]> git.proxmox.com Git - mirror_edk2.git/commitdiff
MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
authorDandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Thu, 5 Sep 2019 07:08:26 +0000 (15:08 +0800)
committerHao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Wed, 25 Sep 2019 02:03:57 +0000 (10:03 +0800)
For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
This follows UEFI Spec.

But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer
the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.

This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly
for the caller in PlatformDriOverrideDxe which don't have the policy to
defer the execution of the image.

Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c

index 2d3736b468828ff7dbb99c190b99a671d7a18d24..f91f038b7ad605b76a7814ee96c9399bf791f708 100644 (file)
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /** @file\r
   Implementation of the shared functions to do the platform driver vverride mapping.\r
 \r
-  Copyright (c) 2007 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
+  Copyright (c) 2007 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
   SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent\r
 \r
 **/\r
@@ -1486,6 +1486,15 @@ GetDriverFromMapping (
                 DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle = ImageHandle;\r
               }\r
             } else {\r
+              //\r
+              // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created\r
+              // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.\r
+              // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should\r
+              // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.\r
+              //\r
+              if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {\r
+                gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);\r
+              }\r
               DriverImageInfo->UnLoadable = TRUE;\r
               DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle = NULL;\r
             }\r