(backported from commit c01bba64427c723870372e97a82ae843ca14e876)
[tyhicks: Backport to 4.18:
- X86_VENDOR_HYGON does not exist because commit c9661c1e80b6 is
missing] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Thomas Gleixner [Thu, 21 Feb 2019 11:36:50 +0000 (12:36 +0100)]
x86/msr-index: Cleanup bit defines
Greg pointed out that speculation related bit defines are using (1 << N)
format instead of BIT(N). Aside of that (1 << N) is wrong as it should use
1UL at least.
(backported from commit a4a931802e51223b3e0548fc31fb3f7dc8f6d032)
[tyhicks: Backport to 4.15:
- The Makefiles do not contain override directives on the modified
lines] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
So that we reduce the difference of tools/include/linux/bitops.h to the
original kernel file, include/linux/bitops.h, trying to remove the need
to define BITS_PER_LONG, to avoid clashes with asm/bitsperlong.h.
And the things removed from tools/include/linux/bitops.h are really in
linux/bits.h, so that we can have a copy and then
tools/perf/check_headers.sh will tell us when new stuff gets added to
linux/bits.h so that we can check if it is useful and if any adjustment
needs to be done to the tools/{include,arch}/ copies.
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nokia.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-y1sqyydvfzo0bjjoj4zsl562@git.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
CVE-2018-12126
CVE-2018-12127
CVE-2018-12130
(cherry picked from commit ba4aa02b417f08a0bee5e7b8ed70cac788a7c854) Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Will Deacon [Tue, 19 Jun 2018 12:53:08 +0000 (13:53 +0100)]
locking/atomics, asm-generic: Move some macros from <linux/bitops.h> to a new <linux/bits.h> file
In preparation for implementing the asm-generic atomic bitops in terms
of atomic_long_*(), we need to prevent <asm/atomic.h> implementations from
pulling in <linux/bitops.h>. A common reason for this include is for the
BITS_PER_BYTE definition, so move this and some other BIT() and masking
macros into a new header file, <linux/bits.h>.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: yamada.masahiro@socionext.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1529412794-17720-4-git-send-email-will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CVE-2018-12126
CVE-2018-12127
CVE-2018-12130
(cherry picked from commit 8bd9cb51daac89337295b6f037b0486911e1b408) Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Eduardo Habkost [Wed, 5 Dec 2018 19:19:56 +0000 (17:19 -0200)]
kvm: x86: Report STIBP on GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
Months ago, we have added code to allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
to the guest, which makes STIBP available to guests. This was implemented
by commits d28b387fb74d ("KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to
MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL") and b2ac58f90540 ("KVM/SVM: Allow direct access to
MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL").
However, we never updated GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID to let userspace know that
STIBP can be enabled in CPUID. Fix that by updating
kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features and kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CVE-2018-12126
CVE-2018-12127
CVE-2018-12130
(cherry picked from commit d7b09c827a6cf291f66637a36f46928dd1423184) Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
with additional information gleaned from other related pages; notably:
- Bonnell shrink was called Saltwell
- Moorefield is the Merriefield refresh which makes it Airmont
The general naming scheme is: FAM6_ATOM_UARCH_SOCTYPE
for i in `git grep -l FAM6_ATOM` ; do
sed -i -e 's/ATOM_PINEVIEW/ATOM_BONNELL/g' \
-e 's/ATOM_LINCROFT/ATOM_BONNELL_MID/' \
-e 's/ATOM_PENWELL/ATOM_SALTWELL_MID/g' \
-e 's/ATOM_CLOVERVIEW/ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET/g' \
-e 's/ATOM_CEDARVIEW/ATOM_SALTWELL/g' \
-e 's/ATOM_SILVERMONT1/ATOM_SILVERMONT/g' \
-e 's/ATOM_SILVERMONT2/ATOM_SILVERMONT_X/g' \
-e 's/ATOM_MERRIFIELD/ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID/g' \
-e 's/ATOM_MOOREFIELD/ATOM_AIRMONT_MID/g' \
-e 's/ATOM_DENVERTON/ATOM_GOLDMONT_X/g' \
-e 's/ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE/ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS/g' ${i}
done
