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Fix GCC44 build failure.
[mirror_edk2.git] / SecurityPkg / VariableAuthenticated / RuntimeDxe / AuthService.c
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0c18794e 1/** @file\r
2 Implement authentication services for the authenticated variable\r
3 service in UEFI2.2.\r
4\r
dc204d5a
JY		 5 Caution: This module requires additional review when modified.\r
6 This driver will have external input - variable data. It may be input in SMM mode.\r
7 This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r
8 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
9 Variable attribute should also be checked to avoid authentication bypass.\r
10\r
11 ProcessVarWithPk(), ProcessVarWithKek() and ProcessVariable() are the function to do\r
12 variable authentication.\r
13\r
14 VerifyTimeBasedPayload() and VerifyCounterBasedPayload() are sub function to do verification.\r
15 They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library\r
16 to verify the signature.\r
17\r
ecc722ad 18Copyright (c) 2009 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
2d3fb919 19This program and the accompanying materials\r
20are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
21which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r
0c18794e 22http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
23\r
2d3fb919 24THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r
0c18794e 25WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
26\r
27**/\r
28\r
29#include "Variable.h"\r
30#include "AuthService.h"\r
31\r
32///\r
33/// Global database array for scratch\r
2d3fb919 34///\r
0c18794e 35UINT8 mPubKeyStore[MAX_KEYDB_SIZE];\r
36UINT32 mPubKeyNumber;\r
f6e23353 37UINT8 mCertDbStore[MAX_CERTDB_SIZE];\r
0c18794e 38UINT32 mPlatformMode;\r
ae09f979 39EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[] = {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, EFI_CERT_X509_GUID};\r
0c18794e 40//\r
41// Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r
42//\r
43CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r
44//\r
45// Hash context pointer\r
46//\r
47VOID *mHashCtx = NULL;\r
48\r
0c18794e 49//\r
2d3fb919 50// Pointer to runtime buffer.\r
51// For "Append" operation to an existing variable, a read/modify/write operation\r
52// is supported by firmware internally. Reserve runtime buffer to cache previous\r
0c18794e 53// variable data in runtime phase because memory allocation is forbidden in virtual mode.\r
54//\r
55VOID *mStorageArea = NULL;\r
56\r
2d3fb919 57//\r
58// The serialization of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r
59// parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r
60// EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value\r
61// i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)\r
62//\r
63UINT8 *mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = NULL;\r
64\r
d912bad7 65//\r
66// Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.\r
67// These data are used to peform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.\r
68//\r
69EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {\r
70//{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }\r
71 {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },\r
72 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
73 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
74 {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },\r
75 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
76 {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},\r
77 {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },\r
78 {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },\r
79 {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 }\r
80};\r
81\r
ecc722ad 82/**\r
83 Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.\r
84\r
85 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
86 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
87\r
88 @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.\r
89 @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.\r
90 \r
91**/\r
92BOOLEAN\r
93NeedPhysicallyPresent(\r
94 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
95 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
96 )\r
97{\r
98 if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))\r
99 || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {\r
100 return TRUE;\r
101 }\r
102 \r
103 return FALSE;\r
104}\r
105\r
106/**\r
107 Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.\r
108\r
109 @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.\r
110 @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.\r
111\r
112**/\r
113BOOLEAN\r
114InCustomMode (\r
115 VOID\r
116 )\r
117{\r
118 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
119\r
120 FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
121 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL && *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr)) == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {\r
122 return TRUE;\r
123 }\r
124 \r
125 return FALSE;\r
126}\r
127\r
128\r
0c18794e 129/**\r
2d3fb919 130 Internal function to delete a Variable given its name and GUID, no authentication\r
131 required.\r
0c18794e 132\r
2d3fb919 133 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
134 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
0c18794e 135\r
2d3fb919 136 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable deleted successfully.\r
137 @retval Others The driver failded to start the device.\r
0c18794e 138\r
139**/\r
140EFI_STATUS\r
2d3fb919 141DeleteVariable (\r
142 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
143 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
144 )\r
145{\r
146 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
147 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
148\r
ecc722ad 149 Status = FindVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
2d3fb919 150 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
151 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
152 }\r
153\r
154 ASSERT (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL);\r
155 return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, &Variable, NULL);\r
156}\r
0c18794e 157\r
158/**\r
159 Initializes for authenticated varibale service.\r
160\r
161 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Function successfully executed.\r
162 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Fail to allocate enough memory resources.\r
163\r
164**/\r
165EFI_STATUS\r
166AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (\r
167 VOID\r
168 )\r
169{\r
170 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
171 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
7aaf2fd6 172 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r
0c18794e 173 UINT8 VarValue;\r
174 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
175 UINT8 *Data;\r
176 UINTN DataSize;\r
177 UINTN CtxSize;\r
beda2356 178 UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
179 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
ecc722ad 180 UINT8 CustomMode;\r
ed47ae02 181 UINT32 ListSize;\r
2d3fb919 182\r
0c18794e 183 //\r
184 // Initialize hash context.\r
185 //\r
186 CtxSize = Sha256GetContextSize ();\r
187 mHashCtx = AllocateRuntimePool (CtxSize);\r
188 if (mHashCtx == NULL) {\r
189 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
190 }\r
191\r
192 //\r
193 // Reserved runtime buffer for "Append" operation in virtual mode.\r
194 //\r
2d3fb919 195 mStorageArea = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize));\r
0c18794e 196 if (mStorageArea == NULL) {\r
197 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
198 }\r
199\r
200 //\r
2d3fb919 201 // Prepare runtime buffer for serialized data of time-based authenticated\r
202 // Variable, i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r
203 //\r
204 mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) + sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r
205 if (mSerializationRuntimeBuffer == NULL) {\r
206 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
207 }\r
208\r
209 //\r
210 // Check "AuthVarKeyDatabase" variable's existence.\r
211 // If it doesn't exist, create a new one with initial value of 0 and EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
0c18794e 212 //\r
213 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 214 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
215 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
216 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 217 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
218 FALSE\r
0c18794e 219 );\r
220\r
221 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
222 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
223 VarValue = 0;\r
224 mPubKeyNumber = 0;\r
225 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
226 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
227 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
228 &VarValue,\r
229 sizeof(UINT8),\r
230 VarAttr,\r
231 0,\r
232 0,\r
233 &Variable,\r
234 NULL\r
235 );\r
236 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
237 return Status;\r
238 }\r
239 } else {\r
240 //\r
241 // Load database in global variable for cache.\r
242 //\r
243 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
244 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
245 ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r
246 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r
247 mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
248 }\r
7aaf2fd6 249\r
ecc722ad 250 FindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &PkVariable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
7aaf2fd6 251 if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
252 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
253 } else {\r
254 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
255 }\r
256 \r
0c18794e 257 //\r
