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Add PubKey index check before touching PubKey cache. Internal PubKey Variable PubkeyI...
[mirror_edk2.git] / SecurityPkg / VariableAuthenticated / RuntimeDxe / AuthService.c
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0c18794e 1/** @file\r
2 Implement authentication services for the authenticated variable\r
3 service in UEFI2.2.\r
4\r
dc204d5a
JY		 5 Caution: This module requires additional review when modified.\r
6 This driver will have external input - variable data. It may be input in SMM mode.\r
7 This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r
8 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
9 Variable attribute should also be checked to avoid authentication bypass.\r
10\r
11 ProcessVarWithPk(), ProcessVarWithKek() and ProcessVariable() are the function to do\r
12 variable authentication.\r
13\r
14 VerifyTimeBasedPayload() and VerifyCounterBasedPayload() are sub function to do verification.\r
15 They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library\r
16 to verify the signature.\r
17\r
25da08c8 18Copyright (c) 2009 - 2014, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
2d3fb919 19This program and the accompanying materials\r
20are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
21which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r
0c18794e 22http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
23\r
2d3fb919 24THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r
0c18794e 25WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
26\r
27**/\r
28\r
29#include "Variable.h"\r
30#include "AuthService.h"\r
31\r
32///\r
33/// Global database array for scratch\r
2d3fb919 34///\r
4ccef561 35UINT8 *mPubKeyStore;\r
0c18794e 36UINT32 mPubKeyNumber;\r
4ccef561
DG		 37UINT32 mMaxKeyNumber;\r
38UINT32 mMaxKeyDbSize;\r
39UINT8 *mCertDbStore;\r
40UINT32 mMaxCertDbSize;\r
0c18794e 41UINT32 mPlatformMode;\r
a555940b
FS		 42UINT8 mVendorKeyState;\r
43\r
ae09f979 44EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[] = {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, EFI_CERT_X509_GUID};\r
0c18794e 45//\r
46// Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r
47//\r
48CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r
49//\r
50// Hash context pointer\r
51//\r
52VOID *mHashCtx = NULL;\r
53\r
2d3fb919 54//\r
55// The serialization of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r
56// parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r
57// EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value\r
58// i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)\r
59//\r
60UINT8 *mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = NULL;\r
61\r
d912bad7 62//\r
63// Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.\r
64// These data are used to peform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.\r
65//\r
66EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {\r
67//{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }\r
68 {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },\r
69 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
70 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
71 {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },\r
72 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
73 {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},\r
74 {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },\r
75 {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },\r
76 {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 }\r
77};\r
78\r
ecc722ad 79/**\r
80 Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.\r
81\r
82 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
83 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
84\r
85 @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.\r
86 @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.\r
87 \r
88**/\r
89BOOLEAN\r
90NeedPhysicallyPresent(\r
91 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
92 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
93 )\r
94{\r
95 if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))\r
96 || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {\r
97 return TRUE;\r
98 }\r
99 \r
100 return FALSE;\r
101}\r
102\r
103/**\r
104 Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.\r
105\r
106 @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.\r
107 @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.\r
108\r
109**/\r
110BOOLEAN\r
111InCustomMode (\r
112 VOID\r
113 )\r
114{\r
115 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
116\r
117 FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
118 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL && *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr)) == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {\r
119 return TRUE;\r
120 }\r
121 \r
122 return FALSE;\r
123}\r
124\r
125\r
0c18794e 126/**\r
2d3fb919 127 Internal function to delete a Variable given its name and GUID, no authentication\r
128 required.\r
0c18794e 129\r
2d3fb919 130 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
131 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
0c18794e 132\r
2d3fb919 133 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable deleted successfully.\r
134 @retval Others The driver failded to start the device.\r
0c18794e 135\r
136**/\r
137EFI_STATUS\r
2d3fb919 138DeleteVariable (\r
139 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
140 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
141 )\r
142{\r
143 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
144 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
145\r
ecc722ad 146 Status = FindVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
2d3fb919 147 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
148 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
149 }\r
150\r
151 ASSERT (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL);\r
152 return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, &Variable, NULL);\r
153}\r
0c18794e 154\r
155/**\r
156 Initializes for authenticated varibale service.\r
157\r
158 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Function successfully executed.\r
159 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Fail to allocate enough memory resources.\r
160\r
161**/\r
162EFI_STATUS\r
163AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (\r
164 VOID\r
165 )\r
166{\r
167 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
168 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
7aaf2fd6 169 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r
0c18794e 170 UINT8 VarValue;\r
171 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
172 UINT8 *Data;\r
173 UINTN DataSize;\r
174 UINTN CtxSize;\r
beda2356 175 UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
176 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
ecc722ad 177 UINT8 CustomMode;\r
ed47ae02 178 UINT32 ListSize;\r
2d3fb919 179\r
0c18794e 180 //\r
181 // Initialize hash context.\r
182 //\r
183 CtxSize = Sha256GetContextSize ();\r
184 mHashCtx = AllocateRuntimePool (CtxSize);\r
185 if (mHashCtx == NULL) {\r
186 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
187 }\r
188\r
4ccef561
DG		 189 //\r
190 // Reserve runtime buffer for public key database. The size excludes variable header and name size.\r
191 //\r
192 mMaxKeyDbSize = PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) - sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER) - sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME);\r
193 mMaxKeyNumber = mMaxKeyDbSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
194 mPubKeyStore = AllocateRuntimePool (mMaxKeyDbSize);\r
195 if (mPubKeyStore == NULL) {\r
196 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
197 }\r
198\r
199 //\r
200 // Reserve runtime buffer for certificate database. The size excludes variable header and name size.\r
201 //\r
202 mMaxCertDbSize = PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) - sizeof (VARIABLE_HEADER) - sizeof (EFI_CERT_DB_NAME);\r
203 mCertDbStore = AllocateRuntimePool (mMaxCertDbSize);\r
204 if (mCertDbStore == NULL) {\r
205 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
206 }\r
207\r
0c18794e 208 //\r
2d3fb919 209 // Prepare runtime buffer for serialized data of time-based authenticated\r
210 // Variable, i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r
211 //\r
212 mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) + sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r
213 if (mSerializationRuntimeBuffer == NULL) {\r
214 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
215 }\r
216\r
217 //\r
218 // Check "AuthVarKeyDatabase" variable's existence.\r
219 // If it doesn't exist, create a new one with initial value of 0 and EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
0c18794e 220 //\r
221 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 222 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
223 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
224 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 225 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
226 FALSE\r
0c18794e 227 );\r
228\r
229 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
230 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
231 VarValue = 0;\r
232 mPubKeyNumber = 0;\r
233 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
234 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
235 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
236 &VarValue,\r
237 sizeof(UINT8),\r
238 VarAttr,\r
239 0,\r
240 0,\r
241 &Variable,\r
242 NULL\r
243 );\r
244 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
245 return Status;\r
246 }\r
247 } else {\r
248 //\r
249 // Load database in global variable for cache.\r
250 //\r
251 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
252 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
253 ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r
254 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r
255 mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
256 }\r
7aaf2fd6 257\r
ecc722ad 258 FindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &PkVariable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
7aaf2fd6 259 if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
260 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
261 } else {\r
262 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
263 }\r
264 \r
0c18794e 265 //\r
a555940b 266 // Create "SetupMode" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
0c18794e 267 //\r
05a643f9 268 FindVariable (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
269 if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
270 mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;\r
271 } else {\r
272 mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;\r
273 }\r
274 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 275 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
276 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
05a643f9 277 &mPlatformMode,\r
278 sizeof(UINT8),\r
279 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,\r
280 0,\r
281 0,\r
2d3fb919 282 &Variable,\r