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Cc: len.brown@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CVE-2018-12126
CVE-2018-12127
CVE-2018-12130
(backported from commit f2c4db1bd80720cd8cb2a5aa220d9bc9f374f04e)
[tyhicks: Backport to 4.15:
- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_pseudo_lock.c doesn't yet exist
- arch/x86/kernel/tsc_msr.c doesn't use any FAM6_ATOM macros because it
is missing commit 397d3ad18dc4
- sound/soc/intel/boards/bytcr_rt5651.c doesn't use any FAM6_ATOM
macros because it is missing commit fbea16dbc0a3
- The FAM6_ATOM items in the intel_pstate_cpu_ids[] array use bxt_funcs
due to missing commit dbd49b85eec7
- Context change in process_cpuid() because SKYLAKE_X and ATOM_DENVERTON
share a case block due to missing commit 733ef0f8e76e
- Manually ran the for loop documented in the commit message to ensure
that there were no additional uses of the old macros] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Stefan Bader [Fri, 26 Apr 2019 06:23:42 +0000 (08:23 +0200)]
UBUNTU: [Packaging] arm64: Drop snapdragon from kernel-versions
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1820868
When dropping the snapdragon flavour from building, one also
must drop it from kernel-versions which controls the udeb
generation.
Fixes: 128e2a3e33d0 "UBUNTU: packaging: arm64: disable building
the snapdragon flavour" Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Stefan Bader [Thu, 25 Apr 2019 08:37:02 +0000 (10:37 +0200)]
UBUNTU: [Packaging] final-checks: Depend on makefile flavours
The available ABI files do not depend on the config flavours but
those actually built. So instead of looking at the config files,
parse the flavours variable of the <arch>.mk files.
This handles a special case which was found for the current
xenial/hwe tree. This is now based on bionic which builds a
snapdragon flavour for arm64. However that flavour is not done
in xenial because it is a separate tree there.
While the flavour gets removed from the .mk file, we rather would
like to preserve the snapdragon.flavour.config file because removing
it will cause re-arrangement of config options which would happen
everytime we update from the bionic master.
However the current final-checks would then fail because of course
there is no build and therefor no ABI files for that flavour.
Ignore: yes Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Stefan Bader [Thu, 25 Apr 2019 08:24:09 +0000 (10:24 +0200)]
UBUNTU: [Config] Add CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1822870
This was introduced by: "powerpc/64: Add CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC"
without updating the config definitions.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Paolo Pisati [Wed, 20 Mar 2019 08:31:00 +0000 (09:31 +0100)]
UBUNTU: packaging: arm64: disable building the snapdragon flavour
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1820868 Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <paolo.pisati@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Fix this by sanitizing dev before using it to index dp->synths.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Fix this by sanitizing info->stream before using it to index
rmidi->streams.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Johannes Berg [Wed, 6 Feb 2019 11:17:14 +0000 (13:17 +0200)]
cfg80211: prevent speculation on cfg80211_classify8021d() return
It's possible that the caller of cfg80211_classify8021d() uses the
value to index an array, like mac80211 in ieee80211_downgrade_queue().
Prevent speculation on the return value.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CVE-2017-5753
(backported from commit 1fc9b7253382ce1a83d9a3e63e88d656eb63f263)
[juergh: Adjusted context.] Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Breno Leitao [Wed, 30 Jan 2019 12:46:00 +0000 (10:46 -0200)]
powerpc/ptrace: Mitigate potential Spectre v1
'regno' is directly controlled by user space, hence leading to a potential
exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
On PTRACE_SETREGS and PTRACE_GETREGS requests, user space passes the
register number that would be read or written. This register number is
called 'regno' which is part of the 'addr' syscall parameter.
This 'regno' value is checked against the maximum pt_regs structure size,
and then used to dereference it, which matches the initial part of a
Spectre v1 (and Spectre v1.1) attack. The dereferenced value, then,
is returned to userspace in the GETREGS case.
