SecurityPkg: Tcg2Dxe: Report correct FinalEventLog size

[mirror_edk2.git] / SecurityPkg / Library / PlatformSecureLibNull / PlatformSecureLibNull.c

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/PlatformSecureLibNull/PlatformSecureLibNull.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/PlatformSecureLibNull/PlatformSecureLibNull.c
index f085d62b7795facd5c3f3d060b1f6dcfa7201f56..8dc07ec74a10967a7cc7e65ca56a5989a95b591b 100644 (file)
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/PlatformSecureLibNull/PlatformSecureLibNull.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/PlatformSecureLibNull/PlatformSecureLibNull.c
@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
 /** @file\r
-  Provides a secure platform-specific method to clear PK(Platform Key).\r
+  NULL PlatformSecureLib instance does NOT really detect whether a physical present \r
+  user exists but return TRUE directly. This instance can be used to verify security\r
+  related features during platform enabling and development. It should be replaced\r
+  by a platform-specific method(e.g. Button pressed) in a real platform for product.\r
 \r
-Copyright (c) 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2016, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
 This program and the accompanying materials \r
 are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License \r
 which accompanies this distribution.  The full text of the license may be found at \r
@@ -12,28 +15,53 @@ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
 \r
 **/\r
 \r
+BOOLEAN       mUserPhysicalPresence      = FALSE;\r
+\r
 /**\r
 \r
-  This function detects whether a secure platform-specific method to clear PK(Platform Key)\r
-  is configured by platform owner. This method is provided for users force to clear PK \r
-  in case incorrect enrollment mis-haps.\r
-  \r
-  UEFI231 spec chapter 27.5.2 stipulates: The platform key may also be cleared using \r
-  a secure platform-specific method. In  this case, the global variable SetupMode \r
-  must also be updated to 1.\r
-  \r
+  This function provides a platform-specific method to detect whether the platform\r
+  is operating by a physically present user. \r
+\r
+  Programmatic changing of platform security policy (such as disable Secure Boot,\r
+  or switch between Standard/Custom Secure Boot mode) MUST NOT be possible during\r
+  Boot Services or after exiting EFI Boot Services. Only a physically present user\r
+  is allowed to perform these operations.\r
+\r
   NOTE THAT: This function cannot depend on any EFI Variable Service since they are\r
   not available when this function is called in AuthenticateVariable driver.\r
-\r
-  @retval  TRUE       The Platform owner wants to force clear PK.\r
-  @retval  FALSE      The Platform owner doesn't want to force clear PK. \r
+  \r
+  @retval  TRUE       The platform is operated by a physically present user.\r
+  @retval  FALSE      The platform is NOT operated by a physically present user.\r
 \r
 **/\r
 BOOLEAN\r
 EFIAPI\r
-ForceClearPK (\r
+UserPhysicalPresent (\r
   VOID\r
   )\r
 {\r
-  return FALSE;\r
+  return mUserPhysicalPresence;  \r
+}\r
+\r
+\r
+/**\r
+  Save user physical presence state from a PCD to mUserPhysicalPresence.\r
+\r
+  @param  ImageHandle   ImageHandle of the loaded driver.\r
+  @param  SystemTable   Pointer to the EFI System Table.\r
+\r
+  @retval  EFI_SUCCESS          PcdUserPhysicalPresence is got successfully.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EFIAPI\r
+PlatformSecureLibNullConstructor (\r
+  IN EFI_HANDLE        ImageHandle,\r
+  IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE  *SystemTable\r
+  )\r
+{\r
+\r
+  mUserPhysicalPresence = PcdGetBool(PcdUserPhysicalPresence);\r
+\r
+  return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
 }\r