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0c18794e | 1 | /** @file\r |
2 | Implement authentication services for the authenticated variable\r | |
3 | service in UEFI2.2.\r | |
4 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
5 | Caution: This module requires additional review when modified.\r |
6 | This driver will have external input - variable data. It may be input in SMM mode.\r | |
7 | This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r | |
8 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
9 | Variable attribute should also be checked to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
10 | \r | |
11 | ProcessVarWithPk(), ProcessVarWithKek() and ProcessVariable() are the function to do\r | |
12 | variable authentication.\r | |
13 | \r | |
14 | VerifyTimeBasedPayload() and VerifyCounterBasedPayload() are sub function to do verification.\r | |
15 | They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library\r | |
16 | to verify the signature.\r | |
17 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 18 | Copyright (c) 2009 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r |
2d3fb919 | 19 | This program and the accompanying materials\r |
20 | are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r | |
21 | which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r | |
0c18794e | 22 | http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r |
23 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 24 | THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r |
0c18794e | 25 | WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r |
26 | \r | |
27 | **/\r | |
28 | \r | |
29 | #include "Variable.h"\r | |
30 | #include "AuthService.h"\r | |
31 | \r | |
32 | ///\r | |
33 | /// Global database array for scratch\r | |
2d3fb919 | 34 | ///\r |
0c18794e | 35 | UINT8 mPubKeyStore[MAX_KEYDB_SIZE];\r |
36 | UINT32 mPubKeyNumber;\r | |
37 | UINT32 mPlatformMode;\r | |
ae09f979 | 38 | EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[] = {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, EFI_CERT_X509_GUID};\r |
0c18794e | 39 | //\r |
40 | // Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r | |
41 | //\r | |
42 | CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r | |
43 | //\r | |
44 | // Hash context pointer\r | |
45 | //\r | |
46 | VOID *mHashCtx = NULL;\r | |
47 | \r | |
0c18794e | 48 | //\r |
2d3fb919 | 49 | // Pointer to runtime buffer.\r |
50 | // For "Append" operation to an existing variable, a read/modify/write operation\r | |
51 | // is supported by firmware internally. Reserve runtime buffer to cache previous\r | |
0c18794e | 52 | // variable data in runtime phase because memory allocation is forbidden in virtual mode.\r |
53 | //\r | |
54 | VOID *mStorageArea = NULL;\r | |
55 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 56 | //\r |
57 | // The serialization of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r | |
58 | // parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r | |
59 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value\r | |
60 | // i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)\r | |
61 | //\r | |
62 | UINT8 *mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = NULL;\r | |
63 | \r | |
d912bad7 | 64 | //\r |
65 | // Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.\r | |
66 | // These data are used to peform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.\r | |
67 | //\r | |
68 | EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {\r | |
69 | //{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }\r | |
70 | {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },\r | |
71 | {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
72 | {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
73 | {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },\r | |
74 | {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },\r | |
75 | {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},\r | |
76 | {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },\r | |
77 | {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },\r | |
78 | {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 }\r | |
79 | };\r | |
80 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 81 | /**\r |
82 | Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.\r | |
83 | \r | |
84 | @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r | |
85 | @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r | |
86 | \r | |
87 | @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.\r | |
88 | @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.\r | |
89 | \r | |
90 | **/\r | |
91 | BOOLEAN\r | |
92 | NeedPhysicallyPresent(\r | |
93 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
94 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r | |
95 | )\r | |
96 | {\r | |
97 | if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))\r | |
98 | || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {\r | |
99 | return TRUE;\r | |
100 | }\r | |
101 | \r | |
102 | return FALSE;\r | |
103 | }\r | |
104 | \r | |
105 | /**\r | |
106 | Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.\r | |
107 | \r | |
108 | @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.\r | |
109 | @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.\r | |
110 | \r | |
111 | **/\r | |
112 | BOOLEAN\r | |
113 | InCustomMode (\r | |
114 | VOID\r | |
115 | )\r | |
116 | {\r | |
117 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
118 | \r | |
119 | FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r | |
120 | if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL && *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr)) == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {\r | |
121 | return TRUE;\r | |
122 | }\r | |
123 | \r | |
124 | return FALSE;\r | |
125 | }\r | |
126 | \r | |
127 | \r | |
0c18794e | 128 | /**\r |
2d3fb919 | 129 | Internal function to delete a Variable given its name and GUID, no authentication\r |
130 | required.\r | |
0c18794e | 131 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 132 | @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r |
133 | @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r | |
0c18794e | 134 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 135 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable deleted successfully.\r |
136 | @retval Others The driver failded to start the device.\r | |
0c18794e | 137 | \r |
138 | **/\r | |
139 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
2d3fb919 | 140 | DeleteVariable (\r |
141 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
142 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r | |
143 | )\r | |
144 | {\r | |
145 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
146 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
147 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 148 | Status = FindVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r |
2d3fb919 | 149 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
150 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
151 | }\r | |
152 | \r | |
153 | ASSERT (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL);\r | |
154 | return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, &Variable, NULL);\r | |
155 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 156 | \r |
157 | /**\r | |
158 | Initializes for authenticated varibale service.\r | |
159 | \r | |
160 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Function successfully executed.\r | |
161 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Fail to allocate enough memory resources.\r | |
162 | \r | |
163 | **/\r | |
164 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
165 | AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (\r | |
166 | VOID\r | |
167 | )\r | |
168 | {\r | |
169 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
170 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
7aaf2fd6 | 171 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r |
0c18794e | 172 | UINT8 VarValue;\r |
173 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r | |
174 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
175 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
176 | UINTN CtxSize;\r | |
beda2356 | 177 | UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r |
178 | UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r | |
ecc722ad | 179 | UINT8 CustomMode;\r |
ed47ae02 | 180 | UINT32 ListSize;\r |
2d3fb919 | 181 | \r |
0c18794e | 182 | //\r |
183 | // Initialize hash context.\r | |
184 | //\r | |
185 | CtxSize = Sha256GetContextSize ();\r | |
186 | mHashCtx = AllocateRuntimePool (CtxSize);\r | |
187 | if (mHashCtx == NULL) {\r | |
188 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
189 | }\r | |
190 | \r | |
191 | //\r | |
192 | // Reserved runtime buffer for "Append" operation in virtual mode.\r | |
193 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 194 | mStorageArea = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize));\r |
0c18794e | 195 | if (mStorageArea == NULL) {\r |
196 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
197 | }\r | |
198 | \r | |
199 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 200 | // Prepare runtime buffer for serialized data of time-based authenticated\r |
201 | // Variable, i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r | |
202 | //\r | |
203 | mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) + sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r | |
204 | if (mSerializationRuntimeBuffer == NULL) {\r | |
205 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
206 | }\r | |
207 | \r | |
208 | //\r | |
209 | // Check "AuthVarKeyDatabase" variable's existence.\r | |
210 | // If it doesn't exist, create a new one with initial value of 0 and EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
0c18794e | 211 | //\r |
212 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 213 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r |
214 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
215 | &Variable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 216 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
217 | FALSE\r | |
0c18794e | 218 | );\r |
219 | \r | |
220 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
221 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
222 | VarValue = 0;\r | |
223 | mPubKeyNumber = 0;\r | |
224 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
225 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
226 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
227 | &VarValue,\r | |
228 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
229 | VarAttr,\r | |
230 | 0,\r | |
231 | 0,\r | |
232 | &Variable,\r | |
233 | NULL\r | |
234 | );\r | |
235 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
236 | return Status;\r | |
237 | }\r | |
238 | } else {\r | |
239 | //\r | |
240 | // Load database in global variable for cache.\r | |
241 | //\r | |
242 | DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r | |
243 | Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r | |
244 | ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r | |
245 | CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r | |
246 | mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r | |
247 | }\r | |
7aaf2fd6 | 248 | \r |
ecc722ad | 249 | FindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &PkVariable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r |
7aaf2fd6 | 250 | if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r |
251 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r | |