This patch sanitizes 'regno' before using it to dereference pt_reg.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> Acked-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CVE-2017-5753
(backported from commit ebb0e13ead2ddc186a80b1b0235deeefc5a1a667)
[juergh: Adjusted context.] Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Fix this by sanitizing channel and addr->channel before using them to
index user->intf->addrinfo and intf->addrinfo, correspondingly.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Fix this by sanitizing IndexCard before using it to index apbs.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Fix this by sanitizing ipcnum before using it to index pDrvData->IPCs.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Fix this by sanitizing nr before using it to index dev->driver->ioctls
and drm_ioctls.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
KVM: arm/arm64: vgic: Fix off-by-one bug in vgic_get_irq()
When using the nospec API, it should be taken into account that:
"...if the CPU speculates past the bounds check then
* array_index_nospec() will clamp the index within the range of [0,
* size)."
The above is part of the header for macro array_index_nospec() in
linux/nospec.h
Now, in this particular case, if intid evaluates to exactly VGIC_MAX_SPI
or to exaclty VGIC_MAX_PRIVATE, the array_index_nospec() macro ends up
returning VGIC_MAX_SPI - 1 or VGIC_MAX_PRIVATE - 1 respectively, instead
of VGIC_MAX_SPI or VGIC_MAX_PRIVATE, which, based on the original logic:
/* SGIs and PPIs */
if (intid <= VGIC_MAX_PRIVATE)
return &vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.private_irqs[intid];
Fix this by calling array_index_nospec() macro with VGIC_MAX_PRIVATE + 1
and VGIC_MAX_SPI + 1 as arguments for its parameter size.
Fixes: 41b87599c743 ("KVM: arm/arm64: vgic: fix possible spectre-v1 in vgic_get_irq()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
[dropped the SPI part which was fixed separately] Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
CVE-2017-5753
(cherry picked from commit c23b2e6fc4ca346018618266bcabd335c0a8a49e) Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Fix this by sanitizing ipcm->substream before using it to index emu->fx8010.pcm
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Fix this by sanitizing info->channel before using it to index hdsp->channel_map
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Also, notice that I refactored the code a bit in order to get rid of the
following checkpatch warning:
ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition
FILE: sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c:4103:
if ((mapped_channel = hdsp->channel_map[info->channel]) < 0)
Fix this by sanitizing vr.mifi before using it to index mrt->vif_table'
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Fix this by sanitizing stream before using it to index pcm->streams
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Fix this by sanitizing both info.mode and info.port before using them
to index emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls, emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls and
emu->portptrs.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Jeff Moyer [Tue, 11 Dec 2018 17:37:49 +0000 (12:37 -0500)]
aio: fix spectre gadget in lookup_ioctx
Matthew pointed out that the ioctx_table is susceptible to spectre v1,
because the index can be controlled by an attacker. The below patch
should mitigate the attack for all of the aio system calls.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CVE-2017-5753
(cherry picked from commit a538e3ff9dabcdf6c3f477a373c629213d1c3066) Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Fix this by sanitizing vr.vifi before using it to index mrt->vif_table'
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Fix this by sanitizing req.gid before calling macro GID_TO_GRU, which
uses it to index gru_base.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Jason Wang [Tue, 30 Oct 2018 06:10:49 +0000 (14:10 +0800)]
vhost: Fix Spectre V1 vulnerability
The idx in vhost_vring_ioctl() was controlled by userspace, hence a
potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
Fixing this by sanitizing idx before using it to index d->vqs.
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CVE-2017-5753
(cherry picked from commit ff002269a4ee9c769dbf9365acef633ebcbd6cbe) Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Breno Leitao [Fri, 19 Oct 2018 20:01:33 +0000 (17:01 -0300)]
HID: hiddev: fix potential Spectre v1
uref->usage_index can be indirectly controlled by userspace, hence leading
to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This field is used as an array index by the hiddev_ioctl_usage() function,
when 'cmd' is either HIDIOCGCOLLECTIONINDEX, HIDIOCGUSAGES or
HIDIOCSUSAGES.
For cmd == HIDIOCGCOLLECTIONINDEX case, uref->usage_index is compared to
field->maxusage and then used as an index to dereference field->usage
array. The same thing happens to the cmd == HIDIOC{G,S}USAGES cases, where
uref->usage_index is checked against an array maximum value and then it is
used as an index in an array.
