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1. Set the secure boot state to Standard Mode when user leaving secure boot setup...
[mirror_edk2.git] / SecurityPkg / VariableAuthenticated / RuntimeDxe / AuthService.c
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0c18794e 1/** @file\r
2 Implement authentication services for the authenticated variable\r
3 service in UEFI2.2.\r
4\r
dc204d5a
JY		 5 Caution: This module requires additional review when modified.\r
6 This driver will have external input - variable data. It may be input in SMM mode.\r
7 This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like\r
8 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
9 Variable attribute should also be checked to avoid authentication bypass.\r
10\r
11 ProcessVarWithPk(), ProcessVarWithKek() and ProcessVariable() are the function to do\r
12 variable authentication.\r
13\r
14 VerifyTimeBasedPayload() and VerifyCounterBasedPayload() are sub function to do verification.\r
15 They will do basic validation for authentication data structure, then call crypto library\r
16 to verify the signature.\r
17\r
83758cdc 18Copyright (c) 2009 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>\r
2d3fb919 19This program and the accompanying materials\r
20are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License\r
21which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at\r
0c18794e 22http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php\r
23\r
2d3fb919 24THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,\r
0c18794e 25WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.\r
26\r
27**/\r
28\r
29#include "Variable.h"\r
30#include "AuthService.h"\r
31\r
32///\r
33/// Global database array for scratch\r
2d3fb919 34///\r
0c18794e 35UINT8 mPubKeyStore[MAX_KEYDB_SIZE];\r
36UINT32 mPubKeyNumber;\r
f6e23353 37UINT8 mCertDbStore[MAX_CERTDB_SIZE];\r
0c18794e 38UINT32 mPlatformMode;\r
ae09f979 39EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[] = {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, EFI_CERT_X509_GUID};\r
0c18794e 40//\r
41// Public Exponent of RSA Key.\r
42//\r
43CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };\r
44//\r
45// Hash context pointer\r
46//\r
47VOID *mHashCtx = NULL;\r
48\r
0c18794e 49//\r
2d3fb919 50// Pointer to runtime buffer.\r
51// For "Append" operation to an existing variable, a read/modify/write operation\r
52// is supported by firmware internally. Reserve runtime buffer to cache previous\r
0c18794e 53// variable data in runtime phase because memory allocation is forbidden in virtual mode.\r
54//\r
55VOID *mStorageArea = NULL;\r
56\r
2d3fb919 57//\r
58// The serialization of the values of the VariableName, VendorGuid and Attributes\r
59// parameters of the SetVariable() call and the TimeStamp component of the\r
60// EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor followed by the variable's new value\r
61// i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data)\r
62//\r
63UINT8 *mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = NULL;\r
64\r
d912bad7 65//\r
66// Requirement for different signature type which have been defined in UEFI spec.\r
67// These data are used to peform SignatureList format check while setting PK/KEK variable.\r
68//\r
69EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {\r
70//{SigType, SigHeaderSize, SigDataSize }\r
71 {EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, 0, 32 },\r
72 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
73 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
74 {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, 0, 20 },\r
75 {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID, 0, 256 },\r
76 {EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},\r
77 {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },\r
78 {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },\r
79 {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 }\r
80};\r
81\r
ecc722ad 82/**\r
83 Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.\r
84\r
85 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
86 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
87\r
88 @retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user could set this variable.\r
89 @retval FALSE This variable is not protected.\r
90 \r
91**/\r
92BOOLEAN\r
93NeedPhysicallyPresent(\r
94 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
95 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
96 )\r
97{\r
98 if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME) == 0))\r
99 || (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {\r
100 return TRUE;\r
101 }\r
102 \r
103 return FALSE;\r
104}\r
105\r
106/**\r
107 Determine whether the platform is operating in Custom Secure Boot mode.\r
108\r
109 @retval TRUE The platform is operating in Custom mode.\r
110 @retval FALSE The platform is operating in Standard mode.\r
111\r
112**/\r
113BOOLEAN\r
114InCustomMode (\r
115 VOID\r
116 )\r
117{\r
118 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
119\r
120 FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
121 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL && *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr)) == CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {\r
122 return TRUE;\r
123 }\r
124 \r
125 return FALSE;\r
126}\r
127\r
128\r
0c18794e 129/**\r
2d3fb919 130 Internal function to delete a Variable given its name and GUID, no authentication\r
131 required.\r
0c18794e 132\r
2d3fb919 133 @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.\r
134 @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.\r
0c18794e 135\r
2d3fb919 136 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable deleted successfully.\r
137 @retval Others The driver failded to start the device.\r
0c18794e 138\r
139**/\r
140EFI_STATUS\r
2d3fb919 141DeleteVariable (\r
142 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
143 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
144 )\r
145{\r
146 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
147 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
148\r
ecc722ad 149 Status = FindVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
2d3fb919 150 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
151 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
152 }\r
153\r
154 ASSERT (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL);\r
155 return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, &Variable, NULL);\r
156}\r
0c18794e 157\r
158/**\r
159 Initializes for authenticated varibale service.\r
160\r
161 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Function successfully executed.\r
162 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Fail to allocate enough memory resources.\r
163\r
164**/\r
165EFI_STATUS\r
166AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (\r
167 VOID\r
168 )\r
169{\r
170 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
171 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
7aaf2fd6 172 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r
0c18794e 173 UINT8 VarValue;\r
174 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
175 UINT8 *Data;\r
176 UINTN DataSize;\r
177 UINTN CtxSize;\r
beda2356 178 UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
179 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
ecc722ad 180 UINT8 CustomMode;\r
ed47ae02 181 UINT32 ListSize;\r
2d3fb919 182\r
0c18794e 183 //\r
184 // Initialize hash context.\r
185 //\r
186 CtxSize = Sha256GetContextSize ();\r
187 mHashCtx = AllocateRuntimePool (CtxSize);\r
188 if (mHashCtx == NULL) {\r
189 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
190 }\r
191\r
192 //\r
193 // Reserved runtime buffer for "Append" operation in virtual mode.\r
194 //\r
2d3fb919 195 mStorageArea = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize));\r
0c18794e 196 if (mStorageArea == NULL) {\r
197 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
198 }\r
199\r
200 //\r
2d3fb919 201 // Prepare runtime buffer for serialized data of time-based authenticated\r
202 // Variable, i.e. (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r
203 //\r
204 mSerializationRuntimeBuffer = AllocateRuntimePool (PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) + sizeof (EFI_TIME));\r
205 if (mSerializationRuntimeBuffer == NULL) {\r
206 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
207 }\r
208\r
209 //\r
210 // Check "AuthVarKeyDatabase" variable's existence.\r
211 // If it doesn't exist, create a new one with initial value of 0 and EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
0c18794e 212 //\r
213 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 214 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
215 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
216 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 217 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
218 FALSE\r
0c18794e 219 );\r
220\r
221 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
222 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
223 VarValue = 0;\r
224 mPubKeyNumber = 0;\r
225 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
226 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
227 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
228 &VarValue,\r
229 sizeof(UINT8),\r
230 VarAttr,\r
231 0,\r
232 0,\r
233 &Variable,\r
234 NULL\r
235 );\r
236 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
237 return Status;\r
238 }\r
239 } else {\r
240 //\r
241 // Load database in global variable for cache.\r
242 //\r
243 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
244 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
245 ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r
246 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r
247 mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
248 }\r
7aaf2fd6 249\r
ecc722ad 250 FindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &PkVariable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
7aaf2fd6 251 if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
252 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
253 } else {\r
254 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
255 }\r
256 \r
0c18794e 257 //\r
05a643f9 258 // Create "SetupMode" varable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
0c18794e 259 //\r
05a643f9 260 FindVariable (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