252 | } else {\r | |
253 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r | |
254 | }\r | |
255 | \r | |
0c18794e | 256 | //\r |
05a643f9 | 257 | // Create "SetupMode" varable with BS+RT attribute set.\r |
0c18794e | 258 | //\r |
05a643f9 | 259 | FindVariable (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r |
260 | if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
261 | mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;\r | |
262 | } else {\r | |
263 | mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;\r | |
264 | }\r | |
265 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 266 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r |
267 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
05a643f9 | 268 | &mPlatformMode,\r |
269 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
270 | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,\r | |
271 | 0,\r | |
272 | 0,\r | |
2d3fb919 | 273 | &Variable,\r |
05a643f9 | 274 | NULL\r |
0c18794e | 275 | );\r |
05a643f9 | 276 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
277 | return Status;\r | |
0c18794e | 278 | }\r |
05a643f9 | 279 | \r |
0c18794e | 280 | //\r |
05a643f9 | 281 | // Create "SignatureSupport" varable with BS+RT attribute set.\r |
0c18794e | 282 | //\r |
05a643f9 | 283 | FindVariable (EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r |
284 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
285 | EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r | |
286 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
287 | mSignatureSupport,\r | |
288 | sizeof(mSignatureSupport),\r | |
289 | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,\r | |
290 | 0,\r | |
291 | 0,\r | |
292 | &Variable,\r | |
293 | NULL\r | |
294 | );\r | |
295 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
296 | return Status;\r | |
0c18794e | 297 | }\r |
beda2356 | 298 | \r |
299 | //\r | |
300 | // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 301 | // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in USER_MODE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.\r |
beda2356 | 302 | // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.\r |
303 | //\r | |
8f8ca22e | 304 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r |
ecc722ad | 305 | FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r |
beda2356 | 306 | if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r |
307 | SecureBootEnable = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r | |
2d3fb919 | 308 | } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r |
309 | //\r | |
310 | // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in USER_MODE.\r | |
311 | //\r | |
8f8ca22e | 312 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r |
beda2356 | 313 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
2d3fb919 | 314 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r |
315 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
316 | &SecureBootEnable,\r | |
317 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
318 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
319 | 0,\r | |
320 | 0,\r | |
beda2356 | 321 | &Variable,\r |
322 | NULL\r | |
323 | );\r | |
324 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
325 | return Status;\r | |
326 | }\r | |
327 | }\r | |
328 | \r | |
05a643f9 | 329 | //\r |
330 | // Create "SecureBoot" varable with BS+RT attribute set.\r | |
331 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 332 | if (SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE && mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r |
333 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r | |
334 | } else {\r | |
335 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
336 | }\r | |
ecc722ad | 337 | FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r |
2d3fb919 | 338 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
339 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r | |
340 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
341 | &SecureBootMode,\r | |
342 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
05a643f9 | 343 | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r |
2d3fb919 | 344 | 0,\r |
345 | 0,\r | |
346 | &Variable,\r | |
347 | NULL\r | |
348 | );\r | |
349 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
350 | return Status;\r | |
351 | }\r | |
352 | \r | |
7aaf2fd6 | 353 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, mPlatformMode));\r |
354 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBootMode));\r | |
355 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));\r | |
356 | \r | |
0c18794e | 357 | //\r |
ecc722ad | 358 | // Check "CustomMode" variable's existence.\r |
0c18794e | 359 | //\r |
ecc722ad | 360 | FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r |
361 | if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r | |
362 | CustomMode = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r | |
363 | } else {\r | |
0c18794e | 364 | //\r |
ecc722ad | 365 | // "CustomMode" not exist, initialize it in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE.\r |
0c18794e | 366 | //\r |
ecc722ad | 367 | CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r |
368 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
369 | EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r | |
370 | &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r | |
371 | &CustomMode,\r | |
372 | sizeof (UINT8),\r | |
373 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
374 | 0,\r | |
375 | 0,\r | |
376 | &Variable,\r | |
377 | NULL\r | |
378 | );\r | |
2d3fb919 | 379 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
380 | return Status;\r | |
0c18794e | 381 | }\r |
0c18794e | 382 | }\r |
ecc722ad | 383 | \r |
384 | DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, CustomMode));\r | |
2d3fb919 | 385 | \r |
ed47ae02 | 386 | //\r |
387 | // Check "certdb" variable's existence.\r | |
388 | // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with \r | |
389 | // EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
390 | //\r | |
391 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
392 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
393 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
394 | &Variable,\r | |
395 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r | |
396 | FALSE\r | |
397 | );\r | |
398 | \r | |
399 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
400 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r | |
401 | ListSize = 0;\r | |
402 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
403 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
404 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
405 | &ListSize,\r | |
406 | sizeof (UINT32),\r | |
407 | VarAttr,\r | |
408 | 0,\r | |
409 | 0,\r | |
410 | &Variable,\r | |
411 | NULL\r | |
412 | );\r | |
413 | \r | |
414 | } \r | |
415 | \r | |
0c18794e | 416 | return Status;\r |
417 | }\r | |
418 | \r | |
419 | /**\r | |
420 | Add public key in store and return its index.\r | |
421 | \r | |
422 | @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data\r | |
423 | \r | |
424 | @return Index of new added item\r | |
425 | \r | |
426 | **/\r | |
427 | UINT32\r | |
428 | AddPubKeyInStore (\r | |
429 | IN UINT8 *PubKey\r | |
430 | )\r | |
431 | {\r | |
432 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
433 | BOOLEAN IsFound;\r | |
434 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
435 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
436 | UINT8 *Ptr;\r | |
437 | \r | |
438 | if (PubKey == NULL) {\r | |
439 | return 0;\r | |
440 | }\r | |
441 | \r | |
442 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
443 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
444 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
445 | &Variable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 446 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
447 | FALSE\r | |
0c18794e | 448 | );\r |
449 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r | |
450 | //\r | |
451 | // Check whether the public key entry does exist.\r | |
452 | //\r | |
453 | IsFound = FALSE;\r | |
454 | for (Ptr = mPubKeyStore, Index = 1; Index <= mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r | |
455 | if (CompareMem (Ptr, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r | |
456 | IsFound = TRUE;\r | |
457 | break;\r | |
458 | }\r | |
459 | Ptr += EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r | |
460 | }\r | |
461 | \r | |
462 | if (!IsFound) {\r | |
463 | //\r | |
464 | // Add public key in database.\r | |
465 | //\r | |
466 | if (mPubKeyNumber == MAX_KEY_NUM) {\r | |
467 | //\r | |
468 | // Notes: Database is full, need enhancement here, currently just return 0.\r | |
469 | //\r | |
470 | return 0;\r | |
471 | }\r | |
472 | \r | |
473 | CopyMem (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r | |
474 | Index = ++mPubKeyNumber;\r | |
475 | //\r | |
476 | // Update public key database variable.\r | |
477 | //\r | |
478 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
479 | AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r | |
480 | &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r | |
481 | mPubKeyStore,\r | |
482 | mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE,\r | |
483 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r | |
484 | 0,\r | |
485 | 0,\r | |
486 | &Variable,\r | |
487 | NULL\r | |
488 | );\r | |
489 | ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r | |
490 | }\r | |
491 | \r | |
492 | return Index;\r | |
493 | }\r | |
494 | \r | |
495 | /**\r | |
85560919 | 496 | Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID type.\r |
0c18794e | 497 | Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.\r |
498 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
499 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r |
500 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
501 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
502 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
503 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
504 | \r | |
0c18794e | 505 | @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.\r |
506 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
507 | @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.\r | |
508 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 509 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r |
0c18794e | 510 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.\r |
2d3fb919 | 511 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.\r |
0c18794e | 512 | \r |
513 | **/\r | |
514 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
515 | VerifyCounterBasedPayload (\r | |
516 | IN UINT8 *Data,\r | |
517 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
518 | IN UINT8 *PubKey\r | |
519 | )\r | |
520 | {\r | |
521 | BOOLEAN Status;\r | |
522 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r | |
523 | EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r | |
524 | UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r | |
525 | VOID *Rsa;\r | |
526 | \r | |
527 | Rsa = NULL;\r | |
528 | CertData = NULL;\r | |
529 | CertBlock = NULL;\r | |
530 | \r | |
531 | if (Data == NULL || PubKey == NULL) {\r | |
532 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
533 | }\r | |
534 | \r | |
535 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r | |
536 | CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r | |
537 | \r | |
538 | //\r | |
539 | // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r | |