This is a summary of the HIDIOCGCOLLECTIONINDEX case, which matches the
traditional Spectre V1 first load:
copy_from_user(uref, user_arg, sizeof(*uref))
if (uref->usage_index >= field->maxusage)
goto inval;
i = field->usage[uref->usage_index].collection_index;
return i;
This patch fixes this by sanitizing field uref->usage_index before using it
to index field->usage (HIDIOCGCOLLECTIONINDEX) or field->value in
HIDIOC{G,S}USAGES arrays, thus, avoiding speculation in the first load.
Fix this by sanitizing pin_index before using it to index
ops->pin_config, and before passing it as an argument to
function ptp_set_pinfunc(), in which it is used to index
info->pin_config.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Acked-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CVE-2017-5753
(cherry picked from commit efa61c8cf2950ab5c0e66cff3cabe2a2b24e81ba) Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Fix this by sanitizing num before using it to index
fsg_opts->common->luns
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Fix this by sanitizing idx before using it to index dma->buflist
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Fix this by sanitizing hdr.cmd before using it to index
ucm_cmd_table.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Fix this by sanitizing hdr.cmd before using it to index
ucm_cmd_table.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
nl80211: Fix possible Spectre-v1 for CQM RSSI thresholds
Use array_index_nospec() to sanitize i with respect to speculation.
Note that the user doesn't control i directly, but can make it out
of bounds by not finding a threshold in the array.
Signed-off-by: Masashi Honma <masashi.honma@gmail.com>
[add note about user control, as explained by Masashi] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CVE-2017-5753
(cherry picked from commit 1222a16014888ed9733c11e221730d4a8196222b) Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Fix this by sanitizing vsa.console before using it to index vc_cons
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Fix this by sanitizing val before using it to index map
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Fix this by sanitizing p.port before using it to index
pcfg->dsp_pff_inst_id
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill
the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with
a dependent load/store [1].
Fix this by sanitizing val before using it to index data->temp_src
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Jeremy Cline [Tue, 31 Jul 2018 01:37:31 +0000 (01:37 +0000)]
fs/quota: Fix spectre gadget in do_quotactl
'type' is user-controlled, so sanitize it after the bounds check to
avoid using it in speculative execution. This covers the following
potential gadgets detected with the help of smatch:
Additionally, a quick inspection indicates there are array accesses with
'type' in quota_on() and quota_off() functions which are also addressed
by this.
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CVE-2017-5753
(cherry picked from commit 7b6924d94a60c6b8c1279ca003e8744e6cd9e8b1) Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Jeremy Cline [Mon, 13 Aug 2018 22:23:13 +0000 (22:23 +0000)]
net: sock_diag: Fix spectre v1 gadget in __sock_diag_cmd()
req->sdiag_family is a user-controlled value that's used as an array
index. Sanitize it after the bounds check to avoid speculative
out-of-bounds array access.
This also protects the sock_is_registered() call, so this removes the
sanitize call there.
Fixes: e978de7a6d38 ("net: socket: Fix potential spectre v1 gadget in sock_is_registered") Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com Cc: jamie.iles@oracle.com Cc: liran.alon@oracle.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CVE-2017-5753
(backported from commit 66b51b0a0341fd42ce657739bdae0561b0410a85)
[juergh: Adjusted for missing sock_is_registered().] Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Fix this by sanitizing info.index before indirectly using it to index
vgpu->vdev.region
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: Zhenyu Wang <zhenyuw@linux.intel.com>
CVE-2017-5753
(cherry picked from commit de5372da605d3bca46e3102bab51b7e1c0e0a6f6) Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Jeremy Cline [Thu, 2 Aug 2018 04:03:40 +0000 (00:03 -0400)]
ext4: fix spectre gadget in ext4_mb_regular_allocator()
'ac->ac_g_ex.fe_len' is a user-controlled value which is used in the
derivation of 'ac->ac_2order'. 'ac->ac_2order', in turn, is used to
index arrays which makes it a potential spectre gadget. Fix this by
sanitizing the value assigned to 'ac->ac2_order'. This covers the
following accesses found with the help of smatch:
Jeremy Cline [Tue, 31 Jul 2018 21:13:16 +0000 (21:13 +0000)]
netlink: Fix spectre v1 gadget in netlink_create()
'protocol' is a user-controlled value, so sanitize it after the bounds
check to avoid using it for speculative out-of-bounds access to arrays
indexed by it.