261 if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
262 mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;\r
263 } else {\r
264 mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;\r
265 }\r
266 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 267 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
268 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
05a643f9 269 &mPlatformMode,\r
270 sizeof(UINT8),\r
271 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,\r
272 0,\r
273 0,\r
2d3fb919 274 &Variable,\r
05a643f9 275 NULL\r
0c18794e 276 );\r
05a643f9 277 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
278 return Status;\r
0c18794e 279 }\r
05a643f9 280 \r
0c18794e 281 //\r
05a643f9 282 // Create "SignatureSupport" varable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
0c18794e 283 //\r
05a643f9 284 FindVariable (EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
285 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
286 EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,\r
287 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
288 mSignatureSupport,\r
289 sizeof(mSignatureSupport),\r
290 EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,\r
291 0,\r
292 0,\r
293 &Variable,\r
294 NULL\r
295 );\r
296 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
297 return Status;\r
0c18794e 298 }\r
beda2356 299\r
300 //\r
301 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.\r
2d3fb919 302 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in USER_MODE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.\r
beda2356 303 // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.\r
304 //\r
8f8ca22e 305 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
ecc722ad 306 FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
beda2356 307 if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL) {\r
308 SecureBootEnable = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));\r
2d3fb919 309 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
310 //\r
311 // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in USER_MODE.\r
312 //\r
8f8ca22e 313 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
beda2356 314 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 315 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
316 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
317 &SecureBootEnable,\r
318 sizeof (UINT8),\r
319 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
320 0,\r
321 0,\r
beda2356 322 &Variable,\r
323 NULL\r
324 );\r
325 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
326 return Status;\r
327 }\r
328 }\r
329\r
05a643f9 330 //\r
331 // Create "SecureBoot" varable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
332 //\r
2d3fb919 333 if (SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE && mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
334 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
335 } else {\r
336 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
337 }\r
ecc722ad 338 FindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
2d3fb919 339 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
340 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
341 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
342 &SecureBootMode,\r
343 sizeof (UINT8),\r
05a643f9 344 EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
2d3fb919 345 0,\r
346 0,\r
347 &Variable,\r
348 NULL\r
349 );\r
350 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
351 return Status;\r
352 }\r
353\r
7aaf2fd6 354 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, mPlatformMode));\r
355 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBootMode));\r
356 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));\r
357\r
0c18794e 358 //\r
f71ed839 359 // Initialize "CustomMode" in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE state.\r
0c18794e 360 //\r
ecc722ad 361 FindVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);\r
f71ed839 362 CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;\r
363 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
364 EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,\r
365 &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,\r
366 &CustomMode,\r
367 sizeof (UINT8),\r
368 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
369 0,\r
370 0,\r
371 &Variable,\r
372 NULL\r
373 );\r
374 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
375 return Status;\r
0c18794e 376 }\r
ecc722ad 377 \r
378 DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, CustomMode));\r
2d3fb919 379\r
ed47ae02 380 //\r
381 // Check "certdb" variable's existence.\r
382 // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with \r
383 // EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
384 //\r
385 Status = FindVariable (\r
386 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
387 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
388 &Variable,\r
389 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
390 FALSE\r
391 );\r
392\r
393 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
394 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
f6e23353 395 ListSize = sizeof (UINT32);\r
ed47ae02 396 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
397 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
398 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
399 &ListSize,\r
400 sizeof (UINT32),\r
401 VarAttr,\r
402 0,\r
403 0,\r
404 &Variable,\r
405 NULL\r
406 );\r
f6e23353 407 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
408 return Status;\r
409 }\r
ed47ae02 410 } \r
411\r
0c18794e 412 return Status;\r
413}\r
414\r
415/**\r
416 Add public key in store and return its index.\r
417\r
418 @param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data\r
419\r
420 @return Index of new added item\r
421\r
422**/\r
423UINT32\r
424AddPubKeyInStore (\r
425 IN UINT8 *PubKey\r
426 )\r
427{\r
428 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
429 BOOLEAN IsFound;\r
430 UINT32 Index;\r
431 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
432 UINT8 *Ptr;\r
83758cdc 433 UINT8 *Data;\r
434 UINTN DataSize;\r
0c18794e 435\r
436 if (PubKey == NULL) {\r
437 return 0;\r
438 }\r
439\r
440 Status = FindVariable (\r
441 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
442 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
443 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 444 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
445 FALSE\r
0c18794e 446 );\r
447 ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r
448 //\r
449 // Check whether the public key entry does exist.\r
450 //\r
451 IsFound = FALSE;\r
452 for (Ptr = mPubKeyStore, Index = 1; Index <= mPubKeyNumber; Index++) {\r
453 if (CompareMem (Ptr, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {\r
454 IsFound = TRUE;\r
455 break;\r
456 }\r
457 Ptr += EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE;\r
458 }\r
459\r
460 if (!IsFound) {\r
461 //\r
462 // Add public key in database.\r
463 //\r
464 if (mPubKeyNumber == MAX_KEY_NUM) {\r
465 //\r
83758cdc 466 // Public key dadatase is full, try to reclaim invalid key.\r
0c18794e 467 //\r
83758cdc 468 if (AtRuntime ()) {\r
469 //\r
470 // NV storage can't reclaim at runtime.\r
471 //\r
472 return 0;\r
473 }\r
474 \r
475 Status = Reclaim (\r
476 mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal.NonVolatileVariableBase,\r
477 &mVariableModuleGlobal->NonVolatileLastVariableOffset,\r
478 FALSE,\r
479 NULL,\r
480 TRUE,\r
481 TRUE\r
482 );\r
483 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
484 return 0;\r
485 }\r
486\r
487 Status = FindVariable (\r
488 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
489 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
490 &Variable,\r
491 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
492 FALSE\r
493 );\r
494 ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r
495\r
496 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
497 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);\r
498 ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));\r
499 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);\r
500 mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
501\r
502 if (mPubKeyNumber == MAX_KEY_NUM) {\r
503 return 0;\r
504 } \r
0c18794e 505 }\r
506\r
507 CopyMem (mPubKeyStore + mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
508 Index = ++mPubKeyNumber;\r
509 //\r
510 // Update public key database variable.\r
511 //\r
512 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
513 AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME,\r
514 &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,\r
515 mPubKeyStore,\r
516 mPubKeyNumber * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE,\r
517 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,\r
518 0,\r
519 0,\r
520 &Variable,\r
521 NULL\r
522 );\r
523 ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);\r
524 }\r
525\r
526 return Index;\r
527}\r
528\r
529/**\r
85560919 530 Verify data payload with AuthInfo in EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID type.\r
0c18794e 531 Follow the steps in UEFI2.2.\r
532\r
dc204d5a
JY		 533 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
534 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
535 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
536 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
537 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
538\r
0c18794e 539 @param[in] Data Pointer to data with AuthInfo.\r
540 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
541 @param[in] PubKey Public key used for verification.\r
542\r
2d3fb919 543 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
0c18794e 544 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION If authentication failed.\r
2d3fb919 545 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Authentication successful.\r
0c18794e 546\r
547**/\r
548EFI_STATUS\r
549VerifyCounterBasedPayload (\r
550 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
551 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
552 IN UINT8 *PubKey\r
553 )\r
554{\r
555 BOOLEAN Status;\r
556 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
557 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
558 UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];\r
559 VOID *Rsa;\r
275beb2b 560 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
561 \r