85560919 | 540 | // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID.\r |
0c18794e | 541 | //\r |
542 | if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r | |
85560919 | 543 | !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)\r |
0c18794e | 544 | ) {\r |
545 | //\r | |
546 | // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
547 | //\r | |
548 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
549 | }\r | |
550 | //\r | |
551 | // Hash data payload with SHA256.\r | |
552 | //\r | |
553 | ZeroMem (Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r | |
554 | Status = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r | |
555 | if (!Status) {\r | |
556 | goto Done;\r | |
557 | }\r | |
558 | Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, (UINTN) (DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE));\r | |
559 | if (!Status) {\r | |
560 | goto Done;\r | |
561 | }\r | |
562 | //\r | |
563 | // Hash Monotonic Count.\r | |
564 | //\r | |
565 | Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &CertData->MonotonicCount, sizeof (UINT64));\r | |
566 | if (!Status) {\r | |
567 | goto Done;\r | |
568 | }\r | |
569 | Status = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Digest);\r | |
570 | if (!Status) {\r | |
571 | goto Done;\r | |
572 | }\r | |
573 | //\r | |
574 | // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.\r | |
575 | //\r | |
576 | Rsa = RsaNew ();\r | |
577 | ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);\r | |
2d3fb919 | 578 | //\r |
0c18794e | 579 | // Set RSA Key Components.\r |
580 | // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r | |
581 | //\r | |
582 | Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r | |
583 | if (!Status) {\r | |
584 | goto Done;\r | |
585 | }\r | |
586 | Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r | |
587 | if (!Status) {\r | |
588 | goto Done;\r | |
589 | }\r | |
590 | //\r | |
591 | // Verify the signature.\r | |
592 | //\r | |
593 | Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 594 | Rsa,\r |
595 | Digest,\r | |
596 | SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,\r | |
597 | CertBlock->Signature,\r | |
0c18794e | 598 | EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r |
599 | );\r | |
600 | \r | |
601 | Done:\r | |
602 | if (Rsa != NULL) {\r | |
603 | RsaFree (Rsa);\r | |
604 | }\r | |
605 | if (Status) {\r | |
606 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
607 | } else {\r | |
608 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
609 | }\r | |
610 | }\r | |
611 | \r | |
0c18794e | 612 | /**\r |
613 | Update platform mode.\r | |
614 | \r | |
615 | @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r | |
616 | \r | |
617 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
618 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r | |
619 | \r | |
620 | **/\r | |
621 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
622 | UpdatePlatformMode (\r | |
623 | IN UINT32 Mode\r | |
624 | )\r | |
625 | {\r | |
626 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
627 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r | |
628 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r | |
629 | UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r | |
beda2356 | 630 | UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r |
631 | UINTN VariableDataSize;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 632 | \r |
0c18794e | 633 | Status = FindVariable (\r |
2d3fb919 | 634 | EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r |
635 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
636 | &Variable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 637 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
638 | FALSE\r | |
0c18794e | 639 | );\r |
640 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
641 | return Status;\r | |
642 | }\r | |
643 | \r | |
05a643f9 | 644 | //\r |
645 | // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r | |
646 | // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r | |
647 | //\r | |
648 | mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;\r | |
649 | CopyMem (GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr), &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r | |
0c18794e | 650 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 651 | if (AtRuntime ()) {\r |
652 | //\r | |
653 | // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r | |
654 | // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r | |
655 | // Variable in runtime.\r | |
656 | //\r | |
657 | return Status;\r | |
658 | }\r | |
659 | \r | |
0c18794e | 660 | //\r |
661 | // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r | |
662 | // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r | |
663 | // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r | |
664 | //\r | |
665 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 666 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r |
667 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
668 | &Variable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 669 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
670 | FALSE\r | |
0c18794e | 671 | );\r |
672 | //\r | |
673 | // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r | |
674 | // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r | |
675 | // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r | |
676 | //\r | |
677 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
678 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
679 | } else {\r | |
680 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r | |
681 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r | |
682 | } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r | |
683 | SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r | |
684 | } else {\r | |
685 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
686 | }\r | |
687 | }\r | |
688 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 689 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r |
beda2356 | 690 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
0c18794e | 691 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r |
692 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
693 | &SecureBootMode,\r | |
694 | sizeof(UINT8),\r | |
695 | VarAttr,\r | |
696 | 0,\r | |
697 | 0,\r | |
698 | &Variable,\r | |
699 | NULL\r | |
700 | );\r | |
beda2356 | 701 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r |
702 | return Status;\r | |
703 | }\r | |
704 | \r | |
705 | //\r | |
706 | // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r | |
707 | //\r | |
708 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 709 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r |
710 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
711 | &Variable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 712 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
713 | FALSE\r | |
beda2356 | 714 | );\r |
2d3fb919 | 715 | \r |
beda2356 | 716 | if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r |
717 | //\r | |
718 | // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r | |
719 | //\r | |
720 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r | |
721 | VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r | |
722 | } else {\r | |
723 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 724 | // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r |
beda2356 | 725 | // variable is not in secure boot state.\r |
726 | //\r | |
727 | if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL || EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
728 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
729 | }\r | |
730 | SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r | |
731 | VariableDataSize = 0;\r | |
732 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 733 | \r |
beda2356 | 734 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
2d3fb919 | 735 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r |
736 | &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r | |
737 | &SecureBootEnable,\r | |
738 | VariableDataSize,\r | |
739 | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r | |
740 | 0,\r | |
741 | 0,\r | |
beda2356 | 742 | &Variable,\r |
743 | NULL\r | |
744 | );\r | |
745 | return Status;\r | |
0c18794e | 746 | }\r |
747 | \r | |
d912bad7 | 748 | /**\r |
e77f9ef6 | 749 | Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx variable.\r |
d912bad7 | 750 | \r |
751 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.\r | |
752 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
753 | @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.\r | |
754 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r | |
755 | \r | |
756 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.\r | |
757 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.\r | |
758 | \r | |
759 | **/\r | |
760 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
761 | CheckSignatureListFormat(\r | |
762 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
763 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
764 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
765 | IN UINTN DataSize\r | |
766 | )\r | |
767 | {\r | |
768 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r | |
769 | UINTN SigDataSize;\r | |
770 | UINT32 Index;\r | |
771 | UINT32 SigCount;\r | |
772 | BOOLEAN IsPk;\r | |
e77f9ef6 | 773 | VOID *RsaContext;\r |
774 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;\r | |
775 | UINTN CertLen;\r | |
d912bad7 | 776 | \r |
777 | if (DataSize == 0) {\r | |
778 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
779 | }\r | |
780 | \r | |
781 | ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);\r | |
782 | \r | |
783 | if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){\r | |
784 | IsPk = TRUE;\r | |
e77f9ef6 | 785 | } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0) ||\r |
786 | (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) && \r | |
787 | (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0 || StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0))){\r | |
d912bad7 | 788 | IsPk = FALSE;\r |
789 | } else {\r | |
790 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
791 | }\r | |
792 | \r | |
793 | SigCount = 0;\r | |
794 | SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
795 | SigDataSize = DataSize;\r | |
e77f9ef6 | 796 | RsaContext = NULL;\r |
d912bad7 | 797 | \r |
798 | //\r | |
799 | // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.\r | |
800 | // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.\r | |
801 | //\r | |
802 | while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
803 | for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {\r | |
804 | if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {\r | |
805 | //\r | |
806 | // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner \r | |
807 | // component) add the data length according to signature type.\r | |
808 | //\r | |
809 | if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) && \r | |
810 | (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {\r | |
811 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
812 | }\r | |
813 | if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINTN) ~0) &&\r | |
814 | SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {\r | |
815 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
816 | }\r | |
817 | break;\r | |
818 | }\r | |
819 | }\r | |
820 | \r | |
821 | if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {\r | |
822 | //\r | |
823 | // Undefined signature type.\r | |
824 | //\r | |
825 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