This addresses the following accesses detected with the help of smatch:
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CVE-2017-5753
(cherry picked from commit bc5b6c0b62b932626a135f516a41838c510c6eba) Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Fix this by sanitizing idx before using it to index data.states
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
CVE-2017-5753
(backported from commit ddf74e79a54070f277ae520722d3bab7f7a6c67a)
[juergh: Adjusted context.] Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Jeremy Cline [Fri, 27 Jul 2018 22:43:02 +0000 (22:43 +0000)]
net: socket: Fix potential spectre v1 gadget in sock_is_registered
'family' can be a user-controlled value, so sanitize it after the bounds
check to avoid speculative out-of-bounds access.
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CVE-2017-5753
(backported from commit e978de7a6d382ec378830ca2cf38e902df0b6d84)
[juergh: Adjusted for missing sock_is_registered().] Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CVE-2017-5753
(cherry picked from commit c8e8cd579bb4265651df8223730105341e61a2d1) Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Mark Rutland [Tue, 10 Jul 2018 18:01:23 +0000 (19:01 +0100)]
KVM: arm/arm64: vgic: Fix possible spectre-v1 write in vgic_mmio_write_apr()
It's possible for userspace to control n. Sanitize n when using it as an
array index, to inhibit the potential spectre-v1 write gadget.
Note that while it appears that n must be bound to the interval [0,3]
due to the way it is extracted from addr, we cannot guarantee that
compiler transformations (and/or future refactoring) will ensure this is
the case, and given this is a slow path it's better to always perform
the masking.
Found by smatch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
CVE-2017-5753
(cherry picked from commit 6b8b9a48545e08345b8ff77c9fd51b1aebdbefb3) Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
John Garry [Fri, 8 Jun 2018 10:26:33 +0000 (18:26 +0800)]
libahci: Fix possible Spectre-v1 pmp indexing in ahci_led_store()
Currently smatch warns of possible Spectre-V1 issue in ahci_led_store():
drivers/ata/libahci.c:1150 ahci_led_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'pp->em_priv' (local cap)
Userspace controls @pmp from following callchain:
em_message->store()
->ata_scsi_em_message_store()
-->ap->ops->em_store()
--->ahci_led_store()
After the mask+shift @pmp is effectively an 8b value, which is used to
index into an array of length 8, so sanitize the array index.
Signed-off-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
CVE-2017-5753
(cherry picked from commit fae2a63737e5973f1426bc139935a0f42e232844) Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Avoid any possible speculation by using array_index_nospec() thus
ensuring the semnum value is bounded to [0, sma->sem_nsems). With the
exception of sem_lock() all of these are slowpaths.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180423171131.njs4rfm2yzyeg6do@linux-n805 Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CVE-2017-5753
(cherry picked from commit ec67aaa46dce26d671b46c94ac674ad0b67d044c) Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
media: dvb_ca_en50221: prevent using slot_info for Spectre attacs
slot can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability,
as warned by smatch:
drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_ca_en50221.c:1479 dvb_ca_en50221_io_write() warn: potential spectre issue 'ca->slot_info' (local cap)
Mark Rutland [Wed, 25 Apr 2018 16:13:41 +0000 (17:13 +0100)]
KVM: arm/arm64: vgic: fix possible spectre-v1 in vgic_get_irq()
It's possible for userspace to control intid. Sanitize intid when using
it as an array index.
At the same time, sort the includes when adding <linux/nospec.h>.
Found by smatch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com> Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CVE-2017-5753
(backported from commit 41b87599c74300027f305d7b34368ec558978ff2)
[juergh: Adjusted context.] Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Fixes: 364a4311f8c6 ("x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry") Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1822760
The backport of upstream commit c595ceee4570 ("x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush
logic") incorrectly put the enabling of L1D flushing in
kvm_write_guest_virt_helper() instead of kvm_write_guest_virt_system().