05a643f9 258 // Create "SetupMode" varable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
0c18794e 259 //\r
05a643f9 260 FindVariable (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
261 if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
262 mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;\r
263 } else {\r
264 mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;\r
265 }\r
266 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 267 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
268 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
05a643f9 269 &mPlatformMode,\r
270 sizeof(UINT8),\r
271 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,\r
272 0,\r
273 0,\r
2d3fb919 274 &Variable,\r
05a643f9 275 NULL\r
0c18794e 276 );\r
05a643f9 277 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
278 return Status;\r
0c18794e 279 }\r
05a643f9 280 \r
0c18794e 281 //\r
05a643f9 282 // Create "SignatureSupport" varable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
0c18794e 283 //\r
05a643f9 284 FindVariable (EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
285 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
286 EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r
287 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
288 mSignatureSupport,\r
289 sizeof(mSignatureSupport),\r
290 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,\r
291 0,\r
292 0,\r
293 &Variable,\r
294 NULL\r
295 );\r
296 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
297 return Status;\r
0c18794e 298 }\r
beda2356 299\r
300 //\r
301 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.\r
2d3fb919 302 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in USER_MODE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.\r
beda2356 303 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.\r
304 //\r
8f8ca22e 305 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
ecc722ad 306 FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
beda2356 307 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
308 SecureBootEnable = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
2d3fb919 309 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
310 //\r
311 // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in USER_MODE.\r
312 //\r
8f8ca22e 313 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
beda2356 314 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 315 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
316 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
317 &SecureBootEnable,\r
318 sizeof (UINT8),\r
319 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
320 0,\r
321 0,\r
beda2356 322 &Variable,\r
323 NULL\r
324 );\r
325 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
326 return Status;\r
327 }\r
328 }\r
329\r
05a643f9 330 //\r
331 // Create "SecureBoot" varable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
332 //\r
2d3fb919 333 if (SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE && mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
334 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
335 } else {\r
336 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
337 }\r
ecc722ad 338 FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
2d3fb919 339 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
340 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
341 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
342 &SecureBootMode,\r
343 sizeof (UINT8),\r
05a643f9 344 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
2d3fb919 345 0,\r
346 0,\r
347 &Variable,\r
348 NULL\r
349 );\r
350 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
351 return Status;\r
352 }\r
353\r
7aaf2fd6 354 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, mPlatformMode));\r
355 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBootMode));\r
356 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));\r
357\r
0c18794e 358 //\r
ecc722ad 359 // Check "CustomMode" variable's existence.\r
0c18794e 360 //\r
ecc722ad 361 FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
362 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
363 CustomMode = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
364 } else {\r
0c18794e 365 //\r
ecc722ad 366 // "CustomMode" not exist, initialize it in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE.\r
0c18794e 367 //\r
ecc722ad 368 CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r
369 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
370 EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r
371 &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r
372 &CustomMode,\r
373 sizeof (UINT8),\r
374 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
375 0,\r
376 0,\r
377 &Variable,\r
378 NULL\r
379 );\r
2d3fb919 380 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
381 return Status;\r
0c18794e 382 }\r
0c18794e 383 }\r
ecc722ad 384 \r
385 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, CustomMode));\r
2d3fb919 386\r
ed47ae02 387 //\r
388 // Check "certdb" variable's existence.\r
389 // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with \r
390 // EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
391 //\r
392 Status = FindVariable (\r
393 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
394 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
395 &Variable,\r
396 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
397 FALSE\r
398 );\r
399\r
400 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
401 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
f6e23353 402 ListSize = sizeof (UINT32);\r
ed47ae02 403 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
404 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
405 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
406 &ListSize,\r
407 sizeof (UINT32),\r
408 VarAttr,\r
409 0,\r
410 0,\r
411 &Variable,\r
412 NULL\r
413 );\r
f6e23353 414 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
415 return Status;\r
416 }\r
ed47ae02 417 } \r
418\r
0c18794e 419 return Status;\r
420}\r
421\r
422/**\r
423 Add public key in store and return its index.\r
424\r
425 @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data\r
426\r
427 @return Index of new added item\r
428\r
429**/\r
430UINT32\r
431AddPubKeyInStore (\r
432 IN UINT8 *PubKey\r
433 )\r
434{\r
435 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
436 BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
437 UINT32 Index;\r
438 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
439 UINT8 *Ptr;\r
440\r
441 if (PubKey == NULL) {\r
442 return 0;\r
443 }\r
444\r
445 Status = FindVariable (\r
446 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
447 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
448 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 449 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
450 FALSE\r
0c18794e 451 );\r
452 ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r
453 //\r
454 // Check whether the public key entry does exist.\r
455 //\r
456 IsFound = FALSE;\r
457 for (Ptr = mPubKeyStore, Index = 1; Index <= mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r
458 if (CompareMem (Ptr, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r
459 IsFound = TRUE;\r
460 break;\r
461 }\r
462 Ptr += EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
463 }\r
464\r
465 if (!IsFound) {\r
466 //\r
467 // Add public key in database.\r
468 //\r
469 if (mPubKeyNumber == MAX_KEY_NUM) {\r
470 //\r
471 // Notes: Database is full, need enhancement here, currently just return 0.\r
472 //\r
473 return 0;\r
474 }\r
475\r
476 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
477 Index = ++mPubKeyNumber;\r
478 //\r
479 // Update public key database variable.\r
480 //\r
481 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
482 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
483 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
484 mPubKeyStore,\r
485 mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE,\r
486 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r
487 0,\r
488 0,\r
489 &Variable,\r
490 NULL\r
491 );\r
492 ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r
493 }\r
494\r
495 return Index;\r
496}\r
497\r
498/**\r
85560919 499 Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID type.\r
0c18794e 500 Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.\r
501\r
dc204d5a
JY		 502 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
503 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
504 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
505 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
506 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
507\r
0c18794e 508 @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.\r
509 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
510 @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.\r
511\r
2d3fb919 512 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
0c18794e 513 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.\r
2d3fb919 514 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.\r
0c18794e 515\r
516**/\r
517EFI_STATUS\r
518VerifyCounterBasedPayload (\r
519 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
520 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
521 IN UINT8 *PubKey\r
522 )\r
523{\r
524 BOOLEAN Status;\r
525 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
526 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
527 UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
528 VOID *Rsa;\r
529\r
530 Rsa = NULL;\r
531 CertData = NULL;\r
532 CertBlock = NULL;\r
533\r
534 if (Data == NULL || PubKey == NULL) {\r
535 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
536 }\r
537\r
538 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
539 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
540\r
541 //\r
542 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
85560919 543 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID.\r
0c18794e 544 //\r