826 | }\r | |
827 | \r | |
e77f9ef6 | 828 | if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r |
829 | //\r | |
830 | // Try to retrieve the RSA public key from the X.509 certificate.\r | |
831 | // If this operation fails, it's not a valid certificate.\r | |
832 | //\r | |
833 | RsaContext = RsaNew ();\r | |
834 | if (RsaContext == NULL) {\r | |
835 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
836 | }\r | |
837 | CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
838 | CertLen = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r | |
839 | if (!RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (CertData->SignatureData, CertLen, &RsaContext)) {\r | |
840 | RsaFree (RsaContext);\r | |
841 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
842 | }\r | |
843 | RsaFree (RsaContext);\r | |
844 | }\r | |
845 | \r | |
d912bad7 | 846 | if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {\r |
847 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
848 | }\r | |
849 | SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;\r | |
850 | \r | |
851 | SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
852 | SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
853 | }\r | |
854 | \r | |
855 | if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {\r | |
856 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
857 | }\r | |
858 | \r | |
859 | if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {\r | |
860 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
861 | }\r | |
862 | \r | |
863 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
864 | }\r | |
865 | \r | |
0c18794e | 866 | /**\r |
867 | Process variable with platform key for verification.\r | |
868 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
869 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r |
870 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
871 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
872 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
873 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
874 | This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
875 | \r | |
0c18794e | 876 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r |
877 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
878 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
879 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
880 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
881 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
882 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r | |
883 | @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r | |
884 | \r | |
885 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 886 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.\r |
887 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
0c18794e | 888 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r |
889 | \r | |
890 | **/\r | |
891 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
892 | ProcessVarWithPk (\r | |
893 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
894 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
895 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
896 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
897 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
898 | IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r | |
899 | IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r | |
900 | )\r | |
901 | {\r | |
902 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
0c18794e | 903 | BOOLEAN Del;\r |
2d3fb919 | 904 | UINT8 *Payload;\r |
905 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
0c18794e | 906 | \r |
8c1babfd | 907 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 || \r |
908 | (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r | |
0c18794e | 909 | //\r |
05a643f9 | 910 | // PK, KEK and db/dbx should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r |
8c1babfd | 911 | // authenticated variable.\r |
0c18794e | 912 | //\r |
913 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
914 | }\r | |
915 | \r | |
785d84ea | 916 | Del = FALSE;\r |
917 | if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !IsPk)) {\r | |
8c1babfd | 918 | Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r |
919 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
785d84ea | 920 | if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r |
921 | Del = TRUE;\r | |
922 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 923 | \r |
d912bad7 | 924 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r |
925 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
926 | return Status;\r | |
927 | }\r | |
928 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 929 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
930 | VariableName,\r | |
931 | VendorGuid,\r | |
932 | Payload,\r | |
933 | PayloadSize,\r | |
934 | Attributes,\r | |
935 | 0,\r | |
8c1babfd | 936 | 0,\r |
2d3fb919 | 937 | Variable,\r |
8c1babfd | 938 | &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r |
2d3fb919 | 939 | );\r |
785d84ea | 940 | } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r |
941 | //\r | |
942 | // Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.\r | |
943 | //\r | |
944 | Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
945 | VariableName,\r | |
946 | VendorGuid,\r | |
947 | Data,\r | |
948 | DataSize,\r | |
949 | Variable,\r | |
950 | Attributes,\r | |
951 | AuthVarTypePk,\r | |
952 | &Del\r | |
953 | );\r | |
954 | } else {\r | |
955 | //\r | |
956 | // Verify against the certificate in data payload.\r | |
957 | //\r | |
958 | Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
959 | VariableName,\r | |
960 | VendorGuid,\r | |
961 | Data,\r | |
962 | DataSize,\r | |
963 | Variable,\r | |
964 | Attributes,\r | |
965 | AuthVarTypePayload,\r | |
966 | &Del\r | |
967 | );\r | |
968 | }\r | |
ecc722ad | 969 | \r |
785d84ea | 970 | if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {\r |
971 | if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !Del) {\r | |
972 | //\r | |
973 | // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r | |
974 | //\r | |
975 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r | |
976 | } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && Del){\r | |
977 | //\r | |
978 | // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r | |
979 | //\r | |
980 | Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r | |
981 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 982 | }\r |
983 | \r | |
984 | return Status;\r | |
985 | }\r | |
986 | \r | |
987 | /**\r | |
988 | Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r | |
989 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
990 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r |
991 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
992 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
993 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
994 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
995 | This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
996 | \r | |
0c18794e | 997 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r |
998 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
999 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
1000 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
1001 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
1002 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
1003 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
1004 | \r | |
1005 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1006 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r |
1007 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
0c18794e | 1008 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r |
1009 | \r | |
1010 | **/\r | |
1011 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1012 | ProcessVarWithKek (\r | |
1013 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1014 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1015 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
1016 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1017 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
1018 | IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r | |
1019 | )\r | |
1020 | {\r | |
1021 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1022 | UINT8 *Payload;\r |
1023 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
ecc722ad | 1024 | \r |
8c1babfd | 1025 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r |
1026 | (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r | |
ecc722ad | 1027 | //\r |
8c1babfd | 1028 | // DB and DBX should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r |
1029 | // authenticated variable.\r | |
ecc722ad | 1030 | //\r |
1031 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1032 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 1033 | \r |
ecc722ad | 1034 | Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r |
1035 | if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r | |
8c1babfd | 1036 | //\r |
1037 | // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r | |
1038 | //\r | |
1039 | return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
1040 | VariableName,\r | |
1041 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1042 | Data,\r | |
1043 | DataSize,\r | |
1044 | Variable,\r | |
1045 | Attributes,\r | |
1046 | AuthVarTypeKek,\r | |
1047 | NULL\r | |
1048 | );\r | |
0c18794e | 1049 | } else {\r |
1050 | //\r | |
ecc722ad | 1051 | // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.\r |
0c18794e | 1052 | //\r |
8c1babfd | 1053 | Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r |
1054 | PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1055 | \r |
e77f9ef6 | 1056 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r |
1057 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1058 | return Status;\r | |
1059 | }\r | |
1060 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1061 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r |
2d3fb919 | 1062 | VariableName,\r |
1063 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1064 | Payload,\r | |
1065 | PayloadSize,\r | |
1066 | Attributes,\r | |
1067 | 0,\r | |
8c1babfd | 1068 | 0,\r |
0c18794e | 1069 | Variable,\r |
8c1babfd | 1070 | &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r |
0c18794e | 1071 | );\r |
1072 | }\r | |
1073 | \r | |
1074 | return Status;\r | |
1075 | }\r | |
1076 | \r | |
1077 | /**\r | |
1078 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r | |
1079 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
1080 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r |
1081 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
1082 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
1083 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
1084 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
1085 | This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r | |
1086 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1087 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r |
1088 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
1089 | \r | |
1090 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
1091 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
1092 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
1093 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
1094 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
1095 | \r | |
1096 | @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
1097 | @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r | |