562 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;\r
0c18794e 563 Rsa = NULL;\r
564 CertData = NULL;\r
565 CertBlock = NULL;\r
566\r
567 if (Data == NULL || PubKey == NULL) {\r
568 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
569 }\r
570\r
571 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
572 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
573\r
574 //\r
575 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
85560919 576 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID.\r
0c18794e 577 //\r
578 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
85560919 579 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)\r
0c18794e 580 ) {\r
581 //\r
582 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
583 //\r
584 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
585 }\r
586 //\r
587 // Hash data payload with SHA256.\r
588 //\r
589 ZeroMem (Digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);\r
590 Status = Sha256Init (mHashCtx);\r
591 if (!Status) {\r
592 goto Done;\r
593 }\r
275beb2b 594 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, PayloadSize);\r
595 if (!Status) {\r
596 goto Done;\r
597 }\r
598 //\r
599 // Hash Size.\r
600 //\r
601 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &PayloadSize, sizeof (UINTN));\r
0c18794e 602 if (!Status) {\r
603 goto Done;\r
604 }\r
605 //\r
606 // Hash Monotonic Count.\r
607 //\r
608 Status = Sha256Update (mHashCtx, &CertData->MonotonicCount, sizeof (UINT64));\r
609 if (!Status) {\r
610 goto Done;\r
611 }\r
612 Status = Sha256Final (mHashCtx, Digest);\r
613 if (!Status) {\r
614 goto Done;\r
615 }\r
616 //\r
617 // Generate & Initialize RSA Context.\r
618 //\r
619 Rsa = RsaNew ();\r
620 ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);\r
2d3fb919 621 //\r
0c18794e 622 // Set RSA Key Components.\r
623 // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.\r
624 //\r
625 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, PubKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);\r
626 if (!Status) {\r
627 goto Done;\r
628 }\r
629 Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));\r
630 if (!Status) {\r
631 goto Done;\r
632 }\r
633 //\r
634 // Verify the signature.\r
635 //\r
636 Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (\r
2d3fb919 637 Rsa,\r
638 Digest,\r
639 SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,\r
640 CertBlock->Signature,\r
0c18794e 641 EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE\r
642 );\r
643\r
644Done:\r
645 if (Rsa != NULL) {\r
646 RsaFree (Rsa);\r
647 }\r
648 if (Status) {\r
649 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
650 } else {\r
651 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
652 }\r
653}\r
654\r
0c18794e 655/**\r
656 Update platform mode.\r
657\r
658 @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r
659\r
660 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
661 @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r
662\r
663**/\r
664EFI_STATUS\r
665UpdatePlatformMode (\r
666 IN UINT32 Mode\r
667 )\r
668{\r
669 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
670 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK Variable;\r
671 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
672 UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
beda2356 673 UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
674 UINTN VariableDataSize;\r
2d3fb919 675\r
0c18794e 676 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 677 EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
678 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
679 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 680 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
681 FALSE\r
0c18794e 682 );\r
683 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
684 return Status;\r
685 }\r
686\r
05a643f9 687 //\r
688 // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
689 // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
690 //\r
691 mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;\r
692 CopyMem (GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr), &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
0c18794e 693\r
2d3fb919 694 if (AtRuntime ()) {\r
695 //\r
696 // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
697 // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
698 // Variable in runtime.\r
699 //\r
700 return Status;\r
701 }\r
702\r
0c18794e 703 //\r
704 // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r
705 // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r
706 // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r
707 //\r
708 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 709 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
710 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
711 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 712 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
713 FALSE\r
0c18794e 714 );\r
715 //\r
716 // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r
717 // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r
718 // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r
719 //\r
720 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
721 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
722 } else {\r
723 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
724 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
725 } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r
726 SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
727 } else {\r
728 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
729 }\r
730 }\r
731\r
2d3fb919 732 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;\r
beda2356 733 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
0c18794e 734 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
735 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
736 &SecureBootMode,\r
737 sizeof(UINT8),\r
738 VarAttr,\r
739 0,\r
740 0,\r
741 &Variable,\r
742 NULL\r
743 );\r
beda2356 744 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
745 return Status;\r
746 }\r
747\r
748 //\r
749 // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r
750 //\r
751 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 752 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
753 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
754 &Variable,\r
ecc722ad 755 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
756 FALSE\r
beda2356 757 );\r
2d3fb919 758\r
beda2356 759 if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r
760 //\r
761 // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r
762 //\r
763 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
764 VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r
765 } else {\r
766 //\r
2d3fb919 767 // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r
beda2356 768 // variable is not in secure boot state.\r
769 //\r
770 if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL || EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
771 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
772 }\r
773 SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
774 VariableDataSize = 0;\r
775 }\r
2d3fb919 776\r
beda2356 777 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 778 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
779 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
780 &SecureBootEnable,\r
781 VariableDataSize,\r
782 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,\r
783 0,\r
784 0,\r
beda2356 785 &Variable,\r
786 NULL\r
787 );\r
788 return Status;\r
0c18794e 789}\r
790\r
d912bad7 791/**\r
e77f9ef6 792 Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx variable.\r
d912bad7 793\r
794 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.\r
795 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
796 @param[in] Data Point to the variable data to be checked.\r
797 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
798\r
799 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.\r
800 @return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check successfully.\r
801 \r
802**/\r
803EFI_STATUS\r
804CheckSignatureListFormat(\r
805 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
806 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
807 IN VOID *Data,\r
808 IN UINTN DataSize\r
809 )\r
810{\r
811 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList;\r
812 UINTN SigDataSize;\r
813 UINT32 Index;\r
814 UINT32 SigCount;\r
815 BOOLEAN IsPk;\r
e77f9ef6 816 VOID *RsaContext;\r
817 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;\r
818 UINTN CertLen;\r
d912bad7 819\r
820 if (DataSize == 0) {\r
821 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
822 }\r
823\r
824 ASSERT (VariableName != NULL && VendorGuid != NULL && Data != NULL);\r
825\r
826 if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){\r
827 IsPk = TRUE;\r
e77f9ef6 828 } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0) ||\r
829 (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) && \r
830 (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0 || StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0))){\r
d912bad7 831 IsPk = FALSE;\r
832 } else {\r
833 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
834 }\r
835\r
836 SigCount = 0;\r
837 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
838 SigDataSize = DataSize;\r
e77f9ef6 839 RsaContext = NULL;\r
d912bad7 840\r
841 //\r
842 // Walk throuth the input signature list and check the data format.\r
843 // If any signature is incorrectly formed, the whole check will fail.\r
844 //\r
845 while ((SigDataSize > 0) && (SigDataSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
846 for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {\r
847 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {\r
848 //\r
849 // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of SignatureOwner \r
850 // component) add the data length according to signature type.\r
851 //\r
852 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) && \r
853 (SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {\r
854 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
855 }\r
856 if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize != ((UINTN) ~0) &&\r
857 SigList->SignatureHeaderSize != mSupportSigItem[Index].SigHeaderSize) {\r
858 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
859 }\r
860 break;\r
861 }\r
862 }\r
863\r
