Wrapped;\r
UINT8 Index;\r
PKCS7 *Pkcs7;\r
- X509_STORE_CTX CertCtx;\r
+ X509_STORE_CTX *CertCtx;\r
+ STACK_OF(X509) *CtxChain;\r
+ STACK_OF(X509) *CtxUntrusted;\r
+ X509 *CtxCert;\r
STACK_OF(X509) *Signers;\r
X509 *Signer;\r
X509 *Cert;\r
- X509 *TempCert;\r
X509 *Issuer;\r
+ X509_NAME *IssuerName;\r
UINT8 *CertBuf;\r
UINT8 *OldBuf;\r
UINTN BufferSize;\r
Status = FALSE;\r
NewP7Data = NULL;\r
Pkcs7 = NULL;\r
+ CertCtx = NULL;\r
+ CtxChain = NULL;\r
+ CtxCert = NULL;\r
+ CtxUntrusted = NULL;\r
Cert = NULL;\r
- TempCert = NULL;\r
SingleCert = NULL;\r
CertBuf = NULL;\r
OldBuf = NULL;\r
}\r
Signer = sk_X509_value (Signers, 0);\r
\r
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init (&CertCtx, NULL, Signer, Pkcs7->d.sign->cert)) {\r
+ CertCtx = X509_STORE_CTX_new ();\r
+ if (CertCtx == NULL) {\r
+ goto _Error;\r
+ }\r
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init (CertCtx, NULL, Signer, Pkcs7->d.sign->cert)) {\r
goto _Error;\r
}\r
//\r
// Initialize Chained & Untrusted stack\r
//\r
- if (CertCtx.chain == NULL) {\r
- if (((CertCtx.chain = sk_X509_new_null ()) == NULL) ||\r
- (!sk_X509_push (CertCtx.chain, CertCtx.cert))) {\r
+ CtxChain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain (CertCtx);\r
+ CtxCert = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert (CertCtx);\r
+ if (CtxChain == NULL) {\r
+ if (((CtxChain = sk_X509_new_null ()) == NULL) ||\r
+ (!sk_X509_push (CtxChain, CtxCert))) {\r
goto _Error;\r
}\r
}\r
- (VOID)sk_X509_delete_ptr (CertCtx.untrusted, Signer);\r
+ CtxUntrusted = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted (CertCtx);\r
+ (VOID)sk_X509_delete_ptr (CtxUntrusted, Signer);\r
\r
//\r
// Build certificates stack chained from Signer's certificate.\r
//\r
// Self-Issue checking\r
//\r
- if (CertCtx.check_issued (&CertCtx, Cert, Cert)) {\r
- break;\r
+ Issuer = NULL;\r
+ if (X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer (&Issuer, CertCtx, Cert) == 1) {\r
+ if (X509_cmp (Issuer, Cert) == 0) {\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
}\r
\r
//\r
// Found the issuer of the current certificate\r
//\r
- if (CertCtx.untrusted != NULL) {\r
+ if (CtxUntrusted != NULL) {\r
Issuer = NULL;\r
- for (Index = 0; Index < sk_X509_num (CertCtx.untrusted); Index++) {\r
- TempCert = sk_X509_value (CertCtx.untrusted, Index);\r
- if (CertCtx.check_issued (&CertCtx, Cert, TempCert)) {\r
- Issuer = TempCert;\r
- break;\r
- }\r
- }\r
+ IssuerName = X509_get_issuer_name (Cert);\r
+ Issuer = X509_find_by_subject (CtxUntrusted, IssuerName);\r
if (Issuer != NULL) {\r
- if (!sk_X509_push (CertCtx.chain, Issuer)) {\r
+ if (!sk_X509_push (CtxChain, Issuer)) {\r
goto _Error;\r
}\r
- (VOID)sk_X509_delete_ptr (CertCtx.untrusted, Issuer);\r
+ (VOID)sk_X509_delete_ptr (CtxUntrusted, Issuer);\r
\r
Cert = Issuer;\r
continue;\r
// UINT8 Certn[];\r
//\r
\r
- if (CertCtx.chain != NULL) {\r
+ if (CtxChain != NULL) {\r
BufferSize = sizeof (UINT8);\r
OldSize = BufferSize;\r
CertBuf = NULL;\r
\r
for (Index = 0; ; Index++) {\r
- Status = X509PopCertificate (CertCtx.chain, &SingleCert, &CertSize);\r
+ Status = X509PopCertificate (CtxChain, &SingleCert, &CertSize);\r
if (!Status) {\r
break;\r
}\r
}\r
}\r
\r
- if (CertCtx.untrusted != NULL) {\r
+ if (CtxUntrusted != NULL) {\r
BufferSize = sizeof (UINT8);\r
OldSize = BufferSize;\r
CertBuf = NULL;\r
\r
for (Index = 0; ; Index++) {\r
- Status = X509PopCertificate (CertCtx.untrusted, &SingleCert, &CertSize);\r
+ Status = X509PopCertificate (CtxUntrusted, &SingleCert, &CertSize);\r
if (!Status) {\r
break;\r
}\r
}\r
sk_X509_free (Signers);\r
\r
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup (&CertCtx);\r
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup (CertCtx);\r
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free (CertCtx);\r
\r
if (SingleCert != NULL) {\r
free (SingleCert);\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
- Verifies the validility of a PKCS#7 signed data as described in "PKCS #7:\r
+ Verifies the validity of a PKCS#7 signed data as described in "PKCS #7:\r
Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard". The input signed data could be wrapped\r
in a ContentInfo structure.\r
\r
If P7Data, TrustedCert or InData is NULL, then return FALSE.\r
- If P7Length, CertLength or DataLength overflow, then return FAlSE.\r
+ If P7Length, CertLength or DataLength overflow, then return FALSE.\r
\r
Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
UEFI Authenticated Variable is external input, so this function will do basic\r
data could be wrapped in a ContentInfo structure.\r
\r
If P7Data, Content, or ContentSize is NULL, then return FALSE. If P7Length overflow,\r
- then return FAlSE. If the P7Data is not correctly formatted, then return FALSE.\r
+ then return FALSE. If the P7Data is not correctly formatted, then return FALSE.\r
\r
Caution: This function may receive untrusted input. So this function will do\r
basic check for PKCS#7 data structure.\r
@retval TRUE The P7Data was correctly formatted for processing.\r
@retval FALSE The P7Data was not correctly formatted for processing.\r
\r
-*/\r
+**/\r
BOOLEAN\r
EFIAPI\r
Pkcs7GetAttachedContent (\r
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