05a643f9 283 NULL\r
0c18794e 284 );\r
05a643f9 285 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
286 return Status;\r
0c18794e 287 }\r
05a643f9 288 \r
0c18794e 289 //\r
a555940b 290 // Create "SignatureSupport" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
0c18794e 291 //\r
05a643f9 292 FindVariable (EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
293 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
294 EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r
295 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
296 mSignatureSupport,\r
297 sizeof(mSignatureSupport),\r
298 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,\r
299 0,\r
300 0,\r
301 &Variable,\r
302 NULL\r
303 );\r
304 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
305 return Status;\r
0c18794e 306 }\r
beda2356 307\r
308 //\r
309 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.\r
2d3fb919 310 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in USER_MODE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.\r
beda2356 311 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.\r
312 //\r
8f8ca22e 313 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
ecc722ad 314 FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
beda2356 315 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
316 SecureBootEnable = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
2d3fb919 317 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
318 //\r
319 // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in USER_MODE.\r
320 //\r
8f8ca22e 321 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
beda2356 322 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 323 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
324 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
325 &SecureBootEnable,\r
326 sizeof (UINT8),\r
327 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
328 0,\r
329 0,\r
beda2356 330 &Variable,\r
331 NULL\r
332 );\r
333 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
334 return Status;\r
335 }\r
336 }\r
337\r
05a643f9 338 //\r
a555940b 339 // Create "SecureBoot" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
05a643f9 340 //\r
2d3fb919 341 if (SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE && mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
342 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
343 } else {\r
344 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
345 }\r
ecc722ad 346 FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
2d3fb919 347 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
348 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
349 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
350 &SecureBootMode,\r
351 sizeof (UINT8),\r
05a643f9 352 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
2d3fb919 353 0,\r
354 0,\r
355 &Variable,\r
356 NULL\r
357 );\r
358 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
359 return Status;\r
360 }\r
361\r
7aaf2fd6 362 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, mPlatformMode));\r
363 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBootMode));\r
364 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));\r
365\r
0c18794e 366 //\r
f71ed839 367 // Initialize "CustomMode" in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE state.\r
0c18794e 368 //\r
ecc722ad 369 FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
f71ed839 370 CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r
371 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
372 EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r
373 &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r
374 &CustomMode,\r
375 sizeof (UINT8),\r
376 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
377 0,\r
378 0,\r
379 &Variable,\r
380 NULL\r
381 );\r
382 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
383 return Status;\r
0c18794e 384 }\r
ecc722ad 385 \r
386 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, CustomMode));\r
2d3fb919 387\r
ed47ae02 388 //\r
389 // Check "certdb" variable's existence.\r
390 // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with \r
391 // EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
392 //\r
393 Status = FindVariable (\r
394 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
395 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
396 &Variable,\r
397 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
398 FALSE\r
399 );\r
400\r
401 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
402 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
f6e23353 403 ListSize = sizeof (UINT32);\r
ed47ae02 404 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
405 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
406 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
407 &ListSize,\r
408 sizeof (UINT32),\r
409 VarAttr,\r
410 0,\r
411 0,\r
412 &Variable,\r
413 NULL\r
414 );\r
f6e23353 415 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
416 return Status;\r
417 }\r
ed47ae02 418 } \r
419\r
a555940b
FS		 420 //\r
421 // Check "VendorKeysNv" variable's existence and create "VendorKeys" variable accordingly.\r
422 //\r
423 FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
424 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
425 mVendorKeyState = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
426 } else {\r
427 //\r
428 // "VendorKeysNv" not exist, initialize it in VENDOR_KEYS_VALID state.\r
429 //\r
430 mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_VALID;\r
431 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
432 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
433 &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,\r
434 &mVendorKeyState,\r
435 sizeof (UINT8),\r
436 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r
437 0,\r
438 0,\r
439 &Variable,\r
440 NULL\r
441 );\r
442 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
443 return Status;\r
444 }\r
445 }\r
446\r
447 //\r
448 // Create "VendorKeys" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
449 //\r
450 FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
451 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
452 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
453 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
454 &mVendorKeyState,\r
455 sizeof (UINT8),\r
456 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
457 0,\r
458 0,\r
459 &Variable,\r
460 NULL\r
461 );\r
462 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
463 return Status;\r
464 }\r
465\r
466 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, mVendorKeyState));\r
467\r
0c18794e 468 return Status;\r
469}\r
470\r
471/**\r
472 Add public key in store and return its index.\r
473\r
474 @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data\r
e3ff137e 475 @param[in] VariableDataEntry The variable data entry \r
0c18794e 476\r
477 @return Index of new added item\r
478\r
479**/\r
480UINT32\r
481AddPubKeyInStore (\r
9a12e582
DG		 482 IN UINT8 *PubKey,\r
483 IN VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY *VariableDataEntry\r
0c18794e 484 )\r
485{\r
9a12e582
DG		 486 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
487 BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
488 UINT32 Index;\r
489 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
490 UINT8 *Ptr;\r
491 UINT8 *Data;\r
492 UINTN DataSize;\r
493 VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY PublicKeyEntry;\r
494 UINT32 Attributes;\r
0c18794e 495\r
496 if (PubKey == NULL) {\r
497 return 0;\r
498 }\r
499\r
500 Status = FindVariable (\r
501 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
502 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
503 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 504 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
505 FALSE\r
0c18794e 506 );\r
ca5a7d87 507 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
25da08c8 508 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Get public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
ca5a7d87 509 return 0;\r
510 }\r
511\r
0c18794e 512 //\r
513 // Check whether the public key entry does exist.\r
514 //\r
515 IsFound = FALSE;\r
516 for (Ptr = mPubKeyStore, Index = 1; Index <= mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r
517 if (CompareMem (Ptr, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r
518 IsFound = TRUE;\r
519 break;\r
520 }\r
521 Ptr += EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
522 }\r
523\r
524 if (!IsFound) {\r
525 //\r
526 // Add public key in database.\r
527 //\r
4ccef561 528 if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {\r
0c18794e 529 //\r
83758cdc 530 // Public key dadatase is full, try to reclaim invalid key.\r
0c18794e 531 //\r
83758cdc 532 if (AtRuntime ()) {\r
533 //\r
534 // NV storage can't reclaim at runtime.\r
535 //\r
536 return 0;\r
537 }\r
538 \r
539 Status = Reclaim (\r
540 mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal.NonVolatileVariableBase,\r
541 &mVariableModuleGlobal->NonVolatileLastVariableOffset,\r
542 FALSE,\r
543 NULL,\r
7baf3c69
SZ		 544 NULL,\r
545 0,\r
83758cdc 546 TRUE\r
547 );\r
548 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
549 return 0;\r
550 }\r
551\r
552 Status = FindVariable (\r
553 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
554 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
555 &Variable,\r
556 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
557 FALSE\r
558 );\r
ca5a7d87 559 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
25da08c8 560 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Get public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
ca5a7d87 561 return 0;\r
562 }\r
83758cdc 563\r
564 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
565 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
566 ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r
567 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r
568 mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
569\r
4ccef561 570 if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {\r
83758cdc 571 return 0;\r
572 } \r
0c18794e 573 }\r
574\r
9a12e582
DG		 575 //\r
576 // Check the variable space for both public key and variable data.\r
577 //\r
578 PublicKeyEntry.VariableSize = (mPubKeyNumber + 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
579 PublicKeyEntry.Guid = &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid;\r
580 PublicKeyEntry.Name = AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME;\r
581 Attributes = VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
582\r
583 if (!CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (Attributes, &PublicKeyEntry, VariableDataEntry, NULL)) {\r
584 //\r
585 // No enough variable space.\r
586 //\r
587 return 0;\r
588 }\r
589\r
0c18794e 590 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
591 Index = ++mPubKeyNumber;\r
592 //\r
593 // Update public key database variable.\r
594 //\r
595 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
596 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
597 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
598 mPubKeyStore,\r
599 mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE,\r