545 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
85560919 546 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)\r
0c18794e 547 ) {\r
548 //\r
549 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
550 //\r
551 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
552 }\r
553 //\r
554 // Hash data payload with SHA256.\r
555 //\r
556 ZeroMem (Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r
557 Status = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r
558 if (!Status) {\r
559 goto Done;\r
560 }\r
561 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, (UINTN) (DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE));\r
562 if (!Status) {\r
563 goto Done;\r
564 }\r
565 //\r
566 // Hash Monotonic Count.\r
567 //\r
568 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &CertData->MonotonicCount, sizeof (UINT64));\r
569 if (!Status) {\r
570 goto Done;\r
571 }\r
572 Status = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Digest);\r
573 if (!Status) {\r
574 goto Done;\r
575 }\r
576 //\r
577 // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.\r
578 //\r
579 Rsa = RsaNew ();\r
580 ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);\r
2d3fb919 581 //\r
0c18794e 582 // Set RSA Key Components.\r
583 // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r
584 //\r
585 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
586 if (!Status) {\r
587 goto Done;\r
588 }\r
589 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r
590 if (!Status) {\r
591 goto Done;\r
592 }\r
593 //\r
594 // Verify the signature.\r
595 //\r
596 Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r
2d3fb919 597 Rsa,\r
598 Digest,\r
599 SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,\r
600 CertBlock->Signature,\r
0c18794e 601 EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r
602 );\r
603\r
604Done:\r
605 if (Rsa != NULL) {\r
606 RsaFree (Rsa);\r
607 }\r
608 if (Status) {\r
609 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
610 } else {\r
611 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
612 }\r
613}\r
614\r
0c18794e 615/**\r
616 Update platform mode.\r
617\r
618 @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r
619\r
620 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
621 @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r
622\r
623**/\r
624EFI_STATUS\r
625UpdatePlatformMode (\r
626 IN UINT32 Mode\r
627 )\r
628{\r
629 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
630 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
631 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
632 UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
beda2356 633 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
634 UINTN VariableDataSize;\r
2d3fb919 635\r
0c18794e 636 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 637 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
638 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
639 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 640 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
641 FALSE\r
0c18794e 642 );\r
643 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
644 return Status;\r
645 }\r
646\r
05a643f9 647 //\r
648 // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
649 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
650 //\r
651 mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;\r
652 CopyMem (GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr), &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
0c18794e 653\r
2d3fb919 654 if (AtRuntime ()) {\r
655 //\r
656 // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
657 // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
658 // Variable in runtime.\r
659 //\r
660 return Status;\r
661 }\r
662\r
0c18794e 663 //\r
664 // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r
665 // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r
666 // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r
667 //\r
668 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 669 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
670 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
671 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 672 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
673 FALSE\r
0c18794e 674 );\r
675 //\r
676 // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r
677 // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r
678 // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r
679 //\r
680 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
681 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
682 } else {\r
683 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
684 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
685 } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r
686 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
687 } else {\r
688 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
689 }\r
690 }\r
691\r
2d3fb919 692 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
beda2356 693 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
0c18794e 694 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
695 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
696 &SecureBootMode,\r
697 sizeof(UINT8),\r
698 VarAttr,\r
699 0,\r
700 0,\r
701 &Variable,\r
702 NULL\r
703 );\r
beda2356 704 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
705 return Status;\r
706 }\r
707\r
708 //\r
709 // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r
710 //\r
711 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 712 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
713 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
714 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 715 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
716 FALSE\r
beda2356 717 );\r
2d3fb919 718\r
beda2356 719 if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r
720 //\r
721 // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r
722 //\r
723 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
724 VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r
725 } else {\r
726 //\r
2d3fb919 727 // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r
beda2356 728 // variable is not in secure boot state.\r
729 //\r
730 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL || EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
731 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
732 }\r
733 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
734 VariableDataSize = 0;\r
735 }\r
2d3fb919 736\r
beda2356 737 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 738 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
739 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
740 &SecureBootEnable,\r
741 VariableDataSize,\r
742 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
743 0,\r
744 0,\r
beda2356 745 &Variable,\r
746 NULL\r
747 );\r
748 return Status;\r
0c18794e 749}\r
750\r
d912bad7 751/**\r
e77f9ef6 752 Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx variable.\r
d912bad7 753\r
754 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.\r
755 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
756 @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.\r
757 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
758\r
759 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.\r
760 @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.\r
761 \r
762**/\r
763EFI_STATUS\r
764CheckSignatureListFormat(\r
765 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
766 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
767 IN VOID *Data,\r
768 IN UINTN DataSize\r
769 )\r
770{\r
771 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r
772 UINTN SigDataSize;\r
773 UINT32 Index;\r
774 UINT32 SigCount;\r
775 BOOLEAN IsPk;\r
e77f9ef6 776 VOID *RsaContext;\r
777 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;\r
778 UINTN CertLen;\r
d912bad7 779\r
780 if (DataSize == 0) {\r
781 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
782 }\r
783\r
784 ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);\r
785\r
786 if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){\r
787 IsPk = TRUE;\r
e77f9ef6 788 } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0) ||\r
789 (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) && \r
790 (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0 || StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0))){\r
d912bad7 791 IsPk = FALSE;\r
792 } else {\r
793 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
794 }\r
795\r
796 SigCount = 0;\r
797 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
798 SigDataSize = DataSize;\r
e77f9ef6 799 RsaContext = NULL;\r
d912bad7 800\r
801 //\r
802 // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.\r
803 // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.\r
804 //\r
805 while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
806 for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {\r
807 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {\r
808 //\r
809 // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner \r
810 // component) add the data length according to signature type.\r
811 //\r
812 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) && \r
813 (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {\r
814 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
815 }\r
816 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINTN) ~0) &&\r
817 SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {\r
818 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
819 }\r
820 break;\r
821 }\r
822 }\r
823\r
824 if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {\r
825 //\r
826 // Undefined signature type.\r
827 //\r
828 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
829 }\r
830\r
e77f9ef6 831 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
832 //\r
833 // Try to retrieve the RSA public key from the X.509 certificate.\r
834 // If this operation fails, it's not a valid certificate.\r