1098 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
1099 | @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1100 | set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r |
1101 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
0c18794e | 1102 | @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r |
1103 | \r | |
1104 | **/\r | |
1105 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1106 | ProcessVariable (\r | |
1107 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1108 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1109 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
1110 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1111 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
1112 | IN UINT32 Attributes\r | |
1113 | )\r | |
1114 | {\r | |
1115 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1116 | BOOLEAN IsDeletion;\r | |
1117 | BOOLEAN IsFirstTime;\r | |
1118 | UINT8 *PubKey;\r | |
1119 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r | |
1120 | EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r | |
1121 | UINT32 KeyIndex;\r | |
1122 | UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r | |
1123 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 1124 | KeyIndex = 0;\r |
0c18794e | 1125 | CertData = NULL;\r |
1126 | CertBlock = NULL;\r | |
1127 | PubKey = NULL;\r | |
1128 | IsDeletion = FALSE;\r | |
1129 | \r | |
ecc722ad | 1130 | if (NeedPhysicallyPresent(VariableName, VendorGuid) && !UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r |
1131 | //\r | |
1132 | // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.\r | |
1133 | //\r | |
1134 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1135 | }\r | |
1136 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1137 | //\r |
1138 | // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r | |
1139 | //\r | |
1140 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
ed47ae02 | 1141 | return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r |
1142 | VariableName,\r | |
1143 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1144 | Data,\r | |
1145 | DataSize,\r | |
1146 | Variable,\r | |
1147 | Attributes,\r | |
1148 | AuthVarTypePriv,\r | |
1149 | NULL\r | |
1150 | );\r | |
0c18794e | 1151 | }\r |
2d3fb919 | 1152 | \r |
0c18794e | 1153 | //\r |
1154 | // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.\r | |
1155 | //\r | |
1156 | if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r | |
1157 | //\r | |
1158 | // Determine current operation type.\r | |
1159 | //\r | |
1160 | if (DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) {\r | |
1161 | IsDeletion = TRUE;\r | |
1162 | }\r | |
1163 | //\r | |
1164 | // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r | |
1165 | //\r | |
1166 | if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
1167 | IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r | |
1168 | } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r | |
1169 | IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r | |
1170 | } else {\r | |
1171 | KeyIndex = Variable->CurrPtr->PubKeyIndex;\r | |
1172 | IsFirstTime = FALSE;\r | |
1173 | }\r | |
389c8779 | 1174 | } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && \r |
1175 | ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)\r | |
1176 | ) {\r | |
0c18794e | 1177 | //\r |
1178 | // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r | |
1179 | //\r | |
1180 | return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r | |
1181 | } else {\r | |
1182 | //\r | |
1183 | // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.\r | |
1184 | // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r | |
1185 | //\r | |
1186 | Status = UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes, 0, 0, Variable, NULL);\r | |
1187 | return Status;\r | |
1188 | }\r | |
1189 | \r | |
1190 | //\r | |
1191 | // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.\r | |
1192 | //\r | |
1193 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r | |
1194 | CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r | |
1195 | PubKey = CertBlock->PublicKey;\r | |
1196 | \r | |
1197 | //\r | |
1198 | // Update Monotonic Count value.\r | |
1199 | //\r | |
1200 | MonotonicCount = CertData->MonotonicCount;\r | |
1201 | \r | |
1202 | if (!IsFirstTime) {\r | |
1203 | //\r | |
1204 | // Check input PubKey.\r | |
1205 | //\r | |
1206 | if (CompareMem (PubKey, mPubKeyStore + (KeyIndex - 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) != 0) {\r | |
1207 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1208 | }\r | |
1209 | //\r | |
1210 | // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable\r | |
1211 | // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.\r | |
1212 | //\r | |
1213 | if (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount) {\r | |
1214 | //\r | |
1215 | // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
1216 | //\r | |
1217 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1218 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1219 | }\r |
0c18794e | 1220 | //\r |
1221 | // Verify the certificate in Data payload.\r | |
1222 | //\r | |
1223 | Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, PubKey);\r | |
1224 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1225 | return Status;\r | |
1226 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1227 | \r |
0c18794e | 1228 | //\r |
1229 | // Now, the signature has been verified!\r | |
1230 | //\r | |
1231 | if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {\r | |
1232 | //\r | |
1233 | // Update public key database variable if need.\r | |
1234 | //\r | |
1235 | KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey);\r | |
4e33001c | 1236 | if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r |
1237 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1238 | }\r | |
0c18794e | 1239 | }\r |
1240 | \r | |
1241 | //\r | |
1242 | // Verification pass.\r | |
1243 | //\r | |
1244 | return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, Attributes, KeyIndex, MonotonicCount, Variable, NULL);\r | |
1245 | }\r | |
1246 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 1247 | /**\r |
1248 | Merge two buffers which formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. Only the new EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r | |
1249 | will be appended to the original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, duplicate EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r | |
1250 | will be ignored.\r | |
1251 | \r | |
1252 | @param[in, out] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r | |
1253 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r | |
1254 | @param[in] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST to be appended.\r | |
1255 | @param[in] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r | |
1256 | \r | |
1257 | @return Size of the merged buffer.\r | |
1258 | \r | |
1259 | **/\r | |
1260 | UINTN\r | |
1261 | AppendSignatureList (\r | |
1262 | IN OUT VOID *Data,\r | |
1263 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1264 | IN VOID *NewData,\r | |
1265 | IN UINTN NewDataSize\r | |
1266 | )\r | |
1267 | {\r | |
1268 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1269 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1270 | UINTN CertCount;\r | |
1271 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r | |
1272 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;\r | |
1273 | UINTN NewCertCount;\r | |
1274 | UINTN Index;\r | |
1275 | UINTN Index2;\r | |
1276 | UINTN Size;\r | |
1277 | UINT8 *Tail;\r | |
1278 | UINTN CopiedCount;\r | |
1279 | UINTN SignatureListSize;\r | |
1280 | BOOLEAN IsNewCert;\r | |
1281 | \r | |
1282 | Tail = (UINT8 *) Data + DataSize;\r | |
1283 | \r | |
1284 | NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;\r | |
1285 | while ((NewDataSize > 0) && (NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1286 | NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1287 | NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1288 | \r | |
1289 | CopiedCount = 0;\r | |
1290 | for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {\r | |
1291 | IsNewCert = TRUE;\r | |
1292 | \r | |
1293 | Size = DataSize;\r | |
1294 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r | |
1295 | while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
1296 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&\r | |
1297 | (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {\r | |
1298 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1299 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1300 | for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {\r | |
1301 | //\r | |
1302 | // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.\r | |
1303 | //\r | |
1304 | if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {\r | |
1305 | IsNewCert = FALSE;\r | |
1306 | break;\r | |
1307 | }\r | |
1308 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1309 | }\r | |
1310 | }\r | |
1311 | \r | |
1312 | if (!IsNewCert) {\r | |
1313 | break;\r | |
1314 | }\r | |
1315 | Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1316 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1317 | }\r | |
1318 | \r | |
1319 | if (IsNewCert) {\r | |
1320 | //\r | |
1321 | // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, append it.\r | |
1322 | //\r | |
1323 | if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r | |
1324 | //\r | |
1325 | // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r | |
1326 | //\r | |
1327 | CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
1328 | Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r | |
1329 | }\r | |
1330 | \r | |
1331 | CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1332 | Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
1333 | CopiedCount++;\r | |
1334 | }\r | |
1335 | \r | |
1336 | NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1337 | }\r | |
1338 | \r | |
1339 | //\r | |
1340 | // Update SignatureListSize in newly appended EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r | |
1341 | //\r | |
1342 | if (CopiedCount != 0) {\r | |
1343 | SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
1344 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);\r | |
1345 | CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r | |
1346 | }\r | |
1347 | \r | |
1348 | NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
1349 | NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
1350 | }\r | |
1351 | \r | |
1352 | return (Tail - (UINT8 *) Data);\r | |
1353 | }\r | |
1354 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1355 | /**\r |
1356 | Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1357 | \r | |
1358 | \r | |
1359 | @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1360 | @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r | |
1361 | \r | |
1362 | @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r | |
1363 | @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r | |
1364 | \r | |
1365 | **/\r | |
1366 | BOOLEAN\r | |
1367 | CompareTimeStamp (\r | |
1368 | IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r | |
1369 | IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r | |
1370 | )\r | |
1371 | {\r | |
1372 | if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r | |
1373 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r | |
1374 | } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r | |
1375 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r | |
1376 | } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r | |
1377 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r | |