864 if (Index == (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM))) {\r
865 //\r
866 // Undefined signature type.\r
867 //\r
868 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
869 }\r
870\r
e77f9ef6 871 if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
872 //\r
873 // Try to retrieve the RSA public key from the X.509 certificate.\r
874 // If this operation fails, it's not a valid certificate.\r
875 //\r
876 RsaContext = RsaNew ();\r
877 if (RsaContext == NULL) {\r
878 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
879 }\r
880 CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SigList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
881 CertLen = SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
882 if (!RsaGetPublicKeyFromX509 (CertData->SignatureData, CertLen, &RsaContext)) {\r
883 RsaFree (RsaContext);\r
884 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
885 }\r
886 RsaFree (RsaContext);\r
887 }\r
888\r
d912bad7 889 if ((SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) % SigList->SignatureSize != 0) {\r
890 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
891 }\r
892 SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;\r
893 \r
894 SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;\r
895 SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize);\r
896 }\r
897\r
898 if (((UINTN) SigList - (UINTN) Data) != DataSize) {\r
899 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
900 }\r
901\r
902 if (IsPk && SigCount > 1) {\r
903 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
904 }\r
905\r
906 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
907}\r
908\r
0c18794e 909/**\r
910 Process variable with platform key for verification.\r
911\r
dc204d5a
JY		 912 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
913 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
914 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
915 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
916 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
917 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
918\r
0c18794e 919 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
920 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
921 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
922 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
923 data, this value contains the required size.\r
924 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
925 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r
926 @param[in] IsPk Indicate whether it is to process pk.\r
927\r
928 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2d3fb919 929 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation.\r
930 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 931 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r
932\r
933**/\r
934EFI_STATUS\r
935ProcessVarWithPk (\r
936 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
937 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
938 IN VOID *Data,\r
939 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
940 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
941 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL,\r
942 IN BOOLEAN IsPk\r
943 )\r
944{\r
945 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
0c18794e 946 BOOLEAN Del;\r
2d3fb919 947 UINT8 *Payload;\r
948 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
0c18794e 949\r
8c1babfd 950 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 || \r
951 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
0c18794e 952 //\r
05a643f9 953 // PK, KEK and db/dbx should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
8c1babfd 954 // authenticated variable.\r
0c18794e 955 //\r
956 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
957 }\r
958\r
785d84ea 959 Del = FALSE;\r
960 if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !IsPk)) {\r
8c1babfd 961 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
962 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
785d84ea 963 if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
964 Del = TRUE;\r
965 }\r
2d3fb919 966\r
d912bad7 967 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
968 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
969 return Status;\r
970 }\r
971\r
2d3fb919 972 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
973 VariableName,\r
974 VendorGuid,\r
975 Payload,\r
976 PayloadSize,\r
977 Attributes,\r
978 0,\r
8c1babfd 979 0,\r
2d3fb919 980 Variable,\r
8c1babfd 981 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
2d3fb919 982 );\r
785d84ea 983 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
984 //\r
985 // Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.\r
986 //\r
987 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
988 VariableName,\r
989 VendorGuid,\r
990 Data,\r
991 DataSize,\r
992 Variable,\r
993 Attributes,\r
994 AuthVarTypePk,\r
995 &Del\r
996 );\r
997 } else {\r
998 //\r
999 // Verify against the certificate in data payload.\r
1000 //\r
1001 Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1002 VariableName,\r
1003 VendorGuid,\r
1004 Data,\r
1005 DataSize,\r
1006 Variable,\r
1007 Attributes,\r
1008 AuthVarTypePayload,\r
1009 &Del\r
1010 );\r
1011 }\r
ecc722ad 1012\r
785d84ea 1013 if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {\r
1014 if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !Del) {\r
1015 //\r
1016 // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r
1017 //\r
1018 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r
1019 } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && Del){\r
1020 //\r
1021 // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r
1022 //\r
1023 Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r
1024 }\r
0c18794e 1025 }\r
1026\r
1027 return Status;\r
1028}\r
1029\r
1030/**\r
1031 Process variable with key exchange key for verification.\r
1032\r
dc204d5a
JY		 1033 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1034 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1035 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1036 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1037 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1038 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
1039\r
0c18794e 1040 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1041 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1042 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1043 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1044 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1045 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1046 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1047\r
1048 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2d3fb919 1049 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
1050 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 1051 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
1052\r
1053**/\r
1054EFI_STATUS\r
1055ProcessVarWithKek (\r
1056 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1057 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1058 IN VOID *Data,\r
1059 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1060 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1061 IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r
1062 )\r
1063{\r
1064 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
2d3fb919 1065 UINT8 *Payload;\r
1066 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
ecc722ad 1067\r
8c1babfd 1068 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r
1069 (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
ecc722ad 1070 //\r
8c1babfd 1071 // DB and DBX should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based\r
1072 // authenticated variable.\r
ecc722ad 1073 //\r
1074 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1075 }\r
0c18794e 1076\r
ecc722ad 1077 Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1078 if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r
8c1babfd 1079 //\r
1080 // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r
1081 //\r
1082 return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1083 VariableName,\r
1084 VendorGuid,\r
1085 Data,\r
1086 DataSize,\r
1087 Variable,\r
1088 Attributes,\r
1089 AuthVarTypeKek,\r
1090 NULL\r
1091 );\r
0c18794e 1092 } else {\r
1093 //\r
ecc722ad 1094 // If in setup mode or custom secure boot mode, no authentication needed.\r
0c18794e 1095 //\r
8c1babfd 1096 Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
1097 PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
2d3fb919 1098\r
e77f9ef6 1099 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
1100 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1101 return Status;\r
1102 }\r
1103 \r
0c18794e 1104 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
2d3fb919 1105 VariableName,\r
1106 VendorGuid,\r
1107 Payload,\r
1108 PayloadSize,\r
1109 Attributes,\r
1110 0,\r
8c1babfd 1111 0,\r
0c18794e 1112 Variable,\r
8c1babfd 1113 &((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->TimeStamp\r
0c18794e 1114 );\r
1115 }\r
1116\r
1117 return Status;\r
1118}\r
1119\r
1120/**\r
1121 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS/EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
1122\r
dc204d5a
JY		 1123 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1124 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1125 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1126 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1127 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1128 This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
1129\r
0c18794e 1130 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1131 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1132\r
1133 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1134 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1135 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1136 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1137 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
1138\r
1139 @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
1140 @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected and needs authentication with\r
1141 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
275beb2b 1142 @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The Database to save the public key is full.\r
0c18794e 1143 @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