9a12e582 600 Attributes,\r
0c18794e 601 0,\r
602 0,\r
603 &Variable,\r
604 NULL\r
605 );\r
25da08c8
DG		 606 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
607 DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update public key database variable failure, Status = %r\n", Status));\r
608 return 0;\r
609 }\r
0c18794e 610 }\r
611\r
612 return Index;\r
613}\r
614\r
615/**\r
85560919 616 Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID type.\r
0c18794e 617 Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.\r
618\r
dc204d5a
JY		 619 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
620 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
621 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
622 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
623 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
624\r
0c18794e 625 @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.\r
626 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
627 @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.\r
628\r
2d3fb919 629 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
0c18794e 630 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.\r
2d3fb919 631 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.\r
0c18794e 632\r
633**/\r
634EFI_STATUS\r
635VerifyCounterBasedPayload (\r
636 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
637 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
638 IN UINT8 *PubKey\r
639 )\r
640{\r
641 BOOLEAN Status;\r
642 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
643 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
644 UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
645 VOID *Rsa;\r
275beb2b 646 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
647 \r
648 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
0c18794e 649 Rsa = NULL;\r
650 CertData = NULL;\r
651 CertBlock = NULL;\r
652\r
653 if (Data == NULL || PubKey == NULL) {\r
654 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
655 }\r
656\r
657 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
658 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
659\r
660 //\r
661 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
85560919 662 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID.\r
0c18794e 663 //\r
664 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
85560919 665 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)\r
0c18794e 666 ) {\r
667 //\r
668 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
669 //\r
670 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
671 }\r
672 //\r
673 // Hash data payload with SHA256.\r
674 //\r
675 ZeroMem (Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r
676 Status = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r
677 if (!Status) {\r
678 goto Done;\r
679 }\r
275beb2b 680 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, PayloadSize);\r
681 if (!Status) {\r
682 goto Done;\r
683 }\r
684 //\r
685 // Hash Size.\r
686 //\r
687 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &PayloadSize, sizeof (UINTN));\r
0c18794e 688 if (!Status) {\r
689 goto Done;\r
690 }\r
691 //\r
692 // Hash Monotonic Count.\r
693 //\r
694 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &CertData->MonotonicCount, sizeof (UINT64));\r
695 if (!Status) {\r
696 goto Done;\r
697 }\r
698 Status = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Digest);\r
699 if (!Status) {\r
700 goto Done;\r
701 }\r
702 //\r
703 // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.\r
704 //\r
705 Rsa = RsaNew ();\r
706 ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);\r
2d3fb919 707 //\r
0c18794e 708 // Set RSA Key Components.\r
709 // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r
710 //\r
711 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
712 if (!Status) {\r
713 goto Done;\r
714 }\r
715 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r
716 if (!Status) {\r
717 goto Done;\r
718 }\r
719 //\r
720 // Verify the signature.\r
721 //\r
722 Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r
2d3fb919 723 Rsa,\r
724 Digest,\r
725 SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,\r
726 CertBlock->Signature,\r
0c18794e 727 EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r
728 );\r
729\r
730Done:\r
731 if (Rsa != NULL) {\r
732 RsaFree (Rsa);\r
733 }\r
734 if (Status) {\r
735 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
736 } else {\r
737 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
738 }\r
739}\r
740\r
0c18794e 741/**\r
742 Update platform mode.\r
743\r
744 @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r
745\r
746 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
747 @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r
748\r
749**/\r
750EFI_STATUS\r
751UpdatePlatformMode (\r
752 IN UINT32 Mode\r
753 )\r
754{\r
755 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
756 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
0c18794e 757 UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
beda2356 758 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
759 UINTN VariableDataSize;\r
2d3fb919 760\r
0c18794e 761 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 762 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
763 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
764 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 765 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
766 FALSE\r
0c18794e 767 );\r
768 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
769 return Status;\r
770 }\r
771\r
05a643f9 772 //\r
773 // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
774 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
775 //\r
776 mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;\r
777 CopyMem (GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr), &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
0c18794e 778\r
2d3fb919 779 if (AtRuntime ()) {\r
780 //\r
781 // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
782 // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
783 // Variable in runtime.\r
784 //\r
785 return Status;\r
786 }\r
787\r
0c18794e 788 //\r
789 // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r
790 // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r
791 // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r
792 //\r
793 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 794 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
795 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
796 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 797 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
798 FALSE\r
0c18794e 799 );\r
800 //\r
801 // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r
802 // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r
803 // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r
804 //\r
805 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
806 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
807 } else {\r
808 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
809 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
810 } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r
811 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
812 } else {\r
813 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
814 }\r
815 }\r
816\r
beda2356 817 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
0c18794e 818 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
819 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
820 &SecureBootMode,\r
821 sizeof(UINT8),\r
0ba17ade 822 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
0c18794e 823 0,\r
824 0,\r
825 &Variable,\r
826 NULL\r
827 );\r
beda2356 828 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
829 return Status;\r
830 }\r
831\r
832 //\r
833 // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r
834 //\r
835 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 836 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
837 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
838 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 839 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
840 FALSE\r
beda2356 841 );\r
2d3fb919 842\r
beda2356 843 if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r
844 //\r
845 // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r
846 //\r
847 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
848 VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r
849 } else {\r
850 //\r
2d3fb919 851 // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r
beda2356 852 // variable is not in secure boot state.\r
853 //\r
854 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL || EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
855 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
856 }\r
857 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
858 VariableDataSize = 0;\r
859 }\r
2d3fb919 860\r
beda2356 861 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 862 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
863 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
864 &SecureBootEnable,\r
865 VariableDataSize,\r
866 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
867 0,\r
868 0,\r
beda2356 869 &Variable,\r
870 NULL\r
871 );\r
872 return Status;\r
0c18794e 873}\r
874\r
d912bad7 875/**\r
e77f9ef6 876 Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx variable.\r
d912bad7 877\r
878 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.\r
879 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
880 @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.\r
881 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
882\r
883 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.\r
884 @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.\r
885 \r
886**/\r
887EFI_STATUS\r
888CheckSignatureListFormat(\r
889 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
890 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
891 IN VOID *Data,\r
892 IN UINTN DataSize\r
893 )\r
894{\r
895 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r
896 UINTN SigDataSize;\r
897 UINT32 Index;\r
898 UINT32 SigCount;\r
899 BOOLEAN IsPk;\r
e77f9ef6 900 VOID *RsaContext;\r
901 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;\r
902 UINTN CertLen;\r
d912bad7 903\r
904 if (DataSize == 0) {\r
905 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
906 }\r
907\r
908 ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);\r
909\r
910 if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){\r
911 IsPk = TRUE;\r
e77f9ef6 912 } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0) ||\r
913 (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) && \r
914 (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0 || StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0))){\r
d912bad7 915 IsPk = FALSE;\r
916 } else {\r
917 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
918 }\r
919\r
920 SigCount = 0;\r
921 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
922 SigDataSize = DataSize;\r
e77f9ef6 923 RsaContext = NULL;\r
d912bad7 924\r
925 //\r
926 // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.\r
927 // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.\r