835 //\r
836 RsaContext = RsaNew ();\r
837 if (RsaContext == NULL) {\r
838 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
839 }\r
840 CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
841 CertLen = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
842 if (!RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (CertData->SignatureData, CertLen, &RsaContext)) {\r
843 RsaFree (RsaContext);\r
844 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
845 }\r
846 RsaFree (RsaContext);\r
847 }\r
848\r
d912bad7 849 if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {\r
850 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
851 }\r
852 SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;\r
853 \r
854 SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r
855 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r
856 }\r
857\r
858 if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {\r
859 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
860 }\r
861\r
862 if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {\r
863 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
864 }\r
865\r
866 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
867}\r
868\r
0c18794e 869/**\r
870 Process variable with platform key for verification.\r
871\r
dc204d5a
JY		 872 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
873 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
874 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
875 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
876 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
877 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
878\r
0c18794e 879 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
880 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
881 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
882 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
883 data, this value contains the required size.\r
884 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
885 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r
886 @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r
887\r
888 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2d3fb919 889 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.\r
890 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 891 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r
892\r
893**/\r
894EFI_STATUS\r
895ProcessVarWithPk (\r
896 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
897 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
898 IN VOID *Data,\r
899 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
900 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
901 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r
902 IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r
903 )\r
904{\r
905 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
0c18794e 906 BOOLEAN Del;\r
2d3fb919 907 UINT8 *Payload;\r
908 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
0c18794e 909\r
8c1babfd 910 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 || \r
911 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
0c18794e 912 //\r
05a643f9 913 // PK, KEK and db/dbx should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
8c1babfd 914 // authenticated variable.\r
0c18794e 915 //\r
916 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
917 }\r
918\r
785d84ea 919 Del = FALSE;\r
920 if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !IsPk)) {\r
8c1babfd 921 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
922 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
785d84ea 923 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
924 Del = TRUE;\r
925 }\r
2d3fb919 926\r
d912bad7 927 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
928 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
929 return Status;\r
930 }\r
931\r
2d3fb919 932 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
933 VariableName,\r
934 VendorGuid,\r
935 Payload,\r
936 PayloadSize,\r
937 Attributes,\r
938 0,\r
8c1babfd 939 0,\r
2d3fb919 940 Variable,\r
8c1babfd 941 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
2d3fb919 942 );\r
785d84ea 943 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
944 //\r
945 // Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.\r
946 //\r
947 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
948 VariableName,\r
949 VendorGuid,\r
950 Data,\r
951 DataSize,\r
952 Variable,\r
953 Attributes,\r
954 AuthVarTypePk,\r
955 &Del\r
956 );\r
957 } else {\r
958 //\r
959 // Verify against the certificate in data payload.\r
960 //\r
961 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
962 VariableName,\r
963 VendorGuid,\r
964 Data,\r
965 DataSize,\r
966 Variable,\r
967 Attributes,\r
968 AuthVarTypePayload,\r
969 &Del\r
970 );\r
971 }\r
ecc722ad 972\r
785d84ea 973 if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {\r
974 if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !Del) {\r
975 //\r
976 // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r
977 //\r
978 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r
979 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && Del){\r
980 //\r
981 // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r
982 //\r
983 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r
984 }\r
0c18794e 985 }\r
986\r
987 return Status;\r
988}\r
989\r
990/**\r
991 Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r
992\r
dc204d5a
JY		 993 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
994 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
995 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
996 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
997 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
998 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
999\r
0c18794e 1000 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1001 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1002 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1003 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1004 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1005 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1006 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1007\r
1008 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2d3fb919 1009 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
1010 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 1011 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
1012\r
1013**/\r
1014EFI_STATUS\r
1015ProcessVarWithKek (\r
1016 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1017 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1018 IN VOID *Data,\r
1019 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1020 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1021 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r
1022 )\r
1023{\r
1024 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2d3fb919 1025 UINT8 *Payload;\r
1026 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
ecc722ad 1027\r
8c1babfd 1028 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r
1029 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
ecc722ad 1030 //\r
8c1babfd 1031 // DB and DBX should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
1032 // authenticated variable.\r
ecc722ad 1033 //\r
1034 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1035 }\r
0c18794e 1036\r
ecc722ad 1037 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1038 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r
8c1babfd 1039 //\r
1040 // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r
1041 //\r
1042 return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1043 VariableName,\r
1044 VendorGuid,\r
1045 Data,\r
1046 DataSize,\r
1047 Variable,\r
1048 Attributes,\r
1049 AuthVarTypeKek,\r
1050 NULL\r
1051 );\r
0c18794e 1052 } else {\r
1053 //\r
ecc722ad 1054 // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.\r
0c18794e 1055 //\r
8c1babfd 1056 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1057 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
2d3fb919 1058\r
e77f9ef6 1059 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
1060 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1061 return Status;\r
1062 }\r
1063 \r
0c18794e 1064 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 1065 VariableName,\r
1066 VendorGuid,\r
1067 Payload,\r
1068 PayloadSize,\r
1069 Attributes,\r
1070 0,\r
8c1babfd 1071 0,\r
0c18794e 1072 Variable,\r
8c1babfd 1073 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
0c18794e 1074 );\r
1075 }\r
1076\r
1077 return Status;\r
1078}\r
1079\r
1080/**\r
1081 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
1082\r
dc204d5a
JY		 1083 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1084 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1085 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1086 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1087 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1088 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
1089\r
0c18794e 1090 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1091 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1092\r
1093 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1094 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1095 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1096 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1097 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1098\r
1099 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
1100 @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r
1101 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
1102 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
2d3fb919 1103 set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r
1104 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 1105 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r
1106\r
1107**/\r
1108EFI_STATUS\r
1109ProcessVariable (\r