2d3fb919 1144 set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation\r
1145 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 1146 @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is not write-protected or pass validation successfully.\r
1147\r
1148**/\r
1149EFI_STATUS\r
1150ProcessVariable (\r
1151 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1152 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1153 IN VOID *Data,\r
1154 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1155 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1156 IN UINT32 Attributes\r
1157 )\r
1158{\r
1159 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1160 BOOLEAN IsDeletion;\r
1161 BOOLEAN IsFirstTime;\r
1162 UINT8 *PubKey;\r
1163 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *CertData;\r
1164 EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;\r
1165 UINT32 KeyIndex;\r
1166 UINT64 MonotonicCount;\r
1167\r
2d3fb919 1168 KeyIndex = 0;\r
0c18794e 1169 CertData = NULL;\r
1170 CertBlock = NULL;\r
1171 PubKey = NULL;\r
1172 IsDeletion = FALSE;\r
1173\r
ecc722ad 1174 if (NeedPhysicallyPresent(VariableName, VendorGuid) && !UserPhysicalPresent()) {\r
1175 //\r
1176 // This variable is protected, only physical present user could modify its value.\r
1177 //\r
1178 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1179 }\r
1180 \r
89be2b03 1181 //\r
1182 // A time-based authenticated variable and a count-based authenticated variable\r
1183 // can't be updated by each other.\r
1184 // \r
1185 if (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) { \r
1186 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&\r
1187 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
1188 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; \r
1189 }\r
1190 \r
1191 if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) && \r
1192 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {\r
1193 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; \r
1194 }\r
1195 }\r
1196 \r
0c18794e 1197 //\r
1198 // Process Time-based Authenticated variable.\r
1199 //\r
1200 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
ed47ae02 1201 return VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1202 VariableName,\r
1203 VendorGuid,\r
1204 Data,\r
1205 DataSize,\r
1206 Variable,\r
1207 Attributes,\r
1208 AuthVarTypePriv,\r
1209 NULL\r
1210 );\r
0c18794e 1211 }\r
2d3fb919 1212\r
0c18794e 1213 //\r
1214 // Determine if first time SetVariable with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS.\r
1215 //\r
1216 if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {\r
1217 //\r
1218 // Determine current operation type.\r
1219 //\r
1220 if (DataSize == AUTHINFO_SIZE) {\r
1221 IsDeletion = TRUE;\r
1222 }\r
1223 //\r
1224 // Determine whether this is the first time with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.\r
1225 //\r
1226 if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL) {\r
1227 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
1228 } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
1229 IsFirstTime = TRUE;\r
1230 } else {\r
1231 KeyIndex = Variable->CurrPtr->PubKeyIndex;\r
1232 IsFirstTime = FALSE;\r
1233 }\r
389c8779 1234 } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && \r
1235 ((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes & (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)\r
1236 ) {\r
0c18794e 1237 //\r
1238 // If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.\r
1239 //\r
1240 return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r
1241 } else {\r
1242 //\r
1243 // If without EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, set and attributes collision.\r
1244 // That means it is not authenticated variable, just update variable as usual.\r
1245 //\r
1246 Status = UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes, 0, 0, Variable, NULL);\r
1247 return Status;\r
1248 }\r
1249\r
1250 //\r
1251 // Get PubKey and check Monotonic Count value corresponding to the variable.\r
1252 //\r
1253 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION *) Data;\r
1254 CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);\r
1255 PubKey = CertBlock->PublicKey;\r
1256\r
1257 //\r
1258 // Update Monotonic Count value.\r
1259 //\r
1260 MonotonicCount = CertData->MonotonicCount;\r
1261\r
1262 if (!IsFirstTime) {\r
1263 //\r
1264 // Check input PubKey.\r
1265 //\r
1266 if (CompareMem (PubKey, mPubKeyStore + (KeyIndex - 1) * EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) != 0) {\r
1267 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1268 }\r
1269 //\r
1270 // Compare the current monotonic count and ensure that it is greater than the last SetVariable\r
1271 // operation with the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS attribute set.\r
1272 //\r
1273 if (CertData->MonotonicCount <= Variable->CurrPtr->MonotonicCount) {\r
1274 //\r
1275 // Monotonic count check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
1276 //\r
1277 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
1278 }\r
2d3fb919 1279 }\r
0c18794e 1280 //\r
1281 // Verify the certificate in Data payload.\r
1282 //\r
1283 Status = VerifyCounterBasedPayload (Data, DataSize, PubKey);\r
1284 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1285 return Status;\r
1286 }\r
2d3fb919 1287\r
0c18794e 1288 //\r
1289 // Now, the signature has been verified!\r
1290 //\r
1291 if (IsFirstTime && !IsDeletion) {\r
1292 //\r
1293 // Update public key database variable if need.\r
1294 //\r
1295 KeyIndex = AddPubKeyInStore (PubKey);\r
4e33001c 1296 if (KeyIndex == 0) {\r
275beb2b 1297 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
4e33001c 1298 }\r
0c18794e 1299 }\r
1300\r
1301 //\r
1302 // Verification pass.\r
1303 //\r
1304 return UpdateVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE, DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE, Attributes, KeyIndex, MonotonicCount, Variable, NULL);\r
1305}\r
1306\r
2d3fb919 1307/**\r
1308 Merge two buffers which formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. Only the new EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r
1309 will be appended to the original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, duplicate EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA\r
1310 will be ignored.\r
1311\r
1312 @param[in, out] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1313 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.\r
1314 @param[in] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST to be appended.\r
1315 @param[in] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.\r
1316\r
1317 @return Size of the merged buffer.\r
1318\r
1319**/\r
1320UINTN\r
1321AppendSignatureList (\r
1322 IN OUT VOID *Data,\r
1323 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1324 IN VOID *NewData,\r
1325 IN UINTN NewDataSize\r
1326 )\r
1327{\r
1328 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
1329 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
1330 UINTN CertCount;\r
1331 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;\r
1332 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *NewCert;\r
1333 UINTN NewCertCount;\r
1334 UINTN Index;\r
1335 UINTN Index2;\r
1336 UINTN Size;\r
1337 UINT8 *Tail;\r
1338 UINTN CopiedCount;\r
1339 UINTN SignatureListSize;\r
1340 BOOLEAN IsNewCert;\r
1341\r
1342 Tail = (UINT8 *) Data + DataSize;\r
1343\r
1344 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) NewData;\r
1345 while ((NewDataSize > 0) && (NewDataSize >= NewCertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1346 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1347 NewCertCount = (NewCertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1348\r
1349 CopiedCount = 0;\r
1350 for (Index = 0; Index < NewCertCount; Index++) {\r
1351 IsNewCert = TRUE;\r
1352\r
1353 Size = DataSize;\r
1354 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
1355 while ((Size > 0) && (Size >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
1356 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &NewCertList->SignatureType) &&\r
1357 (CertList->SignatureSize == NewCertList->SignatureSize)) {\r
1358 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1359 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
1360 for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < CertCount; Index2++) {\r
1361 //\r
1362 // Iterate each Signature Data in this Signature List.\r
1363 //\r
1364 if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {\r
1365 IsNewCert = FALSE;\r
1366 break;\r
1367 }\r
1368 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
1369 }\r
1370 }\r
1371\r
1372 if (!IsNewCert) {\r
1373 break;\r
1374 }\r
1375 Size -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1376 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1377 }\r
1378\r
1379 if (IsNewCert) {\r
1380 //\r
1381 // New EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA, append it.\r
1382 //\r
1383 if (CopiedCount == 0) {\r
1384 //\r
1385 // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header for only once.\r
1386 //\r
1387 CopyMem (Tail, NewCertList, sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
1388 Tail = Tail + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize;\r
1389 }\r
1390\r
1391 CopyMem (Tail, NewCert, NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1392 Tail += NewCertList->SignatureSize;\r
1393 CopiedCount++;\r
1394 }\r
1395\r
1396 NewCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) NewCert + NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1397 }\r
1398\r
1399 //\r
1400 // Update SignatureListSize in newly appended EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.\r
1401 //\r
1402 if (CopiedCount != 0) {\r
1403 SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + NewCertList->SignatureHeaderSize + (CopiedCount * NewCertList->SignatureSize);\r
1404 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) (Tail - SignatureListSize);\r
1405 CertList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;\r
1406 }\r
1407\r
1408 NewDataSize -= NewCertList->SignatureListSize;\r
1409 NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) NewCertList + NewCertList->SignatureListSize);\r
1410 }\r
1411\r
1412 return (Tail - (UINT8 *) Data);\r
1413}\r
1414\r
0c18794e 1415/**\r
1416 Compare two EFI_TIME data.\r
1417\r
1418\r
1419 @param FirstTime A pointer to the first EFI_TIME data.\r
1420 @param SecondTime A pointer to the second EFI_TIME data.\r