Fixes: f0ace387064d ("x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush logic") Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Wanpeng Li [Wed, 10 Apr 2019 10:10:00 +0000 (12:10 +0200)]
KVM: X86: Allow userspace to define the microcode version
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1822760
Linux (among the others) has checks to make sure that certain features
aren't enabled on a certain family/model/stepping if the microcode version
isn't greater than or equal to a known good version.
By exposing the real microcode version, we're preventing buggy guests that
don't check that they are running virtualized (i.e., they should trust the
hypervisor) from disabling features that are effectively not buggy.
Suggested-by: Filippo Sironi <sironi@amazon.de> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
(backported from commit 518e7b94817abed94becfe6a44f1ece0d4745afe)
[juergh:
- Adjusted context.
- rdmsrl -> rdmsrl_safe (to match final upstream).] Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
1) missing entries in the l1d_param array; this can cause a host crash
if an access attempts to reach the missing entry. Future-proof the get
function against any overflows as well. However, the two entries
VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED and VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED must
not be accepted by the parse function, so disable them there.
2) invalid values must be rejected even if the CPU does not have the
bug, so test for them before checking boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_L1TF)
... and a small refactoring, since the .cmd field is redundant with
the index in the array.
Reported-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: a7b9020b06ec6d7c3f3b0d4ef1a9eba12654f4f7 Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0027ff2a75f9dcf0537ac0a65c5840b0e21a4950) Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Tom Lendacky [Wed, 10 Apr 2019 10:10:00 +0000 (12:10 +0200)]
KVM: SVM: Add MSR-based feature support for serializing LFENCE
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1822760
In order to determine if LFENCE is a serializing instruction on AMD
processors, MSR 0xc0011029 (MSR_F10H_DECFG) must be read and the state
of bit 1 checked. This patch will add support to allow a guest to
properly make this determination.
Add the MSR feature callback operation to svm.c and add MSR 0xc0011029
to the list of MSR-based features. If LFENCE is serializing, then the
feature is supported, allowing the hypervisor to set the value of the
MSR that guest will see. Support is also added to write (hypervisor only)
and read the MSR value for the guest. A write by the guest will result in
a #GP. A read by the guest will return the value as set by the host. In
this way, the support to expose the feature to the guest is controlled by
the hypervisor.
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
(backported from commit d1d93fa90f1afa926cb060b7f78ab01a65705b4d)
[juergh: Adjusted context.] Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
x86/speculation/l1tf: Suggest what to do on systems with too much RAM
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1822760
Two users have reported [1] that they have an "extremely unlikely" system
with more than MAX_PA/2 memory and L1TF mitigation is not effective.
Make the warning more helpful by suggesting the proper mem=X kernel boot
parameter to make it effective and a link to the L1TF document to help
decide if the mitigation is worth the unusable RAM.
Aaron Ma [Tue, 2 Apr 2019 04:10:13 +0000 (12:10 +0800)]
UBUNTU: SAUCE: ACPI / bus: Add some Lenovo laptops in list of acpi table term list
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1819921
Some Lenovo laptops failed to boot because of no package handling
with module-level code which is supported from v4.17-rc1.
Due to the regression concerns, add these series of laptops in a quirk
list to be handled.
V2:
Fix non-x86 building error.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Ma <aaron.ma@canonical.com> Acked-by: AceLan Kao <acelan.kao@canonical.com> Acked-by: hwang4 <hui.wang@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
UBUNTU: [Packaging] remove arm64 snapdragon from getabis
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1820868
linux-snapdragon package is being forked out to its own topic branch, so
remove it from the list of images that we fetch the ABI files from.
Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Acked-by: Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Jann Horn [Sat, 12 Jan 2019 01:39:05 +0000 (02:39 +0100)]
fuse: call pipe_buf_release() under pipe lock
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1824553
Some of the pipe_buf_release() handlers seem to assume that the pipe is
locked - in particular, anon_pipe_buf_release() accesses pipe->tmp_page
without taking any extra locks. From a glance through the callers of
pipe_buf_release(), it looks like FUSE is the only one that calls
pipe_buf_release() without having the pipe locked.
This bug should only lead to a memory leak, nothing terrible.