1110 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1111 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1112 IN VOID *Data,\r
1113 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1114 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1115 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
1116 )\r
1117{\r
1118 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1119 BOOLEAN IsDeletion;\r
1120 BOOLEAN IsFirstTime;\r
1121 UINT8 *PubKey;\r
1122 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
1123 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
1124 UINT32 KeyIndex;\r
1125 UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r
1126\r
2d3fb919 1127 KeyIndex = 0;\r
0c18794e 1128 CertData = NULL;\r
1129 CertBlock = NULL;\r
1130 PubKey = NULL;\r
1131 IsDeletion = FALSE;\r
1132\r
ecc722ad 1133 if (NeedPhysicallyPresent(VariableName, VendorGuid) && !UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r
1134 //\r
1135 // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.\r
1136 //\r
1137 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1138 }\r
1139 \r
89be2b03 1140 //\r
1141 // A time-based authenticated variable and a count-based authenticated variable\r
1142 // can't be updated by each other.\r
1143 // \r
1144 if (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) { \r
1145 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&\r
1146 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
1147 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; \r
1148 }\r
1149 \r
1150 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) && \r
1151 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
1152 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; \r
1153 }\r
1154 }\r
1155 \r
0c18794e 1156 //\r
1157 // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r
1158 //\r
1159 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
ed47ae02 1160 return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1161 VariableName,\r
1162 VendorGuid,\r
1163 Data,\r
1164 DataSize,\r
1165 Variable,\r
1166 Attributes,\r
1167 AuthVarTypePriv,\r
1168 NULL\r
1169 );\r
0c18794e 1170 }\r
2d3fb919 1171\r
0c18794e 1172 //\r
1173 // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.\r
1174 //\r
1175 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1176 //\r
1177 // Determine current operation type.\r
1178 //\r
1179 if (DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) {\r
1180 IsDeletion = TRUE;\r
1181 }\r
1182 //\r
1183 // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
1184 //\r
1185 if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
1186 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
1187 } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
1188 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
1189 } else {\r
1190 KeyIndex = Variable->CurrPtr->PubKeyIndex;\r
1191 IsFirstTime = FALSE;\r
1192 }\r
389c8779 1193 } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && \r
1194 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)\r
1195 ) {\r
0c18794e 1196 //\r
1197 // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r
1198 //\r
1199 return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r
1200 } else {\r
1201 //\r
1202 // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.\r
1203 // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r
1204 //\r
1205 Status = UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes, 0, 0, Variable, NULL);\r
1206 return Status;\r
1207 }\r
1208\r
1209 //\r
1210 // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.\r
1211 //\r
1212 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
1213 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
1214 PubKey = CertBlock->PublicKey;\r
1215\r
1216 //\r
1217 // Update Monotonic Count value.\r
1218 //\r
1219 MonotonicCount = CertData->MonotonicCount;\r
1220\r
1221 if (!IsFirstTime) {\r
1222 //\r
1223 // Check input PubKey.\r
1224 //\r
1225 if (CompareMem (PubKey, mPubKeyStore + (KeyIndex - 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) != 0) {\r
1226 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1227 }\r
1228 //\r
1229 // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable\r
1230 // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.\r
1231 //\r
1232 if (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount) {\r
1233 //\r
1234 // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
1235 //\r
1236 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1237 }\r
2d3fb919 1238 }\r
0c18794e 1239 //\r
1240 // Verify the certificate in Data payload.\r
1241 //\r
1242 Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, PubKey);\r
1243 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1244 return Status;\r
1245 }\r
2d3fb919 1246\r
0c18794e 1247 //\r
1248 // Now, the signature has been verified!\r
1249 //\r
1250 if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {\r
1251 //\r
1252 // Update public key database variable if need.\r
1253 //\r
1254 KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey);\r
4e33001c 1255 if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r
1256 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1257 }\r
0c18794e 1258 }\r
1259\r
1260 //\r
1261 // Verification pass.\r
1262 //\r
1263 return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, Attributes, KeyIndex, MonotonicCount, Variable, NULL);\r
1264}\r
1265\r
2d3fb919 1266/**\r
1267 Merge two buffers which formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. Only the new EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r
1268 will be appended to the original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, duplicate EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r
1269 will be ignored.\r
1270\r
1271 @param[in, out] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1272 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r
1273 @param[in] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST to be appended.\r
1274 @param[in] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r
1275\r
1276 @return Size of the merged buffer.\r
1277\r
1278**/\r
1279UINTN\r
1280AppendSignatureList (\r
1281 IN OUT VOID *Data,\r
1282 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1283 IN VOID *NewData,\r
1284 IN UINTN NewDataSize\r
1285 )\r
1286{\r
1287 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
1288 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
1289 UINTN CertCount;\r
1290 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r
1291 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;\r
1292 UINTN NewCertCount;\r
1293 UINTN Index;\r
1294 UINTN Index2;\r
1295 UINTN Size;\r
1296 UINT8 *Tail;\r
1297 UINTN CopiedCount;\r
1298 UINTN SignatureListSize;\r
1299 BOOLEAN IsNewCert;\r
1300\r
1301 Tail = (UINT8 *) Data + DataSize;\r
1302\r
1303 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;\r
1304 while ((NewDataSize > 0) && (NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1305 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1306 NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1307\r
1308 CopiedCount = 0;\r
1309 for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {\r
1310 IsNewCert = TRUE;\r
1311\r
1312 Size = DataSize;\r
1313 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
1314 while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1315 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&\r
1316 (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {\r
1317 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1318 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
1319 for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {\r
1320 //\r
1321 // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.\r
1322 //\r
1323 if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {\r
1324 IsNewCert = FALSE;\r
1325 break;\r
1326 }\r
1327 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
1328 }\r
1329 }\r
1330\r
1331 if (!IsNewCert) {\r
1332 break;\r
1333 }\r
1334 Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1335 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1336 }\r
1337\r
1338 if (IsNewCert) {\r
1339 //\r
1340 // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, append it.\r
1341 //\r
1342 if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r
1343 //\r
1344 // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r
1345 //\r
1346 CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1347 Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
1348 }\r
1349\r
1350 CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1351 Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1352 CopiedCount++;\r
1353 }\r
1354\r
1355 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1356 }\r
1357\r
1358 //\r
1359 // Update SignatureListSize in newly appended EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1360 //\r
1361 if (CopiedCount != 0) {\r
1362 SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1363 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);\r
1364 CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r
1365 }\r
1366\r
1367 NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1368 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1369 }\r
1370\r
1371 return (Tail - (UINT8 *) Data);\r
1372}\r
1373\r
0c18794e 1374/**\r
1375 Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r
1376\r
1377\r
1378 @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r
1379 @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r
1380\r
1381 @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r
1382 @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r
1383\r
1384**/\r
1385BOOLEAN\r
1386CompareTimeStamp (\r
1387 IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r
1388 IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r
1389 )\r
1390{\r
1391 if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r
1392 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r
1393 } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r
1394 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r