928 //\r
929 while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
930 for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {\r
931 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {\r
932 //\r
933 // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner \r
934 // component) add the data length according to signature type.\r
935 //\r
936 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) && \r
937 (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {\r
938 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
939 }\r
940 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINTN) ~0) &&\r
941 SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {\r
942 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
943 }\r
944 break;\r
945 }\r
946 }\r
947\r
948 if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {\r
949 //\r
950 // Undefined signature type.\r
951 //\r
952 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
953 }\r
954\r
e77f9ef6 955 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
956 //\r
957 // Try to retrieve the RSA public key from the X.509 certificate.\r
958 // If this operation fails, it's not a valid certificate.\r
959 //\r
960 RsaContext = RsaNew ();\r
961 if (RsaContext == NULL) {\r
962 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
963 }\r
964 CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
965 CertLen = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
966 if (!RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (CertData->SignatureData, CertLen, &RsaContext)) {\r
967 RsaFree (RsaContext);\r
968 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
969 }\r
970 RsaFree (RsaContext);\r
971 }\r
972\r
d912bad7 973 if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {\r
974 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
975 }\r
976 SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;\r
977 \r
978 SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r
979 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r
980 }\r
981\r
982 if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {\r
983 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
984 }\r
985\r
986 if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {\r
987 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
988 }\r
989\r
990 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
991}\r
992\r
a555940b
FS		 993/**\r
994 Update "VendorKeys" variable to record the out of band secure boot key modification.\r
995\r
996 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is updated successfully.\r
997 @return Others Failed to update variable.\r
998 \r
999**/\r
1000EFI_STATUS\r
1001VendorKeyIsModified (\r
1002 VOID\r
1003 )\r
1004{\r
1005 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1006 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
1007\r
1008 if (mVendorKeyState == VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED) {\r
1009 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1010 }\r
1011 mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED;\r
1012 \r
1013 FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
1014 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1015 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
1016 &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,\r
1017 &mVendorKeyState,\r
1018 sizeof (UINT8),\r
1019 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r
1020 0,\r
1021 0,\r
1022 &Variable,\r
1023 NULL\r
1024 );\r
1025 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1026 return Status;\r
1027 }\r
1028\r
1029 FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
1030 return UpdateVariable (\r
1031 EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,\r
1032 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
1033 &mVendorKeyState,\r
1034 sizeof (UINT8),\r
1035 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
1036 0,\r
1037 0,\r
1038 &Variable,\r
1039 NULL\r
1040 );\r
1041}\r
1042\r
0c18794e 1043/**\r
1044 Process variable with platform key for verification.\r
1045\r
dc204d5a
JY		 1046 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1047 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1048 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1049 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1050 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1051 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
1052\r
0c18794e 1053 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1054 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1055 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1056 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1057 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1058 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1059 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r
1060 @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r
1061\r
1062 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2d3fb919 1063 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.\r
1064 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 1065 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r
1066\r
1067**/\r
1068EFI_STATUS\r
1069ProcessVarWithPk (\r
1070 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1071 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1072 IN VOID *Data,\r
1073 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1074 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1075 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r
1076 IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r
1077 )\r
1078{\r
1079 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
0c18794e 1080 BOOLEAN Del;\r
2d3fb919 1081 UINT8 *Payload;\r
1082 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
0c18794e 1083\r
8c1babfd 1084 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 || \r
1085 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
0c18794e 1086 //\r
05a643f9 1087 // PK, KEK and db/dbx should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
8c1babfd 1088 // authenticated variable.\r
0c18794e 1089 //\r
1090 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1091 }\r
1092\r
785d84ea 1093 Del = FALSE;\r
1094 if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !IsPk)) {\r
8c1babfd 1095 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1096 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
785d84ea 1097 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
1098 Del = TRUE;\r
1099 }\r
2d3fb919 1100\r
d912bad7 1101 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
1102 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1103 return Status;\r
1104 }\r
1105\r
2d3fb919 1106 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1107 VariableName,\r
1108 VendorGuid,\r
1109 Payload,\r
1110 PayloadSize,\r
1111 Attributes,\r
1112 0,\r
8c1babfd 1113 0,\r
2d3fb919 1114 Variable,\r
8c1babfd 1115 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
2d3fb919 1116 );\r
a555940b
FS		 1117 if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
1118 return Status;\r
1119 }\r
1120\r
5ecc20b5 1121 if ((mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) || IsPk) {\r
a555940b
FS		 1122 Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r
1123 }\r
785d84ea 1124 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
1125 //\r
1126 // Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.\r
1127 //\r
1128 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1129 VariableName,\r
1130 VendorGuid,\r
1131 Data,\r
1132 DataSize,\r
1133 Variable,\r
1134 Attributes,\r
1135 AuthVarTypePk,\r
1136 &Del\r
1137 );\r
1138 } else {\r
1139 //\r
1140 // Verify against the certificate in data payload.\r
1141 //\r
1142 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1143 VariableName,\r
1144 VendorGuid,\r
1145 Data,\r
1146 DataSize,\r
1147 Variable,\r
1148 Attributes,\r
1149 AuthVarTypePayload,\r
1150 &Del\r
1151 );\r
1152 }\r
ecc722ad 1153\r
785d84ea 1154 if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {\r
1155 if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !Del) {\r
1156 //\r
1157 // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r
1158 //\r
1159 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r
1160 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && Del){\r
1161 //\r
1162 // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r
1163 //\r
1164 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r
1165 }\r
0c18794e 1166 }\r
1167\r
1168 return Status;\r
1169}\r
1170\r
1171/**\r
1172 Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r
1173\r
dc204d5a
JY		 1174 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1175 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1176 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1177 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1178 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1179 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
1180\r
0c18794e 1181 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1182 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1183 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1184 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1185 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1186 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1187 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1188\r
1189 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2d3fb919 1190 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
1191 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 1192 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
1193\r
1194**/\r
1195EFI_STATUS\r
1196ProcessVarWithKek (\r
1197 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1198 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1199 IN VOID *Data,\r
1200 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1201 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1202 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r
1203 )\r
1204{\r
1205 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2d3fb919 1206 UINT8 *Payload;\r
1207 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
ecc722ad 1208\r
8c1babfd 1209 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r
1210 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
ecc722ad 1211 //\r
8c1babfd 1212 // DB and DBX should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
1213 // authenticated variable.\r
ecc722ad 1214 //\r
1215 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1216 }\r
0c18794e 1217\r
ecc722ad 1218 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1219 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r
8c1babfd 1220 //\r
1221 // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r
1222 //\r
1223 return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1224 VariableName,\r
1225 VendorGuid,\r
1226 Data,\r
1227 DataSize,\r
1228 Variable,\r
1229 Attributes,\r
1230 AuthVarTypeKek,\r
1231 NULL\r
1232 );\r
0c18794e 1233 } else {\r
1234 //\r
ecc722ad 1235 // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.\r
0c18794e 1236 //\r
8c1babfd 1237 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1238 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