1421\r
1422 @retval TRUE The FirstTime is not later than the SecondTime.\r
1423 @retval FALSE The FirstTime is later than the SecondTime.\r
1424\r
1425**/\r
1426BOOLEAN\r
1427CompareTimeStamp (\r
1428 IN EFI_TIME *FirstTime,\r
1429 IN EFI_TIME *SecondTime\r
1430 )\r
1431{\r
1432 if (FirstTime->Year != SecondTime->Year) {\r
1433 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Year < SecondTime->Year);\r
1434 } else if (FirstTime->Month != SecondTime->Month) {\r
1435 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Month < SecondTime->Month);\r
1436 } else if (FirstTime->Day != SecondTime->Day) {\r
1437 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Day < SecondTime->Day);\r
1438 } else if (FirstTime->Hour != SecondTime->Hour) {\r
1439 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Hour < SecondTime->Hour);\r
1440 } else if (FirstTime->Minute != SecondTime->Minute) {\r
42ed7604 1441 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Minute < SecondTime->Minute);\r
2d3fb919 1442 }\r
0c18794e 1443\r
1444 return (BOOLEAN) (FirstTime->Second <= SecondTime->Second);\r
1445}\r
1446\r
ed47ae02 1447/**\r
1448 Find matching signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
1449 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1450\r
1451 The data format of "certdb":\r
1452 //\r
1453 // UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1454 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs1[];\r
1455 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certs2[];\r
1456 // /// ...\r
1457 // /// AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA Certsn[];\r
1458 //\r
1459\r
1460 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1461 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1462 @param[in] Data Pointer to variable "certdb".\r
1463 @param[in] DataSize Size of variable "certdb".\r
1464 @param[out] CertOffset Offset of matching CertData, from starting of Data.\r
1465 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1466 @param[out] CertNodeOffset Offset of matching AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA , from\r
1467 starting of Data.\r
1468 @param[out] CertNodeSize Length of AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA in bytes.\r
1469\r
1470 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1471 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find matching certs.\r
1472 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Find matching certs and output parameters.\r
1473\r
1474**/\r
1475EFI_STATUS\r
1476FindCertsFromDb (\r
1477 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1478 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1479 IN UINT8 *Data,\r
1480 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1481 OUT UINT32 *CertOffset, OPTIONAL\r
1482 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize, OPTIONAL\r
1483 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeOffset,OPTIONAL\r
1484 OUT UINT32 *CertNodeSize OPTIONAL\r
1485 )\r
1486{\r
1487 UINT32 Offset;\r
1488 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
1489 UINT32 CertSize;\r
1490 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1491 UINT32 NodeSize;\r
1492 UINT32 CertDbListSize;\r
1493\r
1494 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1495 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1496 }\r
1497\r
1498 //\r
1499 // Check whether DataSize matches recorded CertDbListSize.\r
1500 //\r
1501 if (DataSize < sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1502 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1503 }\r
1504\r
1505 CertDbListSize = ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) Data);\r
1506\r
1507 if (CertDbListSize != (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1508 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1509 }\r
1510\r
1511 Offset = sizeof (UINT32);\r
1512\r
1513 //\r
1514 // Get corresponding certificates by VendorGuid and VariableName.\r
1515 //\r
1516 while (Offset < (UINT32) DataSize) {\r
1517 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (Data + Offset);\r
1518 //\r
1519 // Check whether VendorGuid matches.\r
1520 //\r
1521 if (CompareGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid)) {\r
1522 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1523 NameSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->NameSize);\r
1524 CertSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertDataSize);\r
1525\r
1526 if (NodeSize != sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3 + CertSize +\r
1527 sizeof (CHAR16) * NameSize) {\r
1528 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1529 }\r
1530\r
1531 Offset = Offset + sizeof (EFI_GUID) + sizeof (UINT32) * 3;\r
1532 //\r
1533 // Check whether VariableName matches.\r
1534 //\r
1535 if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) && \r
1536 (CompareMem (Data + Offset, VariableName, NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)) == 0)) {\r
1537 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
1538\r
1539 if (CertOffset != NULL) {\r
1540 *CertOffset = Offset;\r
1541 }\r
1542\r
1543 if (CertDataSize != NULL) {\r
1544 *CertDataSize = CertSize; \r
1545 }\r
1546\r
1547 if (CertNodeOffset != NULL) {\r
1548 *CertNodeOffset = (UINT32) ((UINT8 *) Ptr - Data);\r
1549 }\r
1550\r
1551 if (CertNodeSize != NULL) {\r
1552 *CertNodeSize = NodeSize;\r
1553 }\r
1554\r
1555 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1556 } else {\r
1557 Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16) + CertSize;\r
1558 }\r
1559 } else {\r
1560 NodeSize = ReadUnaligned32 (&Ptr->CertNodeSize);\r
1561 Offset = Offset + NodeSize;\r
1562 }\r
1563 }\r
1564\r
1565 return EFI_NOT_FOUND; \r
1566}\r
1567\r
1568/**\r
1569 Retrieve signer's certificates for common authenticated variable\r
1570 by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1571\r
1572 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1573 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1574 @param[out] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
1575 @param[out] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1576\r
1577 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1578 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
1579 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get signer's certificates successfully.\r
1580\r
1581**/\r
1582EFI_STATUS\r
1583GetCertsFromDb (\r
1584 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1585 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1586 OUT UINT8 **CertData,\r
1587 OUT UINT32 *CertDataSize\r
1588 )\r
1589{\r
1590 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1591 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1592 UINT8 *Data;\r
1593 UINTN DataSize;\r
1594 UINT32 CertOffset;\r
1595\r
1596 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) || (CertDataSize == NULL)) {\r
1597 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1598 }\r
1599 \r
1600 //\r
1601 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1602 //\r
1603 Status = FindVariable (\r
1604 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1605 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1606 &CertDbVariable,\r
1607 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1608 FALSE\r
1609 ); \r
1610 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1611 return Status;\r
1612 }\r
1613\r
1614 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1615 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1616 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1617 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1618 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1619 }\r
1620\r
1621 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1622 VariableName,\r
1623 VendorGuid,\r
1624 Data,\r
1625 DataSize,\r
1626 &CertOffset,\r
1627 CertDataSize,\r
1628 NULL,\r
1629 NULL\r
1630 );\r
1631\r
1632 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1633 return Status;\r
1634 }\r
1635\r
1636 *CertData = Data + CertOffset;\r
1637 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1638}\r
1639\r
1640/**\r
1641 Delete matching signer's certificates when deleting common authenticated\r
1642 variable by corresponding VariableName and VendorGuid from "certdb".\r
1643\r
1644 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1645 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1646\r
1647 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1648 @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Fail to find "certdb" or matching certs.\r
1649 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
1650 @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is completed successfully.\r
1651\r
1652**/\r
1653EFI_STATUS\r
1654DeleteCertsFromDb (\r
1655 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1656 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid\r
1657 )\r
1658{\r
1659 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1660 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1661 UINT8 *Data;\r
1662 UINTN DataSize;\r
1663 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
1664 UINT32 CertNodeOffset;\r
1665 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
1666 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
1667 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
1668\r
1669 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {\r
1670 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1671 }\r
1672 \r
1673 //\r
1674 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1675 //\r
1676 Status = FindVariable (\r
1677 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1678 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1679 &CertDbVariable,\r
1680 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1681 FALSE\r
1682 ); \r
1683 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1684 return Status;\r
1685 }\r
1686\r
1687 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1688 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1689 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1690 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1691 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1692 }\r
1693\r
1694 if (DataSize == sizeof (UINT32)) {\r
1695 //\r
1696 // There is no certs in certdb.\r
1697 //\r
1698 return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
1699 }\r
1700\r
1701 //\r
1702 // Get corresponding cert node from certdb.\r