1395 } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r
1396 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r
1397 } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r
1398 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r
1399 } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r
42ed7604 1400 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < SecondTime->Minute);\r
2d3fb919 1401 }\r
0c18794e 1402\r
1403 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r
1404}\r
1405\r
ed47ae02 1406/**\r
1407 Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
1408 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1409\r
1410 The data format of "certdb":\r
1411 //\r
1412 // UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1413 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];\r
1414 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs2[];\r
1415 // /// ...\r
1416 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certsn[];\r
1417 //\r
1418\r
1419 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1420 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1421 @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb".\r
1422 @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb".\r
1423 @param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.\r
1424 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1425 @param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from\r
1426 starting of Data.\r
1427 @param[out] CertNodeSize Length of AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA in bytes.\r
1428\r
1429 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1430 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.\r
1431 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.\r
1432\r
1433**/\r
1434EFI_STATUS\r
1435FindCertsFromDb (\r
1436 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1437 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1438 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
1439 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1440 OUT UINT32 *CertOffset, OPTIONAL\r
1441 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize, OPTIONAL\r
1442 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset,OPTIONAL\r
1443 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL\r
1444 )\r
1445{\r
1446 UINT32 Offset;\r
1447 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
1448 UINT32 CertSize;\r
1449 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1450 UINT32 NodeSize;\r
1451 UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1452\r
1453 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1454 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1455 }\r
1456\r
1457 //\r
1458 // Check whether DataSize matches recorded CertDbListSize.\r
1459 //\r
1460 if (DataSize < sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1461 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1462 }\r
1463\r
1464 CertDbListSize = ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) Data);\r
1465\r
1466 if (CertDbListSize != (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1467 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1468 }\r
1469\r
1470 Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r
1471\r
1472 //\r
1473 // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r
1474 //\r
1475 while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1476 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r
1477 //\r
1478 // Check whether VendorGuid matches.\r
1479 //\r
1480 if (CompareGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid)) {\r
1481 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1482 NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r
1483 CertSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertDataSize);\r
1484\r
1485 if (NodeSize != sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3 + CertSize +\r
1486 sizeof (CHAR16) * NameSize) {\r
1487 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1488 }\r
1489\r
1490 Offset = Offset + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3;\r
1491 //\r
1492 // Check whether VariableName matches.\r
1493 //\r
1494 if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) && \r
1495 (CompareMem (Data + Offset, VariableName, NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)) == 0)) {\r
1496 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
1497\r
1498 if (CertOffset != NULL) {\r
1499 *CertOffset = Offset;\r
1500 }\r
1501\r
1502 if (CertDataSize != NULL) {\r
1503 *CertDataSize = CertSize; \r
1504 }\r
1505\r
1506 if (CertNodeOffset != NULL) {\r
1507 *CertNodeOffset = (UINT32) ((UINT8 *) Ptr - Data);\r
1508 }\r
1509\r
1510 if (CertNodeSize != NULL) {\r
1511 *CertNodeSize = NodeSize;\r
1512 }\r
1513\r
1514 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1515 } else {\r
1516 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16) + CertSize;\r
1517 }\r
1518 } else {\r
1519 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1520 Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r
1521 }\r
1522 }\r
1523\r
1524 return EFI_NOT_FOUND; \r
1525}\r
1526\r
1527/**\r
1528 Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
1529 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1530\r
1531 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1532 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1533 @param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
1534 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1535\r
1536 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1537 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
1538 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.\r
1539\r
1540**/\r
1541EFI_STATUS\r
1542GetCertsFromDb (\r
1543 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1544 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1545 OUT UINT8 **CertData,\r
1546 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize\r
1547 )\r
1548{\r
1549 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1550 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1551 UINT8 *Data;\r
1552 UINTN DataSize;\r
1553 UINT32 CertOffset;\r
1554\r
1555 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) || (CertDataSize == NULL)) {\r
1556 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1557 }\r
1558 \r
1559 //\r
1560 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1561 //\r
1562 Status = FindVariable (\r
1563 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1564 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1565 &CertDbVariable,\r
1566 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1567 FALSE\r
1568 ); \r
1569 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1570 return Status;\r
1571 }\r
1572\r
1573 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1574 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1575 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1576 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1577 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1578 }\r
1579\r
1580 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1581 VariableName,\r
1582 VendorGuid,\r
1583 Data,\r
1584 DataSize,\r
1585 &CertOffset,\r
1586 CertDataSize,\r
1587 NULL,\r
1588 NULL\r
1589 );\r
1590\r
1591 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1592 return Status;\r
1593 }\r
1594\r
1595 *CertData = Data + CertOffset;\r
1596 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1597}\r
1598\r
1599/**\r
1600 Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated\r
1601 variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1602\r
1603 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1604 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1605\r
1606 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1607 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
1608 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
1609 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r
1610\r
1611**/\r
1612EFI_STATUS\r
1613DeleteCertsFromDb (\r
1614 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1615 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
1616 )\r
1617{\r
1618 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1619 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1620 UINT8 *Data;\r
1621 UINTN DataSize;\r
1622 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
1623 UINT32 CertNodeOffset;\r
1624 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
1625 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
1626 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
1627\r
1628 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {\r
1629 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1630 }\r
1631 \r
1632 //\r
1633 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1634 //\r
1635 Status = FindVariable (\r
1636 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1637 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1638 &CertDbVariable,\r
1639 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1640 FALSE\r
1641 ); \r
1642 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1643 return Status;\r
1644 }\r
1645\r
1646 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1647 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1648 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1649 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1650 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1651 }\r
1652\r
1653 if (DataSize == sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1654 //\r
1655 // There is no certs in certdb.\r
1656 //\r
1657 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1658 }\r
1659\r
1660 //\r
1661 // Get corresponding cert node from certdb.\r
1662 //\r
1663 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1664 VariableName,\r
1665 VendorGuid,\r
1666 Data,\r
1667 DataSize,\r
1668 NULL,\r
1669 NULL,\r
1670 &CertNodeOffset,\r
1671 &CertNodeSize\r
1672 );\r
1673\r
1674 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1675 return Status;\r