2d3fb919 1239\r
e77f9ef6 1240 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
1241 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1242 return Status;\r
1243 }\r
1244 \r
0c18794e 1245 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 1246 VariableName,\r
1247 VendorGuid,\r
1248 Payload,\r
1249 PayloadSize,\r
1250 Attributes,\r
1251 0,\r
8c1babfd 1252 0,\r
0c18794e 1253 Variable,\r
8c1babfd 1254 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
0c18794e 1255 );\r
a555940b
FS		 1256 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1257 return Status;\r
1258 }\r
1259\r
1260 if (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) {\r
1261 Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r
1262 }\r
0c18794e 1263 }\r
1264\r
1265 return Status;\r
1266}\r
1267\r
1268/**\r
1269 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
1270\r
dc204d5a
JY		 1271 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1272 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1273 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1274 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1275 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1276 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
1277\r
0c18794e 1278 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1279 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1280\r
1281 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1282 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1283 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1284 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1285 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1286\r
1287 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
1288 @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r
1289 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
275beb2b 1290 @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The Database to save the public key is full.\r
0c18794e 1291 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
2d3fb919 1292 set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r
1293 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 1294 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r
1295\r
1296**/\r
1297EFI_STATUS\r
1298ProcessVariable (\r
1299 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1300 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1301 IN VOID *Data,\r
1302 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1303 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1304 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
1305 )\r
1306{\r
1307 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1308 BOOLEAN IsDeletion;\r
1309 BOOLEAN IsFirstTime;\r
1310 UINT8 *PubKey;\r
1311 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
1312 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
1313 UINT32 KeyIndex;\r
1314 UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r
9a12e582 1315 VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY VariableDataEntry;\r
0c18794e 1316\r
2d3fb919 1317 KeyIndex = 0;\r
0c18794e 1318 CertData = NULL;\r
1319 CertBlock = NULL;\r
1320 PubKey = NULL;\r
1321 IsDeletion = FALSE;\r
1322\r
ecc722ad 1323 if (NeedPhysicallyPresent(VariableName, VendorGuid) && !UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r
1324 //\r
1325 // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.\r
1326 //\r
1327 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1328 }\r
1329 \r
89be2b03 1330 //\r
1331 // A time-based authenticated variable and a count-based authenticated variable\r
1332 // can't be updated by each other.\r
1333 // \r
1334 if (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) { \r
1335 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&\r
1336 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
1337 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; \r
1338 }\r
1339 \r
1340 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) && \r
1341 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
1342 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; \r
1343 }\r
1344 }\r
1345 \r
0c18794e 1346 //\r
1347 // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r
1348 //\r
1349 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
ed47ae02 1350 return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1351 VariableName,\r
1352 VendorGuid,\r
1353 Data,\r
1354 DataSize,\r
1355 Variable,\r
1356 Attributes,\r
1357 AuthVarTypePriv,\r
1358 NULL\r
1359 );\r
0c18794e 1360 }\r
2d3fb919 1361\r
0c18794e 1362 //\r
1363 // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.\r
1364 //\r
1365 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1366 //\r
1367 // Determine current operation type.\r
1368 //\r
1369 if (DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) {\r
1370 IsDeletion = TRUE;\r
1371 }\r
1372 //\r
1373 // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
1374 //\r
1375 if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
1376 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
1377 } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
1378 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
1379 } else {\r
1380 KeyIndex = Variable->CurrPtr->PubKeyIndex;\r
1381 IsFirstTime = FALSE;\r
1382 }\r
389c8779 1383 } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && \r
1384 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)\r
1385 ) {\r
0c18794e 1386 //\r
1387 // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r
1388 //\r
1389 return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r
1390 } else {\r
1391 //\r
1392 // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.\r
1393 // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r
1394 //\r
1395 Status = UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes, 0, 0, Variable, NULL);\r
1396 return Status;\r
1397 }\r
1398\r
1399 //\r
1400 // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.\r
1401 //\r
1402 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
1403 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
1404 PubKey = CertBlock->PublicKey;\r
1405\r
1406 //\r
1407 // Update Monotonic Count value.\r
1408 //\r
1409 MonotonicCount = CertData->MonotonicCount;\r
1410\r
1411 if (!IsFirstTime) {\r
1412 //\r
8c83d0c0
CZ		 1413 // 2 cases need to check here\r
1414 // 1. Internal PubKey variable. PubKeyIndex is always 0 \r
1415 // 2. Other counter-based AuthVariable. Check input PubKey.\r
0c18794e 1416 //\r
8c83d0c0 1417 if (KeyIndex == 0 || CompareMem (PubKey, mPubKeyStore + (KeyIndex - 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) != 0) {\r
0c18794e 1418 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1419 }\r
1420 //\r
1421 // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable\r
1422 // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.\r
1423 //\r
1424 if (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount) {\r
1425 //\r
1426 // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
1427 //\r
1428 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1429 }\r
2d3fb919 1430 }\r
0c18794e 1431 //\r
1432 // Verify the certificate in Data payload.\r
1433 //\r
1434 Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, PubKey);\r
1435 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1436 return Status;\r
1437 }\r
2d3fb919 1438\r
0c18794e 1439 //\r
1440 // Now, the signature has been verified!\r
1441 //\r
1442 if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {\r
9a12e582
DG		 1443 VariableDataEntry.VariableSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
1444 VariableDataEntry.Guid = VendorGuid;\r
1445 VariableDataEntry.Name = VariableName;\r
1446\r
0c18794e 1447 //\r
1448 // Update public key database variable if need.\r
1449 //\r
9a12e582 1450 KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey, &VariableDataEntry);\r
4e33001c 1451 if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r
275beb2b 1452 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
4e33001c 1453 }\r
0c18794e 1454 }\r
1455\r
1456 //\r
1457 // Verification pass.\r
1458 //\r
1459 return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, Attributes, KeyIndex, MonotonicCount, Variable, NULL);\r
1460}\r
1461\r
2d3fb919 1462/**\r
1463 Merge two buffers which formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. Only the new EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r
1464 will be appended to the original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, duplicate EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r
1465 will be ignored.\r
1466\r
732d199d 1467 @param[in, out] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1468 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r
1469 @param[in] FreeBufSize Size of free data buffer \r
1470 @param[in] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST to be appended.\r
1471 @param[in] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r
1472 @param[out] MergedBufSize Size of the merged buffer\r
2d3fb919 1473\r
732d199d 1474 @return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if input Data buffer overflowed\r
2d3fb919 1475\r
1476**/\r
732d199d 1477EFI_STATUS\r
2d3fb919 1478AppendSignatureList (\r
1479 IN OUT VOID *Data,\r
1480 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
732d199d 1481 IN UINTN FreeBufSize,\r
2d3fb919 1482 IN VOID *NewData,\r
732d199d 1483 IN UINTN NewDataSize,\r
1484 OUT UINTN *MergedBufSize\r
2d3fb919 1485 )\r
1486{\r
1487 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
1488 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
1489 UINTN CertCount;\r
1490 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r
1491 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;\r
1492 UINTN NewCertCount;\r
1493 UINTN Index;\r
1494 UINTN Index2;\r
1495 UINTN Size;\r
1496 UINT8 *Tail;\r
1497 UINTN CopiedCount;\r
1498 UINTN SignatureListSize;\r
1499 BOOLEAN IsNewCert;\r
1500\r
1501 Tail = (UINT8 *) Data + DataSize;\r
1502\r
1503 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;\r
1504 while ((NewDataSize > 0) && (NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1505 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1506 NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1507\r
1508 CopiedCount = 0;\r
1509 for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {\r
1510 IsNewCert = TRUE;\r
1511\r
1512 Size = DataSize;\r
1513 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
1514 while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1515 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&\r
1516 (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {\r
1517 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1518 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
1519 for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {\r
1520 //\r
1521 // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.\r
1522 //\r
1523 if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {\r
1524 IsNewCert = FALSE;\r
1525 break;\r
1526 }\r
1527 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
1528 }\r
1529 }\r
1530\r
1531 if (!IsNewCert) {\r
1532 break;\r
1533 }\r
1534 Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1535 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1536 }\r