1703 //\r
1704 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1705 VariableName,\r
1706 VendorGuid,\r
1707 Data,\r
1708 DataSize,\r
1709 NULL,\r
1710 NULL,\r
1711 &CertNodeOffset,\r
1712 &CertNodeSize\r
1713 );\r
1714\r
1715 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1716 return Status;\r
1717 }\r
1718\r
1719 if (DataSize < (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1720 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1721 }\r
1722\r
1723 //\r
1724 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
1725 //\r
1726 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize - CertNodeSize;\r
f6e23353 1727 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
ed47ae02 1728\r
1729 //\r
1730 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r
1731 //\r
1732 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, CertNodeOffset);\r
1733 //\r
1734 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
1735 //\r
1736 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1737 //\r
1738 // Copy the DB entries after deleting node.\r
1739 //\r
1740 if (DataSize > (CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize)) {\r
1741 CopyMem (\r
1742 NewCertDb + CertNodeOffset,\r
1743 Data + CertNodeOffset + CertNodeSize,\r
1744 DataSize - CertNodeOffset - CertNodeSize\r
1745 );\r
1746 }\r
1747\r
1748 //\r
1749 // Set "certdb".\r
1750 // \r
1751 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; \r
1752 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1753 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1754 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1755 NewCertDb,\r
1756 NewCertDbSize,\r
1757 VarAttr,\r
1758 0,\r
1759 0,\r
1760 &CertDbVariable,\r
1761 NULL\r
1762 );\r
1763\r
ed47ae02 1764 return Status;\r
1765}\r
1766\r
1767/**\r
1768 Insert signer's certificates for common authenticated variable with VariableName\r
1769 and VendorGuid in AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA to "certdb".\r
1770\r
1771 @param[in] VariableName Name of authenticated Variable.\r
1772 @param[in] VendorGuid Vendor GUID of authenticated Variable.\r
1773 @param[in] CertData Pointer to signer's certificates.\r
1774 @param[in] CertDataSize Length of CertData in bytes.\r
1775\r
1776 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Any input parameter is invalid.\r
1777 @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED An AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry with same VariableName\r
1778 and VendorGuid already exists.\r
1779 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
1780 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Insert an AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA entry to "certdb"\r
1781\r
1782**/\r
1783EFI_STATUS\r
1784InsertCertsToDb (\r
1785 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1786 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1787 IN UINT8 *CertData,\r
1788 IN UINTN CertDataSize\r
1789 )\r
1790{\r
1791 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK CertDbVariable;\r
1792 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1793 UINT8 *Data;\r
1794 UINTN DataSize;\r
1795 UINT32 VarAttr;\r
1796 UINT8 *NewCertDb;\r
1797 UINT32 NewCertDbSize;\r
1798 UINT32 CertNodeSize;\r
1799 UINT32 NameSize;\r
1800 AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *Ptr;\r
1801\r
1802 if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL)) {\r
1803 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
1804 }\r
1805 \r
1806 //\r
1807 // Get variable "certdb".\r
1808 //\r
1809 Status = FindVariable (\r
1810 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1811 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1812 &CertDbVariable,\r
1813 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
1814 FALSE\r
1815 ); \r
1816 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1817 return Status;\r
1818 }\r
1819\r
1820 DataSize = DataSizeOfVariable (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1821 Data = GetVariableDataPtr (CertDbVariable.CurrPtr);\r
1822 if ((DataSize == 0) || (Data == NULL)) {\r
1823 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1824 return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
1825 }\r
1826\r
1827 //\r
1828 // Find whether matching cert node already exists in "certdb".\r
1829 // If yes return error.\r
1830 //\r
1831 Status = FindCertsFromDb (\r
1832 VariableName,\r
1833 VendorGuid,\r
1834 Data,\r
1835 DataSize,\r
1836 NULL,\r
1837 NULL,\r
1838 NULL,\r
1839 NULL\r
1840 );\r
1841\r
1842 if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
1843 ASSERT (FALSE);\r
1844 return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
1845 }\r
1846\r
1847 //\r
1848 // Construct new data content of variable "certdb".\r
1849 //\r
1850 NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);\r
1851 CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16); \r
f6e23353 1852 NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize;\r
1853 if (NewCertDbSize > MAX_CERTDB_SIZE) {\r
ed47ae02 1854 return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
1855 }\r
f6e23353 1856 NewCertDb = (UINT8*) mCertDbStore;\r
ed47ae02 1857\r
1858 //\r
1859 // Copy the DB entries before deleting node.\r
1860 //\r
1861 CopyMem (NewCertDb, Data, DataSize);\r
1862 //\r
1863 // Update CertDbListSize.\r
1864 //\r
1865 CopyMem (NewCertDb, &NewCertDbSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1866 //\r
1867 // Construct new cert node.\r
1868 //\r
1869 Ptr = (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA *) (NewCertDb + DataSize);\r
1870 CopyGuid (&Ptr->VendorGuid, VendorGuid);\r
1871 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertNodeSize, &CertNodeSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1872 CopyMem (&Ptr->NameSize, &NameSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1873 CopyMem (&Ptr->CertDataSize, &CertDataSize, sizeof (UINT32));\r
1874 \r
1875 CopyMem (\r
1876 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA),\r
1877 VariableName,\r
1878 NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16)\r
1879 );\r
1880\r
1881 CopyMem (\r
1882 (UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16),\r
1883 CertData,\r
1884 CertDataSize\r
1885 );\r
1886 \r
1887 //\r
1888 // Set "certdb".\r
1889 // \r
1890 VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; \r
1891 Status = UpdateVariable (\r
1892 EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,\r
1893 &gEfiCertDbGuid,\r
1894 NewCertDb,\r
1895 NewCertDbSize,\r
1896 VarAttr,\r
1897 0,\r
1898 0,\r
1899 &CertDbVariable,\r
1900 NULL\r
1901 );\r
1902\r
ed47ae02 1903 return Status;\r
1904}\r
1905\r
0c18794e 1906/**\r
1907 Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set\r
1908\r
dc204d5a
JY		 1909 Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
1910 This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
1911 This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
1912 This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
1913 buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
1914\r
0c18794e 1915 @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
1916 @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
1917 @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
1918 @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
1919 data, this value contains the required size.\r
1920 @param[in] Variable The variable information which is used to keep track of variable usage.\r
1921 @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
785d84ea 1922 @param[in] AuthVarType Verify against PK, KEK database, private database or certificate in data payload.\r
0c18794e 1923 @param[out] VarDel Delete the variable or not.\r
1924\r
1925 @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
2d3fb919 1926 @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
1927 check carried out by the firmware.\r
0c18794e 1928 @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to process variable due to lack\r
1929 of resources.\r
1930 @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable pass validation successfully.\r
1931\r
1932**/\r
1933EFI_STATUS\r
1934VerifyTimeBasedPayload (\r
1935 IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
1936 IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
1937 IN VOID *Data,\r
1938 IN UINTN DataSize,\r
1939 IN VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK *Variable,\r
1940 IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
ed47ae02 1941 IN AUTHVAR_TYPE AuthVarType,\r
0c18794e 1942 OUT BOOLEAN *VarDel\r
1943 )\r
1944{\r
1945 UINT8 *RootCert;\r
1946 UINT8 *SigData;\r
2d3fb919 1947 UINT8 *PayloadPtr;\r
0c18794e 1948 UINTN RootCertSize;\r
1949 UINTN Index;\r
2d3fb919 1950 UINTN CertCount;\r
1951 UINTN PayloadSize;\r
0c18794e 1952 UINT32 Attr;\r
1953 UINT32 SigDataSize;\r
1954 UINT32 KekDataSize;\r
0c18794e 1955 BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r
1956 EFI_STATUS Status;\r
1957 EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
1958 EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
1959 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK KekVariable;\r
1960 EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *CertData;\r
1961 UINT8 *NewData;\r
1962 UINTN NewDataSize;\r
1963 VARIABLE_POINTER_TRACK PkVariable;\r
2d3fb919 1964 UINT8 *Buffer;\r
1965 UINTN Length;\r
ed47ae02 1966 UINT8 *SignerCerts;\r
1967 UINT8 *WrapSigData;\r
1968 UINTN CertStackSize;\r
1969 UINT8 *CertsInCertDb;\r
1970 UINT32 CertsSizeinDb;\r
0c18794e 1971\r
0c18794e 1972 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
1973 CertData = NULL;\r
1974 NewData = NULL;\r
1975 Attr = Attributes;\r
ed47ae02 1976 WrapSigData = NULL;\r
1977 SignerCerts = NULL;\r
1978 RootCert = NULL;\r
0c18794e 1979\r
1980 //\r
2d3fb919 1981 // When the attribute EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS is\r
0c18794e 1982 // set, then the Data buffer shall begin with an instance of a complete (and serialized)\r
2d3fb919 1983 // EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. The descriptor shall be followed by the new\r
1984 // variable value and DataSize shall reflect the combined size of the descriptor and the new\r
1985 // variable value. The authentication descriptor is not part of the variable data and is not\r
0c18794e 1986 // returned by subsequent calls to GetVariable().\r
1987 //\r
1988 CertData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data;\r