1676 }\r
1677\r
1678 if (DataSize < (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1679 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1680 }\r
1681\r
1682 //\r
1683 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
1684 //\r
1685 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize - CertNodeSize;\r
f6e23353 1686 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
ed47ae02 1687\r
1688 //\r
1689 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r
1690 //\r
1691 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, CertNodeOffset);\r
1692 //\r
1693 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
1694 //\r
1695 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1696 //\r
1697 // Copy the DB entries after deleting node.\r
1698 //\r
1699 if (DataSize > (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1700 CopyMem (\r
1701 NewCertDb + CertNodeOffset,\r
1702 Data + CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize,\r
1703 DataSize - CertNodeOffset - CertNodeSize\r
1704 );\r
1705 }\r
1706\r
1707 //\r
1708 // Set "certdb".\r
1709 // \r
1710 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; \r
1711 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1712 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1713 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1714 NewCertDb,\r
1715 NewCertDbSize,\r
1716 VarAttr,\r
1717 0,\r
1718 0,\r
1719 &CertDbVariable,\r
1720 NULL\r
1721 );\r
1722\r
ed47ae02 1723 return Status;\r
1724}\r
1725\r
1726/**\r
1727 Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName\r
1728 and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb".\r
1729\r
1730 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1731 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1732 @param[in] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
1733 @param[in] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1734\r
1735 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1736 @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName\r
1737 and VendorGuid already exists.\r
1738 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
1739 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb"\r
1740\r
1741**/\r
1742EFI_STATUS\r
1743InsertCertsToDb (\r
1744 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1745 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1746 IN UINT8 *CertData,\r
1747 IN UINTN CertDataSize\r
1748 )\r
1749{\r
1750 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1751 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1752 UINT8 *Data;\r
1753 UINTN DataSize;\r
1754 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
1755 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
1756 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
1757 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
1758 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1759 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
1760\r
1761 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL)) {\r
1762 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1763 }\r
1764 \r
1765 //\r
1766 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1767 //\r
1768 Status = FindVariable (\r
1769 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1770 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1771 &CertDbVariable,\r
1772 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1773 FALSE\r
1774 ); \r
1775 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1776 return Status;\r
1777 }\r
1778\r
1779 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1780 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1781 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1782 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1783 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1784 }\r
1785\r
1786 //\r
1787 // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb".\r
1788 // If yes return error.\r
1789 //\r
1790 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1791 VariableName,\r
1792 VendorGuid,\r
1793 Data,\r
1794 DataSize,\r
1795 NULL,\r
1796 NULL,\r
1797 NULL,\r
1798 NULL\r
1799 );\r
1800\r
1801 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1802 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1803 return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
1804 }\r
1805\r
1806 //\r
1807 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
1808 //\r
1809 NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);\r
1810 CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16); \r
f6e23353 1811 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize;\r
1812 if (NewCertDbSize > MAX_CERTDB_SIZE) {\r
ed47ae02 1813 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1814 }\r
f6e23353 1815 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
ed47ae02 1816\r
1817 //\r
1818 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r
1819 //\r
1820 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, DataSize);\r
1821 //\r
1822 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
1823 //\r
1824 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1825 //\r
1826 // Construct new cert node.\r
1827 //\r
1828 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (NewCertDb + DataSize);\r
1829 CopyGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid);\r
1830 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertNodeSize, &CertNodeSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1831 CopyMem (&Ptr->NameSize, &NameSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1832 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertDataSize, &CertDataSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1833 \r
1834 CopyMem (\r
1835 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA),\r
1836 VariableName,\r
1837 NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)\r
1838 );\r
1839\r
1840 CopyMem (\r
1841 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16),\r
1842 CertData,\r
1843 CertDataSize\r
1844 );\r
1845 \r
1846 //\r
1847 // Set "certdb".\r
1848 // \r
1849 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; \r
1850 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1851 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1852 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1853 NewCertDb,\r
1854 NewCertDbSize,\r
1855 VarAttr,\r
1856 0,\r
1857 0,\r
1858 &CertDbVariable,\r
1859 NULL\r
1860 );\r
1861\r
ed47ae02 1862 return Status;\r
1863}\r
1864\r
0c18794e 1865/**\r
1866 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
1867\r
dc204d5a
JY		 1868 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1869 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1870 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1871 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1872 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1873\r
0c18794e 1874 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1875 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1876 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1877 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1878 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1879 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1880 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
785d84ea 1881 @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r
0c18794e 1882 @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r
1883\r
1884 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2d3fb919 1885 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
1886 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 1887 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r
1888 of resources.\r
1889 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
1890\r
1891**/\r
1892EFI_STATUS\r
1893VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1894 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1895 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1896 IN VOID *Data,\r
1897 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1898 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1899 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
ed47ae02 1900 IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r
0c18794e 1901 OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r
1902 )\r
1903{\r
1904 UINT8 *RootCert;\r
1905 UINT8 *SigData;\r
2d3fb919 1906 UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r
0c18794e 1907 UINTN RootCertSize;\r
1908 UINTN Index;\r
2d3fb919 1909 UINTN CertCount;\r
1910 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
0c18794e 1911 UINT32 Attr;\r
1912 UINT32 SigDataSize;\r
1913 UINT32 KekDataSize;\r
0c18794e 1914 BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r
1915 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1916 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
1917 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
1918 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable;\r
1919 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r
1920 UINT8 *NewData;\r
1921 UINTN NewDataSize;\r
1922 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r
2d3fb919 1923 UINT8 *Buffer;\r
1924 UINTN Length;\r
ed47ae02 1925 UINT8 *SignerCerts;\r
1926 UINT8 *WrapSigData;\r
1927 UINTN CertStackSize;\r
1928 UINT8 *CertsInCertDb;\r
1929 UINT32 CertsSizeinDb;\r
0c18794e 1930\r
0c18794e 1931 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
1932 CertData = NULL;\r
1933 NewData = NULL;\r
1934 Attr = Attributes;\r
ed47ae02 1935 WrapSigData = NULL;\r
1936 SignerCerts = NULL;\r
1937 RootCert = NULL;\r
0c18794e 1938\r
1939 //\r
2d3fb919 1940 // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is\r
0c18794e 1941 // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r
2d3fb919 1942 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new\r
1943 // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new\r
1944 // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not\r
0c18794e 1945 // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r