1378 | } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r | |
1379 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r | |
1380 | } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r | |
1381 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < FirstTime->Minute);\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1382 | }\r |
0c18794e | 1383 | \r |
1384 | return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r | |
1385 | }\r | |
1386 | \r | |
ed47ae02 | 1387 | /**\r |
1388 | Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r | |
1389 | by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r | |
1390 | \r | |
1391 | The data format of "certdb":\r | |
1392 | //\r | |
1393 | // UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r | |
1394 | // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];\r | |
1395 | // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs2[];\r | |
1396 | // /// ...\r | |
1397 | // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certsn[];\r | |
1398 | //\r | |
1399 | \r | |
1400 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1401 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1402 | @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb".\r | |
1403 | @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb".\r | |
1404 | @param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.\r | |
1405 | @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r | |
1406 | @param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from\r | |
1407 | starting of Data.\r | |
1408 | @param[out] CertNodeSize Length of AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA in bytes.\r | |
1409 | \r | |
1410 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
1411 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.\r | |
1412 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.\r | |
1413 | \r | |
1414 | **/\r | |
1415 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1416 | FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1417 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1418 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1419 | IN UINT8 *Data,\r | |
1420 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1421 | OUT UINT32 *CertOffset, OPTIONAL\r | |
1422 | OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize, OPTIONAL\r | |
1423 | OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset,OPTIONAL\r | |
1424 | OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL\r | |
1425 | )\r | |
1426 | {\r | |
1427 | UINT32 Offset;\r | |
1428 | AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r | |
1429 | UINT32 CertSize;\r | |
1430 | UINT32 NameSize;\r | |
1431 | UINT32 NodeSize;\r | |
1432 | UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r | |
1433 | \r | |
1434 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1435 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1436 | }\r | |
1437 | \r | |
1438 | //\r | |
1439 | // Check whether DataSize matches recorded CertDbListSize.\r | |
1440 | //\r | |
1441 | if (DataSize < sizeof (UINT32)) {\r | |
1442 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1443 | }\r | |
1444 | \r | |
1445 | CertDbListSize = ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) Data);\r | |
1446 | \r | |
1447 | if (CertDbListSize != (UINT32) DataSize) {\r | |
1448 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1449 | }\r | |
1450 | \r | |
1451 | Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r | |
1452 | \r | |
1453 | //\r | |
1454 | // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r | |
1455 | //\r | |
1456 | while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r | |
1457 | Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r | |
1458 | //\r | |
1459 | // Check whether VendorGuid matches.\r | |
1460 | //\r | |
1461 | if (CompareGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid)) {\r | |
1462 | NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r | |
1463 | NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r | |
1464 | CertSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertDataSize);\r | |
1465 | \r | |
1466 | if (NodeSize != sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3 + CertSize +\r | |
1467 | sizeof (CHAR16) * NameSize) {\r | |
1468 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1469 | }\r | |
1470 | \r | |
1471 | Offset = Offset + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3;\r | |
1472 | //\r | |
1473 | // Check whether VariableName matches.\r | |
1474 | //\r | |
1475 | if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) && \r | |
1476 | (CompareMem (Data + Offset, VariableName, NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)) == 0)) {\r | |
1477 | Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
1478 | \r | |
1479 | if (CertOffset != NULL) {\r | |
1480 | *CertOffset = Offset;\r | |
1481 | }\r | |
1482 | \r | |
1483 | if (CertDataSize != NULL) {\r | |
1484 | *CertDataSize = CertSize; \r | |
1485 | }\r | |
1486 | \r | |
1487 | if (CertNodeOffset != NULL) {\r | |
1488 | *CertNodeOffset = (UINT32) ((UINT8 *) Ptr - Data);\r | |
1489 | }\r | |
1490 | \r | |
1491 | if (CertNodeSize != NULL) {\r | |
1492 | *CertNodeSize = NodeSize;\r | |
1493 | }\r | |
1494 | \r | |
1495 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1496 | } else {\r | |
1497 | Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16) + CertSize;\r | |
1498 | }\r | |
1499 | } else {\r | |
1500 | NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r | |
1501 | Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r | |
1502 | }\r | |
1503 | }\r | |
1504 | \r | |
1505 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND; \r | |
1506 | }\r | |
1507 | \r | |
1508 | /**\r | |
1509 | Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r | |
1510 | by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r | |
1511 | \r | |
1512 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1513 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1514 | @param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r | |
1515 | @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r | |
1516 | \r | |
1517 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
1518 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r | |
1519 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.\r | |
1520 | \r | |
1521 | **/\r | |
1522 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1523 | GetCertsFromDb (\r | |
1524 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1525 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1526 | OUT UINT8 **CertData,\r | |
1527 | OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize\r | |
1528 | )\r | |
1529 | {\r | |
1530 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r | |
1531 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1532 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1533 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1534 | UINT32 CertOffset;\r | |
1535 | \r | |
1536 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) || (CertDataSize == NULL)) {\r | |
1537 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1538 | }\r | |
1539 | \r | |
1540 | //\r | |
1541 | // Get variable "certdb".\r | |
1542 | //\r | |
1543 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
1544 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
1545 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
1546 | &CertDbVariable,\r | |
1547 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r | |
1548 | FALSE\r | |
1549 | ); \r | |
1550 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1551 | return Status;\r | |
1552 | }\r | |
1553 | \r | |
1554 | DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1555 | Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1556 | if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1557 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1558 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1559 | }\r | |
1560 | \r | |
1561 | Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1562 | VariableName,\r | |
1563 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1564 | Data,\r | |
1565 | DataSize,\r | |
1566 | &CertOffset,\r | |
1567 | CertDataSize,\r | |
1568 | NULL,\r | |
1569 | NULL\r | |
1570 | );\r | |
1571 | \r | |
1572 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1573 | return Status;\r | |
1574 | }\r | |
1575 | \r | |
1576 | *CertData = Data + CertOffset;\r | |
1577 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1578 | }\r | |
1579 | \r | |
1580 | /**\r | |
1581 | Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated\r | |
1582 | variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r | |
1583 | \r | |
1584 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1585 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1586 | \r | |
1587 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
1588 | @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r | |
1589 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r | |
1590 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r | |
1591 | \r | |
1592 | **/\r | |
1593 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1594 | DeleteCertsFromDb (\r | |
1595 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1596 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r | |
1597 | )\r | |
1598 | {\r | |
1599 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r | |
1600 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1601 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1602 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1603 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r | |
1604 | UINT32 CertNodeOffset;\r | |
1605 | UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r | |
1606 | UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r | |
1607 | UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r | |
1608 | \r | |
1609 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {\r | |
1610 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1611 | }\r | |
1612 | \r | |
1613 | //\r | |
1614 | // Get variable "certdb".\r | |
1615 | //\r | |
1616 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
1617 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
1618 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
1619 | &CertDbVariable,\r | |
1620 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r | |
1621 | FALSE\r | |
1622 | ); \r | |
1623 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1624 | return Status;\r | |
1625 | }\r | |
1626 | \r | |
1627 | DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1628 | Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1629 | if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1630 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1631 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1632 | }\r | |
1633 | \r | |
1634 | if (DataSize == sizeof (UINT32)) {\r | |
1635 | //\r | |
1636 | // There is no certs in certdb.\r | |
1637 | //\r | |
1638 | return EFI_SUCCESS;\r | |
1639 | }\r | |
1640 | \r | |
1641 | //\r | |
1642 | // Get corresponding cert node from certdb.\r | |
1643 | //\r | |
1644 | Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1645 | VariableName,\r | |
1646 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1647 | Data,\r | |
1648 | DataSize,\r | |
1649 | NULL,\r | |
1650 | NULL,\r | |
1651 | &CertNodeOffset,\r | |
1652 | &CertNodeSize\r | |
1653 | );\r | |
1654 | \r | |
1655 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1656 | return Status;\r | |
1657 | }\r | |
1658 | \r | |
1659 | if (DataSize < (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r | |