1537\r
1538 if (IsNewCert) {\r
1539 //\r
1540 // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, append it.\r
1541 //\r
1542 if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r
732d199d 1543 if (FreeBufSize < sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) {\r
1544 return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;\r
1545 }\r
1546\r
2d3fb919 1547 //\r
1548 // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r
1549 //\r
732d199d 1550\r
2d3fb919 1551 CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1552 Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
732d199d 1553 FreeBufSize -= sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
2d3fb919 1554 }\r
1555\r
732d199d 1556 if (FreeBufSize < NewCertList->SignatureSize) {\r
1557 return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;\r
1558 }\r
2d3fb919 1559 CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1560 Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
732d199d 1561 FreeBufSize -= NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
2d3fb919 1562 CopiedCount++;\r
1563 }\r
1564\r
1565 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1566 }\r
1567\r
1568 //\r
1569 // Update SignatureListSize in newly appended EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1570 //\r
1571 if (CopiedCount != 0) {\r
1572 SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1573 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);\r
1574 CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r
1575 }\r
1576\r
1577 NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1578 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1579 }\r
1580\r
732d199d 1581 *MergedBufSize = (Tail - (UINT8 *) Data);\r
1582 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
2d3fb919 1583}\r
1584\r
0c18794e 1585/**\r
1586 Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r
1587\r
1588\r
1589 @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r
1590 @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r
1591\r
1592 @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r
1593 @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r
1594\r
1595**/\r
1596BOOLEAN\r
1597CompareTimeStamp (\r
1598 IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r
1599 IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r
1600 )\r
1601{\r
1602 if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r
1603 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r
1604 } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r
1605 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r
1606 } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r
1607 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r
1608 } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r
1609 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r
1610 } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r
42ed7604 1611 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < SecondTime->Minute);\r
2d3fb919 1612 }\r
0c18794e 1613\r
1614 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r
1615}\r
1616\r
ed47ae02 1617/**\r
1618 Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
1619 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1620\r
1621 The data format of "certdb":\r
1622 //\r
1623 // UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1624 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];\r
1625 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs2[];\r
1626 // /// ...\r
1627 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certsn[];\r
1628 //\r
1629\r
1630 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1631 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1632 @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb".\r
1633 @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb".\r
1634 @param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.\r
1635 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1636 @param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from\r
1637 starting of Data.\r
1638 @param[out] CertNodeSize Length of AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA in bytes.\r
1639\r
1640 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1641 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.\r
1642 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.\r
1643\r
1644**/\r
1645EFI_STATUS\r
1646FindCertsFromDb (\r
1647 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1648 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1649 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
1650 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1651 OUT UINT32 *CertOffset, OPTIONAL\r
1652 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize, OPTIONAL\r
1653 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset,OPTIONAL\r
1654 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL\r
1655 )\r
1656{\r
1657 UINT32 Offset;\r
1658 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
1659 UINT32 CertSize;\r
1660 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1661 UINT32 NodeSize;\r
1662 UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1663\r
1664 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1665 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1666 }\r
1667\r
1668 //\r
1669 // Check whether DataSize matches recorded CertDbListSize.\r
1670 //\r
1671 if (DataSize < sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1672 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1673 }\r
1674\r
1675 CertDbListSize = ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) Data);\r
1676\r
1677 if (CertDbListSize != (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1678 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1679 }\r
1680\r
1681 Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r
1682\r
1683 //\r
1684 // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r
1685 //\r
1686 while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1687 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r
1688 //\r
1689 // Check whether VendorGuid matches.\r
1690 //\r
1691 if (CompareGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid)) {\r
1692 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1693 NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r
1694 CertSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertDataSize);\r
1695\r
1696 if (NodeSize != sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3 + CertSize +\r
1697 sizeof (CHAR16) * NameSize) {\r
1698 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1699 }\r
1700\r
1701 Offset = Offset + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3;\r
1702 //\r
1703 // Check whether VariableName matches.\r
1704 //\r
1705 if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) && \r
1706 (CompareMem (Data + Offset, VariableName, NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)) == 0)) {\r
1707 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
1708\r
1709 if (CertOffset != NULL) {\r
1710 *CertOffset = Offset;\r
1711 }\r
1712\r
1713 if (CertDataSize != NULL) {\r
1714 *CertDataSize = CertSize; \r
1715 }\r
1716\r
1717 if (CertNodeOffset != NULL) {\r
1718 *CertNodeOffset = (UINT32) ((UINT8 *) Ptr - Data);\r
1719 }\r
1720\r
1721 if (CertNodeSize != NULL) {\r
1722 *CertNodeSize = NodeSize;\r
1723 }\r
1724\r
1725 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1726 } else {\r
1727 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16) + CertSize;\r
1728 }\r
1729 } else {\r
1730 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1731 Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r
1732 }\r
1733 }\r
1734\r
1735 return EFI_NOT_FOUND; \r
1736}\r
1737\r
1738/**\r
1739 Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
1740 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1741\r
1742 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1743 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1744 @param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
1745 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1746\r
1747 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1748 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
1749 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.\r
1750\r
1751**/\r
1752EFI_STATUS\r
1753GetCertsFromDb (\r
1754 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1755 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1756 OUT UINT8 **CertData,\r
1757 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize\r
1758 )\r
1759{\r
1760 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1761 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1762 UINT8 *Data;\r
1763 UINTN DataSize;\r
1764 UINT32 CertOffset;\r
1765\r
1766 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) || (CertDataSize == NULL)) {\r
1767 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1768 }\r
1769 \r
1770 //\r
1771 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1772 //\r
1773 Status = FindVariable (\r
1774 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1775 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1776 &CertDbVariable,\r
1777 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1778 FALSE\r
1779 ); \r
1780 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1781 return Status;\r
1782 }\r
1783\r
1784 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1785 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1786 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1787 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1788 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1789 }\r
1790\r
1791 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1792 VariableName,\r
1793 VendorGuid,\r
1794 Data,\r
1795 DataSize,\r
1796 &CertOffset,\r
1797 CertDataSize,\r
1798 NULL,\r
1799 NULL\r
1800 );\r
1801\r
1802 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1803 return Status;\r
1804 }\r
1805\r
1806 *CertData = Data + CertOffset;\r
1807 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1808}\r
1809\r
1810/**\r
1811 Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated\r
1812 variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1813\r
1814 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1815 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1816\r
1817 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1818 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
1819 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
1820 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r
1821\r
1822**/\r
1823EFI_STATUS\r
1824DeleteCertsFromDb (\r
1825 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1826 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
1827 )\r
1828{\r
1829 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1830 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1831 UINT8 *Data;\r
1832 UINTN DataSize;\r
1833 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
1834 UINT32 CertNodeOffset;\r
1835 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
1836 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
1837 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
1838\r
1839 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {\r