1946 //\r
1947 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r
2d3fb919 1948\r
1949 //\r
1950 // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the\r
1951 // TimeStamp value are set to zero.\r
1952 //\r
1953 if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||\r
1954 (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||\r
1955 (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r
1956 (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r
1957 (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {\r
2e24814a 1958 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2d3fb919 1959 }\r
1960\r
0c18794e 1961 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
1962 if (CompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, &Variable->CurrPtr->TimeStamp)) {\r
1963 //\r
1964 // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
1965 //\r
1966 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1967 }\r
1968 }\r
1969\r
1970 //\r
1971 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
1972 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r
1973 //\r
1974 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
2d3fb919 1975 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r
0c18794e 1976 //\r
1977 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
1978 //\r
1979 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1980 }\r
2d3fb919 1981\r
0c18794e 1982 //\r
1983 // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r
1984 // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r
1985 //\r
2d3fb919 1986 SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;\r
1987 SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r
648f98d1 1988\r
0c18794e 1989 //\r
1990 // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r
1991 //\r
2d3fb919 1992 PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;\r
1993 PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;\r
0c18794e 1994\r
1995 //\r
1996 // Construct a buffer to fill with (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r
1997 //\r
2d3fb919 1998 NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r
1999 sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);\r
2000 NewData = mSerializationRuntimeBuffer;\r
0c18794e 2001\r
2d3fb919 2002 Buffer = NewData;\r
2003 Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
2004 CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);\r
2005 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 2006\r
2d3fb919 2007 Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
2008 CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);\r
2009 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 2010\r
2d3fb919 2011 Length = sizeof (UINT32);\r
2012 CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);\r
2013 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 2014\r
2d3fb919 2015 Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);\r
2016 CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);\r
2017 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 2018\r
2d3fb919 2019 CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
0c18794e 2020\r
ed47ae02 2021 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {\r
0c18794e 2022 //\r
2023 // Get platform key from variable.\r
2024 //\r
2025 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 2026 EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
2027 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
2028 &PkVariable,\r
ecc722ad 2029 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
2030 FALSE\r
0c18794e 2031 );\r
2032 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2033 return Status;\r
2034 }\r
2035\r
2036 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);\r
2037 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2038 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
4e33001c 2039 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
0c18794e 2040\r
2041\r
2042 //\r
2043 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2044 //\r
2045 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2046 SigData,\r
2047 SigDataSize,\r
2048 RootCert,\r
2049 RootCertSize,\r
2050 NewData,\r
2051 NewDataSize\r
2052 );\r
2053\r
ed47ae02 2054 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypeKek) {\r
2d3fb919 2055\r
0c18794e 2056 //\r
2057 // Get KEK database from variable.\r
2058 //\r
2059 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 2060 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
2061 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
2062 &KekVariable,\r
ecc722ad 2063 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
2064 FALSE\r
0c18794e 2065 );\r
2066 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2067 return Status;\r
2068 }\r
2069\r
2070 //\r
2071 // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r
2d3fb919 2072 //\r
0c18794e 2073 KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r
2074 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r
2075 while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
2076 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
2077 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2078 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
2079 for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
2080 //\r
2081 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r
2082 //\r
2083 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
4e33001c 2084 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
2d3fb919 2085\r
0c18794e 2086 //\r
2087 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2088 //\r
2089 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2090 SigData,\r
2091 SigDataSize,\r
2092 RootCert,\r
2093 RootCertSize,\r
2094 NewData,\r
2095 NewDataSize\r
2096 );\r
2097 if (VerifyStatus) {\r
2098 goto Exit;\r
2099 }\r
2100 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
2101 }\r
2102 }\r
2103 KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
2104 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
2105 }\r
ed47ae02 2106 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
2107\r
2108 //\r
2109 // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX.\r
2110 // Get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r
2111 //\r
2112 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r
2113 SigData,\r
2114 SigDataSize,\r
2115 &SignerCerts,\r
2116 &CertStackSize,\r
2117 &RootCert,\r
2118 &RootCertSize\r
2119 );\r
2120 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2121 goto Exit;\r
2122 }\r
2123\r
2124 //\r
2125 // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb for existing\r
2126 // variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates\r
2127 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
2128 //\r
2129 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL)) {\r
2130 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2131\r
2132 Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);\r
2133 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2134 goto Exit;\r
2135 }\r
2136 \r
2137 if ((CertStackSize != CertsSizeinDb) ||\r
2138 (CompareMem (SignerCerts, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0)) {\r
2139 goto Exit;\r
2140 }\r
2141 }\r
2142\r
2143 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2144 SigData,\r
2145 SigDataSize,\r
2146 RootCert,\r
2147 RootCertSize,\r
2148 NewData,\r
2149 NewDataSize\r
2150 );\r
2151 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2152 goto Exit;\r
2153 }\r
2154\r
2155 //\r
2156 // Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.\r
2157 //\r
2158 if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL)) {\r
2159 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);\r
2160 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2161 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2162 goto Exit;\r
2163 }\r
2164 } else if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
2165 //\r
2166 // Insert signer's certificates when adding a new common authenticated variable.\r
2167 //\r
2168 Status = InsertCertsToDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, SignerCerts, CertStackSize);\r
2169 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2170 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2171 goto Exit;\r
2172 }\r
2173 }\r
785d84ea 2174 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePayload) {\r
2175 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) PayloadPtr;\r
2176 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2177 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
2178 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
2179 \r
2180 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2181 //\r
2182 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2183 SigData,\r
2184 SigDataSize,\r
2185 RootCert,\r
2186 RootCertSize,\r
2187 NewData,\r
2188 NewDataSize\r
2189 );\r
ed47ae02 2190 } else {\r
2191 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
0c18794e 2192 }\r
2193\r
2194Exit:\r
2195\r
ed47ae02 2196 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
2197 Pkcs7FreeSigners (RootCert);\r
2198 Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);\r
2199 }\r
2200\r
0c18794e 2201 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2202 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2203 }\r
2204\r
d912bad7 2205 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
2206 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2207 return Status;\r
2208 }\r
2209\r
2d3fb919 2210 if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (VarDel != NULL)) {\r
0c18794e 2211 *VarDel = TRUE;\r
2212 }\r
2d3fb919 2213\r
0c18794e 2214 //\r
2215 // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r
2216 //\r
ed47ae02 2217 return UpdateVariable (\r
2218 VariableName,\r
2219 VendorGuid,\r
2220 PayloadPtr,\r
2221 PayloadSize,\r
2222 Attributes,\r
2223 0,\r
2224 0,\r
2225 Variable,\r
2226 &CertData->TimeStamp\r
2227 );\r
0c18794e 2228}\r
ed47ae02 2229\r
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