1660 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1661 | }\r | |
1662 | \r | |
1663 | //\r | |
1664 | // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r | |
1665 | //\r | |
1666 | NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize - CertNodeSize;\r | |
1667 | NewCertDb = AllocateZeroPool (NewCertDbSize);\r | |
1668 | if (NewCertDb == NULL) {\r | |
1669 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1670 | }\r | |
1671 | \r | |
1672 | //\r | |
1673 | // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r | |
1674 | //\r | |
1675 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, CertNodeOffset);\r | |
1676 | //\r | |
1677 | // Update CertDbListSize.\r | |
1678 | //\r | |
1679 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
1680 | //\r | |
1681 | // Copy the DB entries after deleting node.\r | |
1682 | //\r | |
1683 | if (DataSize > (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r | |
1684 | CopyMem (\r | |
1685 | NewCertDb + CertNodeOffset,\r | |
1686 | Data + CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize,\r | |
1687 | DataSize - CertNodeOffset - CertNodeSize\r | |
1688 | );\r | |
1689 | }\r | |
1690 | \r | |
1691 | //\r | |
1692 | // Set "certdb".\r | |
1693 | // \r | |
1694 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; \r | |
1695 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
1696 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
1697 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
1698 | NewCertDb,\r | |
1699 | NewCertDbSize,\r | |
1700 | VarAttr,\r | |
1701 | 0,\r | |
1702 | 0,\r | |
1703 | &CertDbVariable,\r | |
1704 | NULL\r | |
1705 | );\r | |
1706 | \r | |
1707 | FreePool (NewCertDb);\r | |
1708 | return Status;\r | |
1709 | }\r | |
1710 | \r | |
1711 | /**\r | |
1712 | Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName\r | |
1713 | and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb".\r | |
1714 | \r | |
1715 | @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1716 | @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r | |
1717 | @param[in] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r | |
1718 | @param[in] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r | |
1719 | \r | |
1720 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r | |
1721 | @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName\r | |
1722 | and VendorGuid already exists.\r | |
1723 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r | |
1724 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb"\r | |
1725 | \r | |
1726 | **/\r | |
1727 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1728 | InsertCertsToDb (\r | |
1729 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1730 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1731 | IN UINT8 *CertData,\r | |
1732 | IN UINTN CertDataSize\r | |
1733 | )\r | |
1734 | {\r | |
1735 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r | |
1736 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1737 | UINT8 *Data;\r | |
1738 | UINTN DataSize;\r | |
1739 | UINT32 VarAttr;\r | |
1740 | UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r | |
1741 | UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r | |
1742 | UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r | |
1743 | UINT32 NameSize;\r | |
1744 | AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r | |
1745 | \r | |
1746 | if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL)) {\r | |
1747 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r | |
1748 | }\r | |
1749 | \r | |
1750 | //\r | |
1751 | // Get variable "certdb".\r | |
1752 | //\r | |
1753 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
1754 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
1755 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
1756 | &CertDbVariable,\r | |
1757 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r | |
1758 | FALSE\r | |
1759 | ); \r | |
1760 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1761 | return Status;\r | |
1762 | }\r | |
1763 | \r | |
1764 | DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1765 | Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
1766 | if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r | |
1767 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1768 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r | |
1769 | }\r | |
1770 | \r | |
1771 | //\r | |
1772 | // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb".\r | |
1773 | // If yes return error.\r | |
1774 | //\r | |
1775 | Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r | |
1776 | VariableName,\r | |
1777 | VendorGuid,\r | |
1778 | Data,\r | |
1779 | DataSize,\r | |
1780 | NULL,\r | |
1781 | NULL,\r | |
1782 | NULL,\r | |
1783 | NULL\r | |
1784 | );\r | |
1785 | \r | |
1786 | if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
1787 | ASSERT (FALSE);\r | |
1788 | return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r | |
1789 | }\r | |
1790 | \r | |
1791 | //\r | |
1792 | // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r | |
1793 | //\r | |
1794 | NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);\r | |
1795 | CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16); \r | |
1796 | NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize; \r | |
1797 | NewCertDb = AllocateZeroPool (NewCertDbSize);\r | |
1798 | if (NewCertDb == NULL) {\r | |
1799 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r | |
1800 | }\r | |
1801 | \r | |
1802 | //\r | |
1803 | // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r | |
1804 | //\r | |
1805 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, DataSize);\r | |
1806 | //\r | |
1807 | // Update CertDbListSize.\r | |
1808 | //\r | |
1809 | CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
1810 | //\r | |
1811 | // Construct new cert node.\r | |
1812 | //\r | |
1813 | Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (NewCertDb + DataSize);\r | |
1814 | CopyGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid);\r | |
1815 | CopyMem (&Ptr->CertNodeSize, &CertNodeSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
1816 | CopyMem (&Ptr->NameSize, &NameSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
1817 | CopyMem (&Ptr->CertDataSize, &CertDataSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r | |
1818 | \r | |
1819 | CopyMem (\r | |
1820 | (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA),\r | |
1821 | VariableName,\r | |
1822 | NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)\r | |
1823 | );\r | |
1824 | \r | |
1825 | CopyMem (\r | |
1826 | (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16),\r | |
1827 | CertData,\r | |
1828 | CertDataSize\r | |
1829 | );\r | |
1830 | \r | |
1831 | //\r | |
1832 | // Set "certdb".\r | |
1833 | // \r | |
1834 | VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; \r | |
1835 | Status = UpdateVariable (\r | |
1836 | EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r | |
1837 | &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r | |
1838 | NewCertDb,\r | |
1839 | NewCertDbSize,\r | |
1840 | VarAttr,\r | |
1841 | 0,\r | |
1842 | 0,\r | |
1843 | &CertDbVariable,\r | |
1844 | NULL\r | |
1845 | );\r | |
1846 | \r | |
1847 | FreePool (NewCertDb);\r | |
1848 | return Status;\r | |
1849 | }\r | |
1850 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1851 | /**\r |
1852 | Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r | |
1853 | \r | |
dc204d5a JY |
1854 | Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r |
1855 | This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r | |
1856 | This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r | |
1857 | This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r | |
1858 | buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r | |
1859 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1860 | @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r |
1861 | @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r | |
1862 | @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r | |
1863 | @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r | |
1864 | data, this value contains the required size.\r | |
1865 | @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r | |
1866 | @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r | |
785d84ea | 1867 | @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r |
0c18794e | 1868 | @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r |
1869 | \r | |
1870 | @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1871 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r |
1872 | check carried out by the firmware.\r | |
0c18794e | 1873 | @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r |
1874 | of resources.\r | |
1875 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r | |
1876 | \r | |
1877 | **/\r | |
1878 | EFI_STATUS\r | |
1879 | VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r | |
1880 | IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r | |
1881 | IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r | |
1882 | IN VOID *Data,\r | |
1883 | IN UINTN DataSize,\r | |
1884 | IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r | |
1885 | IN UINT32 Attributes,\r | |
ed47ae02 | 1886 | IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r |
0c18794e | 1887 | OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r |
1888 | )\r | |
1889 | {\r | |
1890 | UINT8 *RootCert;\r | |
1891 | UINT8 *SigData;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1892 | UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r |
0c18794e | 1893 | UINTN RootCertSize;\r |
1894 | UINTN Index;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1895 | UINTN CertCount;\r |
1896 | UINTN PayloadSize;\r | |
0c18794e | 1897 | UINT32 Attr;\r |
1898 | UINT32 SigDataSize;\r | |
1899 | UINT32 KekDataSize;\r | |
0c18794e | 1900 | BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r |
1901 | EFI_STATUS Status;\r | |
1902 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r | |
1903 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r | |
1904 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable;\r | |
1905 | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r | |
1906 | UINT8 *NewData;\r | |
1907 | UINTN NewDataSize;\r | |
1908 | VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1909 | UINT8 *Buffer;\r |
1910 | UINTN Length;\r | |
ed47ae02 | 1911 | UINT8 *SignerCerts;\r |
1912 | UINT8 *WrapSigData;\r | |
1913 | UINTN CertStackSize;\r | |
1914 | UINT8 *CertsInCertDb;\r | |
1915 | UINT32 CertsSizeinDb;\r | |
0c18794e | 1916 | \r |
0c18794e | 1917 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r |
1918 | CertData = NULL;\r | |
1919 | NewData = NULL;\r | |
1920 | Attr = Attributes;\r | |
ed47ae02 | 1921 | WrapSigData = NULL;\r |
1922 | SignerCerts = NULL;\r | |
1923 | RootCert = NULL;\r | |
0c18794e | 1924 | \r |
1925 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1926 | // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is\r |
0c18794e | 1927 | // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r |
2d3fb919 | 1928 | // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new\r |
1929 | // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new\r | |
1930 | // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not\r | |
0c18794e | 1931 | // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r |
1932 | //\r | |
1933 | CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1934 | \r |
1935 | //\r | |
1936 | // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the\r | |
1937 | // TimeStamp value are set to zero.\r | |