1840 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1841 }\r
1842 \r
1843 //\r
1844 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1845 //\r
1846 Status = FindVariable (\r
1847 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1848 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1849 &CertDbVariable,\r
1850 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1851 FALSE\r
1852 ); \r
1853 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1854 return Status;\r
1855 }\r
1856\r
1857 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1858 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1859 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1860 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1861 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1862 }\r
1863\r
1864 if (DataSize == sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1865 //\r
1866 // There is no certs in certdb.\r
1867 //\r
1868 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1869 }\r
1870\r
1871 //\r
1872 // Get corresponding cert node from certdb.\r
1873 //\r
1874 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1875 VariableName,\r
1876 VendorGuid,\r
1877 Data,\r
1878 DataSize,\r
1879 NULL,\r
1880 NULL,\r
1881 &CertNodeOffset,\r
1882 &CertNodeSize\r
1883 );\r
1884\r
1885 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1886 return Status;\r
1887 }\r
1888\r
1889 if (DataSize < (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1890 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1891 }\r
1892\r
1893 //\r
1894 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
1895 //\r
1896 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize - CertNodeSize;\r
f6e23353 1897 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
ed47ae02 1898\r
1899 //\r
1900 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r
1901 //\r
1902 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, CertNodeOffset);\r
1903 //\r
1904 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
1905 //\r
1906 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1907 //\r
1908 // Copy the DB entries after deleting node.\r
1909 //\r
1910 if (DataSize > (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1911 CopyMem (\r
1912 NewCertDb + CertNodeOffset,\r
1913 Data + CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize,\r
1914 DataSize - CertNodeOffset - CertNodeSize\r
1915 );\r
1916 }\r
1917\r
1918 //\r
1919 // Set "certdb".\r
1920 // \r
1921 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; \r
1922 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1923 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1924 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1925 NewCertDb,\r
1926 NewCertDbSize,\r
1927 VarAttr,\r
1928 0,\r
1929 0,\r
1930 &CertDbVariable,\r
1931 NULL\r
1932 );\r
1933\r
ed47ae02 1934 return Status;\r
1935}\r
1936\r
1937/**\r
1938 Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName\r
1939 and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb".\r
1940\r
1941 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1942 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1943 @param[in] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
1944 @param[in] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1945\r
1946 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1947 @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName\r
1948 and VendorGuid already exists.\r
1949 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
1950 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb"\r
1951\r
1952**/\r
1953EFI_STATUS\r
1954InsertCertsToDb (\r
1955 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1956 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1957 IN UINT8 *CertData,\r
1958 IN UINTN CertDataSize\r
1959 )\r
1960{\r
1961 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1962 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1963 UINT8 *Data;\r
1964 UINTN DataSize;\r
1965 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
1966 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
1967 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
1968 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
1969 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1970 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
1971\r
1972 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL)) {\r
1973 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1974 }\r
1975 \r
1976 //\r
1977 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1978 //\r
1979 Status = FindVariable (\r
1980 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1981 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1982 &CertDbVariable,\r
1983 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1984 FALSE\r
1985 ); \r
1986 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1987 return Status;\r
1988 }\r
1989\r
1990 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1991 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1992 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1993 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1994 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1995 }\r
1996\r
1997 //\r
1998 // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb".\r
1999 // If yes return error.\r
2000 //\r
2001 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
2002 VariableName,\r
2003 VendorGuid,\r
2004 Data,\r
2005 DataSize,\r
2006 NULL,\r
2007 NULL,\r
2008 NULL,\r
2009 NULL\r
2010 );\r
2011\r
2012 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2013 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
2014 return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
2015 }\r
2016\r
2017 //\r
2018 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
2019 //\r
2020 NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);\r
2021 CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16); \r
f6e23353 2022 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize;\r
4ccef561 2023 if (NewCertDbSize > mMaxCertDbSize) {\r
ed47ae02 2024 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
2025 }\r
f6e23353 2026 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
ed47ae02 2027\r
2028 //\r
2029 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r
2030 //\r
2031 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, DataSize);\r
2032 //\r
2033 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
2034 //\r
2035 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
2036 //\r
2037 // Construct new cert node.\r
2038 //\r
2039 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (NewCertDb + DataSize);\r
2040 CopyGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid);\r
2041 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertNodeSize, &CertNodeSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
2042 CopyMem (&Ptr->NameSize, &NameSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
2043 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertDataSize, &CertDataSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
2044 \r
2045 CopyMem (\r
2046 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA),\r
2047 VariableName,\r
2048 NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)\r
2049 );\r
2050\r
2051 CopyMem (\r
2052 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16),\r
2053 CertData,\r
2054 CertDataSize\r
2055 );\r
2056 \r
2057 //\r
2058 // Set "certdb".\r
2059 // \r
2060 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; \r
2061 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2062 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
2063 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
2064 NewCertDb,\r
2065 NewCertDbSize,\r
2066 VarAttr,\r
2067 0,\r
2068 0,\r
2069 &CertDbVariable,\r
2070 NULL\r
2071 );\r
2072\r
ed47ae02 2073 return Status;\r
2074}\r
2075\r
0c18794e 2076/**\r
2077 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
2078\r
dc204d5a
JY		 2079 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
2080 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
2081 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
2082 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
2083 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
2084\r
0c18794e 2085 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
2086 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
2087 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
2088 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
2089 data, this value contains the required size.\r
2090 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
2091 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
785d84ea 2092 @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r
0c18794e 2093 @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r
2094\r
2095 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2d3fb919 2096 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
2097 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 2098 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r
2099 of resources.\r
2100 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
2101\r
2102**/\r
2103EFI_STATUS\r
2104VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
2105 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
2106 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
2107 IN VOID *Data,\r
2108 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
2109 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
2110 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
ed47ae02 2111 IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r
0c18794e 2112 OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r
2113 )\r
2114{\r
2115 UINT8 *RootCert;\r
2116 UINT8 *SigData;\r
2d3fb919 2117 UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r
0c18794e 2118 UINTN RootCertSize;\r
2119 UINTN Index;\r
2d3fb919 2120 UINTN CertCount;\r
2121 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
0c18794e 2122 UINT32 Attr;\r
2123 UINT32 SigDataSize;\r
2124 UINT32 KekDataSize;\r
0c18794e 2125 BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r
2126 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2127 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
2128 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
2129 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable;\r
2130 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r
2131 UINT8 *NewData;\r
2132 UINTN NewDataSize;\r
2133 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r
2d3fb919 2134 UINT8 *Buffer;\r
2135 UINTN Length;\r
ed47ae02 2136 UINT8 *SignerCerts;\r
2137 UINT8 *WrapSigData;\r
2138 UINTN CertStackSize;\r
2139 UINT8 *CertsInCertDb;\r
2140 UINT32 CertsSizeinDb;\r
0c18794e 2141\r
0c18794e 2142 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2143 CertData = NULL;\r
2144 NewData = NULL;\r
2145 Attr = Attributes;\r
ed47ae02 2146 WrapSigData = NULL;\r
2147 SignerCerts = NULL;\r
2148 RootCert = NULL;\r
d4193108 2149 CertsInCertDb = NULL;\r
0c18794e 2150\r
2151 //\r
2d3fb919 2152 // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is\r
0c18794e 2153 // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r