Fixes: dd3bb14f44a6 ("fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9509941e9c534920ccc4771ae70bd6cbbe79df1c) Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
Because the FUSE_RELEASE and FUSE_RELEASEDIR paths share code, this
incorrectly caused the FUSE_RELEASEDIR request to be dropped and never sent
to userspace.
Pass an isdir bool to distinguish between FUSE_RELEASE and FUSE_RELEASEDIR
inside of fuse_file_put.
Fixes: 7678ac50615d ("fuse: support clients that don't implement 'open'") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.14 Signed-off-by: Chad Austin <chadaustin@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2e64ff154ce6ce9a8dc0f9556463916efa6ff460) Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
Lukas Czerner [Fri, 9 Nov 2018 13:51:46 +0000 (14:51 +0100)]
fuse: fix use-after-free in fuse_direct_IO()
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1824553
In async IO blocking case the additional reference to the io is taken for
it to survive fuse_aio_complete(). In non blocking case this additional
reference is not needed, however we still reference io to figure out
whether to wait for completion or not. This is wrong and will lead to
use-after-free. Fix it by storing blocking information in separate
variable.
This was spotted by KASAN when running generic/208 fstest.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com> Reported-by: Zorro Lang <zlang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Fixes: 744742d692e3 ("fuse: Add reference counting for fuse_io_priv") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.6
(cherry picked from commit ebacb81273599555a7a19f7754a1451206a5fc4f) Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
Miklos Szeredi [Fri, 9 Nov 2018 14:52:16 +0000 (15:52 +0100)]
fuse: fix possibly missed wake-up after abort
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1824553
In current fuse_drop_waiting() implementation it's possible that
fuse_wait_aborted() will not be woken up in the unlikely case that
fuse_abort_conn() + fuse_wait_aborted() runs in between checking
fc->connected and calling atomic_dec(&fc->num_waiting).
Do the atomic_dec_and_test() unconditionally, which also provides the
necessary barrier against reordering with the fc->connected check.
The explicit smp_mb() in fuse_wait_aborted() is not actually needed, since
the spin_unlock() in fuse_abort_conn() provides the necessary RELEASE
barrier after resetting fc->connected. However, this is not a performance
sensitive path, and adding the explicit barrier makes it easier to
document.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Fixes: b8f95e5d13f5 ("fuse: umount should wait for all requests") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v4.19
(cherry picked from commit 2d84a2d19b6150c6dbac1e6ebad9c82e4c123772) Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
Miklos Szeredi [Fri, 9 Nov 2018 14:52:16 +0000 (15:52 +0100)]
fuse: fix leaked notify reply
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1824553
fuse_request_send_notify_reply() may fail if the connection was reset for
some reason (e.g. fs was unmounted). Don't leak request reference in this
case. Besides leaking memory, this resulted in fc->num_waiting not being
decremented and hence fuse_wait_aborted() left in a hanging and unkillable
state.
Fixes: 2d45ba381a74 ("fuse: add retrieve request") Fixes: b8f95e5d13f5 ("fuse: umount should wait for all requests") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+6339eda9cb4ebbc4c37b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v2.6.36
(cherry picked from commit 7fabaf303458fcabb694999d6fa772cc13d4e217) Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1824553
Using waitqueue_active() is racy. Make sure we issue a wake_up()
unconditionally after storing into fc->blocked. After that it's okay to
optimize with waitqueue_active() since the first wake up provides the
necessary barrier for all waiters, not the just the woken one.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Fixes: 3c18ef8117f0 ("fuse: optimize wake_up") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.10
(cherry picked from commit 908a572b80f6e9577b45e81b3dfe2e22111286b8) Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1824553
Otherwise fuse_dev_do_write() could come in and finish off the request, and
the set_bit(FR_SENT, ...) could trigger the WARN_ON(test_bit(FR_SENT, ...))
in request_end().
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Reported-by: syzbot+ef054c4d3f64cd7f7cec@syzkaller.appspotmai Fixes: 46c34a348b0a ("fuse: no fc->lock for pqueue parts") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2
(cherry picked from commit 4c316f2f3ff315cb48efb7435621e5bfb81df96d) Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1824553
After we found req in request_find() and released the lock,
everything may happen with the req in parallel:
fuse: Don't access pipe->buffers without pipe_lock()
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1824553
fuse_dev_splice_write() reads pipe->buffers to determine the size of
'bufs' array before taking the pipe_lock(). This is not safe as
another thread might change the 'pipe->buffers' between the allocation
and taking the pipe_lock(). So we end up with too small 'bufs' array.