1938 | //\r | |
1939 | if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||\r | |
1940 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||\r | |
1941 | (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r | |
1942 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r | |
1943 | (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {\r | |
2e24814a | 1944 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r |
2d3fb919 | 1945 | }\r |
1946 | \r | |
0c18794e | 1947 | if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r |
1948 | if (CompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, &Variable->CurrPtr->TimeStamp)) {\r | |
1949 | //\r | |
1950 | // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
1951 | //\r | |
1952 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1953 | }\r | |
1954 | }\r | |
1955 | \r | |
1956 | //\r | |
1957 | // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r | |
1958 | // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r | |
1959 | //\r | |
1960 | if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1961 | !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r |
0c18794e | 1962 | //\r |
1963 | // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r | |
1964 | //\r | |
1965 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
1966 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1967 | \r |
0c18794e | 1968 | //\r |
1969 | // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r | |
1970 | // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r | |
1971 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1972 | SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;\r |
1973 | SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r | |
648f98d1 | 1974 | \r |
0c18794e | 1975 | //\r |
1976 | // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r | |
1977 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1978 | PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;\r |
1979 | PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;\r | |
0c18794e | 1980 | \r |
1981 | //\r | |
1982 | // Construct a buffer to fill with (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r | |
1983 | //\r | |
2d3fb919 | 1984 | NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r |
1985 | sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
1986 | NewData = mSerializationRuntimeBuffer;\r | |
0c18794e | 1987 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 1988 | Buffer = NewData;\r |
1989 | Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r | |
1990 | CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);\r | |
1991 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 1992 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 1993 | Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r |
1994 | CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);\r | |
1995 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 1996 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 1997 | Length = sizeof (UINT32);\r |
1998 | CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);\r | |
1999 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 2000 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 2001 | Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);\r |
2002 | CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);\r | |
2003 | Buffer += Length;\r | |
0c18794e | 2004 | \r |
2d3fb919 | 2005 | CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r |
0c18794e | 2006 | \r |
ed47ae02 | 2007 | if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {\r |
0c18794e | 2008 | //\r |
2009 | // Get platform key from variable.\r | |
2010 | //\r | |
2011 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 2012 | EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r |
2013 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
2014 | &PkVariable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 2015 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
2016 | FALSE\r | |
0c18794e | 2017 | );\r |
2018 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2019 | return Status;\r | |
2020 | }\r | |
2021 | \r | |
2022 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
2023 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
2024 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r | |
4e33001c | 2025 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r |
0c18794e | 2026 | \r |
2027 | \r | |
2028 | //\r | |
2029 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
2030 | //\r | |
2031 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2032 | SigData,\r | |
2033 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2034 | RootCert,\r | |
2035 | RootCertSize,\r | |
2036 | NewData,\r | |
2037 | NewDataSize\r | |
2038 | );\r | |
2039 | \r | |
ed47ae02 | 2040 | } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypeKek) {\r |
2d3fb919 | 2041 | \r |
0c18794e | 2042 | //\r |
2043 | // Get KEK database from variable.\r | |
2044 | //\r | |
2045 | Status = FindVariable (\r | |
2d3fb919 | 2046 | EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r |
2047 | &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r | |
2048 | &KekVariable,\r | |
ecc722ad | 2049 | &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r |
2050 | FALSE\r | |
0c18794e | 2051 | );\r |
2052 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2053 | return Status;\r | |
2054 | }\r | |
2055 | \r | |
2056 | //\r | |
2057 | // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r | |
2d3fb919 | 2058 | //\r |
0c18794e | 2059 | KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r |
2060 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r | |
2061 | while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r | |
2062 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r | |
2063 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
2064 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r | |
2065 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r | |
2066 | //\r | |
2067 | // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r | |
2068 | //\r | |
2069 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r | |
4e33001c | 2070 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r |
2d3fb919 | 2071 | \r |
0c18794e | 2072 | //\r |
2073 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
2074 | //\r | |
2075 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2076 | SigData,\r | |
2077 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2078 | RootCert,\r | |
2079 | RootCertSize,\r | |
2080 | NewData,\r | |
2081 | NewDataSize\r | |
2082 | );\r | |
2083 | if (VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2084 | goto Exit;\r | |
2085 | }\r | |
2086 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r | |
2087 | }\r | |
2088 | }\r | |
2089 | KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r | |
2090 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r | |
2091 | }\r | |
ed47ae02 | 2092 | } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r |
2093 | \r | |
2094 | //\r | |
2095 | // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX.\r | |
2096 | // Get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r | |
2097 | //\r | |
2098 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r | |
2099 | SigData,\r | |
2100 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2101 | &SignerCerts,\r | |
2102 | &CertStackSize,\r | |
2103 | &RootCert,\r | |
2104 | &RootCertSize\r | |
2105 | );\r | |
2106 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2107 | goto Exit;\r | |
2108 | }\r | |
2109 | \r | |
2110 | //\r | |
2111 | // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb for existing\r | |
2112 | // variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates\r | |
2113 | // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r | |
2114 | //\r | |
2115 | if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL)) {\r | |
2116 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2117 | \r | |
2118 | Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);\r | |
2119 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2120 | goto Exit;\r | |
2121 | }\r | |
2122 | \r | |
2123 | if ((CertStackSize != CertsSizeinDb) ||\r | |
2124 | (CompareMem (SignerCerts, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0)) {\r | |
2125 | goto Exit;\r | |
2126 | }\r | |
2127 | }\r | |
2128 | \r | |
2129 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2130 | SigData,\r | |
2131 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2132 | RootCert,\r | |
2133 | RootCertSize,\r | |
2134 | NewData,\r | |
2135 | NewDataSize\r | |
2136 | );\r | |
2137 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r | |
2138 | goto Exit;\r | |
2139 | }\r | |
2140 | \r | |
2141 | //\r | |
2142 | // Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.\r | |
2143 | //\r | |
2144 | if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL)) {\r | |
2145 | Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);\r | |
2146 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2147 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2148 | goto Exit;\r | |
2149 | }\r | |
2150 | } else if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {\r | |
2151 | //\r | |
2152 | // Insert signer's certificates when adding a new common authenticated variable.\r | |
2153 | //\r | |
2154 | Status = InsertCertsToDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, SignerCerts, CertStackSize);\r | |
2155 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2156 | VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r | |
2157 | goto Exit;\r | |
2158 | }\r | |
2159 | }\r | |
785d84ea | 2160 | } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePayload) {\r |
2161 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) PayloadPtr;\r | |
2162 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r | |
2163 | RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r | |
2164 | RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r | |
2165 | \r | |
2166 | // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r | |
2167 | //\r | |
2168 | VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r | |
2169 | SigData,\r | |
2170 | SigDataSize,\r | |
2171 | RootCert,\r | |
2172 | RootCertSize,\r | |
2173 | NewData,\r | |
2174 | NewDataSize\r | |
2175 | );\r | |
ed47ae02 | 2176 | } else {\r |
2177 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
0c18794e | 2178 | }\r |
2179 | \r | |
2180 | Exit:\r | |
2181 | \r | |
ed47ae02 | 2182 | if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r |
2183 | Pkcs7FreeSigners (RootCert);\r | |
2184 | Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);\r | |
2185 | }\r | |
2186 | \r | |
0c18794e | 2187 | if (!VerifyStatus) {\r |
2188 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r | |
2189 | }\r | |
2190 | \r | |
d912bad7 | 2191 | Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r |
2192 | if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r | |
2193 | return Status;\r | |
2194 | }\r | |
2195 | \r | |
2d3fb919 | 2196 | if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (VarDel != NULL)) {\r |
0c18794e | 2197 | *VarDel = TRUE;\r |
2198 | }\r | |
2d3fb919 | 2199 | \r |
0c18794e | 2200 | //\r |
2201 | // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r | |
2202 | //\r | |
ed47ae02 | 2203 | return UpdateVariable (\r |
2204 | VariableName,\r | |
2205 | VendorGuid,\r | |
2206 | PayloadPtr,\r | |
2207 | PayloadSize,\r | |
2208 | Attributes,\r | |
2209 | 0,\r | |
2210 | 0,\r | |
2211 | Variable,\r | |
2212 | &CertData->TimeStamp\r | |
2213 | );\r | |
0c18794e | 2214 | }\r |
ed47ae02 | 2215 | \r |