2d3fb919 1989\r
1990 //\r
1991 // Verify that Pad1, Nanosecond, TimeZone, Daylight and Pad2 components of the\r
1992 // TimeStamp value are set to zero.\r
1993 //\r
1994 if ((CertData->TimeStamp.Pad1 != 0) ||\r
1995 (CertData->TimeStamp.Nanosecond != 0) ||\r
1996 (CertData->TimeStamp.TimeZone != 0) ||\r
1997 (CertData->TimeStamp.Daylight != 0) ||\r
1998 (CertData->TimeStamp.Pad2 != 0)) {\r
2e24814a 1999 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2d3fb919 2000 }\r
2001\r
0c18794e 2002 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
2003 if (CompareTimeStamp (&CertData->TimeStamp, &Variable->CurrPtr->TimeStamp)) {\r
2004 //\r
2005 // TimeStamp check fail, suspicious replay attack, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
2006 //\r
2007 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2008 }\r
2009 }\r
2010\r
2011 //\r
2012 // wCertificateType should be WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID.\r
2013 // Cert type should be EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID.\r
2014 //\r
2015 if ((CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) ||\r
2d3fb919 2016 !CompareGuid (&CertData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r
0c18794e 2017 //\r
2018 // Invalid AuthInfo type, return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.\r
2019 //\r
2020 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2021 }\r
2d3fb919 2022\r
0c18794e 2023 //\r
2024 // Find out Pkcs7 SignedData which follows the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.\r
2025 // AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength is the length of the entire certificate, including the length of the header.\r
2026 //\r
2d3fb919 2027 SigData = CertData->AuthInfo.CertData;\r
2028 SigDataSize = CertData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength - (UINT32) (OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData));\r
648f98d1 2029\r
0c18794e 2030 //\r
2031 // Find out the new data payload which follows Pkcs7 SignedData directly.\r
2032 //\r
2d3fb919 2033 PayloadPtr = SigData + SigDataSize;\r
2034 PayloadSize = DataSize - OFFSET_OF_AUTHINFO2_CERT_DATA - (UINTN) SigDataSize;\r
0c18794e 2035\r
2036 //\r
2037 // Construct a buffer to fill with (VariableName, VendorGuid, Attributes, TimeStamp, Data).\r
2038 //\r
2d3fb919 2039 NewDataSize = PayloadSize + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + sizeof (UINT32) +\r
2040 sizeof (EFI_GUID) + StrSize (VariableName) - sizeof (CHAR16);\r
2041 NewData = mSerializationRuntimeBuffer;\r
0c18794e 2042\r
2d3fb919 2043 Buffer = NewData;\r
2044 Length = StrLen (VariableName) * sizeof (CHAR16);\r
2045 CopyMem (Buffer, VariableName, Length);\r
2046 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 2047\r
2d3fb919 2048 Length = sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
2049 CopyMem (Buffer, VendorGuid, Length);\r
2050 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 2051\r
2d3fb919 2052 Length = sizeof (UINT32);\r
2053 CopyMem (Buffer, &Attr, Length);\r
2054 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 2055\r
2d3fb919 2056 Length = sizeof (EFI_TIME);\r
2057 CopyMem (Buffer, &CertData->TimeStamp, Length);\r
2058 Buffer += Length;\r
0c18794e 2059\r
2d3fb919 2060 CopyMem (Buffer, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
0c18794e 2061\r
ed47ae02 2062 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePk) {\r
0c18794e 2063 //\r
2064 // Get platform key from variable.\r
2065 //\r
2066 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 2067 EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
2068 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
2069 &PkVariable,\r
ecc722ad 2070 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
2071 FALSE\r
0c18794e 2072 );\r
2073 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2074 return Status;\r
2075 }\r
2076\r
2077 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (PkVariable.CurrPtr);\r
2078 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2079 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
4e33001c 2080 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
0c18794e 2081\r
2082\r
2083 //\r
2084 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2085 //\r
2086 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2087 SigData,\r
2088 SigDataSize,\r
2089 RootCert,\r
2090 RootCertSize,\r
2091 NewData,\r
2092 NewDataSize\r
2093 );\r
2094\r
ed47ae02 2095 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypeKek) {\r
2d3fb919 2096\r
0c18794e 2097 //\r
2098 // Get KEK database from variable.\r
2099 //\r
2100 Status = FindVariable (\r
2d3fb919 2101 EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,\r
2102 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
2103 &KekVariable,\r
ecc722ad 2104 &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,\r
2105 FALSE\r
0c18794e 2106 );\r
2107 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2108 return Status;\r
2109 }\r
2110\r
2111 //\r
2112 // Ready to verify Pkcs7 SignedData. Go through KEK Signature Database to find out X.509 CertList.\r
2d3fb919 2113 //\r
0c18794e 2114 KekDataSize = KekVariable.CurrPtr->DataSize;\r
2115 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) GetVariableDataPtr (KekVariable.CurrPtr);\r
2116 while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
2117 if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
2118 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2119 CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
2120 for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
2121 //\r
2122 // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify\r
2123 //\r
2124 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
4e33001c 2125 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
2d3fb919 2126\r
0c18794e 2127 //\r
2128 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2129 //\r
2130 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2131 SigData,\r
2132 SigDataSize,\r
2133 RootCert,\r
2134 RootCertSize,\r
2135 NewData,\r
2136 NewDataSize\r
2137 );\r
2138 if (VerifyStatus) {\r
2139 goto Exit;\r
2140 }\r
2141 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
2142 }\r
2143 }\r
2144 KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;\r
2145 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);\r
2146 }\r
ed47ae02 2147 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
2148\r
2149 //\r
2150 // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX.\r
2151 // Get signer's certificates from SignedData.\r
2152 //\r
2153 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (\r
2154 SigData,\r
2155 SigDataSize,\r
2156 &SignerCerts,\r
2157 &CertStackSize,\r
2158 &RootCert,\r
2159 &RootCertSize\r
2160 );\r
2161 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2162 goto Exit;\r
2163 }\r
2164\r
2165 //\r
2166 // Get previously stored signer's certificates from certdb for existing\r
2167 // variable. Check whether they are identical with signer's certificates\r
2168 // in SignedData. If not, return error immediately.\r
2169 //\r
2170 if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL)) {\r
2171 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2172\r
2173 Status = GetCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, &CertsInCertDb, &CertsSizeinDb);\r
2174 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2175 goto Exit;\r
2176 }\r
2177 \r
2178 if ((CertStackSize != CertsSizeinDb) ||\r
2179 (CompareMem (SignerCerts, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0)) {\r
2180 goto Exit;\r
2181 }\r
2182 }\r
2183\r
2184 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2185 SigData,\r
2186 SigDataSize,\r
2187 RootCert,\r
2188 RootCertSize,\r
2189 NewData,\r
2190 NewDataSize\r
2191 );\r
2192 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2193 goto Exit;\r
2194 }\r
2195\r
2196 //\r
2197 // Delete signer's certificates when delete the common authenticated variable.\r
2198 //\r
275beb2b 2199 if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) == 0)) {\r
ed47ae02 2200 Status = DeleteCertsFromDb (VariableName, VendorGuid);\r
2201 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2202 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2203 goto Exit;\r
2204 }\r
275beb2b 2205 } else if (Variable->CurrPtr == NULL && PayloadSize != 0) {\r
ed47ae02 2206 //\r
2207 // Insert signer's certificates when adding a new common authenticated variable.\r
2208 //\r
2209 Status = InsertCertsToDb (VariableName, VendorGuid, SignerCerts, CertStackSize);\r
2210 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2211 VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
2212 goto Exit;\r
2213 }\r
2214 }\r
785d84ea 2215 } else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePayload) {\r
2216 CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) PayloadPtr;\r
2217 Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
2218 RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
2219 RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1);\r
2220 \r
2221 // Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.\r
2222 //\r
2223 VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (\r
2224 SigData,\r
2225 SigDataSize,\r
2226 RootCert,\r
2227 RootCertSize,\r
2228 NewData,\r
2229 NewDataSize\r
2230 );\r
ed47ae02 2231 } else {\r
2232 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
0c18794e 2233 }\r
2234\r
2235Exit:\r
2236\r
ed47ae02 2237 if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {\r
2238 Pkcs7FreeSigners (RootCert);\r
2239 Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCerts);\r
2240 }\r
2241\r
0c18794e 2242 if (!VerifyStatus) {\r
2243 return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
2244 }\r
2245\r
d912bad7 2246 Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, PayloadPtr, PayloadSize);\r
2247 if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
2248 return Status;\r
2249 }\r
2250\r
2d3fb919 2251 if ((PayloadSize == 0) && (VarDel != NULL)) {\r
0c18794e 2252 *VarDel = TRUE;\r
2253 }\r
2d3fb919 2254\r
0c18794e 2255 //\r
2256 // Final step: Update/Append Variable if it pass Pkcs7Verify\r
2257 //\r
ed47ae02 2258 return UpdateVariable (\r
2259 VariableName,\r
2260 VendorGuid,\r
2261 PayloadPtr,\r
2262 PayloadSize,\r
2263 Attributes,\r
2264 0,\r
2265 0,\r
2266 Variable,\r
2267 &CertData->TimeStamp\r
2268 );\r
0c18794e 2269}\r
ed47ae02 2270\r
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