Move the bufs allocations inside pipe_lock()/pipe_unlock() to fix this.
Fixes: dd3bb14f44a6 ("fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device") Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.35 Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
(backported from commit a2477b0e67c52f4364a47c3ad70902bc2a61bd4c) Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1824553
syzbot is hitting NULL pointer dereference at process_init_reply().
This is because deactivate_locked_super() is called before response for
initial request is processed.
Fix this by aborting and waiting for all requests (including FUSE_INIT)
before resetting fc->sb.
Original patch by Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SKAURA.ne.jp>.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+b62f08f4d5857755e3bc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Fixes: e27c9d3877a0 ("fuse: fuse: add time_gran to INIT_OUT") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.19 Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
(backported from commit e8f3bd773d22f488724dffb886a1618da85c2966) Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1824553
fuse_abort_conn() does not guarantee that all async requests have actually
finished aborting (i.e. their ->end() function is called). This could
actually result in still used inodes after umount.
Add a helper to wait until all requests are fully done. This is done by
looking at the "num_waiting" counter. When this counter drops to zero, we
can be sure that no more requests are outstanding.
Fixes: 0d8e84b0432b ("fuse: simplify request abort") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2 Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
(backported from commit b8f95e5d13f5f0191dcb4b9113113d241636e7cb) Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1824553
fuse_dev_release() assumes that it's the only one referencing the
fpq->processing list, but that's not true, since fuse_abort_conn() can be
doing the same without any serialization between the two.
Fixes: c3696046beb3 ("fuse: separate pqueue for clones") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2 Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 45ff350bbd9d0f0977ff270a0d427c71520c0c37) Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
Michael Neuling [Fri, 14 Sep 2018 01:14:11 +0000 (11:14 +1000)]
powerpc: Avoid code patching freed init sections
This stops us from doing code patching in init sections after they've
been freed.
In this chain:
kvm_guest_init() ->
kvm_use_magic_page() ->
fault_in_pages_readable() ->
__get_user() ->
__get_user_nocheck() ->
barrier_nospec();
We have a code patching location at barrier_nospec() and
kvm_guest_init() is an init function. This whole chain gets inlined,
so when we free the init section (hence kvm_guest_init()), this code
goes away and hence should no longer be patched.
We seen this as userspace memory corruption when using a memory
checker while doing partition migration testing on powervm (this
starts the code patching post migration via
/sys/kernel/mobility/migration). In theory, it could also happen when
using /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/barrier_nospec.
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1822870 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.13+ BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1822870 Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
(backported from commit 51c3c62b58b357e8d35e4cc32f7b4ec907426fe3) Signed-off-by: Manoj Iyer <manoj.iyer@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add count cache flush parameters to kvmppc_get_cpu_char()
Add KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_BCCTR_FLUSH_ASSIST &
KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE to the characteristics returned
from the H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS H-CALL, as queried from either the
hypervisor or the device tree.
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1822870 Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <sjitindarsingh@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2b57ecd0208f7ac0b20b1b171698f027481a39f6) Signed-off-by: Manoj Iyer <manoj.iyer@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
Michael Ellerman [Thu, 21 Mar 2019 04:24:33 +0000 (15:24 +1100)]
powerpc/security: Fix spectre_v2 reporting
When I updated the spectre_v2 reporting to handle software count cache
flush I got the logic wrong when there's no software count cache
enabled at all.
The result is that on systems with the software count cache flush
disabled we print:
Which correctly indicates that the count cache is disabled, but
incorrectly says the software count cache flush is enabled.
The root of the problem is that we are trying to handle all
combinations of options. But we know now that we only expect to see
the software count cache flush enabled if the other options are false.
So split the two cases, which simplifies the logic and fixes the bug.
We were also missing a space before "(hardware accelerated)".
projects / mirror_ubuntu-bionic-kernel.git / log