2d3fb919 2154 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new\r
2155 // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new\r
2156 // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not\r
0c18794e 2157 // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r
2158 //\r
2159 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r
2d3fb919 2160\r
2161 //\r
2162 // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the\r
2163 // TimeStamp value are set to zero.\r
2164 //\r
2165 if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||\r
2166 (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||\r
2167 (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r
2168 (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r
2169 (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {\r
2e24814a 2170 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2d3fb919 2171 }\r
2172\r
0c18794e 2173 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
2174 if (CompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, &Variable->CurrPtr->TimeStamp)) {\r
2175 //\r
2176 // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
2177 //\r
2178 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2179 }\r
2180 }\r
2181\r
2182 //\r
2183 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
2184 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r
2185 //\r
2186 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
2d3fb919 2187 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r
0c18794e 2188 //\r
2189 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
2190 //\r
2191 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2192 }\r
2d3fb919 2193\r
0c18794e 2194 //\r
2195 // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r
2196 // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r
2197 //\r
2d3fb919 2198 SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;\r
2199 SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r
648f98d1 2200\r
0c18794e 2201 //\r
2202 // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r
2203 //\r
2d3fb919 2204 PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;\r
2205 PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;\r
0c18794e 2206\r
2207 //\r
2208 // Construct a buffer to fill with (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r
2209 //\r
2d3fb919 2210 NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r
2211 sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);\r
2212 NewData = mSerializationRuntimeBuffer;\r
0c18794e 2213\r
2d3fb919 2214 Buffer = NewData;\r
2215 Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
2216 CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);\r
2217 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 2218\r
2d3fb919 2219 Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
2220 CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);\r
2221 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 2222\r
2d3fb919 2223 Length = sizeof (UINT32);\r
2224 CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);\r
2225 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 2226\r
2d3fb919 2227 Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);\r
2228 CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);\r
2229 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 2230\r
2d3fb919 2231 CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
0c18794e 2232\r
ed47ae02 2233 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {\r
0c18794e 2234 //\r
74b5fd7a
FS		 2235 // Verify that the signature has been made with the current Platform Key (no chaining for PK).\r
2236 // First, get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r
2237 //\r
2238 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r
2239 SigData,\r
2240 SigDataSize,\r
2241 &SignerCerts,\r
2242 &CertStackSize,\r
2243 &RootCert,\r
2244 &RootCertSize\r
2245 );\r
2246 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2247 goto Exit;\r
2248 }\r
2249\r
2250 //\r
2251 // Second, get the current platform key from variable. Check whether it's identical with signer's certificates\r
2252 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
0c18794e 2253 //\r
2254 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 2255 EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
2256 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
2257 &PkVariable,\r
ecc722ad 2258 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
2259 FALSE\r
0c18794e 2260 );\r
2261 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
74b5fd7a
FS		 2262 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2263 goto Exit;\r
0c18794e 2264 }\r
0c18794e 2265 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);\r
2266 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
74b5fd7a
FS		 2267 if ((RootCertSize != (CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1))) ||\r
2268 (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, RootCert, RootCertSize) != 0)) {\r
2269 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2270 goto Exit;\r
2271 }\r
0c18794e 2272\r
2273 //\r
2274 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2275 //\r
2276 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2277 SigData,\r
2278 SigDataSize,\r
2279 RootCert,\r
2280 RootCertSize,\r
2281 NewData,\r
2282 NewDataSize\r
2283 );\r
2284\r
ed47ae02 2285 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypeKek) {\r
2d3fb919 2286\r
0c18794e 2287 //\r
2288 // Get KEK database from variable.\r
2289 //\r
2290 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 2291 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
2292 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
2293 &KekVariable,\r
ecc722ad 2294 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
2295 FALSE\r
0c18794e 2296 );\r
2297 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2298 return Status;\r
2299 }\r
2300\r
2301 //\r
2302 // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r
2d3fb919 2303 //\r
0c18794e 2304 KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r
2305 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r
2306 while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
2307 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
2308 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2309 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
2310 for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
2311 //\r
2312 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r
2313 //\r
2314 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
4e33001c 2315 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
2d3fb919 2316\r
0c18794e 2317 //\r
2318 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2319 //\r
2320 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2321 SigData,\r
2322 SigDataSize,\r
2323 RootCert,\r
2324 RootCertSize,\r
2325 NewData,\r
2326 NewDataSize\r
2327 );\r
2328 if (VerifyStatus) {\r
2329 goto Exit;\r
2330 }\r
2331 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
2332 }\r
2333 }\r
2334 KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
2335 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
2336 }\r
ed47ae02 2337 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
2338\r
2339 //\r
2340 // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX.\r
2341 // Get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r
2342 //\r
2343 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r
2344 SigData,\r
2345 SigDataSize,\r
2346 &SignerCerts,\r
2347 &CertStackSize,\r
2348 &RootCert,\r
2349 &RootCertSize\r
2350 );\r
2351 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2352 goto Exit;\r
2353 }\r
2354\r
2355 //\r
2356 // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb for existing\r
2357 // variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates\r
2358 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
2359 //\r
2360 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL)) {\r
2361 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2362\r
2363 Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);\r
2364 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2365 goto Exit;\r
2366 }\r
2367 \r
2368 if ((CertStackSize != CertsSizeinDb) ||\r
2369 (CompareMem (SignerCerts, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0)) {\r
2370 goto Exit;\r
2371 }\r
2372 }\r
2373\r
2374 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2375 SigData,\r
2376 SigDataSize,\r
2377 RootCert,\r
2378 RootCertSize,\r
2379 NewData,\r
2380 NewDataSize\r
2381 );\r
2382 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2383 goto Exit;\r
2384 }\r
2385\r
2386 //\r
2387 // Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.\r
2388 //\r
275beb2b 2389 if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
ed47ae02 2390 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);\r
2391 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2392 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2393 goto Exit;\r
2394 }\r
275beb2b 2395 } else if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL && PayloadSize != 0) {\r
ed47ae02 2396 //\r
2397 // Insert signer's certificates when adding a new common authenticated variable.\r
2398 //\r
2399 Status = InsertCertsToDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, SignerCerts, CertStackSize);\r
2400 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2401 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2402 goto Exit;\r
2403 }\r
2404 }\r
785d84ea 2405 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePayload) {\r
2406 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) PayloadPtr;\r
2407 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2408 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
2409 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
2410 \r
2411 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2412 //\r
2413 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2414 SigData,\r
2415 SigDataSize,\r
2416 RootCert,\r
2417 RootCertSize,\r
2418 NewData,\r
2419 NewDataSize\r
2420 );\r
ed47ae02 2421 } else {\r
2422 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
0c18794e 2423 }\r
2424\r
2425Exit:\r
2426\r
74b5fd7a 2427 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk || AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
ed47ae02 2428 Pkcs7FreeSigners (RootCert);\r
2429 Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);\r
2430 }\r
2431\r
0c18794e 2432 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2433 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2434 }\r
2435\r
d912bad7 2436 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
2437 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2438 return Status;\r
2439 }\r
2440\r
2d3fb919 2441 if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (VarDel != NULL)) {\r
0c18794e 2442 *VarDel = TRUE;\r
2443 }\r
2d3fb919 2444\r
0c18794e 2445 //\r
2446 // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r
2447 //\r
ed47ae02 2448 return UpdateVariable (\r
2449 VariableName,\r
2450 VendorGuid,\r
2451 PayloadPtr,\r
2452 PayloadSize,\r
2453 Attributes,\r
2454 0,\r
2455 0,\r
2456 Variable,\r
2457 &CertData->TimeStamp\r
2458 );\r
0c18794e 2459}\r
ed47ae02 2460\r
EFI Development Kit II mirror for PVE